Agni-5 successfully launched from a cannister ( Video, Credits- DRDO)

Agni-5 launch from Cannister ( Video credits- DRDO)

BUSINESS UNDERPINS INDIA-US DEFENCE DEAL – ANALYSIS ( Source- The Eurasia Review, Author- Sameer Patil)

Image credits- MEA Official Gallery

Source- The Eurasia Review

Author- Sameer Patil

On January 25, India and the U.S. renewed their bilateral defence pact for 10 more years. The ‘2015 Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship’ strengthens cooperation between the two countries in the areas of defence technology, military exchanges, and counter-terrorism.[1]

For the first time, co-production and co-development are at the core of the defence engagement outlined in the framework, indicating the importance for India of technology transfers and indigenous manufacturing. The agreement makes India part of a group of nations that includes Japan, U.K., and Taiwan, with whom the U.S. cooperates on defence technology.

Specifically, four pathfinder projects for co-production and co-development were identified through the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative of 2012, which serves as the guiding principles for the framework for cooperation. All the projects are experiments in making simpler technologies and easy-to-produce equipment. If successfully executed, they will help India build advanced weapons systems in the future and co-develop other weapons technologies with the U.S.

The pathfinder projects are a real opportunity for India to move away from arms imports, which have so far constituted approximately 70% of the country’s defence expenditure—of approximately $47.4 billion in 2013. [2] Defence acquisitions from the U.S. itself have crossed over $10 billion in the last decade.[3]Screen Shot 2015-01-30 at 9.10.38 PM

Over the last decade, the India-U.S. bilateral defence cooperation has mainly focussed on purchases, including big ticket items such as the $4.1 billion acquisition of the C-17 transport aircraft. [8] The equipment the U.S. has currently offered India for co-production and co-development may appear less advanced in comparison. But, as India’s slow and difficult experience in indigenously developing and producing some of these basic technologies shows, they require significant amounts of R&D. Given India’s modest defence industrial base, the equipment being offered by the U.S. is easy to produce and a good start to boosting the defence industry.

Co-production will also mean a consistent availability of high-quality weapons to the Indian armed forces. For instance, the Mobile Electric Hybrid Power Sources system will be particularly useful for the army units deployed in the remote and high-altitude locations of Jammu and Kashmir and in the Northeast. Similarly, the Raven drones offer a 360° view of the proximate area for soldiers, providing valuable tactical intelligence.

The plans for India-U.S. defence cooperation also align well with the Modi government’s ‘Make in India’ framework and its efforts to promote the role of Indian business in defence production. In particular, two segments will benefit—the Indian partners of existing joint ventures, and small and medium enterprises, which constitute the larger defence industrial ecosystem.

Both AeroVironment and Lockheed Martin already have joint ventures in India with private defence companies—Dynamatic Technologies Limited[9] and Tata Advanced Systems,[10] respectively. Therefore, the go-ahead by India and the U.S. for these companies, which hold rights to the drone and the “roll on/roll off” technology, to undertake co-production, will give them a head-start. The plans to make Raven’s joint venture in India the global manufacturing hub for the product will help Indian companies become a part of the global supply chain.

While co-production implies manufacturing an existing product, co-development involves jointly conceiving and creating a new product. This will eventually be a significant opportunity for India to establish its R&D base—a basic requirement for a robust defence industrial foundation. It is what China did, and it enabled the country to transition from being the world’s largest arms importer to becoming the fifth largest arms exporter.[11] [12]

Since 2012, the U.S. government has offered defence technologies for co-development to India, after industry-wide consultations within the U.S. Unfortunately, the Indian side has not matched these efforts. India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) did identify advanced technologies—such as those related to lasers and hypersonic flights—for acquisition.[13] However, in doing this, the DRDO did not consult either public sector units or businesses in the defence sector. The Indian government must now comprehensively address these gaps.

Other potential R&D opportunities arising out of co-development with the U.S. must also be optimally utilised—including in naval systems, the shipbuilding sector, electronics, and semi-conductor industries,[14] which constitute the core of modern defence equipment. This potential can be realised if the government establishes a regular forum to consult with business, where larger national interests can be aligned with commercial interests.

By taking these necessary steps, India can strengthen its defence R&D and build a robust indigenous defence industrial base—and that ultimately is the goal of defence technology cooperation with the U.S.

About the author- Sameer Patil is Associate Fellow, National Security, Ethnic Conflict and Terrorism, at Gateway House.

Original link to the article- Click here

Chanakya: India's Truly Radical Machiavelli ( Source- The National Interest, Author- Akhilesh Pillalamarri)

Chanakya

Source- The National Interest

Author- Akhilesh Pillalamarri

In his recent book, World Order, Henry Kissinger refers to the ancient Indian treatise, the Arthashastra, as a work that lays out the requirements of power, which is the “dominant reality” in politics. For Kissinger, the Arthashastra contained a realist vision of politics long before the Prince, which Kissinger deems “a combination of Machiavelli and Clausewitz.” Meanwhile, the German sociologist Max Weber once called it “truly radical ‘Machiavellianism’ . . . compared to it, Machiavelli’s The Prince is harmless.”

The Arthashastra is indeed a masterpiece of statecraft, diplomacy, and strategy and is an example of non-Western literature that should be read as part of the “realist” canon. Its prescriptions are especially relevant for foreign policy today.

Although the Arthashastra is ostensibly authored by Kautilya (“crooked”), most scholars agree that Kautilya was a pen name of the ancient Indian minister Chanakya. Chanakya was the minister to Chandragupta Maurya, founder of the Mauryan Empire, which emerged in an environment resembling a Westphalian Europe of many states that encompassed most of present day South Asia. In his role as minister, Chanakya was said to have played a leading role in assembling and administering this large empire. In the Arthashastra, he compiles his observations of statecraft based on this experience.

Kautilya’s Arthashastra is a prescriptive text that lays out rules and norms for successfully running a state and conducting international relations. Like Sunzi’s Art of War, the Arthashastra abounds in generalities and is not descriptive of specific, historical events or battles. In this way, Kautilya sought to make the text useful and relevant in a variety of situations, across eras, a sort of “textbook for kings.”

The Arthashastra belongs to a class of ancient Hindu texts called shastras, which lay out general rules for a variety of subjects, such as architecture, alchemy, astronomy, and pleasure. The term Arthashastra itself means rules or norms of artha, a concept translated as “means of life” or “worldly success.” Like The Prince, then, Arthashastra is a guide for rulers on how to successfully govern a state.

The text of the Arthashastra is divided into fifteen books that discuss a variety of military, political and economic subjects. The underlying basis of the Arthashastra’s prescriptions is the notion that reasons of state justify various actions and policies regardless of ethical norms, a view shared by Machiavelli’s The Prince. Pragmatism and utility are thus of key importance to Kautilya. For example, the Arthashastra suggests that a king ought to fake divine miracles at state temples, so as to increase his revenue from pilgrimages. This is despite the fact that Kautilya himself was a Brahmin, or a member of Hinduism’s priestly caste.

The International System

Some of the Arthashastra’s most timeless observations are on international relations and foreign policy, found mostly in books seven, eleven, and twelve. Kautilya lays out a theory of the international system called the “circle of states,” or rajamandala. According to this theory, hostile states are those that border the ruler’s state, forming a circle around it. In turn, states that surround this set of hostile states form another circle around the circle of hostile states. This second circle of states can be considered the natural allies of the ruler’s state against the hostile states that lie between them. Put more succinctly, “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Elements of this logic are found in India’s foreign policy today, which sees states such as Japan and Afghanistan as natural allies against China and Pakistan, respectively.

The idea of the rajamandala also holds that relations between two contingent states will generally be tense, a fact that was definitely true of many regions, such as Europe, until fairly recently (this does not preclude the possibility of a neighbor being friendly or a vassal). This idea may explain the perception among India’s smaller South Asian neighbors that India is an overbearing and dominating neighbor.

The theory of a circle of states entails that every ruler within an international system will find his (or her) state at the center of its own circle of states. This ruler is described as a vijigishu, or would-be conqueror, whose power ought to gradually radiate into ever more distant circles. According to Kautilya’s view of human nature, “the possession of power and happiness in a greater degree makes a king superior to another; in a lesser degree, inferior, and in equal degree, equal. Hence, a king shall always endeavor to augment his power and elevate his happiness.” Thus, according to Kautilya, a ruler will always try to increase his (or her) power and territory to the greatest extent possible. Such a viewpoint is similar to offensive realism in International Relations theory, which depicts states as being power maximizers (although suggesting the drive for power is rooted in human nature is consistent with the kind of Classical Realism Kissinger is associated with). The ultimate strategy of a state is not to maintain a balance of power between states but to overcome this equilibrium in order to establish stability through hegemony.

Nonetheless, in the Arthashastra, the cardinal virtue is realpolitik, which emphasizes the state’s self-interests and security above all else. This necessities policies and attitudes that subject the ultimate objective of a state—to maximize power—to temporary objectives such as the creation of various alliances, coalitions, and balances of power. This viewpoint fits with the idea that states only have permanent interests, and will do whatever necessary to pursue these interests. The attainment of these possibilities is a practical necessity and is the subject of Kautilya’s discussion on foreign policy.

Foreign Policy

The Arthashastra speaks at significant length on the policies necessary to secure the goals of the state. There are several guiding principles that govern Kautilya’s views on foreign policy. These include: a ruler ought to develop his state by augmenting and exploiting its resources and power, the state ought to try and eliminate enemy states, those who help in this objective are friends, a state ought to stick to a prudent course, a ruler’s behavior must appear just, and peace is preferable to war in attaining a goal.

Under the framework of these principles, the Arthashastra describes six methods of foreign policy, all of which are designed to enhance the power of one’s state relative to other states and, if possible, to conquer or dominate them. These six methods are interdependent but can variously be used as the circumstances dictate.

1. Making Peace (samdhi). Kautilya describes this method as one in which a state enters into an agreement with specific conditions for a period of time. This method is to be used when a state is in relative decline compared to other states. For example, the states that fought against Napoleon entered into various coalitions in order to defeat him. However, this did not necessarily entail cooperation after Waterloo. The Western allies and the Soviet Union likewise entered into an agreement to defeat Nazi Germany, but their partnership dissolved after that goal was achieved.

2. Waging War (vigraha). This strategy occurs when a state is more powerful than another state and can defeat it through military strength, strategy, tactics, or internal conditions in the enemy’s country. Countless examples of this abound throughout human history.

3. Doing Nothing (asana). This method is used when there is nothing to be gained from either waging war or establishing a treaty with another state. It could also be a state of prolonged waiting in order to take into account the circumstances at hand before making a policy decision. Consider, for example, Japan’s alleged period of isolation during the Tokugawa Era. While often described as a period of isolation, Japanese rulers during this time observed the changing world order around them and determined it was best to not get actively involved in hostilities or treaties with foreign powers during this time.

4. Preparing for War (yana). This method requires building up one’s forces. This could entail intimidating the enemy or forcing them to use resources in order to build up their own forces. However, if not done right, mobilization and preparation of war could lead to the ruin of one’s own country. American military build-ups during the 1980s hurt the Soviet economy. Germany relatively rapid mobilization during World War I compared to the speed of France and Russia’s mobilization gave Germany an initial advantage on the battlefield.

5. Seeking Protection (samsraya). This strategy essentially entails bandwagoning with a stronger state for one’s own security. Various small states in Europe, for example, derive security from allying with the United States.

6. Dual Policy/Alliances (dvaidhibhava). This strategy deals with multiple states at once, by binding some together with one’s own state in an alliance to fight enemy states. For example, a British alliance with France and Russia before the First World War allowed it to stave off hostilities with these states while containing Germany.

The Arthashastra also contains foreign policy advice for special cases. Some of these deal with neutral states or potentially treacherous allies. Others deal with how to deal with oligarchies (or democracies), recommending sowing dissension among such states in order to weaken them. This policy has often been used by China and Russia in dealing with nomadic confederations in Central Asia. Kautilya also recommends using bribery or conciliation as necessary.

In short, the Arthashastra contains a wealth of recommendations on a variety of situations that can be useful and practical in modern times. Implicit in it is a warning to avoid idealizations and abstractions while remaining pragmatic.

Influence and Legacy

The Arthashastra was influential in ancient and classical India, but disappeared from widespread usage sometime in the 12th or 13th centuries as a result of invasions and conquest. It was not rediscovered until 1904, when an old manuscript was found in a private collection (other manuscripts were subsequently discovered).

Since then, many of its maxims and ideas have influenced Indian thought, and especially among the realist school of Indian political thinking. Another Indian work, the epic the Mahabharata continued to exert substantial influence across India and featured similar ideas on power and realism. However, for much of the modern era, independent India’s thinking on politics and international relations were derived not from the Arthashastra or similar works, but from the non-alignment and pacifism of Jawaharlal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi, who were perhaps loosely inspired by the example of Asoka, grandson of Kautilya’s king. Asoka abjured realpolitik and attempted to run his empire on the principles of morality and peace (the Mauryan Empire fell apart quickly after Asoka’s death).

Despite this, the influence of the Arthashastra and its ideas have found their way into Indian thinking, as well as influencing many non-Indians. While Indians can and do read Western political thinkers, including realists like Machiavelli and Hobbes, many policymakers feel more comfortable if they can find a precedent for their policies in their own country’s literature and history. The modern Indian concept of non-alignment itself may be a reflection of Kautilya’s advice for a nation to only follow its self-interest and not get locked into permanent enmity or friendship with any other nation. After the end of the Cold War, India has begun to apply more of the Arthashastra’s maxims as it has grown in confidence and ability and realized the necessity of pursuing its own interests, regardless of their normative component. Expect this to continue for the foreseeable future.

About the author- Akhilesh Pillalamarri is a South Asia columnist for The Diplomat. You can follow him on Twitter: @AkhiPill.

Original link to the article- http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chanakya-indias-truly-radical-machiavelli-12146

The End of the Submarine as We Know it? ( Source- The Diplomat, Author- Franz- Stefan Gady)

USS Santa Fe ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons/ United States Navy)

Source- The Diplomat

Author- Franz- Stefan Gady

The U.S. Navy’s dominant position in undersea warfare can no longer be taken for granted. “Emerging technologies present a serious challenge in that they may empower development of potential rival undersea forces and erode the stealth of U.S. submarines,” concludes a new report by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). The report, entitled “The Emerging Era in Undersea Warfare,” lays out the rapid changes occurring in the technological realm and how they will affect future combat under waters.

While the report’s author, Bryan Clark, notes that the United States will have the opportunity to be the “first mover” and establish itself as a leader in this emerging new field within undersea warfare, he also unequivocally points out that the U.S. Navy will have to give up its current undersea warfare concepts due to the “vulnerability of today’s principal undersea platform, the manned submarine.” The U.S. must develop “a new family of undersea vehicles,” Clark argues

Although largely unnamed by Clark, he, like most other U.S. naval analysts, singles out the Chinese navy as the principle threat and most likely future adversary of the U.S. naval forces underseas. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments – filled with the acolytes of Andy Marshall, who very early on in his career recognized the military potential of the emerging Asian superpower and fused it with his obsession of a revolution in military affairs (RMA) – has particularly become a mouthpiece for those seeing U.S. military superiority eroded by the new Asian military juggernaut.

Most senior U.S. defense officials agree with the threatening nature of the Chinese military buildup. “What I’m seeing [now] in foreign modernization, again, particularly China’s, is a suite of capabilities that are intended, clearly to me, at least, to defeat the American way of doing power projection, [the] American way of warfare when we fight in an expeditionary manner far from the United States,” emphasizes Frank Kendall, U.S. undersecretary of defense for acquisition in a recent interview.

As my former net assessment/defense analysis professor once told me: “Defense analysts are paid to be pessimists.” In that sense, a quote from the movie The Three Days of the Condor comes to my mind after reading this new CSBA report. “Boy, have you found a home,” replies Robert Redford sarcastically, after a CIA agent tried to argue about the necessity of playing out hypothetical worst case scenarios. By that, I mean that the hostile intentions of the PLAN are automatically assumed , as is the need for the United States to be able to forcefully project power anywhere on the world’s oceans. It often seems to me that by merging intentions with capabilities, perhaps  through a selective reading of Chinese military literature, one is able justify just about any future naval conflict scenario as long as the acronyms A2/AD (anti-access/anti-denial) and the word “network” are somewhere included in the analysis.

However the larger picture aside, from a technical and operational perspective, the report is fascinating. Clark singles out the rapid increasing in computer processing — big data –to be one of the biggest game changers (e.g., in helping to run sophisticated oceanographic models) and permeating all aspects of a new form of undersea warfare. He cites three technological advancements in particular:

New ASW capabilities to find and attack undersea platforms;

Undersea platform improvements that will enhance their endurance and stealth; and

New undersea weapon, sensor and communications systems.

From an operational point of view, the report notes that “manned submarines will likely need to shift from being frontline tactical platforms like aircraft to being host and coordination platforms like aircraft carriers.” This would be a big change from how large portions of the U.S. submarine fleet are used today.  The aircraft carrier comparison would also imply that future submarines would need to be bigger than today’s Virginia-class submarines, in order to accommodate a host of new systems, as well as an array of unmanned vehicles and weapons.

Over the next year CSBA will further explore trends in undersea warfare technology; The Diplomat will follow this discussion closely — so stay tuned!

About the author- Franz-Stefan Gady is an Associate Editor with The Diplomat.

His interests include civil-military relations, revolution in military affairs, and cyber diplomacy. He also is a Senior Fellow with the EastWest Institute. Franz-Stefan has reported from a wide range of countries and conflict zones including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. His writing and photos have appeared in Foreign Policy Magazine, The Atlantic Monthly, The National Interest, Vice News, the Middle East Eye, The Christian Science Monitor, Profil, Der Standard, and Die Presse among other publications. Follow him on Twitter (https://twitter.com/HoansSolo).

Original link to the article- http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/the-end-of-the-submarine-as-we-know-it/

The Mixed Consequences of Sino-Indian Competition in the Indian Ocean ( Source- The Diplomat, Author- Jack Detsch)

Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Author- Indian Navy)

Source- The Diplomat

Author- Jack Detsch

On Monday, just hours after Air Force One touched down in India, the secret service quickly shuttled a jet-lagged President Obama to New Delhi’s Rajpath or “King’s Way.” There, Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi watched India’s finest military hardware parade through the heart of the city.

The spectacle probably did not impress Obama, who is accustomed to making speeches atop enormous aircraft carriers. But the timing of his trip is not an accident. He arrived on the eve of the 66th anniversary of the signing of India’s constitution, days after criticizing China in his State of the Union address. “As we speak, China wants to write the rules for the world’s fastest-growing region,” Obama told Congress last Tuesday. “Why would we let that happen?”

It’s not the first time the president has taunted China to score political points. But that gesture, and Obama’s decision to meet with Modi twice in the span of four months, shows that the White House is becoming increasingly invested in India. Over the past decade, with America’s focus trained on Iraq and Afghanistan, China and India’s rivalry in the Indian Ocean has intensified, with competitive investments in ports, docks, and trans-shipment facilities along the basin. Washington has a deep interest in keeping the peace: the ocean is the go-between for 70 percent of the world’s oil.

For India, the ocean’s endless histories and myths do much to invite fascination and boost the price of waterfront real estate. Mercantile contentions drive China’s interest. Xi Jinping has fastidiously cultivated relationships with India’s neighbors to pursue under-the-radar development projects around the basin. That includes modernizing Bangladesh’s bottlenecked Chittagong Port and Cox’s Bazar.

China’s expanding defense budget also allows the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be more assertive around the basin. Beijing has become the world’s fifth largest arms exporter, disbursing $2 billion in weapons each year. The glut of guns and money has allowed China to project power deeper into the region, sending a surface action group into the eastern Indian Ocean in early 2014 and two PLA submarines to Colombo, Sri Lanka, in October.

In principle, however, China tries to look like a dignified global citizen. A 2013 defense ministry white paper titled “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces” calls for compliance with the U.N. Charter and deploying troops in lockstep with local laws. Many of China’s ambitions in the Indian Ocean over the next decade are logistical, including agreements for refueling, replenishment, and low-level maintenance. China may be more interested in securing oil routes, vulnerable to lingering conflicts in the Persian Gulf and pirates in the Strait of Malacca, than offending India.

None of those ideas are written in ink. Beijing’s relationship with Pakistan, India’s bitter enemy, is almost purely military. Since a 2008 agreement escalated ties, Pakistan has leaned on the PLA to supply nearly two-thirds of its aircraft and three-quarters of its tanks. Islamabad has given China free rein at Gwadar, a prime warm-water port at the edge of the Persian Gulf. Beijing has proliferated naval vessels to other allies in the Ocean, too, selling two Ming class submarines to Bangladesh for $203.3 million for a 2019 delivery.

India is also fielding a world class Navy, and funneling boatloads of money into major facilities along the rim. After China’s submarine incursion in Sri Lanka last year, India pledged to bolster its military technology, spending $8.1 billion to purchase six diesel electric submarines. Sittwe, one of Myanmar’s busiest ports, has received an Indian-sponsored facelift to the tune of $100 million. It’s part of the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, a larger development that includes the construction of an inland waterway on the Kaladan. Sagar, where India has installed missiles, will also be the site of a new deep-water port. India’s Navy and mariners can readily control maritime traffic in shipping lanes, and also possesses an easy route to the Strait of Malacca, the world’s second largest oil chokepoint.

All of that pressure may not be necessary. China and India don’t dislike each other as they do the Japanese and the Pakistanis. Their economies are deeply intertwined. Xi warmly toasted Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his September visit to India, and inked business deals and investment promises worth around $20 billion dollars.

Competition at sea is a byproduct of competition on shore. Some of the deepest Sino-Indian tensions circle around Tibet. China asserts sovereignty over Aksai Chin, in Kashmir, and Arunachal Pradesh, near the Tibetan Plateau. In 2009, China and India agreed to set up a hotline between heads of government in both countries, after a conflict over the status of Arunachal Pradesh. That still hasn’t happened. Regular diplomatic communication would be welcome.

Things seemed to move in that direction last year. India and China signed a Border Defense Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) — a bilateral agreement meant to prohibit the use of force, particularly along the line of control in Tibet. The BDCA also called for meetings of border personnel, high-level defense representatives, and the creation of an annual defense dialogue. Unfortunately, it has done little to change the status quo.

Although competition over the Indian Ocean has widened the rift between Asia’s two biggest powers, it has proven fruitful for a strategically critical and often overlooked region. Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Pakistan, long neglected by investors, have received much needed development money. Port facilities in South and Southeast Asia are getting more efficient: Chittagong, Sittwe, Gwadar, and Sagar could be the foundation for a robust shipping economy in the region. Though competition could hurt stability, China and India have charted a course for the development of the region. Barack Obama’s visit is the greatest indication yet that the world is taking notice.

About the author- Jack Detsch is a writer, radio journalist, and researcher in the San Francisco Bay Area. He can be found on Twitter @JackDetsch.

Original link to the article- http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/the-mixed-consequences-of-sino-indian-competition-in-the-indian-ocean/

Japan to Join Indian Submarine Race? ( Source- The Diplomat, Author- Prashanth Parameswaran)

Soryu Class Submarine ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons)

Source- The Diplomat

Author-Prashanth Parameswaran

India has forwarded a proposal to Japan asking if it would be interested in a multi-billion dollar project to build six submarines in India, Indian media sources reported January 29. 

Since 2007, India has been trying to add six new submarines with foreign collaboration under Project 75I in order to replace a fleet that has been depleted by aging and accidents. But the move has been repeatedly delayed due to bureaucratic wrangling.

The plan has now once again gained steam under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government. Last October, the Defense Acquisition Council approved the proposal to build the six diesel-electric submarines indigenously at a project cost of around $8.1 billion dollars. All six of them will be built in an Indian shipyard in the country under the “Make inIndia” initiative, and they will be equipped with both land-attack missile capabilities and air-independent propulsion for greater underwater endurance.

Now, Indian media outlets are quoting sources as saying that New Delhi has asked Tokyo to “consider the possibility” of making its diesel-electric Soryu-class submarines, manufactured by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation, in India. The condition, of course, is that Japan will have to form a joint venture with an Indian shipyard.

The media reports suggest that the move is in line with closer security cooperation between India and Japan, as evidenced by Modi’s meeting with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe last year. The potential sale of Japan’s Soryus overseas is also not difficult to fathom, given both its reputation as well as the attention lavished on a potential sale to Australia, which we have recently covered here at The Diplomat.

Even if this is true, it is unclear at this point whether Japan would throw its hat in the ring. And even if Tokyo does, it would be only one of several candidates in the Indian submarine race, which includes the string of usual suspects in France, Germany, Russia and Spain. The Soryus are widely-regarded as one of the world’s most advanced diesel-electric submarines, and they have several notable traits including their size and long submersion times. But the decision may come down to a range of other factors, including compatibility and the fact that several of the other candidates already have experience building submarines for India.

It may be a while before we find out the outcome — The Times of India suggests it could take over two years just to select a tender winner. It may take another seven to eight years for the first submarine to roll out. As is often the case with Indian defense issues, the actual time frames may vary.

In the meantime, a committee is scheduled to submit a report to the defense ministry next month on the domestic shipyards capable of manufacturing submarines. Defense officials have suggested that the tender or request for proposal to shipyards will be issued this year.

About the author- Prashanth Parameswaran is Associate Editor at The Diplomat based in Washington, D.C., where he writes mostly on Southeast Asia and Asian security affairs. He is also a PhD candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

Prashanth previously worked on Asian affairs at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Project 2049 Institute, where he focused on Southeast Asia. He has also conducted extensive field research in the region and consulted for companies and governments. His writings have appeared in a wide range of publications in the United States and in Asia, including Foreign Policy, The National Interest, The Washington Quarterly, The Straits Times, and The Nation. You can follow him on Twitter @TheAsianist.

Original link to the article- http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/japan-to-join-indian-submarine-race/

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China: Getting Ready to Dominate the Indian Ocean? ( Source- The National Interest, Author- Abhijit Singh)

PLAN ship Hongzehu ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Author- United States navy)

Source- The National Interest

Author- Abhijit Singh 

After a PLA-Navy submarine docked twice in Colombo, Sri Lanka last year, there is anxiety among Indian analysts of a renewed thrust by China for a permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean. New Delhi’s policy and strategic circles are abuzz with rumours of a likely Chinese naval base in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Following reports of increased Chinese naval activity off India’s Southern maritime frontiers, New Delhi has even revived the proposal for an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, in the hope that it would discourage Beijing from adopting a proactive maritime policy in the Indian Ocean.

Chinese maritime forays in the IOR aren’t a new phenomenon. For some time Beijing has been trying to expand its strategic footprint in the Indian Ocean. The increasing frequency of Chinese anti-piracy deployments and naval exercises, as well as growing investments in maritime infrastructure projects have burnished China’s image as a maritime player in the region. Yet, thus far, it seemed unlikely China had plans for establishing naval bases.

The recent spurt in Chinese naval exercises in the Indian Ocean, however, has led to whispers of a more pre-emptive PLA-N strategy. A string of naval deployments – including one with the 20,000-ton amphibious ship, the Chengbaishan, and another involving a nuclear submarine – has provided evidence that Beijing has its sights set on dominating the Indian Ocean. As a consequence, Chinese maritime basing in the Indian Ocean is no longer a strategic contingency to be taken lightly.

The first, in a set of revealing events, is the recent docking of a Chinese submarine at Colombo. While there was much discussion of the geopolitical implications of the visit, key operational details escaped critical analysis. It is noteworthy, for instance, that the Chinese submarine did not dock at the Sri Lanka Port Authority (SLPA) berths in Colombo – mandated to accommodate military vessels – but at the Colombo South Container Terminal (CSCT), a deep-water facility built, controlled and run by a Chinese company, the China Merchants Holdings (International). The CSCT may be well-suited for submarine dockings, but it is also a “Chinese enclave” within a Sri Lankan administered harbor. The presence of the Chinese submarine at the CSCT constituted a violation of protocol, but Sri Lankan authorities were reluctant to describe it as such. The SLPA chairman’s explanation that the submarine needed the extra-depth at the CSCT seemed implausible, considering that the Ming-class diesel-electric’s limited draft rendered it apt for berthing at any of the available SLPA facilities. Moreover, as commentators pointed out, the submarine visit was preceded by the docking of two other Chinese naval vessels at CSCT that Colombo tried hard to keep out of the media glare. This strengthens Indian suspicions that PLA-N assets are being allowed privileged access to Sri Lankan ports funded by Chinese investments.

Colombo is not the only Sri Lankan port with an exclusively Chinese facility. China also has a controlling stake at Hambantota port, where according to media reports Sri Lanka has agreed to grant Chinese state-owned companies operating rights to four berths in exchange for an easing of loan conditions. Apparently, Colombo handed over control of the port to China without issuing a commercial tender, a fact that took many in the shipping industry by surprise.

Similarly, in Maldives, the Ihavandhippolhu Integrated Development Project, or iHavan, reportedly rides on huge concessional loans and aid financing from China. The loans, apparently, have been awarded at such a high rate of interest that Male is almost certain to default, unless it is offered some kind of unilateral waiver. Yet, it is exactly what Beijing is expected to do, as part of a now established formula of relaxing loan conditions in exchange for control over maritime projects it helps finance.

This raises troubling questions about the motive behind China’s Maritime Silk Route, an umbrella term referring to maritime infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region. Beijing, denies that the plan is a rebranding exercise for an existing “string of pearls” strategy aimed at encircling India. Still, with an impending $40 billion dollar investment plan, it seems highly unlikely China would have assumed responsibility for the onerous projects without the promise of future strategic gains.

Beijing has been in fire-fighting mode ever since a news report appeared in the Namibian in November 2014 alleging the existence of Chinese plan for naval bases in the Indo-Pacific region and the west coast of Africa. A Chinese government spokesperson claimed the report borrowed liberally from a commentary in a Chinese state-controlled news portal in February 2013 that advised the PLAN to build overseas bases and protect its energy line in the Indian Ocean. There is some truth to this contention.

What is more pertinent, however, is that the original article not only outlined a blueprint for the establishment of 18 Chinese “Overseas Strategic Support Bases” in the IOR, but also recommended three specific categories of such facilities: fueling and material supply bases for peacetime use (Djibouti, Aden, and Salalah); relatively fixed supply bases for warship berthing, fixed-wing reconnaissance aircraft and the naval staff ashore rest (Seychelles); and fully functional centers for replenishment, rest and large warship weapons maintenance (Gwadar in Pakistan). Describing the precise nature and functions of the future bases, the commentary suggested a methodology for acquiring the facilities. Access to fixed supply bases – as being planned in Seychelles – it said, could be gained by signing short-term or medium-term agreements, while the “fully functional centers” in Pakistan and other IOR states needed medium-and long-term MoUs.

It is the possibility of Chinese dual-use bases in the IOR that deserves the most attention. A commercial facility with low-level logistical support capability, a dual-use base is a risk-free way of establishing maritime presence in a region of interest. In 2013, Beijing is said to have expressed an interest in such a facility at Gwadar, thus validating claims that China may be looking for a low-level military presence in the IOR. Modern dual-use maritime facilities aren’t completely benign assets. As a recent US National Defense University report pointed out, a powerful nation like China has the ability to upgrade a commercial port to support military operations in conflict scenarios, and even use it as a cover for construction of secret munitions stockpiles and other port infrastructure. It is possible, therefore, that Beijing might be contemplating agreements that offer it the right to properly militarize dual-use facilities in times of conflict.

A “dual-use” base is also what China appears to be pursuing in Seychelles. In 2011, it was widely reported that Seychelles has offered China maritime basing for its ships deployed to the Gulf of Aden and the West Indian Ocean to combat piracy. While Beijing was quick to deny the existence of such a plan, it did not exclude the possibility of an overseas supply point, fanning fears that it desired a more permanent military presence in the IOR.

China’s pitch for benign security in the Indian Ocean appears to be an attempt to convince Indian Ocean states of the need for Chinese support and security arrangements. It is critical for the PLA-N to have a system of assured logistics, refueling, repair and replenish facilities in the Indian Ocean that would enable sustain operations over a prolonged period. A sustained “maritime presence” in the Indian Ocean Region, however, is all Beijing needs to strategically dominate the region. The ready availability of PLA-N assets for maritime security tasks has the potential to take the regional security initiative away from India. Not only would a Chinese naval presence in the IOR challenge the Indian Navy’s primacy as a net-security provider, it would also erode India’s strategic influence in the region.

A permanent PLA-N presence in the IOR without conventional “naval bases” could be a strategic master-stroke by Beijing, leaving New Delhi all at sea.

About the author- Abhijit Singh is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) at New Delhi and specializes in maritime security affairs. This piece first appeared in CSIS: PACNET newsletter here.

Original link to the article- http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-getting-ready-dominate-the-indian-ocean-12130

Hey, America: Give the Balance of Power a Chance ( Source- The National Interest, Author- Paul Pillar)

Image credits- MEA Official Gallery

Source- The National Interest

Author- Paul Pillar

President Obama and his team scored an early success in the president's visit to India that didn't really require any effort on their part. The first 45 minutes of the president's meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi was devoted to discussing China, with the U.S. side pleased to find Modi sharing their own concerns about implications of China's rise for the strategic situation in the region. Not only were the U.S. and Indian assessments about China congruent; Modi took the initiative in suggesting revival of an informal security network that included the United States, India, Australia, and Japan.

Modi's posture on this subject was much different from what has characterized India's overall strategic posture for most of its history since independence. Throughout the Cold War a major element of Indian diplomacy was what bore the label of neutralism, and later was more often called nonalignment. Neutralism did not sit well at all with U.S. policymakers, some of whom—most notably Secretary of State John Foster Dulles—sharply criticized it. In 1956 Dulles stated, “These neutral governments do not seem to realize that the Communist intentions are so diabolical and so hostile to their freedom and independence.” He said that neutralist countries “would eventually succumb unless they could develop a crusading spirit against the evil forces of Communism.” Dulles especially angered the Indians by referring to their variety of neutralism as “immoral”.

Dulles may have been more unrestrained than most in the language he applied to this topic, but he was reflecting a strong and recurring American outlook that has been applied as well to other situations in international politics. That outlook is one of seeing the world divided fairly clearly between good guys and bad guys, of becoming impatient with those who do not see it the same way, and of using U.S. initiative to get the laggards to take their proper place in the good-vs.-bad lineup. That outlook manifested itself years after the Cold War when President George W. Bush told everyone else in the world that they were either with us or with the terrorists.

Two basic problems have limited the effectiveness of this habitual American approach. One is that many people and governments do not see the global lineup the same way, and they have good reasons not to. International conflict is just not that simple, and cannot be reduced to such orderly lines. The other reason is that most people and governments do not like being prodded by the United States into standing in particular spots in the lineup as the United States defines it. They would rather reach their own conclusions and make their own decisions in acting on those conclusions. Certainly this last consideration has been for many years a major factor in shaping Indian policies.

A different and better approach for the United States would be more often to let the natural rhythm of the balance of power work. This would be understood by serious realists, for whom balancing in international politics is a core concept. There is something of a hidden hand at work, akin to how such a hand works economically in free markets. The hidden hand does not write the same script each time, and political scientists have explored the conditions under which balancing rather than bandwagoning is most likely, and vice versa. But if something a would-be hegemon is doing worries us, it probably is worrying others as well.

And thus expansion of Chinese power, including into India's own ocean, naturally makes Modi worry, without our having to tell him that he should be worried, and makes him willing to do something about it. The favorable result at the New Delhi meeting demonstrates how a balancing approach that relies on others' own interests and conclusions usually will be more successful than lecturing people, pushing and prodding them into our preferred position, or casting moral aspersions on them.

Original link to the article- http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/india-china-letting-the-balance-power-do-its-thing-12133

A Transformative Moment in Indo-US Ties? ( Source- The Diplomat, Author- Harsh V. Pant)

Image credits- Flickr / MEA Official gallery

Source- The Diplomat

Author- Harsh V. Pant

Just a year back, the world’s largest and oldest democracies seemed on a collision course over the Khobragade affair. Today, thanks to deft diplomacy by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his team, Washington and Delhi stand on the cusp of a potentially transformative moment in their bilateral ties. When Modi visited the U.S. in September, his domestic critics wanted to discredit him by asking where the substance was. They argued that Modi’s visit was about style; that the optics overpowered the real issues that were bedeviling the relationship. When Modi invited Obama as the chief guest at the Republic Day celebrations in Delhi, the critics came back arguing that there was little point to inviting Obama, who had become a lame-duck president with the defeat of the Democrats in November 2014 elections.

But what Modi and Obama have been able to accomplish in the last two days underscores once again how far ahead Modi is of his critics. It also shows the remarkable ability of Modi to understand how modern day politics and diplomacy work. The optics of his visit to the U.S. last September was precisely what convinced Washington about Modi’s ability to deliver. The Obama administration recognized that after years of disappointment from Manmohan Singh, they were now getting an interlocutor in Modi who understood how important it was get the U.S.-India equation right — and he was ready to deliver with his immense cache of political capital. So even though Obama’s foreign policy agenda has been crowded, he has managed to galvanize the American bureaucracy to give one more chance to India before the end of his term. And that bet seems to be paying off.

What is equally important is how the anti-Americanism of the Indian political class is also now a thing of the past. Even when the NDA government under Atal Bihari Vajpayee was trying to structure a partnership with the U.S. and the UPA under Manmohan Singh was trying to take that forward, the anti-western hypocrisy of the Indian establishment was jarringly evident. The BJP’s old guard led the charge to make the passage of the civil nuclear deal difficult and then worked to bring in a liability law that did so much damage to Indian interests. The Indian Left, Right and Center all colluded in this charade. Washington was needed when it came to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and China but swords would be out if any Indian leader dared to make a case that a strong partnership was in the interest of India. All in the name of good old-fashioned non-alignment! Manmohan Singh’s efforts to operationalize the nuclear deal were scuttled by his own party more than by the opposition.

Modi has put an end to that nonsense. His bear hug to Obama is a reflection of the reality that only a minority in India have been able to time and again articulate: there are no real substantive issues dividing the two countries. For sure, there are differences but they are on tactics. And it is this realization that made Modi and Obama take the plunge and sort out issues, ranging from the nuclear deal to defense cooperation. The nuclear deal had been held up for six years amid concerns over the liability for any nuclear accident. With Obama using his executive powers to roll back the condition that U.S. authorities be allowed to monitor use of nuclear material purchased by India even from third countries and the U.S. agreeing to India’s proposal to build a risk-management insurance pool of Rs 1,500 crore (approximately $24 million) to provide cover to suppliers who shunned the civil nuclear agreement because it made them liable to pay compensation in the event of a nuclear accident, a great leap forward has been made.

Bilateral defense cooperation has also been energized with the two states agreeing to extend the Defense Cooperation Agreement and identifying four projects under the Defense Technology Trade Initiative (DTTI) for joint production and development as well as exploring cooperation for jet engines and aircraft carrier systems. There is an attempt now to make the DTTI more operational so that it becomes result-oriented. So far, since its institutionalization in 2012, no major projects had emerged; now certain projects have been clearly outlined on which work will begin. This is a major step forward and also very ambitious with the talk of working groups on aircraft carrier and jet engine technologies.

Where the two leaders are now looking at the U.S.-India relationship through the prism of the strategic changes in the larger Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean region, what has been striking is how marginal Pakistan has become in the relationship. The P-word was not mentioned even once in the joint press conference of Modi and Obama. In their joint statement the two leaders reiterated their call for Pakistan to bring the perpetrators of the November 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai to justice even as they reaffirmed the need for joint and concerted efforts to disrupt  entities such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, D Company, and the Haqqani Network.

There is much to look forward to as Indo-U.S. relations move to another level now. A confident new India is shedding the diffidence of the past in its dealings with America. And that can only be a good thing for the two nations.

About the author- Harsh V. Pant is professor of international relations in the Defence Studies Department and the India Institute at King’s College London. He is also an adjunct fellow with the Wadhwani Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. His current research is focused on Asian security issues. His most recent book is India’s Afghan Muddle.

Original link to the article- http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/a-transformative-moment-in-indo-us-ties/

Why 2016 Could Be a Nightmare for China ( Source- The Diplomat, Author- Kerry Brown)

Image credits- The Global Post

Source- The Diplomat

Author- Kerry Brown

In the late 1990s, former President Jiang Zemin liked to talk of China entering a two-decade era of “strategic opportunity” — a period when China could become a middle income country while continuing the Deng-ist strategy of building up its capacity and strengthening its economy during the era of American hegemony. During this period, China would be low profile, largely free of global leadership responsibilities, and able to plead its status as a poor, developing power focused on solving its own problems as a reason to sidestep heavy diplomatic duties beyond its borders.

Three-quarters of the way into this era of “strategic opportunity,” and we might argue that this period has already come to an end. Economically and geopolitically, the China of Xi Jinping increasingly talks and acts like an emerging super power. Xi, with his grand narratives of a “new model of great power relations” for the U.S. and China, and a “New Silk Road” for most of the rest of the planet, seems to have the look, and tone, of someone willing to stand more on the global stage and get attention.

It seems like the “era of strategic opportunity,” where the onus was on internal issues and keeping a low profile, has been replaced by a China where, as Xi puts it in a recently collected edition of speeches (The Governance of China), its inward and outward context are intimately linked. For China, the pressure is now on finding “holistic” solutions where it often proactively takes the lead on the global stage and wants to be listened to.

Even so, it still makes sense to think along the lines of smaller strategic opportunities. One date in particular stands out – that of only a year hence, when there are perfectly good reasons to predict that the global and regional atmosphere for China will grow a little frostier and less benign. China needs to grab its chances now before they disappear.

The first reason 2016 will be a trial for China is the U.S. presidential election. For all his talk of “pivots” and rebalancing, President Obama has been a good president for China. He has been read as weak and overstretched and was treated with staggering disdain during his first visit to Beijing in 2009. Under Obama’s watch, we witnessed the rise of an assertive, pushy China that has been increasingly able to call the shots, at least in its neighborhood. Now, this might be a very unfair reading. Historically, Obama’s achievements in terms of doing a climate change deal late last year with the Chinese might go down as a far-sighted move, bringing benefits years from now. But the perception amongst many in Beijing and Washington is that he has been weak (and in diplomacy, perception is usually 99 percent of what matters).

In 2016, we might well see Hilary Clinton move to the White House. Her image, in China, is not that of someone who is weak. The Chinese media reception for her various visits to the People’s Republic, from the time  she attended the U.N. conference on women in 1995 up to her period as secretary of state, has been half-admiring, half-apprehensive. She is seen as someone who is tough and frighteningly ambitious. Chinese analysts and policy makers may well already be starting to fear what the complexion of a Clinton White House focused from day one on reaffirming the United States’ prime role in the world might mean for them.

The same year will all bring a presidential elections in Taiwan. Like Obama, but for very different reasons, incumbent Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang (KMT) has been a good ally for Beijing. He promoted economic closeness and political carefulness, significantly reducing the cross-strait tensions that existed in the eight years under Chen Shui-bian before Ma’s election in 2008. But this has brought him some of the worst approval ratings a Taiwanese leader has ever seen. 2016 might not be a walkover for the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), but it is theirs to lose. And the DPP policy toward the mainland would be far less accommodating than that of the KMT.

In the space of a few months in 2016, therefore, Beijing will see the leadership of two of its key partners change, with the real possibility that this will bring about a more confrontational environment. Xi Jinping has proved adept at coining new phrases to capture significant interest for China. But 2016, far from being a furthering of the China Dream, could turn out to be the start of a nightmare. There is a little over 18 months of a small strategic opportunity For Xi to achieve as much as possible with Presidents Obama and Ma before they disappear. In 2015 and 2016 we may well see some unexpected and surprising moves as the Chinese side tries to capitalize on this. The question is whether Obama and Ma are in the mood to respond to these overtures, or whether their reserves of imagination and patience on Chinese matters are long since used up.

About the author- Kerry Brown  is Team Leader of the Europe China Research and Advice Network (ECRAN) funded by the European Union, and an Associate Fellow of Chatham House, London.

He is the author of The New Emperors (I.B. Tauris, 2014), a book on the leadership of modern China.

Original link to the article- http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/why-2016-could-be-a-nightmare-for-china/