America's Next Big Challenge: Countering China’s Diplomatic Blitzkrieg ( Source- The National Interest, Author- Richard Javad Heydarian )

Image credits-Wikimedia Commons/ White House 

Source- The National Interest

Author- Richard Javad Heydarian 

Much to the delight of China, recent weeks have witnessed a dramatic reorientation in the Asian strategic landscape. Demonstrating sophisticated statecraft, Chinese president Xi Jinping astutely utilized the recently concluded Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit to emphasize Beijing’s centrality to regional prosperity and stability. Xi rekindled communication channels with estranged neighbors such as Japan and Vietnam, exploring various mechanisms to de-escalate territorial tensions in the Western Pacific. The summit featured icy bilateral meetings between the Chinese leader (with a poker face) and his Japanese and Vietnamese counterparts, namely Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Truong Tan Sang. The meetings came on the heels of weeks of preparation by special envoys to facilitate a formal meeting between their respective heads of states. There was also an informal talk between Xi and his Filipino counterpart, Benigno Aquino, who welcomed his first direct contact with the Chinese president.

There was a huge element of symbolism to the whole affair, and how the meetings were choreographed by Beijing and framed by the Chinese media. Xi, widely considered China’s first paramount leader in decades, acted like a benevolent Chinese emperor, receiving humbled emissaries seeking more stable ties with the Middle Kingdom. But the meeting with Abe was particularly awkward. Traditionally, Chinese leaders await their guests and warmly welcome them with smiles and handshakes. The Japanese leader, however, had to anxiously wait for his Chinese host at Beijing's Great Hall of the People, settling for no smiles and a cold handshake. It marked a huge departure from Abe’s very friendly, landmark meeting with Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, back in 2006, when both sides fervently hailed a “turning point” in their bilateral relations. This time, Xi and Abe settled for expressing their mutual interest in preventing a military conflict, preserving high-stakes economic ties and reiterating their previous agreements, over the past four decades, on friendship and cooperation. Overall, however, the meeting was shrouded in strategic ambiguity: It isn’t clear whether there was any major compromise on bilateral differences, particularly on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute.

The APEC summit served as Xi’s coming-out party, presenting himself as a global leader. He boldly projected China as the most consequential economic player in the Asia-Pacific theater, proposing an ambitious Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), which, if implemented, would render the U.S.-proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free-trade agreement as superfluous. Immediately after the APEC summit, Chinese premier Li Keqiang followed suit, launching a charm-offensive during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Myanmar. Proposing a “diamond decade” between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors, China dangled $20 billion in loans to the ASEAN, offered to host an ASEAN-China defense-ministers meeting, and proposed the establishment of an ASEAN-China defense hotline. Among other things, China’s recent diplomatic offensive seems to have blunted any efforts by rival claimant states to develop a unified position vis-à-vis Beijing’s maritime assertiveness across the Western Pacific. No wonder, there was hardly any serious effort by the ASEAN and rival claimant states—with the exception of the Philippines—to push for a binding Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea. China has reverted to its tried-and-tested economic statecraft, leveraging large-scale trade and investments schemes to divide and dominate its neighbors.

Shifting Sands

To put things into perspective, one should acknowledge how just a few months ago, China seemed isolated. Earlier this year, China risked a major regional backlash when it dispatched multiple oil rigs into Vietnamese-claimed waters in the South China Sea, sparking panic among rival claimants and encouraging Pacific powers such as Japan, India and Australia to step up their strategic cooperation. Even ASEAN, notorious for its internal divisions and often-subservient stance vis-à-vis Beijing, was forced to express its displeasure with China’s provocative actions.

From Spain to Singapore, much of the international community emphasized the necessity for resolving the South China Sea disputes in accordance to international law; this was tantamount to an implicit statement of support for the Philippines’ arbitration case against China. In Vietnam, huge protests—largely spontaneous, leading to the destruction of Chinese-owned assets and massive exodus of Chinese citizens—placed tremendous pressure on the authorities to stand up to China, which, in turn, raised the risk of direct confrontation. China’s salami-slicing strategy confronted rising marginal costs, since rival claimant states such as Vietnam were now willing to stand up to China. Vietnam even entertained the idea of joining the Philippines in filing an arbitration case against China.

More worryingly, China’s historical rival, Japan, was able to capitalize on growing territorial tensions to carve out a new security role in the region, with the Abe administration proactively pursuing closer defense and strategic ties with Southeast Asian claimant states such as the Philippines and Vietnam, as well as middle powers such as India and Australia. China faced another crisis when anti-Beijing protests spread across China’s peripheries, from Taiwan to Hong Kong. Recent polls suggest that most countries in the region are worried by China’s territorial spats with its neighbors in the Western Pacific, with the citizens of Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines overwhelmingly viewing China as a main national-security threat. Polls in Hong Kong and Taiwan also suggest growing alienation of local citizens from Mainland China.

Turning the Tables

To head off a full-scale “soft-power crisis,” the Xi administration tried to reach out to its key neighbors. With respect to Vietnam, it withdrew its oil rig from disputed waters ahead of the announced schedule, intensified dialogue between their top decision makers (the Politburo members), augmented crisis-management mechanisms (i.e., hotlines) and welcomed a meeting between Sang and Xi.

Shortly after Indian prime minister Narendra Modi’s visit (early September) to Tokyo, which culminated in major investment and security agreements, Xi embarked on a high-profile trip to India. Although the bilateral summit was partly overshadowed by renewed tensions on the two countries’ disputed Himalayan borders, Xi was evidently seeking to prevent a full-blown strategic alliance between New Delhi and Tokyo. China pledged up to $20 billion in investment deals, with the two leaders signing twelve bilateral agreements on a range of economic, sociocultural and political issues. Most remarkably, China signaled its openness to a meeting between Xi and Abe, with the Japanese National Security Advisor Shotaro Yachi and Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi coordinating the mechanics and parameters of the much-anticipated event. Remarkably, Xi was willing to meet Abe, even though Tokyo refused to openly admit the contested nature of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands—a long-standing Chinese precondition for any high-level talk.

Clearly, Xi aimed to defuse regional tensions, present China as a peace-seeking power and undermine efforts by Washington and its regional allies to constrain Beijing’s increasingly assertive posturing in the Western Pacific. Aside from avoiding regional isolation, China is also intent on chipping away at American leadership in the region. For almost seven decades, the United States has underwritten regional trade, freedom of navigation in the high seas and the national security of treaty allies and strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific region. The Xi Jinping administration, however, seems intent on establishing a Sino-centric order in its neighborhood.

China has already begun to flex its military muscle. In recent years, there has been an increase in incidents involving People’s Liberation Army (PLA) jet fighters and Chinese paramilitary vessels boldly harassing American and Japanese forces—as part of a broader attempt to deny foreign militaries access to China’s 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). One possible reason for China’s increased assertiveness in the South China Sea may have to do with the PLA’s recent deployment of advanced nuclear submarines to the area, a crucial step towards dominating adjacent waters. To remind the United States of China’s astonishing leaps in military technology, the PLA made sure that the testing of its two prototype stealth fighters (J-31 and J-20) coincided with the visits of top American leaders to China, first during then U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ visit to China in 2011, and recently during Obama’s visit to the APEC summit.

But China’s most potent challenge to American primacy in Asia lies in the economic realm. Beijing has proactively pushed for a whole host of alternative financial arrangements and development institutions in the region and beyond. The TPP has been hobbled by deadlocks in negotiations, with both the Obama administration and its negotiating partners, especially Japan, facing tremendous domestic opposition to the proposed trading agreement.

Meanwhile, China has been pushing for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which excludes the United States and aims to integrate China’s bilateral trading agreements with major regional economies in Asia into an overarching trading network. Last month, China inaugurated the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), with $50 billion in initial capital. The AIIB is widely seen as potential rival to the U.S.- and Japanese-led Asian Development Bank.

Under the New Silk Road project, which aims to connect China to Europe (via Central Asia and the Middle East) along the ancient Silk Road, China is offering up to $40 billion of infrastructure funds to a whole host of countries spread across the Eurasian landmass. Interestingly, China is also looking at a Maritime Silk Road, which will integrate neighboring Southeast Asian countries into a transcontinental, Sino-centric New Silk Road. For centuries, Manila served as the major port in Southeast Asia, acting as a key element of the pan-Pacific Galleon trade, but its ongoing territorial spats with China have raised speculations that Beijing could bypass the Philippines—if it refuses to change tact—in favor of Singapore and Indonesia, the ASEAN’s two most influential members, which will be crucial to prospects of a unified regional position on the South China Sea disputes.

There are signs that the Obama administration is worried by China’s economic offensive. Washington has reportedly opposed efforts by China to begin a feasibility study on the FTAAP, while America’s top Asian allies were reportedly encouraged to boycott the AIIB. Overall, however, it is clear that China has combined proactive diplomacy with large-scale economic incentives to quell any regional backlash against its maritime assertiveness across the Western Pacific. It remains to be seen how Washington aims to counter China’s latest diplomatic blitzkrieg.

About the author- Richard Javad Heydarian is an Assistant Professor in international affairs and political science at De La Salle University, and a policy advisor at the Philippine House of Representatives. He is the author of How Capitalism Failed the Arab World: The Economic Roots and Precarious Future of the Middle East Uprisings (Zed, London), and the forthcoming book The Philippines: The US, China, and the Struggle for Asia’s Pivot State (Zed, 2015). You can follow him on Twitter:@Richeydarian.

Original link to the article- http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-next-big-challenge-countering-china%E2%80%99s-diplomatic-11754 

Modi’s Diplomatic Chutzpah ( Source- The Diplomat, Author- Harsh V. Pant)

Image credits- Flickr/ Narendra Modi Official

Source- The Diplomat

Author- Harsh V. Pant

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has once again demonstrated why he remains one of the most interesting politicians in the country. By inviting the U.S. president, Barack Obama, to next year’s Republic Day celebrations, he has stumped his critics and surprised even his supporters. Last week, he informed the nation of his decision in a tweet, “This Republic Day, we hope to have a friend over… invited President Obama to be the 1st US president to grace the occasion as chief guest.” The White House was quick to accept the invite, underscoring the importance Washington attaches to restoring dynamism in U.S.-India relations and the confidence it has in the ability of Modi to deliver. “At the invitation of Prime Minister Modi, the President will travel to India in January 2015 to participate in the Indian Republic Day celebration in New Delhi as the Chief Guest,” a statement by the White House read minutes after the Modi tweet. With this visit, Obama will become the only U.S. president to visit India twice during his term in office.

Modi’s move is remarkable for many reasons. Most striking is the sheer audacity with which Modi seems to be challenging the foreign policy shibboleths of the past. On the surface, an invite for the U.S. President is not really significant. After all, the U.S. is now one of the closest partners of India. Be it the economy, defense, regional security, or geopolitics, there is today an extraordinary degree of convergence between the interests of the two states. Yet the diffidence of the Congress led-United Progressive Alliance government in acknowledging this openly was a reflection of the outmoded ideological trappings of the past. Even as former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was gung-ho about a robust U.S.-India relationship, his party made sure that in the last four years, ties with the U.S. were not only put on the backburner but deliberate efforts were made to scuttle forward movement on issues which were clearly in India’s interest.

And now Prime Minister Modi in just a few months has brought about a paradigm shift in the relationship despite having being denied a visa by the U.S. in the past. In his very first month, his government scuttled the World Trade Organization’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) talks, leading to much talk of India’s impending global isolation. Yet New Delhi held onto its negotiating position and ultimately ended up signing a pact with the U.S. on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit in Nay Pyi Daw, which indefinitely extends the so-called “peace clause” in the TFA. India’s food procurement and subsidy program now cannot be challenged in any forum until a conclusive deal on the subject is concluded on the issue. Obama commended the “personal leadership” of Modi in finding a way forward to break the impasse. Here was a leader who was not merely obstructionist but was eager to find ways to move forward.

It was a clear diplomatic win for India but the prime minister decided to take U.S.-India ties a notch higher by inviting Obama to the 2015 Republic Day celebrations – an invite that is usually viewed as a celebration of India’s close diplomatic partnerships. This will be the first time a U.S. leader will grace India’s Republic Day celebrations as a chief guest. How ironic when one realizes that China and Pakistan have been part of these celebrations in the past but not the oldest democracy in the world. The Congress Party would never have been able to accomplish such a feat. The non-alignment ayatollahs in India must be scrambling at the diplomatic successes of the prime minister. For years, the nation has been told that the only way Indian foreign policy establishment can secure Indian interests is by working within the rubric of non-alignment. Just two years back, some of the best and the brightest in the Indian foreign policy establishment came up with a “new” foreign policy strategy for India. And lo and behold, they titled it “Non-Alignment 2.0.”

And now we have a prime minister and a government that is not trapped in the ideological moorings of the past. The Modi government is re-shaping Indian foreign policy in some fundamental ways. A self-assured Modi and his team have given up the defensiveness of the past. India is now confidently engaging with all major powers to secure the best possible outcomes for itself. Where in the name of non-alignment previous governments would not acknowledge its convergence with key partners, Modi and his government are explicit about affirming India’s key partnerships. The coyness of the past is giving way to a new refreshing openness, which is embedded in the pragmatic instincts of the prime minister. So the U.S.-India joint statement signed during the visit of Modi to Washington was explicit about the U.S.-India convergence in maintaining stability in South China Sea. It didn’t matter if the Chinese get annoyed. And after 28 long years, India reaches out to Australia at the highest levels to underscore Australia’s importance as a strategic partner of priority. Israel’s keenness to have an open relationship with India is too being reciprocated.

With his latest invite to Obama, Modi is signaling that the senseless anti-Americanism of the Indian polity is a thing of the past and there is every likelihood that Obama’s visit to India could be transformative. Modi has been consistently springing up surprises on the foreign policy front and is not afraid to take risks. It is remarkable that in just eight months into office, Modi will have hosted the U.S. president, the Russian president, and the Chinese president. Not a bad start for a politician who was considered by his opponents as a provincial leader before his electoral victory! And not bad for a government which has not uttered the word non-alignment even once since assuming office!

About the author- Harsh V. Pant is professor of international relations in the Defence Studies Department and the India Institute at King’s College London. He is also an adjunct fellow with the Wadhwani Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. His current research is focused on Asian security issues. His most recent book is India’s Afghan Muddle.

Now read the original article here- http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/modis-diplomatic-chutzpah/

Indians are Global Decision Maker , Pakistan is Beggar - Pakistan Media

WHY ABSENCE OF INDIA FROM APEC DISMAYS CHINA – ANALYSIS ( Source- The Eurasia Review, Author- Bhaskar Roy)

APEC 2014 Summit in China ( Image credits- APEC)

Source- The Eurasia Review

Author- Bhaskar Roy

The November 2014 APEC summit in Beijing should make the Chinese government and the Communist Party of China (CPC), proud. It is not only the summit, but discussions with foreign leaders on the sidelines of the summit that must be read together.

On the sidelines, Chinese president Xi Jinping finally agreed to meet Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and pulled bilateral relations from the brink. Abe agreed to the four-point proposal (nothing new) a behaviour demanded by Xi.

An important agreement was reached with South Korea on the bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA), gas import agreement with Russia (reportedly at rock bottom price) pushed further and an agreement made with the US to expand technology trade.

The most important success for Beijing was receiving endorsement for its Free Trade Area Asia Pacific (FTAAP). Though China is the biggest Asian country leading the initiative, the pact also includes the USA which may, when necessary, restrict China’s freedom to wrestle down smaller countries of the region.

At the same time, the US initiated Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) which does not include China, is perceived by Beijing as a network of countries set up to encircle or constrict China’s growth and influence. Yet, in a complicated geopolitical game, the FTAAP is also seen as an instrument to counter the TPP. And, with the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Australia on the sidelines of the G-20 in Brisbane, China appears to have shaken the US-Australia strategic arrangement to an extent.

Looking at the totality of the season’s political and strategic flavour, China has scored a series of successes. Why then is China dismayed or even frustrated at India not attending the Beijing APEC summit?

The official Chinese daily, the Global Times (Nov-16), the Duowei news, a media outlet run by overseas Chinese, and the Taiwanese news portal Want China Times, joined in a chorus to accuse India of being a trade relations breaker. The Want China Times (Nov.11) article appeared to be somewhat confused and reluctant to fully blame India, though it labeled a series of negative charges on India’s economic and trade rules to justify why New Delhi was denied membership of the economic body in 1989.

The article, however, concluded that from India’s perspective attending as an observer at Xi Jinping’s invitation was meaningless since it was not going to be allowed to accede to the APEC as a full member. The article also speculated that Xi Jinping’s invitation was a move to save India’s face, but could not really clarify.

Xi Jinping invited Prime Minister Narendra Modi to attend the APEC summit as an observer when the two met at the BRICS summit in Brazil in July. The Indian statement came later that since it was not an APEC member, it could not attend.

The Global Times, while pointing out India’s negative attitude, insisted that the world and this organization were waiting for a positive response from India to join the APEC. It claimed that the Chinese invitation to be an observer was an endorsement of India’s membership. There was an implicit message that China was trying to save India’s “face” through this invitation.

The Chinese argument or reasoning lacks conviction. There are no free meals, and China is known to extract a couple of feasts if it offers a meal. There is more than one reason for China’s invitation.

On one end is the tussle in the Asia Pacific region between China, which wants to dominate the region, and the US which wants to ensure this lucrative and strategic part of the globe remains free from Chinese capture. The US initiative, however, predicates a hesitant or unsure approach. Nevertheless, China does respect USA’s strength and appears to have put aside the theory that “the US was in a clear state of decline, while China was on an unchallenged rise”.

China has acknowledged that India is a rising power and sought after by different powers in the region to correct the power imbalance. While India-China relations have improved in commercial areas, India’s relations with two Asia Pacific countries, Japan and Australia, both US allies, have also improved rapidly.

A greater Chinese concern would be giving new life to India-US strategic partnership, defence deals and joint military and naval exercises which can go beyond anti-piracy and counter-terrorism. Beijing would want a neutral India though New Delhi has substantial interest in South China Sea and Sea of Japan to counter China’s muscular approach on territorial issues.

China has used Russia very deftly by manipulating bilateral relations in such a way that Moscow became the front country to counter the US while Beijing was trying to enhance its “new great power relations” with Washington. India should not fall into this kind of trap.

Appearing along with Pakistan and Mongolia as observers at the APEC would do India no good. The Chinese knew that. Here is another example of Chinese efforts to equate India with Pakistan, and even tiny Mongolia in a large international forum. India is not going to hang around listening to sweet nothings from China, relegated outside the door. India would stand to lose face, and this would reflect poorly among its small neighbouring countries.

Finally, as the recent SAARC summit (Nov. 25-28) in Kathmandu revealed China was maneuvering to became a full member of this important regional body. Appeasing India with “I help you in APEC, and you help me in SAARC” could have worked in the old days. Since there is a moratorium on new membership in this organization, Pakistan pushed China’s case as a dialogue partner. There would be other SAARC members who would be quite happy to have China in, with an important role to corner India. As a member China would manipulate the SAARC countries to anchor its Maritime Silk Road initiative. Sri Lanka has already agreed to be China’s Maritime Silk Road mascot.

Some of India’s small neighbours are salivating at this prospect. They do not realize their sovereignty would be submerged. For the time being the crisis has been averted – a fractured SAARC cannot expand its membership without putting the original house in order.

Nevertheless, the innocent faced Chinese multipronged strategic initiative is masterly, and to be acutely wary of.

About the author- The writer is a New Delhi based strategic analyst. He can be reached at e-mail: grouchohart@yahoo.com

Original link to the article- http://www.eurasiareview.com/28112014-absence-india-apec-dismays-china-analysis/

Naga ( Snake) worship and in Hindu philosophy ( Source- The Ancient Indian UFO)

Image credits- Ancient Indian UFO 

Source- Ancient Indian UFO

Snake worship is an ancient and widespread religious practice in Indian customs. The cobra is associated with the lingam the emblem of lord Siva who is an Indian god.

Snake worshipping is an ancient religious practice in India. On Nagapanchami Day, the day of the serpent festival, people offer eggs and milk to snakes. This festival is celebrated by many Indians. On this day, the people worship snake gods with flowers, milk and eggs in front of their idols in temples. 

NAGA ~ THE SPIRITUALY REALISED SNAKE WORSHIPPERS WERE REVERED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD !!!

Kundalini (कुंडलिनी, IAST: kuṃḍalinī is a Sanskrit word meaning either "coiled up" or "coiling like a snake." There are a number of other translations of the term usually emphasizing a more serpentine nature to the word— e.g. 'serpent power'. It has been suggested that the caduceus symbol of coiling snakes is an ancient symbolic representation of Kundalini physiology, despite widespread agreement that the symbol originated with Hermes and Greek mythology.

The concept of Kundalini comes from yogic philosophy of ancient India and refers to the mothering intelligence behind yogic awakening and spiritual maturation,where it is also known as Kundalini Shakti. It might be regarded by yogis as a sort of deity, hence the occasional capitalization of the term. Within a western frame of understanding it is often associated with the practice of contemplative or religious practices that might induce an altered state of consciousness, either brought about spontaneously or through yoga, psychedelic drugs, or a near-death experience.

According to the yogic tradition, Kundalini is curled up in the back part of the root chakra in three and one-half turns around the sacrum. Yogic phenomenology states that kundalini awakening is associated with the appearance of bio-energetic phenomena that are said to be experienced somatically by the yogi. This appearance is also referred to as "pranic awakening". Prana is interpreted as the vital, life-sustaining force in the body. Uplifted, or intensified life-energy is called pranotthana and is supposed to originate from an apparent reservoir of subtle bio-energy at the base of the spine. This energy is also interpreted as a vibrational phenomena that initiates a period, or a process of vibrational spiritual development.

The word "NAGA" was used as base for people who were spiritually awakened. Naga, ( Sanskrit: “serpent”) in Hinduism and Buddhism, a member of a class of semidivine beings, half human and half serpentine. They are considered to be a strong, handsome race who can assume either human or wholly serpentine form.

Three notable nagas are Shesha (or Ananta), who in the Hindu myth of creation is said to support Narayana (Vishnu) as he lies on the cosmic ocean and on whom the created world rests; Vasuki, who was used as a churning rope to churn the cosmic ocean of milk; and Takshaka, the tribal chief of the snakes.

The Russian Air Force's Super Weapon: Beware the PAK-FA Stealth Fighter ( Source- The National Interest, Author- Dave Majumdar)

Sukhoi PAK FA ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons/ Alex Beltukov

Source- The Diplomat

Author- Dave Majumdar

The Russian Sukhoi T-50 PAK-FA stealth fighter could prove to be a formidable competitor to American fifth-generation combat aircraft such as the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Indeed, in some measures, the new Russian warplane will exceed both U.S.-built jets, but the PAK-FA is not without its flaws.

“The analysis that I have seen on the PAK-FA indicates a pretty sophisticated design that is at least equal to, and some have said even superior to U.S. fifth-generation aircraft,” former U.S. Air Force intelligence chief Lt. Gen. Dave Deptula told the National Interest. “It certainly has greater agility with its combination of thrust vectoring, all moving tail surfaces, and excellent aerodynamic design, than does the F-35.”

Indeed, the PAK-FA appears to be optimized for the air-superiority role like the F-22 more so than the multirole, strike-optimized F-35. Like the Raptor, the PAK-FA is being designed to fly high and fast to impart the maximum amount of launch energy to its arsenal of long-range air-to-air missiles—which would greatly increase the range of those missiles.

“Performance-wise it certainly looks to compete with the Raptor,” one senior military official with extensive experience on U.S. fifth-generation fighters told the National Interest.

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Like the F-22, the Russian machine is expected to be able to cruise supersonically for extended periods of time—probably faster than Mach 1.5. The aircraft’s maximum speed should be greater than Mach 2.0—assuming its low observables coatings can handle the stress.

However, unlike the American fifth-generation aircraft, the PAK-FA places less emphasis of stealth, and much more emphasis on maneuverability. While it could compete with the Raptor in terms of raw kinematic performance, the PAK-FA greatly exceeds the F-35. And that performance margin might increase.

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The Russian aircraft is currently powered by modified versions of the Su-30 Flanker’s engines called the Izdeliye 117 or AL-41F1, which produce about 33,000 pounds of thrust. The engine, which runs far hotter than the original AL-31 engines from which it was derived, is not proving to be as reliable as initially hoped. But the current engines are only temporary. Later production variants of the PAK-FA are expected to be powered by a new engine called the Izdeliye 30, which should enter service in 2020.

The Russian jet is also equipped with a powerful avionics suite, which is an evolution of Sukhoi’s work on the Flanker-series fighters. “Indications are that the avionics are derived from the Su-35S with the addition of a very high power-aperture X-band multimode AESA radar,” Deptula said.

Further, there are indications that the PAK-FA is also equipped with L-band radar arrays, which are able to detect the presence of a fighter-sized stealth aircraft. While the L-band radar would not allow the PAK-FA to target a stealth aircraft, it would allow the pilot to focus the jet’s other sensors on a particular area of the sky.

In addition to radars and electronic support measures, the PAK-FA is equipped with infrared search and track capabilities.

While the Russians have made enormous leaps in their sensor capabilities, U.S. warplanes still hold the edge in terms of sensor and data-fusion, which is critical for modern warfare. “The real question is can the Russians achieve the same degree of data fusion and networking capabilities of the F-22A and F-35—right now I’d put my money on the U.S. and our allies in that regard,” Deptula said.

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A senior U.S. industry official agreed with Deptula’s assessment. In terms of its avionics, the PAK-FA is closer to a Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet or F-16E/F Block 60 than an F-22 or F-35. “Some may claim that the PAK-FA is a 5th gen. fighter, but it's more of a 4.5 gen. fighter by U.S. standards,” the industry official said.

In fact, the PAK-FA’s lack of true sensor fusion and comprehensive data links that are on par with its American counterparts may prove to be its Achilles’ heel. U.S. strategists are moving towards an approach where every aircraft or surface ship can act as a sensor for any aircraft, ship or vehicle that carries a weapon. The launch aircraft might not even guide the weapon once it has been fired. The U.S. Navy is already implementing a construct called the Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) that would do just that. The Air Force, too, is working on something similar.

“In the future—while aerodynamic performance will continue to be important—speed, range and payload to a greater degree than maneuverability. Even more important will be the ability to ubiquitously share knowledge to the point that we have faster decision advantage than any adversary,” Deptula said. “This is the notion of the ‘combat cloud.’ It’s more about how we integrate the sensor-shooters that are resident in systems coming online, more than it is about new platforms.”

The senior military official agreed with Deptula’s assessment, but added that the PAK-FA has another vulnerability, too. The Russians generally do not have a requirement to fight inside a dense, highly advanced integrated air defense system (IADS) like a U.S. jet would. As such, while the PAK-FA does have stealthy features, it places far less emphasis on low observables technology than does the F-22 or F-35. “Its failure to prioritize stealth and sensor fusion make it vulnerable to both Western fifth-gen. fighters, certainly the F-22,” the official said. “When you look at the concept the USAF [U.S. Air Force] will apply with the F-22/F-35 team, the PAK-FA will run in to significant challenges.”

The Chinese, however, are a different story. “That scenario, by the way, is exactly why the Chinese see value in the J-20 and J-31 combo,” the senior official said.

In any case, while Russia might be able to develop a very capable fifth-generation fighter, there are questions as to whether the country can produce such a machine. The Soviet industrial base was always optimized to produce large quantities with relatively crude quality controls. However, stealth technology requires a level of manufacturing precision that Russia has never demonstrated before—especially after collapse of its industrial base in the years that followed the demise of the Soviet Union. “It has a long way to go before reaching IOC [initial operational capability],” the senior industry official said. “Both the Russians and Chinese have yet to ramp-up production of one of their new generation fighters. The Russians have to first resuscitate their aerospace industrial capacity…. and neither has the stealth technology, manufacturing, and operational experience like the U.S.”

Senior U.S. Air Force officials concurred with the industry official’s assessment. “I will mention that getting a fifth-gen. aircraft from brochure to fully functional and reliable is very difficult,” a senior Air Force official said. “They don't have as much experience as our industrial base with some of the capability they want in it and it is still pretty hard for us to do, so I predict growing pains in fielding.”

Comprehensively assessing the PAK-FA before it is fielded is a difficult proposition even for those with access to military intelligence data. “It's tough to tell until the PAK-FA goes into production,” another senior Air Force official said. “I doubt they'll be on par with our fifth-gen. fighters, but we don't have many and they'll likely overmatch any fourth-gen. [fighter like the F-15, F-16 or F/A-18.]”

Nonetheless, the United States has started to work on shaping the requirements for the next-generation successors to the F-22 and F-35 in the form of the Air Force F-X air-superiority fighter and the U.S. Navy’s F/A-XX next-generation strike fighter. But even before then, there are steps the Pentagon can take to mitigate the threat from Russian and Chinese stealth fighters.

“Fifth-gen. aircraft and information technologies are enabling new concepts of operation that we have yet to fully exploit. I’d suggest that is where we put our energy before spending a lot of time and money building another evolutionary fighter,” Deptula said. “LRS-B [Long Range Strike-Bomber], if properly designed for growth, will be the next major component of this concept than will be F-X and F/A-XX.”

Deptula said that fully integrating the Pentagon’s disparate weapons so that they function as a coherent whole would provide capabilities beyond what a new aircraft might provide. “Future developments in data sharing promise to dramatically enhance the way that combat effects are attained as individual aerospace assets are fully integrated with sea, land, space and cyber systems to form an omnipresent defense complex,” he said. “Individual systems connected together to form a self-forming/self healing ‘combat cloud’ and able to leverage their respective strengths, while simultaneously circumventing specific system weaknesses and vulnerabilities is where we need to be heading. This could well be the basis of the next ‘offset strategy’ that the [Secretary of Defense] and his deputy are now championing.”

About the author- Dave Majumdar has been covering defense since 2004. He currently writes for the U.S. Naval Institute, Aviation Week and The Daily Beast, among others. Majumdar previously covered national security issues at Flight International, Defense News and C4ISR Journal. Majumdar studied Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary and is a student of naval history.

Original link to the article- http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-russian-air-forces-super-weapon-beware-the-pak-fa-11742

China's defense spending increased tenfold in 25 years but still not a Super Power ( Source- Defence News, Author- Darshil R. Patel)

Chinese soldiers ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons) 

Source- The Defence News 

Author- Darshil R. Patel

China has witnessed double-digit economic growth for decades and has now becomes the world's second largest economy. It possesses a sophisticated military that's among the best in the world. Inspite of China bordering a number of small unstable countries, its borders are fully secure.

China in the past has suffered many invasions and has been humiliated by foreign aggressors at many occasions. This is probably one of the reasons why China's defense spending has increased tenfold in the past 25 years. China has a long and extensive coastline and Beijing is leaving no stone unturned to build a powerful blue-water navy by developing stealth destroyers and frigates and a large fleet of nuclear submarines.

The west especially the United States is alarmed at the pace at which China is modernising its military along with an aggressive foreign policy. A few policy makers in Washington believe that China is the only military power that can in a few cases compete and actually defeat the United States Army in certain circumstances.

But the truth of China's military is far from what the media portrays. China's military budget has grown in double-digits year-on-year but the high cost of inflation in China is eating away the increase in funding. China's Air Force, Navy and Army are ridden by corruption and their weapons are considered to be sub-standard and inferior to its western counterparts.

The PLA surely is slowly and steadily becoming technologically advance but that does not give Beijing the ability to mobilise its armed forces for Global Military Missions. The difference between the U.S. and China is that the former is an expeditionary super power with no enemies touching its borders where as China is a confined military power surrounded by potential enemies. China has unresolved border issues and territorial claims with almost every neighbouring country.

Russia, India, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Philippines and Taiwan are just a few countries that surround China and are all economically strong and historic adversaries. China's allies which is namely Pakistan and North Korea are weak and failed states with extremely high political and economic instability.


China's Military Power ::
China has the world's largest military with around 2.3 million standing army and around 8,00,000 reserve troops. These ground forces are mainly to protect China's homeland defense. China's 2.3 million army is divided into 18 group armies which are similar to an American Corp. Each army consists of three to five infantry and mechanized divisions. China has only one tank division.

The PLA Navy commands 255,000 sailors and 10,000 highly trained marines. PLA naval forces are divided into the North, East and South seas fleet. It possesses one aircraft carrier, 23 destroyers, 52 frigates, 49 diesel attack submarines and five nuclear attack subs. It also has at least three Jin-class ballistic missile submarines that represent China's undersea nuclear deterrent. 

The Air Force has 330,000 active personnel spread out at 150 air and naval aviation bases. China possesses 1321 fighter and attack aircraft's including hundreds of J-7s, 134 heavy bombers and tankers and 20 early warning air planes. It also has more than 700 combat helicopters in its inventory. 

The PLA also consists of a unique Second Artillery Corp which is a separate branch of the military that is in charge of China's land based conventional and nuclear missiles. The Second Artillery Corp has around 90,000 personnel divided into six missile brigades.

The Second Artillery Corp has more than 1,100 conventional short range 1,000 km ballistic missiles, 300 medium range and 120 long range nuclear ballistic missiles.


China's Military Spending ::
International analysts believe that China spent around $188 billion dollars in 2013 which is about 9% of Global military spend and just under half of all spending in Asia. In 2013, the US spent $640 bn, Russia $88bn, India $47bn, and Japan $48bn.

China might seem to be spending a lot but its military technology is far inferior to major countries surrounding it. For example the bulk of Chinese Air Force is obsolete and comprises of Chinese made fighter jets which are untested and unproven in battle. China cannot purchase sophisticated weapons from Europe and America as there is an international ban in the sale of sophisticated military weapons to China.

China's arsenal overflows with outdated equipment. It has around 7,580 battle tanks but only 450 of those are Type 98As and Type 99s. They are no where close to modern technology. Comparatively, all of America's 5,000 M-1 tanks are modern.


China's aggressive behaviour to India's advantage ::
China's aggressive behaviour in the East and South China Seas has prompted many of its neighbours to band together and seek support of larger more powerful allies like India and Japan. Japan is building relationships with China's other disgruntled neighbours and with Western powers. Tokyo is currently in talks with Australia, the U.K., India, Indonesia, The Philippines, Vietnam, Canada, and the U.S. to form an axis to confine and challenge China's hegemony.


Keeping a watch on China ::
China has nuclear weapons. It is ruled by a strong nationalistic communist government with a history of brutality towards its own citizens. It ha territorial claims with all its neighbours and a defense budget that is rising by 8% annually. It is wise for India and other powers to keep a watchful eye on China and try to contain it by joining military alliances.

China still has a long way to go before it poses a major challenge to countries like the U.S., Australia, Japan, Taiwan and India and the rest of the world.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Article written by Darshil R Patel exclusively for Defence News.
Bsc. in CASFX.
Email address: info@DefenceNews.in

Original link to the article- http://www.defencenews.in/defence-news-internal.aspx?id=C4kXuOWzjow=

Indo-US defence treaty: Killing many birds with one stone ( Source- The Hindustan Times, Authors- John Yoo & Riddhi Dasgupta)

Image credits- Flickr/ MEA Official

Source- The Hindustan Times

Authors- John Yoo & Riddhi Dasgupta

For Prime Minister Narendra Modi to stimulate India’s economy, a new balance of power must emerge in Asia. As the world’s most powerful democracies, India and the United States should form an alliance. A mutual defence treaty will maintain regional peace and security, counter rising threats to the liberal economic order, and promote the postwar status quo that will generate India’s rejuvenation.

With the end of the Cold War, the falling out between Pakistan and the US, and China’s rise, the timing is perfect for an India-US accord. Defence cooperation between the two nations remains strong. In 2005, the US and India agreed to nuclear cooperation. Last year, India imported approximately $2 billion of military equipment from the US, a significant increase from $237 million in 2009. Today, the US is the Indian Army’s most frequent partner for military exercises.

Americans are benefiting enormously from renewed relations with India. Indians have emigrated to the US in large numbers, they and their children have enriched American universities, and their entrepreneurship and technical skills have produced thousands of jobs and companies. Indian-Americans have become political leaders, university professors, and the CEOs. Bilateral trade has increased five-fold since 2001 to nearly $100 billion; and New Delhi’s economic reforms have reinforced its valuable role in regional stability at a time when disorder seems to plague West Asia and Southeast Asia.

As chief minister of Gujarat, Modi is already on record as favouring neoliberal economic policies that spurn India’s vestiges of socialism, five-year plans and the permit-licence raj. Modi’s political success and promises of economic reform make the new prime minister a reformer in the American mould. But most importantly, India and the US share an immediate interest: Containing China. China’s political and military rise as the world’s largest economy might be inevitable. However, it is unknown whether its rise will spell the end of the western economic and political order. At the beginning of the Cold War, many observers similarly worried that the Soviet Union and the communist bloc would rise to world dominance. But the US and its allies successfully pursued a steady, half-century containment strategy, rebuilding the West, fostering Asian and Latin American growth, and waiting until the Soviet empire could manage itself no more.

Drawing 2.3 million active frontline personnel and a $126 billion defence budget, China seems intent on using its military to expand its political influence. But China can be fickle in its allegiances and its only constant commitment has been to pragmatism. Beijing famously broke with Moscow, invaded Vietnam, and has of course gone from antipathy to affection to engaged rivalry with the US. Despite troubled relations with India since the war of 1962, China knows that its status as Washington’s most favoured nation (or, since 1998, the rechristened Permanent Normal Trade Relations) economic partner is much too crucial to jeopardise.

India can build a balancing coalition consisting of the US, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Australia. Its emergence as a counterweight to China presents an opportunity matched by the time for a re-alignment in the American approach to Pakistan. Once Washington’s most dependable regional ally, Pakistan has become an impediment to freeing Afghanistan of the Taliban and destroying al Qaeda. Without the US, however, Pakistan would lose its primary adviser and financial source.

India wants to collaborate with the US and the community of nations. A military equipment deal, a goodwill package or legislation raising India’s H1B visa quota would work deftly. The same goes with mutual cooperation to apprehend terrorist networks.

The deal makes eminent sense on both defence and economic fronts.

About the authors- John Yoo is Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, 

and Riddhi Dasgupta is an international law expert . The views expressed by the authors are personal

-See more at: http://www.hindustantimes.com/comment/analysis/indo-us-defence-treaty-killing-many-birds-with-one-stone/article1-1289766.aspx#sthash.hhC0JzYr.dpuf

Troubled Skies Above the East China Sea ( Source- The Diplomat, Author- Roncevert Almond )

F-35 ( Image credits- Flickr/ Author)

Source- The Diplomat

Author- Roncevert Almond

The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (the “Commission” or “USCC”) recently issued its 2014 Annual Report to Congress. The Commission’s mandate is ‘‘to monitor, investigate, and report to Congress on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.’’

In developing its report, the Commission traveled from South Korea to Australia, but its request for an official visit was denied by Chinese government authorities. Despite this limitation, the USCC was able to effectively investigate a wide range of issues, from China’s role in global issues like weapons proliferation and energy consumption to bilateral concerns like disputes before the World Trade Organization and access to U.S. capital markets. Of particular interest to the Asia-Pacific region is the Commission’s findings regarding Beijing’s attempt to expand China’s sphere of influence by aggressively advancing its security interests in East Asia.

According to the Commission, Beijing has concluded that the U.S.-led East Asia security architecture does not benefit China’s core interests. Instead, Beijing promotes a vision of regional security that marginalizes the United States in favor of an Asian-based order with China at its center. President Xi Jinping appears to have tightened his grip on foreign policy and is actively seeking to link China with its continental and maritime neighbors. In this vein, Xi has proposed regional trade corridors based on the precedent of the historic ancient Silk Road and Java trade routes, a campaign designed to project China’s image as a “responsible stakeholder” while increasing access to markets and natural resources.

The USCC notes, however, that Beijing’s efforts to improve China’s image in South and East Asia has been marred by the use of military might and economic power to extract political and security concessions from neighboring states. In particular, Beijing’s increasingly coercive actions towards its maritime neighbors in the East and South China Seas have created headwinds for its diplomatic efforts to cultivate positive relationships in the region. Among the key actions highlighted by the Commission was Beijing’s unilateral establishment of an Aircraft Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea (the “ECS ADIZ”) in November 2013.

An ADIZ is an area of airspace adjacent to, but beyond, the national airspace and territory of the state, where aircraft are identified, monitored and controlled in the interests of national security. The legal basis for these extraterritorial zones is found in customary international law related to anticipatory self-defense and state practice dating back to the Cold War. Administration of an ADIZ is restricted by the principles of necessity and proportionality that limit a state’s ability to exercise self-defensive measures, including the use of force, as well as standards set forth in international aviation and maritime law. Given its roots in custom, ADIZs are characterized by variances associated with each state’s unique practice; these variances are then subject to countervailing actions by states challenging newly declared norms. This legal dynamic helps explain the political and military maneuvering in the region in response to the ECS ADIZ.

The ECS ADIZ extends more than 300 miles from Chinese territory and overlaps with nearly 50 percent of an existing Japanese ADIZ in the area. The ECS ADIZ also encompasses contested territory, including the Senkaku Islands (or Diaoyu Islands) which are administered by Japan, but claimed by China and Taiwan.

The Commission found that “[t]he new East China Sea ADIZ is the boldest of China’s recent attempts to demonstrate control, sovereignty, and administration of disputed areas in the East China Sea.”

Unsurprisingly, the ECS ADIZ has increased tensions between China and Japan. The Commission reports that on two occasions in 2014, Chinese SU-27 fighter aircraft came within less than 200 feet of Japanese military reconnaissance aircraft in the ECS ADIZ – encounters that threatened the safety and security of the aircraft and crew. Chinese air incursions around Japan increased 78 percent in the six months between October 2013 and March 2014 when compared to the previous six-month period.

The zone also aligns with a significant portion of a Chinese exclusive economic zone (EEZ) – maritime areas adjacent to the territorial sea where coastal states exercise certain sovereignty rights related to the economic development and protection of natural resources. The Commission found that Beijing likely perceives the ECS ADIZ as augmenting China’s legal position and justification for its maritime territorial claims. China has previously asserted special security privileges in the EEZ, despite the fact that this position has no basis under the functional jurisdiction of EEZ set forth in the 1982 United Nation Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS).

China dramatically demonstrated this position on April 1, 2001 when a Chinese F-8 military aircraft intercepted and collided with a U.S. EP-3 military reconnaissance aircraft above the Chinese EEZ in the South China Sea. Following the EP-3 incident, some Chinese commentators had advocated the establishment of an ADIZ above the EEZ in the South China Sea. The ECS ADIZ and China’s recent military flight operations may consequently be interpreted as a continuation of China’s broad assertions of the authority granted by the EEZ.

In response to these assertions, the United States has used missions like the EP-3 flight to reinforce its policy of maintaining complete high seas freedom of overflight in international airspace, including above the EEZ. Consistent with this posture, following establishment of the ECS ADIZ in 2013, the United States promptly flew two B-52 bombers through the zone without complying with China’s aircraft identification rules.

The United States is not alone in its condemnation of the ECS ADIZ. The European Union, Japan, South Korea, Australia and others have all rejected China’s establishment of the zone. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) issued a statement asserting that the freedom of overflight above the high seas should be preserved in accordance with “universally recognized principles of international law” established under the UNCLOS and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards issued pursuant to the International Convention on Civil Aviation (the “Chicago Convention”). For the purposes of customary international law, such expressions of rejection are important to prevent the assertions of one state from crystalizing, through assumptions of opinio juris, into unwanted customary norms.

In March of this year, the United States and Japan submitted a letter to ICAO challenging the ECS ADIZ as violating the Chicago Convention. The ICAO Council, as a specialized UN agency, is certainly an appropriate forum for the ECS ADIZ question and it has adjudicated similar disputes in the past – its first case involved a clash over traffic rights between states with rivaling territorial claims, India and Pakistan. The ICAO Council has also investigated disputed military interceptions of aircraft traversing international airspace, a scenario that could arise during Chinese enforcement of the ECS ADIZ. To date, however, ICAO has not acted to resolve the dispute.

Regardless of whether at ICAO or another forum, the ECS ADIZ has increased the risk of miscalculation and miscommunication among aircraft operating in the region. To lessen the threat of such dangers, the legal ambiguity regarding the implementation of ADIZ must be resolved. The recently announced U.S.-China Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) On the Rules of Behavior for the Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters is a step forward on this point. However, the document is not legally binding and it is incomplete. For example, the annex regarding air-to-air encounters is reportedly not complete and the scope of application does not include non-signatory parties.

What is also clear, as the Commission reports, is that China is challenging the status quo and thus the U.S. position as the primary power in East Asia. The ECS ADIZ is symptomatic of a greater strategic competition. As the United States continues to rebalance its foreign policy to meet this contest, Washington will need to reinforce allies and signal its commitment to maintaining and fostering the region’s security architecture. Washington’s response to the ECS ADIZ is critical to this effort. Indeed, the world is watching the troubled skies above the East China Sea.

Roncevert Almond is an international lawyer and partner at The Wicks Group. He has advised the USCC on legal issues related to the ADIZ. 

Read more here- http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/troubled-skies-above-the-east-china-sea/