The US Navy and the Pivot: Less Means Less ( Copy right @ The Diplomat, original article by William Kyle)

USS Arleigh Burke (Image Courtesy- Wikimedia Commons and the United States Navy)

Five years of Obama administration foreign policy are in the history books as the world continues to move beyond the era of the Global War on Terror. While the jury is still out regarding the ultimate impact of his post-GWOT redirection of American foreign policy, U.S. President Barack Obama’s initiatives since 2011 have clearly been designed to steer American policy in a profoundly Pacific direction. This shift has direct consequences for the U. S. Navy in the so-called “Pacific Century.”

In fact, this new direction leaves the U.S. Navy in the unenviable position of being at the vanguard of a “Pacific Pivot” while facing potentially dramatic reductions in force structure and modernization budgets. However, it is not clear that the Pacific “pivot” strategy actually requires a dramatic, Cold War-like increase in American naval presence for success—rather, it may be enough for the U.S. Navy to implement its own structural pivot to better match American foreign policy goals with resources.

In the wake of the GWOT and 2008 financial crisis, many assessments predicted the end of America’s “unipolar moment,” spurring the Obama administration to announce a new foreign policy direction in 2011. Fighting popular perceptions of previous regional neglect, Obama stressed that the United States was permanently turning its principal attention towards Asia. In November 2011, this new Asia policy directive got its own catchphrase when then-Secretary of State Hilary Clinton published an article in Foreign Policy magazine titled “America’s Pacific Century,” emphasizing both the current and future importance of Asia and America’s desired role in the region. Thus was born the American “pivot” to the Pacific.

More than two years after Clinton first outlined that broad policy, there are many indicators that the strategy is more than just another step in a U.S.-China arms race. Since announcing the pivot, emphasis has been placed on involvement in regional multilateralism and economic integration through pursuit of initiatives such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership regional free trade agreement, accession to the East Asia Summit, and establishment of a permanent mission to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The administration continues to play up regional involvement to convey the message that the United States intends to remain an integral Pacific power. Although security policy does constitute a key component of the unfolding, multifaceted Pacific strategy, the very limited security initiatives implemented or proposed to date do not appear to be the policy centerpiece. In reality, the “pivot” is (thus far) more of a rhetorical statement of American interest in the preservation of the American-led status quo, backed up with regional initiatives that do not require or include a significant redistribution of hard power assets. Even so, this new emphasis on the Pacific theater has significant repercussions for the U.S. Navy, in an era of diminishing resources and unpropitious regional trends.

The security aspect of the strategic pivot ostensibly seeks to enhance the United States’ military presence in the region in the coming “Asian century.” Highly publicized steps such as the stationing of 2,500 U.S. Marines in Darwin, Australia and Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) in Singapore thrust this aspect of the pivot into the public eye. The strategic impetus behind these largely symbolic force re-deployments has been the subject of much debate. While the Obama administration has tried to emphasize that China’s military growth is not driving the American pivot strategy, many analysts and scholars see things differently. Advocates from the “realist” camp of foreign policy experts often focus on China’s growing military capabilities. For example scholars Andrew Erickson and Adam Liff offer analyses such as this:

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) increasingly has the resources, capabilities, and confidence to attempt to assert China’s interests on its contested periphery, particularly in the Near Seas (Yellow, East, and South China Seas). This development has the potential to seriously challenge the interests of the U.S., its allies, and other partners in the region, as well as access to and security of a vital portion of the global commons—waters and airspace that all nations rely on for prosperity, yet which none own. That’s why the PLA’s development matters so much to a Washington located halfway around the world.

Key policy documents such as the Pentagon’s “Sustaining US Global Leadership – Priorities for 21st Century Defense” and the “Joint Operational Access Concept” aim squarely at China’s anti-access/area denial military strategy and further bolster the argument that the pivot is a function of growing American insecurity at China’s military rise.

While China has been critical of America’s new Pacific military posturing, the Obama administration has focused much effort in the diplomatic and economic arenas as a means to alleviate the growing strategic distrust between America and the PRC. Secretary of State John Kerry has followed in former Secretary Clinton’s footsteps with a high level of personal engagement, while both America and China have invested substantial resources in more than 60 issues-based and regional dialogues. Even the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship, traditionally the weakest component of the bilateral relationship, hasimproved substantially under Xi Jinping’s leadership. While strategic insecurity stemming from China’s military expansion certainly is a major factor behind the strategic pivot, the Obama administration has not yet adopted hard power as the primary instrument to counter Chinese revisionism in the Asia-Pacific of the 21st century.

On the surface, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert appeared to initiate a major “pivot” in U.S. naval power, increasing the Pacific allocation of naval ships and aircraft from fifty to sixty percent of the navy’s total force while fielding new capabilities focused on Asia-Pacific challenges. This appears to be consistent with other U.S. Navy rebalancing endeavors such as accessing new Pacific bases, expanding joint exercises and arms sales, and debating new doctrine (such as the controversial Air-Sea Battle). However, the increasingly unfavorable budgetary environment may ultimately render the rebalanced force in the Pacific a paper tiger. For example, Greenert’s sixty percent force reallocation means little as his vision of a 306-ship navy crashes upon the rocks of sequestration. Constrained budgets, rather than a Pacific surge, are dictating force reductions that may undermine regional trust in America’s continued leadership. More interestingly, in calling for a more muscular Pacific posture, the Navy may actually be out of sync with more balanced Obama administration policy. Even as the Navy attempts to pursue more robust Pacific capabilities, Obama administration budget cuts may result in a Navy that is too under-resourced to ensure sufficient American control of the seas in the event of an Asian Pacific conflict.

While previous ideas and initiatives, such as Admiral Mike Mullen’s “thousand-ship navy” and “offshore balancing,” have been proposed as a means to sustain regional influence, the continued reliance of the traditional “hub-and-spokes” Pacific alliance system with the U.S. Navy serving as security guarantor indicate a lack of progress in implementing any new strategic concept. For example, ongoing attempts to regain military access to the Philippines is a continuation of previous Cold War era policy, which now risks stretching dwindling U.S. Navy assets instead of encouraging Manila to contribute more to collective regional security. Other relatively modest efforts to bolster the capabilities of regional allies (such as the recent joint-Japanese and American joint program to develop a new littoral combat ship), also feature in the American pivot. However, outstanding issues such as the severe restrictions the pacifist post-World War II Japanese constitution places upon its military, and Japan’s dismal relations with South Korea (another staunch “spoke” ally of America), further underline the need for an updated American approach to regional security. Pursuit of a more cooperative relationship with regional allies via equitable burden-sharing security arrangements is most likely the best way forward, as America’s shrinking military footprint may prove insufficient to hold a U.S.-friendly coalition together in the future.

Regional experts have highlighted the potential risk of antagonizing Beijing while cutting defense budgets and engaging only in soft rebalancing as a hedge against China’s military rise. This risk of making an enemy out of an increasingly capable great power, while presenting only a modest deterrent, represents a potential recipe for disaster for American credibility and national interests. The apparent gap between the forces that the current U.S. maritime strategy would require in the increasingly militarized Pacific of the 21st century and the fading likelihood sufficient resources will be readily available reveal a dangerous disconnect between resources and expectations.

Rather than expend scarce resources trying to maintain uncontested sea dominance, the Navy may be better advised to strengthen its East Asian spokes rather than the hub under the current policy direction. As the United States prioritizes diplomatic and economic initiatives to enhance its integration in the Asia Pacific while downsizing its military, the U.S. Navy will face a diminishing pool of assets to maintain regional military hegemony even as China grows increasingly capable. As the gap between goals and resources allotted to American forces in the Pacific grows increasingly irreconcilable, perhaps another pivot, this time of American maritime strategy, is in order.

William Kyle is an imagery analyst covering military issues in Asia. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense.

Weapons Development- Where does India stand?

INS Arihant ( Pic Courtesy-Wikimedia Commons and DRDO)

India as far as the development of weapons are concerned is still at a nascent stage. Now when you compare the development of high end weapon system, naturally the comparison falls between India and China. But in all the articles that is circulated in the net that one reads, when ever these comparisons take place, India is castigated for the shoddy development cycle of weapon platforms while it is always stated that China is miles ahead of us. To a certain extent, it may be true. But are we so bad is the real question? 

On a closer look, India has been in recent years making strides in the development of world class 

LCA Tejas ( Pic courtesy- Wikimedia Commons and Author)

weapons platforms. India has a robust missile development program that has seen the development of a whole family of new generation missiles. The same is the case with other platforms including the LCA "Tejas", ships like the Shivalik class frigates and Kolkata class destroyers. But what is lagging is the significant time that takes from the gestation of a project to the induction of the weapons platforms into active services. The main complaint that is always put forward against the way India handles the development of a project is the delay in the development of a weapons system. The case in point is the "Arjun Main Battle tank" project. Conceived in the late 1970's as a replacement to a whole generation of MBT's of Russian origin, Arjun achieved fruitfulness only by early 2000's after nearly three decades of development. But by this time, a whole new generation of tanks are in the making in other parts of the world. But to be fair on DRDO, it has to be stated that the weapon systems that it develops are world class. The point has been proved from time and again by Arjun tank that beat the rival MBT- T90 of Russian origin with almost comparable specifications fair and square. Arjun is now stated to be one of the best of it's class of Main Battle tanks in the world. But this result came after 30 long years of development and by this time, we are already talking about the development of next generation tanks. 

The same is the case with LCA "Tejas" combat plane project. Tejas is not the first project of development of a combat aircraft undertaken by India. In fact that honour goes to HF-24 "Marut". But that project never realized it's fullest potential. The Tejas was conceived. It was designed to be a forth generation aircraft. But it got it's initial operation clearance only in 2014 and will enter active squadron service with the Indian Airforce only by 2015. It 's real potential will come when Mark-II enter trials and production by 2017. But by this time, the Chinese would have started inducing their 5'th gen aircrafts, the J-20 and J-31 that is currently in test. India's indigenous  5'th generation project, The Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) is still in design stages and no known road map for induction to services is in place. It is estimated that AMCA will enter services sometime in the next decade. But by this time, countries around the world would be busy developing 6'th generation aircrafts. 

MAIN PROBLEM WITH INDIA

The main problem that India faces is not the strictest adherence to the time table for development of a defence project. Targets are missed on a regular basis on almost all the projects. Now I do concede that defence projects are very complicated in nature, the case of the development of American development of the F-35 project that is running behind schedule with several teething problems still unresolved. But what India requires is a professional approach to product management. Targets has to be met at all costs. This is because the defence technology is prone to sudden changes and rapid development of technology which can make  a platform redundant as compared to other platforms around the world if there is a significant delay. But everything is not bleak as far as India is concerned. Tejas that will soon enter squadron services will remain relevant for many decades , thanks to the high usage of composite materials that reduces Radar Cross Section (RCS) that makes the aircraft less visible to radars. It incorporates several 5'th gen traits. Tejas is a product and a solution to a problem that is faced by us. We hold the patent and the design and we can innovate and develop on the product as and when we require without the getting into the cobweb of licences, We do not need anybody's permission to develop our own products. Unlike several other countries that can copy any products as and how they feel, India having a robust legal system with international agreements will always be handicapped and will need to rely on international vendors until we develop our own technology. Projects like the Arjun MBT, LCA Tejas, Shivalik frigates has enabled India to create a whole ecosystem on which we can develop further and make newer products. When each of our products reach completion, we can find that these platforms are proving to be world class, capable of standing with the best. But several unresolved issued need to be nailed out before India becomes a hub of development of world class weapon systems. It is futile to compare India with China as the doctrine followed by both are entirely different. While India concentrates on high end technologies but fewer platforms, China on the other hand always aim for numerical superiority and will beat India fair and square at a ratio to 5:1. But India compensates these with high end technologies. But no China is also developing world class technologies, it is only a matter of time before both come face to face and become competitors in the world  of weapons development. 

THE BUSINESS OF WEAPONS

In the end of the day, it makes good business sense to sell the product to other countries as any country will need a return for it's high end investments. India is uniquely placed because a platform like Tejas will be in great demand with all those countries in Africa and Latin America who will be phasing out the Russian vintage products like the MIG-21. Tejas fits the bill perfectly. Their only competition of comparable configuration will be the Chinese CAC- FC1 Xiaolong ( also known as JF-17 with the Pakistani Airforce). But both countries are world's apart in comparison of technology with Tejas employing high end composites and avionics that is comparable to the best in the world. 

It is high time India put it's act together and start developing weapon systems indigenously rather than rely on a foreign country. India has all the ecosystems ready and it is only a matter of time before they are developed to world class standards comparable to the best in the world. That is the need of the hour and we as Indians has to rise to the occasion. Time is not far when we will see India becoming a leading country in the development of weapon systems and a power to reckoned  with in the world of arms. as an Indian,that day will be the proudest movement in my life.

(Disclaimer- The above article was written with resources available  in public domain. But as is with sensitive military technology, due care is taken about the accuracy. But readers discretion is advised- JAI HIND) 

May their soul rest in peace

Image courtesy- Wikimedia commons

                                                  

Today, five brave air warriors lost their live when an Indian Air force crashed. Our thoughts and prayers will be

with their families. They answered the call of duty and made the ultimate sacrifice. May their soul rest in peace.

Indian Home Grown AMCA and alternative to FGFA ( Copy Right @ AIN Online)

Image Courtesy- Wikimedia Commons

Despite being involved in the fifth-generation fighter aircraft (FGFA) joint program with Russia, India is developing a next-generation fighter of its own–the advanced multirole combat aircraft (AMCA).

The Indian defense ministry’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) showed a large-scale model of the AMCA at Aero India 2013 in February, in Bengaluru. The aerodynamic shape has been considerably refined in comparison to an earlier model exhibited at Aero India 2011, and even more so when compared to a model for wind-tunnel testing shown at Aero India 2009, at which time it was “MCA” without being “Advanced.” This provides evidence that AMCA is being developed in parallel with FGFA. DRDO’s Aeronautical Development Establishment is leading the AMCA program.

Addressing the next-generation fighter issue, Air Marshall Norman Anil Kumar Browne, the Indian air force chief of staff, declined to compare the AMCA and FGFA, but insisted that “homegrown” projects shall be continued, especially in the area of mission equipment and fighter engines, since “nobody will give us these technologies.”

Browne also spoke in support of the light combat aircraft “Tejas,” despite the continuing slow progress of this indigenous fighter project, which has been delayed by some 20 years. He said the Tejas would attain initial operational clearance (IOC) at the end of this year and would be through final operational clearance in 2015, with the rider that the air force does not expect this airplane to fully meet specification until the advent of the Tejas Mk.2, with its entry-into-service planned for 2024.

The AMCA is likely to be powered by the Kaveri motor, also developed in-country. This engine had been conceived for the Tejas, but ran slower than expected and was eventually “detached” from the airframe effort. Instead, experimental and series production Tejas aircraft received the General Electric F404 turbine engine and later will get the more advanced F414.

The very fact that India continues with the AMCA is an indication that New Delhi has some concerns about the FGFA. Browne hinted that because of India’s late decision to join the Russian project, the FGFA is difficult to arrange as a 50/50 program, as the baseline airframe is too advanced for that. There are also some other fears, such as maturity of the Russian technology in certain spheres. In particular, the prototypes constructed so far feature extensive use of metal in their airframes, reflecting the gaps and shortcomings in the modern composite technology available to Sukhoi. At the same time, the homegrown Tejas has a 43-percent share of composites in its airframe.

Official information on the AMCA at Aero India 2013 was limited to a one-page leaflet with three views and key marketing terms, such as net-centric warfare, vehicle management (including weapons), data fusion, decision aids, integrated modular avionics, internal carriage of weapons, signature control with sharpening for low observability, AESA radar, IRsearch-and-track, supersonic persistence, high-speed weapon release and thrust vectoring. It was stated that the aircraft would be able to “swing roles” variously between long/short-range and air-to-air/ground strike.

According to press reports, scientist Dr. A.K. Ghosh heads the AMCA development effort. Some observers have suggested that, unlike the FGFA, the AMCA’s primary role will be ground attack, and so it will be a direct replacement to the MiG-27M and the Jaguar. Also, there are reports about a “revolutionary” pilot station employing a panoramic active-matrix display (or displays) with touch-screen interface and voice commands, and a helmet-mounted sight replacing, rather than supplementing, a head-up display.

The AMCA is likely to be an “electronically” actuated airplane rather than hydraulically operated. Instead of the digital flight-control computer, as used on the Tejas, the AMCA is to have a distributed processing system employing fast processors and smart subsystems that can pass over and combine the processing power available in them. This requires the employment of the IEEE-1394B-STD rather than MIL-STD-1553B databus standard. The new airplane is also planned to have a “central computational system connected internally and externally on an optic-fiber channel by means of a multiport connectivity switching modules.” Also mentioned are fly-by-light, electro-optic architecture with fiberoptic links for signal and data communications.

Congress promises all on defence front but did little over last decade ( Copy Right @ Times of India)

Image courtesy- Wikipedia Commons

From "continued and rapid" modernisation of the armed forces to a strong indigenous defence industrial base (DIB), from a national commission for ex-servicemen to credible deterrence and second-strike capability, Congress promised all on the military front in its manifesto released on Wednesday. 

"India's security preparedness will be based on a comprehensive security doctrine that combines conventional and strategic measures... The Congress pledges to make India's defence forces technology-enabled and equipped with modern weapons, aircraft, ships and delivery systems to repel any threat from land, sea or air," it said. 

Experts, however, were left unimpressed. "There were no systemic reforms either to build a strong DIB, genuinely integrate the Service headquarters with the defence ministry or reform the cumbersome arms procurement procedures over the last 10 years of UPA rule," said a senior Army officer. Yes, the almost 14-lakh strong armed forces did undergo modernisation, but in an extremely muddled manner with no clear long-term policy to systematically build military capabilities. 

Consequently, despite India becoming the world's largest arms importer, the armed forces still have huge operational shortages in fighter jets, submarines, howitzers, helicopters, night-fighting equipment, air defence weapons and the like. The manifesto said it was "imperative to encourage indigenous manufacturing in every way". But the UPA government precisely failed to do just that. Neither could it ensure DRDO and its 50 establishments, five defence PSUs, four shipyards and 39 ordnance factories delivered the goods, not was the private sector encouraged to jump into the defence production sector in a major way. While the combat edge against Pakistan has eroded to a certain extent, China has assiduously expanded its huge military advantage against India, both in the conventional as well as nuclear arenas. 

"The budgeted defence expenditure should be hiked to at least 2.5% of the GDP, instead of letting it remain below 2%, to ensure adequate modernization and requisite deterrence against both China and Pakistan," said another officer. Some even said the Congress was now proposing the national commission for ex-servicemen while its government had opposed it in court in 2011. The last decade, in fact, saw the civil-military divide widen, with one military chief dragging the government to court, another resigning, and ex-servicemen continuously attacking the government for disregarding their genuine demands. It was only recently, before the model code of conduct kicked in, that the government finally agreed to the long-demanded one-rank, one-pension principle.

How Russia Could Strangle The US Space Program Over Sanctions ( Copy Right @ The Global Post)

Image Courtesy- Wikimedia commons and Pete Souza

 Think Russia has no way to put pressure on the United States? Think again.

The US relies heavily on Russia to furnish the engines that power rockets that deliver both military and civil payloads into space.

This includes GPS systems in cars and cellphones, and even systems that allow ATMs to function. Weather satellites are launched into space via Russian-powered rockets, and military systems such as early missile detection also depend on our friends in Moscow.

In addition, since NASA scrapped the space shuttle program in 2011, the US has to rely on Russian Soyuz capsules to get its astronauts to the space station and to bring them back home.

As the crisis over Crimea deepens and tit-for-tat sanctions go into effect, conventional wisdom has held that the US is holding all the cards. Given the relatively small amount of trade the US conducts with Russia each year, and its pre-eminent position as the world’s largest economy, Washington has projected confidence as it moves to isolate Moscow diplomatically and economically.

But Russia is unlikely to take it lying down. As Stephen Walt, professor of international affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, warned in a talk at Harvard recently, “They have ways of responding [to sanctions] that … we’re not going to like.”

One of the things Americans may dislike very much indeed is a possible ban on the sale of RD-180 engines to the US under a contract with Russian manufacturer NPO Energomash.

The RD-180 powers the Atlas V rocket, the main launch vehicle used to get US military and civil payloads into space.

“The Russian rocket engines are the best in the world,” said Royce Dalby, a space systems expert and managing director of Avascent, an aerospace and defense consulting firm in Washington, DC. “RD-180 provides the most efficient and least expensive means of getting our national security payloads into space.”

The dollar amounts are not great, relatively speaking: While the actual price paid for the engines is proprietary, experts estimate the cost from $11 million to $15 million per engine.

In an average year the US launches eight or nine satellites with the Atlas V.

But it gives the Russians a virtual stranglehold on the US space program, including systems vital for national security.

Over the next 24 months, according to Dalby, the Atlas V will be used to launch four classified spy satellites for the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), one unclassified imagery satellite, two weather satellites, four GPS satellites, three military communications satellites, two classified payloads for the Air Force and one NASA science satellite.

“[Losing the RD-180] would be a blow to our national security,” said John Logsdon, the founder and long-time director of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University. “The Atlas V is the primary vehicle we use to launch military and civil pay loads into space.”

The question of US dependence on Russian rockets has begun to worry the defense establishment as well.

Testifying at a budget hearing of the House Appropriations Committee in mid-March, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel indicated that the Pentagon was concerned about the RD-180 issue.

When asked by an Alabama congressman whether the crisis in Ukraine would prompt the Defense Department to move ahead with additional funding to develop domestic capabilities to manufacture rocket engines, Hagel responded that it certainly would.

“You’re obviously referring to the relationship with the Russians on the rocket motors,” the defense secretary said. “Well, I think this is going to engage us in a review of that issue. I don’t think there’s any question about that.”

But developing a domestic capability will be a long and expensive process.

United Launch Alliance (ULA), the Lockheed Martin-Boeing joint venture that manufactures the Atlas V rocket, says it has the situation well in hand.

“Atlas V will continue to provide assured access to space for our nation’s national security satellites,” the Centennial, Colo.-based company said in a written reply to questions. “ULA maintains more than a two-year supply of RD-180 engines in the United States to minimize potential supply disruptions, and has developed significant engineering and manufacturing capability which ultimately demonstrated the capability to co-produce the RD-180 domestically.”

Company spokeswoman Jessica Rye, however, acknowledged that ULA does not at present have an alternative rocket engine in the pipeline.

“We have not pursued an alternative engine,” she said. “Any new engine development would be a four-to-five year process."

The history of US-Russian cooperation on space issues goes back to the chaotic 1990s, right after the collapse of the Soviet Union. With communism in retreat, US-backed companies and organizations poured billions into helping Russia get on its feet.

In science, especially space technology, Washington was intent on keeping Russian scientists peacefully engaged, to discourage them from selling their skills elsewhere.

Besides, there was world-class technology and know-how to pick up at bargain-basement prices.

“[The Russians] had accomplished a heck of a lot in space, and we knew we could learn from their capabilities,” said Dalby, who himself worked in Moscow in the 1990s.

But times change, and the heady promise of friendship and cooperation gave way to a frostier relationship once Vladimir Putin came to power on New Year’s Day, 2000.

Russia has threatened to pull the plug on the RD-180 before.

Last August, when President Barack Obama was contemplating military action against Syria over the use of chemical weapons, Russian media reported that the government was considering a halt in the RD-180 program.

According to Dalby, this produced a near panic in the space industry.

There may be alternatives on the horizon. Elon Musk, head of SpaceX, a company looking to unseat ULA as the Air Force’s go-to rocket builder, testified before Congress in mid-March.

“In light of Russia’s de facto annexation of the Ukraine’s Crimea region and the formal severing of military ties, the Atlas V cannot possibly be described as providing ‘assured access to space‘ for our nation when supply of the main engine depends on President Putin’s permission,” Musk told the committee.

Instead, he proposed his Falcon rockets, which he said could provide high reliability at a much lower cost.

But the Falcon would not be able to do the job without extensive, and expensive, tweaking, Dalby says.

“The Falcon rocket is smaller and can’t loft most of the military payloads that the Atlas tackles,” Dalby said. “Also, satellites are designed to fly on certain rockets from the outset, and it would take years to reconfigure, if it would even be possible.”

According to George Washington University’s Logsdon, the Delta IV engine, which is produced entirely in the US, could step in, but it might have to be adjusted a bit for the task.

There is also the possibility that Pratt & Whitney, which has a joint venture with NPO Energomash, could take over production. According to Logsdon, the US contractors have access to the blueprints for the engine.

“But there is a fair degree of art as well as science here,” he said. “The Russians are extremely experienced in advanced metallurgy and design. You cannot just snap your fingers and make it happen.”

Then there is the space station — the US pays the Russians over $400 million a year to transport US astronauts there and back.

“And for that there is no alternative,” Logsdon said.

So for now the US is in a delicate balancing act — trying to combine strong censure of the Kremlin’s behavior with a cooperative relationship with Russia on space.

“For the record I still think cooperation with Russia is a good idea,” Dalby said. “The International Space Station program, especially, has been a tremendous platform for building trust and mutual understanding. Unfortunately, it can’t overshadow more terrestrial problems.”

This post originally appeared at GlobalPost. Copyright 2014. Follow GlobalPost on Twitter.

Read more: http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/united-states/140324/nasa-russia-sanctions-rocket-rd-180-atlas-v#ixzz2xAcAJh4L

Road Infrastructure Development in Gujarat 2012 (+playlist)

North Korea & Human Rights: Tolerating the Intolerable ( Copy Right @ The Diplomat, original article by Clint Work)

Image courtesy- Reuters/KCNA

The UN Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry report on the DPRK by the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) revealed in excruciating detail the horrors that are a regular part of the Kim Dynasty’s repressive rule. The systematic abuse of human rights by the regime is extensive, intensive, and appalling. Nevertheless, the report should not come as a surprise to those engaged with North Korea or, for that matter, anyone who is familiar with DPRK history. The report is also, as things currently stand, without consequence. The operative phrase here is “as things currently stand.” The report and others like it are crucial in terms of post-unification transitional justice, if and when unification comes on South Korean terms. Unfortunately, until then, the report and its recommendations are simply nonstarters. This is the case for several salient reasons.

First, in terms of taking Kim Jung-un and the perpetrators of these crimes to the ICC, China openly statedbefore the report was even released that it would not allow such a step. Because the DPRK is not a signatory to the Rome Statue, the ICC requires a referral from the UN Security Council in order to gain the jurisdiction necessary to prosecute the DPRK. China’s rhetorical (and real) veto stops the process before it begins. From Beijing’s perspective this is both consistent and reasonable. Second, even if Beijing permitted such a step and the ICC found the perpetrators guilty, it would have no impact on the leadership in Pyongyang, as it did not with Sudanese President Omar Bashir. Third, the recommendations in the report that are directed at the Kim regime are equally as fanciful. If followed, such reforms would bring about nothing short of the fundamental transformation of the regime. Again, much of the world may desire a wholesale reversal of the DPRK’s internal and external policies, but it is foolhardy to expect such a self-derived shift. Fourth, even the U.S. faces real difficulties in integrating human rights concerns in its denuclearization effort. Incorporating human rights would complicate already stalled Six-Party talks as well as prove counter-productive by aggravating China. This leaves us where we began, with a seemingly intolerable state of affairs that calls for something to be done, but with little in the way of realistic or practicable options. So, where to from here?

For the sake of argument let us explore the broad range of policy options: 1) complete isolation of the regime; 2) enhanced external pressure, culminating in full-scale military invasion, with the intent of bringing the regime down; 3) engagement on several levels. This set of policy options applies to several state and nonstate actors dealing with North Korea.

The first option, complete isolation of the Kim Dynasty, is not really an option at all. There are several explanations for this. First, larger states within the region including China and Russia will continue to engage the DPRK for a variety of reasons, from strategically driven economic engagement in fledgling Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to concern over the potential for massive instability caused by rapid and/or violent regime collapse. The latter is a central concern for Beijing, which goes a long way to explaining its reticence to pressure the DPRK and its willingness to help prop up the regime with sufficient trade and aid. Consistent with this, China-DPRK trade is up from last year, despite (or because of) concerns over the execution of Jang Song-thaek last December. Nor is the South Korean government amenable to the isolation of the North, manifest in its own involvement in the aforementioned economic projects, the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the historical unity of the Korean Peninsula, and the shared concern with Beijing over peninsular stability. Washington is also unlikely to leave the regime isolated over its concerns with the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs as well as its trade in illicit materials.

The second option involves greater external pressure, ranging from increased sanctions to full-scale invasion. This option, like complete isolation, is also not really an option. First, while China is undoubtedly concerned with the DPRK’s overly risk-accepting and aggressive behavior, it is far more concerned with preserving stability on the peninsula. Thus, Beijing has become less tolerant of Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile tests and has abstained from vetoing certain sanctions on the Security Council, yet it has simultaneously refrained from obstructing Chinese firms in Northeast China from increasing their commercial trade with the beleaguered regime. Furthermore, regarding human rights, Beijing wants to avoid being held accountable for its complicity in the Kim Dynasty’s crimes; namely its practice of forcibly returning defectors back across the Yalu. Add to this Beijing’s longstanding aversion to any discussion of human rights directed at its own internal abuses. Second, full-scale invasion, the most extreme form of pressure, is also patently absurd. Let us further test this idea.

The current situation as it stands with the DPRK is one without a military solution. Not only does the maxim “if you break it you own it” (as Paul Whitefield recently noted) apply, but a far a more obvious reason persists. That is, the DPRK has nuclear weapons. No revolution in military affairs is going to guarantee with absolute certainty that such weapons will be eliminated before North Korea could use them. Moreover, the U.S. itself, despite its heavily militarized orientation toward the North, has prevented the ROK from taking escalatory actions in response to what are normally considered acts of war. As Daniel Pinkston writes: “The U.S. political and military leaderships are unwilling to fight a full-scale war in Korea over the shooting down of an aircraft, the sinking of a ship, the insertion of KPA Special Forces for limited operations, or firing artillery on a fishing village.” Bruce Cuming’s describes the U.S. presence as dual deterrence or civil-war deterrence, meaning the simultaneous deterrence of North Korea from starting a conflagration and of South Korea from escalating it. What is more, nuclear weapons notwithstanding, even the DRPK’s conventional capabilities (though dated and far less advanced than U.S. and ROK arsenals) make very real Pyongyang’s threat to turn Seoul into “a sea of fire.” Though an all-out conflict would likely bring about the end of the DPRK as a sovereign state, it would very likely inflict immense damage on the South Korean capital, threaten Tokyo, and potentially bring about larger instability in the region before its demise. In sum, bringing the regime down through greater pressure is not possible, both because key regional powers will not allow it and the military option is untenable in any rational (and moral) calculation. The very real potential for even greater human suffering and destruction is simply too prohibitive a risk. This leaves the third option, engagement.

Engagement should not be interpreted as simply diplomatic engagement. Although diplomacy should not be entirely jettisoned, it appears that traditional diplomacy with the Kim Dynasty is of limited utility. The DPRK is not going to give up its nukes. Pyongyang saw what happened to Gadhafi when he gave up his program and to Saddam when he did not have one. The U.S. demand that the DPRK denuclearize is a nonstarter in Pyongyang for as long as the current regime is in power. Even Beijing’s recent mention of denuclearization as the goal will fall on deaf ears. In this sense, the Six Party Talks appear futile. However, this is not a reason to abandon them. If for no other reason, the talks are valuable insofar as they provide a framework within which interested parties address their shared and divergent perspectives. That said, we must broaden our conception of engagement – one more commensurate with just how extraordinary this situation is.

The DPRK is truly unlike any other state (in the words of the UN Panel of Experts, a state “that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world”). Although constantly referred to as a failed Stalinist state, even that moniker does not go far enough. As Andrei Lankov’s work clearly shows, the DPRK (from Great Leader Kim Il Sung, to Dear Leader Kim Jung Il, to Supreme Leader Kim Jung Un) successfully “out-Stalined” Stalin himself. The restrictions on personal movement, the Inminban (neighborhood watch) system, the hierarchical and entrenched Songbun class structure, and the ubiquitous organizational life within the DPRK all make for a world unrecognizable to most outsiders, from a Chinese communist in capitalist garb to a Western Liberal. And while these restrictions loosened in the 1990s due to internal economic breakdown and widespread famine, they continue to prove crucial for both the Kim Dynasty and its elite courtiers to retain their place atop the miserable North Korean masses.

This repressive structure is underpinned by a radical domestic ideology, characterized by some as a mix of Confucian and Marxist-Leninist thought, by others (such as B.R. Meyers) as an extremist right-wing, race-based worldview with roots in Japanese ethno-fascist thought. These debates aside, DPRK state ideology is characterized both by its severe insularity from the external world yet indebtedness to the same. As Bruce Cumings correctly argues, the regime is at once deeply anti-colonial, profoundly nationalist (and xenophobic), yet still rooted in Japanese imperial symbolism. The point is that the ruling regime in Pyongyang has no intent whatsoever to change according to the demands of human rights groups or the wider international community. To do so would be tantamount to suicide. And while not risk-averse or quiescent, the Kim Dynasty is anything but suicidal. Its hold on power is what defines it. To loosen is to die. Thus, engagement must involve taking more seriously this inflexibility.

The world has never seen anything as Orwellian as the DPRK. Thus, to antagonize it over human rights or even weapons development, neither of which (by its own ideological underpinnings and strategic calculus) it will ever stop, is futile. What we are left with instead is an immensely displeasing reality of pushing for slow, patient change, which is not noticeable in the short term and involves the smallest of advances here and there. This means circus shows like Rodman’s are actually good things, at least in the sense that they could go on to foster future sports exchanges. The problem is that pundits, policymakers and even scholars let their visceral dislike of the regime prevent them from taking their critique of the regime to its full extent. The DPRK truly is insular and hermetic; its governance is horrific. Thus, anything that exposes people within North Korea to another view is a good thing. Any kind of exchange or message that clashes with official doctrine is positive.

Energy should be put into pushing all types of exchange across the Yalu and Tumen, from SEZs to any and all socio-cultural exchange. This activity is often economically irrational and wasteful, provides much-needed resources for the regime to stay afloat, and is always used as a propaganda victory by the Kim dynasty (as is literally everything that happens). Engagement here is not engagement in search of economic returns or in the hope of touching off laissez-faire reforms (i.e. capitalism with North Korean characteristics). The DPRK’s capricious rule prevents the sort of credibility of commitment that is a prerequisite for the efficient allocation of resources; sudden breach of contract and/or expropriation by the regime is a constant risk. Pyongyang permits special economic zones as a predatory regime looking to gain resources to further solidify its rapacious rule. As long as those who rule in Pyongyang remain in place, they will not make the changes that Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese did. Rather, the objective is to plant the seeds for as many crosscutting forces (vis-à-vis regime dictates) as possible, in order to foster contradictions within the interstices of an Orwellian nightmare. Over time, this could give rise to non-regime forces that cannot be stopped by the regime but that emanate from within the DPRK itself.

Engagement in this sense does not include treating the regime in Pyongyang as an equal or normal state (in traditional diplomatic terms) or in fully maligning the regime through intense pressure. Neither option is practicable or worthwhile. Instead, the regime should be treated as it is: namely, as a very distasteful and nuclear-armed state, with an entrenched ruling elite whose worldview prevents it from changing. This sort of engagement is not flashy work. It is seemingly fitful and ineffective, but it is the best of several bad or non-existent options. Pushing the regime further has obvious limits: Beijing will not permit it, there is no military option, and collapse is not necessarily an unqualified good because of the enormous imponderables related to power vacuums, loose nukes, and the nature of what proceeds the collapse – not to mention the possibility of even greater repercussions.

Caveats and Closing

The discussion of the DPRK’s ideology is not to be confused as support for the notion that the DPRK is “irrational.” In fact, it is anything but. The leaders in Pyongyang may be some of the most calculating in the world. North Korea represents an extreme example of Peter Gourevitch’s second-image reversed theory, wherein the international system is not simply an expression of domestic structures but, in fact, a cause of them. This is not to argue that the DPRK can be forgiven its many crimes because the external environment has simply dictated its internal make-up. That would be pure apologia. However, it is clear that leaders in Pyongyang shrewdly calculate their interests based on shifting external dynamics. The domestic ideology is simply the prism through which these dynamics are translated.

The military-first (Songun) policy is a clear outgrowth of the enormous shift brought about by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Seoul’s clear ascendancy in the battle for inter-Korean legitimacy, and the diplomatic isolation Pyongyang faced with the end of the Cold War. There are internal explanations as well, including the longstanding breakdown of a very unproductive and inefficient economic system, the consequent need to channel the remaining scarce resources to the ultimate backers of regime power, and a preexisting, heavily militarized state structure. In this sense, then, Pyongyang is still a “rational actor,” albeit a deeply idiosyncratic one. Therefore, intense pressure is counterproductive but deterrence should also remain in place. Beijing itself has clearly drawn a line regarding the North’s risk-acceptant behavior.

The above discussion is also in no way meant to disparage or question the significance of human rights work done by the UN and other NGOs. As noted, the recent report is critical for post-unification justice. Moreover, the work done by the UN and other groups helps provide insight regarding the internal workings of a very opaque country. This work becomes even more valuable when considering the enormous uncertainties surrounding regime collapse and reunification. All the information the outside world can attain beforehand will help in addressing the enormity of the task if and when such events come to pass. So, instead of putting greater pressure on the regime in the hopes of precipitating fundamental change or collapse (the obstacles to which have been examined above), the focus should be on planning for the event. This has already begun.

The powerful and contradictory combination of voluntarism and inevitability underpinning Western liberalism and, in turn, universal human rights must come to terms with the fact that the world cannot always be molded to fit good intentions, no matter how much power stands behind them. My sentiment is with those who work tirelessly for universal human rights. Their work is both profoundly admirable and immensely important. And while history is littered with dastardly examples of the failure to act, this may be one situation in which pushing too hard results in greater suffering. Tragically, we are left in the meantime tolerating the intolerable.

Clint Work is a Seoul-based writer focusing on Northeast Asian international relations, history and political economy, U.S. foreign policy in North East Asia, and U.S.-Korean relations

An Indian view of sea power ( Copy Right @ The Strategist, the original article by Himanil Raina)

Pic courtesy- Wikimedia commons

(This article originally appeared in The Strategist, written by Himanil Raina. Himanil Raina is a student of NELSAR and also a freelance writer of geopolitical and international affairs. Due credits is given to him)

‘We cannot afford to be weak at sea … history has shown that whatever power controls the Indian Ocean has, in the first instance, India’s seaborne trade at her mercy, and in the second, India’s very independence itself.’ Jawaharlal Nehru

Indian strategic culture has been characterised by a preoccupation with land based threats (PDF), a bias evident from an examination of budgetary allocations to the three services. The Navy has traditionally got the least funding, resulting in it being called the Cinderella Service. This has been due to several factors. First, India has a history over millennia of being repeatedly invaded from the Northwestern plains. Second, the British stymied the growth of the Indian Navy, seeing it as a potential strategic competitor. Third, all of India’s major 20th century conflicts in 1947, 1962,1965,1971 and 1999 were against land powers. Finally, the trend was reinforced by the US alignment with Pakistan as a response to India’s perceived tilting towards the USSR, which had the effect of keeping India focused on remaining a land power and not transitioning to a maritime one.

Since the 1990s, India has rejected inward-looking economic models of growth and has increasingly integrated itself into the global economy. As a result, 75% of India’s trade by value and 97% by volume is now carried by sea. Sustained rates of economic growth towards double figures are required for India to pursue its primary national goals of lifting large proportions of its population out of poverty, and once again becoming a pivotal nation in global affairs. Fuelling this growth requires great quantities of energy.

With four fifths of Indian energy supplies being imported by sea—the bulk of which originates from the Persian Gulf and passes through the Straits of Hormuz—India is confronted with the ‘Hormuz dilemma’. That particular arc of nations is home to Islamic extremist groups and has a large presence of private military security companies. The former Indian navy chief flagged these as a threat. India’s unease about security around Hormuz and the western Indian Ocean is palpable in a region that collectively accounts for a sizeable proportion of the crises and conflicts in the world.

The Indian Ocean is home to the world’s most important shipping lanes and the principal maritime straits, including the Malacca Strait, the Bab al Mandab and the Lombok Strait in addition to Hormuz. Together these carry over half the world’s container traffic and over 80% of the world’s seaborne oil trade transits through the Indian Ocean. Geopolitical security concerns coupled with widespread piracy have ensured the presence of many external powers. The recognition that theAsia Pacific is the future engine of world growth and the rise of China have compelled the US to have a forward deployed presence in the region and are the prime reasons for the US pivot. The US Navy has long identified a need for an expansion in ship numbers, but its fleet continues to shrink. Most recently, the identified required fleet size was in the range of 313–346 ships, but it’s presently hovering in the 280s.

The US has proclaimed India as a natural ally and a linchpin of America’s ‘pivot’ that will act as a ‘regional anchor’ in the new world order. In 2010, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates declared India’s potential to be a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh expressed similar sentiments. India now plans for the development of a blue water Navy, as envisioned by then Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Suresh Mehta in 2006. India aims to have 160 combat ships by 2022, centered around at least three aircraft carriers. With the Navy now receiving a budget share hovering about the 20% mark, and with the Navy’s portion of capital acquisitions far exceeding that of the Army, this is no longer mere conjecture.

While there are tensions on the Himalayan front, large scale land warfare in the high altitude Himalayas for any prolonged stretch of time is extrordinarily difficult. It’s on the seas where Indi–China strategic competition with China is most likely to play out. India fears the so-called ‘string of pearls’—a supposed Chinese attempt at encircling India in its maritime backyard. China also depends on oceanic energy supplies for its survival, preoccupied as it is with its own ‘Malacca dilemma’.

Today China finds itself in a rare situation historically (PDF) of not having land-based threats pose as its dominant security concerns, which has resulted in China’s explosive expansion of its naval arm which will, among other things, bring it into the Indian Ocean in some numbers. India has described China as the ‘principal variable in the calculus of Indian foreign and defence policy’. As recent crises in the Ukraine, Syria and Iran have demonstrated, the US needs to maintain a global naval presence—some argue that the US needs to maintain a ‘three-hub navy’. But with declining fleet numbers, the US will need partners, and India is one obvious candidate. How the US chooses to engage India and balance China will determine the trajectory taken by sea power in the Indian Ocean and beyond.