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India’s defense strategy has always been a blend of secrecy, deterrence, and rapid modernization. From high-altitude warfare in the Himalayas to cutting-edge cyber defenses, the country has quietly built a military playbook that remains hidden from public view. But what if we told you that some of these strategies have been revealed? In this blog, we decode India’s most classified military strategies —from the infamous Cold Start Doctrine to Project Varsha, India’s secret naval base . Let’s dive into the hidden world of India's defense planning. 1️⃣ Cold Start Doctrine – India’s Blitzkrieg Strategy After the 2001 Indian Parliament attack , India realized that traditional military mobilization was too slow to respond effectively to threats. Enter Cold Start Doctrine —a rapid retaliation strategy designed to: ✅ Deploy Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) within hours ✅ Launch swift, limited strikes without provoking nuclear retaliation ✅ Capture key enemy positions within 48 hours be...

Sukhoi SU-30 MKI ( Source- Wikimedia Commons / Chanakya  The Great) Source- Russia & India Report Author- Rakesh Krishnan Simha How many fighter squadrons does the Indian Air Force need to fight a war, and more importantly, win it? A senior IAF commander says the current fleet strength of 33 squadrons – approximately 600 aircraft – is not enough to fight a two-front war. The “sanctioned strength” is quoted at 42 squadrons and anything below this will impact national security. Where did this number come from? In the 1950s, the defence brass had recommended 64 fighter squadrons for the IAF. That was revised to 42 in the 1960s. There is nothing magical about this number and only those who fail to recognise that the nature of air combat has changed will cling to it. Back in the 1960s; when the supersonic era was in its infancy; jet fighters were smaller, accident prone, required longer maintenance hours and had low endurance. For instance, it was said about the...

Indian Army Para SF  ( Source- Wikimedia Commons)  Source- The Diplomat Author- Ankit Panda Does India project hard power? If it does, what tools does it use? Finally, what are its ambitions for power projection in the future, as it continues to rise and emerge as a world power? These questions are at the center of a new monograph by Shashank Joshi, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. Indian Power Projection: Ambition, Arms and Influence presents, as of 2016, what is perhaps the most up-to-date compendium of information on India’s hard power toolkit and Indian policymaker attitudes toward that toolkit. Generally, owing to a range of domestic political factors and its security situation vis-a-vis its neighbors, India has been largely uninterested in far-reaching power projection since its independence. Indeed, today as during much of the Cold War, the country’s primary warfighting scenarios are against its neighbor to the west, Pak...

Indian Army Sikh light infantry ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Antônio Milena ) Source- The National Interest Author- James Jay Carafano Bharat Karnad is a professor of National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi—and the Machiavelli of India. His new book, “Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet),” lays out everything that’s wrong with his country's foreign policy, bureaucracy and defense establishment and how to fix it. What distinguishes Karnad's thinking about the future place of India in the world is that he is a true realist in the Machiavellian manner. Realism is often confused with being realistic. That's just wrong. Strategic thinkers of every stripe think they are realistic. Being realistic is figuring out what works. Realism is about why it works. Realists contend ‘power’ serves as the operative force governing the relationship between states. Everything else—structure, treaties, bargains, deals, rules, sanctio...

Indian army Rajput regiment in parade ( Image source- Wikimedia Commons / Credits- Antonio Milena) Source- The National Interest Author- Akhilesh Pillalamarri India has two great, ancient epics that saturate its civilization, much like the Bible and Shakespeare in the West: the Ramayana, and the Mahabharata. The Ramayana is simpler in structure and focuses on the ideal reign of a single ruler, Rama, who has traditionally been the model for political authority in South and Southeast Asia. On the other hand, like the Bible or Herodotus’ Histories, the Mahabharata describes a multitude of political and military situations from many perspectives. This makes it a broad, useful compendium of strategy, rather than just political authority, that was widely accessible to anyone throughout Indian history. Since it was composed around 400 B.C.E. (possibly loosely based on events that happened around 1000 B.C.E.), its contribution to the Indian worldview cannot be understated, not ...

Credits- Flickr / MEA Official image, Government of India " In International relations, there are no permanent friends nor permanent enemies, but only permanent national interests":- So they say in international relations. Nothing exemplifies this more than the emerging geopolitics of Asia-Pacific. There is indeed a tectonic  shift in relations and serious realignment taking place as we speak.  History of Indian Foreign relations After gaining independence, India chose the path of non alignment with a tilt to the socialistic policies emphasizing left leaning politics. This ensured that India cultivated closer relations with the USSR which for the time payed rich dividends for India. Russia was the chief source from which India procured vital and high tech weapon systems and also the USSR had been instrumental in protecting Indian national interests in international forums like the United Nations. They also helped India at th...

INS Sahyadiri ( Source- Wikimedia Commons / Author- Saberwyn) Source- The Diplomat Author- Prashanth Parameswaran Indian Chief of Naval Staff Admiral R.K. Dhowan will be paying a five-day visit to Singapore and Thailand this week in a bid to strengthen naval cooperation and boost India’s ‘Act East Policy’ in the region, according to an official government statement seen by The Diplomat. Since Narendra Modi took office last year, India has been attempting to further boost cooperation with Southeast Asian states as part of its ‘Act East Policy’, a variation on the ‘Look East Policy’ first formulated under Narasimha Rao in 1991. As I have noted before, the Modi government’s use of the ‘Act East Policy’ is designed to signal a more action-oriented policy toward Southeast Asia (See: “Modi Unveils India’s ‘Act East Policy’ to ASEAN in Myanmar”). This applies to defense relations as well, and Dhowan’s trip is being publicized as a case in point. In Singapore, Dhowan will...

INS Satpura- F48 (Source- Wikimedia Commons / Author- United States Navy)  Source- The Diplomat Author- Prashanth Parameswaran This week, Indian warships visited Cambodia and Thailand as part of a two-month long operational deployment in surrounding waters in pursuit of India’s ‘Act East’ Policy. According to a June 23 press release by the Indian embassy in Bangkok seen by The Diplomat, the Indian Navy’s Eastern Fleet under the command of Rear Admiral Ajendra Bahadur Singh entered the two Southeast Asian countries as part of a broader operational deployment to Southeast Asia and the Southern Indian Ocean. The ships had been on a 45-day deployment, which included port calls to Jakarta (Indonesia), Fremantle (Australia), and Singapore, where they participated in the bilateral exercise SIMBEX-15 with the Royal Singapore Navy. The visits, the press release said, were “in pursuance of India’s ‘Act East’ policy.” As I have written before, India’s ‘Act East’ policy u...

Pagodas of Bagan Burma ( Source- Wikimedia Commons / Author- Corto Maltese) Source- The Diplomat  Author- Vibhanshu Shankar The Indian army’s cross-border strike against insurgents over the border with Myanmar has received significant attention over the past few weeks. Lost amidst the debates about the rise of a potential new Indian ‘doctrine’ and endless details about the operation itself has been the effect that such incidents – as well as the posturing that results from them – can have on the relationship between New Delhi and Naypyidaw. Indeed, an assessment of the overall Indo-Myanmar relationship suggests the need for greater Indian humility, rather than hubris, in its relationship with its Southeast Asian neighbor. By focusing too much on the operation itself, some have missed two valuable points. First, India-Myanmar ties have reached a strategic depth. This alignment is based on a new understanding of shifting inter-regional geopolitics and a shared sense...