A New Era for India-Sri Lanka Relations? ( Source- The Diplomat, Author- Sudha Ramachandran)

Image credits- President of Sri Lanka

Source- The Diplomat

Author- Sudha Ramachandran

Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena’s recent visit to India was aimed at mending bilateral relations that had deteriorated under his predecessor, Mahinda Rajapaksa, on account of the latter’s close embrace of China. During Sirisena’s visit, India and Sri Lanka signed four agreements that are expected to strengthen bilateral co-operation. However, whether these can counter effectively China’s enormous presence in the island seems doubtful. India is still a long way from matching or reducing China’s role in Sri Lanka.

Of the four agreements, the most significant is that on civilian nuclear co-operation, which envisages an “exchange of knowledge and expertise, sharing of resources, capacity building and training of personnel in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” Other agreements deal with co-operation in the fields of culture and agriculture, and will enable Sri Lanka to participate in the Nalanda University project. The two sides also agreed to expand defense and security co-operation.

The Indian media’s response to Sirisena’s visit has been largely upbeat.  While an editorial in Times of India drew attention to the “strategic significance” of the nuclear agreement and described it as “a sign of trust” between the two countries, The Hindu observed that Sri Lanka’s decision to sign a nuclear agreement with India rather than Pakistan, with which it had explored a similar pact two years ago, “shows the maturity of the new Sri Lankan leadership and the importance it attaches to its relations with New Delhi.”

Several publications pointed to the nuclear pact serving to counter China’s influence in Sri Lanka. An editorial in New Indian Express observed that this is “proof that Sri Lanka wants to roll back the policies pursued by the previous government that made it a close ally of China.” It described the nuclear deal with India as “a major setback for China.”

Excessively Optimistic

However, such perceptions are excessively optimistic.

“I don’t think the nuclear pact will impact Sri Lanka-China relations much,” Jabin T. Jacob, Assistant Director at the Delhi-based Institute of Chinese Studies, told The Diplomat. “If anything, it might open up Sri Lanka to the attentions of Chinese nuclear power equipment suppliers,” he warned, stressing that China’s presence in Sri Lanka “will only continue to rise in the coming years.”

The Sino-Sri Lanka relationship has always been cordial. Sri Lanka was among the first countries to recognize the People’s Republic of China. In the 1950s, the two signed a landmark rubber-rice agreement that provided Sri Lanka with a large market for its rubber in China, even as Beijing supplied it with low-priced rice.

But it was after Rajapaksa became president in 2005 that the bilateral relationship touched new heights. During the Sri Lankan civil war, China strongly supported Rajapaksa’s military strategy against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Unlike India, which was selective and conditional in the support it extended Rajapaksa, China offered wholehearted support, supplying Colombo with all the hardware on its military wish-list. In the postwar period, Beijing was unwavering in its defense of the Rajapaksa government at various international human rights forums.

As significant as its support for the Sri Lankan government during the civil war is China’s rapid emergence as Sri Lanka’s top investor. Beijing was generous in extending loans, albeit at a high rate of interest, for infrastructure development in the war-torn country. Infrastructure projects in which China has invested include the $361 million Phase-I of the Hambantota deep-sea port, the $1.4 billion port city on reclaimed land off Colombo, a $500 million-China-owned container terminal at Colombo port, a $455 million coal power plant, highways and expressways, and a theater.

While China’s growing economic influence in Sri Lanka irked Delhi, it was Rajapaksa’s enthusiastic endorsement of China’s Maritime Silk Route project, a vital strategic initiative for China in the Indian Ocean, and China’s growing military presence in Sri Lanka – a Chinese warship and submarine docked at Colombo port last year, in spite of Indian reservations – that set alarm bells ringing in Delhi. It raised grave concern in India over Colombo’s excessive tilt towards China and its facilitation of China’s presence in the Indian Ocean.

Unsurprisingly, then, India welcomed Sirisena’s victory in the January presidential elections must be seen.

Balancing relations between India and China was among the themes of Sirisena’s election campaign. Sirisena promised to scrap infrastructure contracts with China, including the port city project off Colombo. This raised hope in Delhi of a sea-change in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy should Sirisena come to power, a change that would be advantageous to India as China’s role in the island would be cut down.

However, the dramatic change in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy vis-à-vis China hasn’t happened yet. The promised cancellation of the Colombo port city deal hasn’t been fulfilled, although the Sirisena government in a recent move did not approve a 25-year tax holiday for the project that the Rajapaksa government had proposed.

Nuclear Deals

Again, while Colombo did sign a civilian nuclear agreement with India, signaling it had overcome apprehensions raised by the Rajapaksa government over safety issues surrounding India’s Koodankulam nuclear power project, which is located 250 km off the Lankan coast, within days of the president’s return from his India trip, Sri Lanka’s Power Minister Patali Champika Ranawaka announced that his country was exploring nuclear energy co-operation with Pakistan to improve “technical capacities and human capacities.” Sri Lanka and Pakistan are scheduled to sign a civilian nuclear pact when Sirisena visits Pakistan end March.

Sirisena “cannot be seen to be acting on India’s orders,” an Indian diplomat said, and hence, “the measured approach to foreign policy changes.” Stressing the fact that his government “will not throw China out,” the diplomat explained that Colombo “cannot afford to draw Beijing’s ire as the latter has already invested huge amounts in projects.”

Importantly, Sri Lanka needs the funds that China is providing it with. Its postwar reconstruction needs, especially in infrastructure, is high.

According to S I Keethaponcalan, a Sri Lankan academic teaching at Salisbury University in the United States, China is a more valuable partner for Sri Lanka than India is as India “can never match the kind of investments the Chinese have made in the island.” Moreover, Sri Lanka and China have enjoyed close ties traditionally and China is regarded as a “reliable friend,” he observed.

Consequently, throwing out China is not an option for Sri Lanka.

What we can expect then is that Sri Lanka’s relations with India and China “will become more balanced under Sirisena,” Keethaponcalan said. The president is likely to achieve this by being “selective” with regard to the assistance his country receives from China. He could “avoid defense and security-related deals with China” and can be expected to “confine China primarily to the economic sector.” In contrast, relations with India will be more “multi-dimensional,” including security, political, economic and cultural engagement, he pointed out.

China’s role in Sri Lanka will be determined not just by what role Colombo wants it to play but also by China’s interests in Sri Lanka. “Beijing’s interest in Sri Lanka is not just in the market it provides for Chinese goods but in the strategic advantage it offers China through an influential presence there,” the diplomat said.

Indeed China’s role in the island is “not simply a matter of Sino-Sri Lankan ties alone. How much influence Beijing will seek will also depend on Beijing’s overall relations with India and its security interests in the Indian Ocean,” Jacob observes.

Sri Lanka’s location in the Indian Ocean, just a few kilometers from the Indian coast and near one of the busiest sea lanes in the world – one that carries much of the oil that fuels the Chinese economy – makes it attractive to Beijing. India believes that China’s interest in Sri Lanka and its growing footprint there is part of an encirclement strategy to contain India and that Beijing will use its huge influence in Sri Lanka to secure a military presence there.

The Chinese strategy is “smarter” than that, argues Jacob. China, he says, “is cultivating influence not by overt military presence but by encouraging people-to-people contacts, offering scholarships, sponsoring conference trips, and boosting Chinese tourism in India’s neighboring countries. This softly, softly, approach is more effective and far more difficult for India to counter.

Indeed India may convince the Sirisena government to trim its defense and security co-operation with China, but asking it to halt Beijing’s exercise of soft power in Sri Lanka will be difficult.

Importantly, Delhi must understand that it cannot counter Chinese influence in Sri Lanka by badgering or bullying Colombo to cut back on co-operating with Beijing or dictating who its friends and allies should be.

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi is visiting Sri Lanka in March and China in May while Sirisena is due to visit Pakistan and China soon. The coming weeks and months are likely to shed more light on the India-Sri Lanka-China equation.

Dr Sudha Ramachandran is an independent journalist/researcher based in Bangalore, India. She writes on South Asian political and security issues and can be contacted at sudha.ramachandran@live.in.

Original link to the article- http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/a-new-era-for-india-sri-lanka-relations/

North Korea’s New Anti-Ship Missile: No Cause for Alarm ( Source- The Diplomat/ Author- Nah Liang Tuang)

Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Author- David Monniaux

Source- The Diplomat

Author- Nah Liang Tuang

On February 8, 2015, North Korea test fired five of what it termed “cutting edge” anti-ship missiles. Strategic political analysis would indicate that the date of the test firing holds more significance, as Pyongyang has chosen to showcase its latest naval armament upgrade a few weeks before annual U.S.-ROK military exercises, which the former regards as invasion rehearsals. While the missile testing was conducted to convey Pyongyang’s displeasure to Washington and Seoul, the successful testing of anti-ship missiles at a range of 200 km, as reported by South Korea’s defense ministry, is a development of note but not of alarm.

No ‘Silver Bullet’

According to knowledgeable analysts, the DPRK’s latest weapon appears to be a Russian Kh-35 anti-ship missile, which the North Koreans christen the “KN-09” and claim as their own. Assuming that the KN-09 shares the same technical and performance specifications as the Kh-35, whether as a renamed Russian import or a reverse engineered copy, it can be argued that the DPRK’s newest anti-ship missile is an attempt at economical force modernization rather than a “silver bullet” to counteract ROK naval superiority.

Considering the missile inventory of the Korean People’s Navy (KPN), we can see that its earlier anti-ship missiles ranging from the Soviet SS-N-2 Styx to the Chinese Silkworm and CSS-N-8 Saccade were developed from the 1950s to the late 1980s, and could be considered outdated. With the introduction of the KN-09 or Kh-35, the DPRK now has a modern missile which was deployed in Russian service as recently as 2003.

When making the case for KN-09 deployment as a force modernization measure, rather than as a short cut to negating South Korean naval preponderance, it would help to compare the characteristics and capabilities of the Kh-35/KN-09 with the American made Harpoon anti-ship missile used by the ROK navy. Examining the latest versions of both missiles, we can see that they have similar ranges (260 vs 278 km), are guided by onboard inertial navigation and active radar homing, are sea skimming (to reduce detection probability) while being day/night capable, and even have similar warhead weights and speeds (0.8 vs 0.7 Mach).

Factoring in the funding limitations the DPRK military faces given North Korean economic weakness, the KN-09 can be seen as a symbolic move to match South Korean naval prowess in the field of anti-ship capabilities. Specifically, the Russians sell the Kh-35 at $500,000 apiece, but a reverse engineered KN-09 would be more affordable due to cheaper local labor. In contrast, the Harpoon missile costs $1.2 million each.

However, missiles and other armaments alone do not determine naval power. Even if the modernization of the KPN’s fleet is accounted for, and deployment of the KN-09 amongst the DPRK’s surface fleet (it is not submarine launchable) maximized, the ROK navy would still prevail in any open seas conflict.

Lackluster Fleet 

Simply put, the upgrading of the North Korean Navy (for which the KN-09 was the most recent feature), does not change the balance of naval power vis-à-vis South Korea. Excluding the ROK’s destroyers, the latter still has the former outmatched. Considering any DPRK attempt to challenge the ROK in the East or West Sea away from near coastal waters, it can be shown that the ROK has the quantitative edge in frigates and corvettes (30 vs 12), and fast attack craft and large coastal patrol vessels (81 vs 59). Even though the KPN has far more submarines (70 vs 15) and numerous small patrol vessels/torpedo boats, the latter’s submarines are less capable, and are of limited sea denial value given advanced South Korean anti-submarine warfare capabilities. As for the North’s numerous small craft, these lack sufficient range for extended operations beyond near coastal waters.

Turning to qualitative comparisons, the DPRK is upgrading one of its 1970s era Najin-class frigates with new fire control systems, radar, automated 30mm cannon and KN-09 missiles while introducing two new helicopter carrying anti-submarine warfare Nampo-class corvettes. However, these upgrades simply allow the KPN to fractionally match the ROK Navy’s older fleet of eight Ulsan-class frigates which have contemporary fire control radar, submarine hunting sonar, electronic counter measures systems, and are armed with modern Harpoon missiles and Blue Shark torpedoes.

As for fast attack craft and submarines, the North recently built three Nongo-class fast attack craft with purported stealth features and armed with KN-09 missiles, while also constructing a Sinpo-class submarine possibly incorporating Yugoslavian and Russian designs from the 1960s to the early 1980s. But despite such fleet modernization, the Nongo and Sinpo-class vessels are still outclassed by their ROK Navy contemporaries, the Gumdoksuri-class patrol vessels and the Chang Bogo-class submarines. The Gumdoksuri-class features leading-edge combat management systems and Harpoon equivalent missiles, and the Chang Bogo-class, underwent systems upgrades from 2000-2009.

The Real Worry 

Having seen that Pyongyang’s latest sabre rattling episode in particular and naval modernization in general does not portend any destabilizing changes to the status-quo on the Korean peninsula, the real concern for North Korea’s neighbors remains its nuclear arms program. Indeed, any significant increase in North Korean nuclear warheads from the 12 it is currently believed to possess along with the demonstration of a reliable intercontinental ballistic missile would be a serious cause for concern. That, however, is a topic for another commentary pending further developments.    

About the author- Nah Liang Tuang is an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. 

Original link to the article- http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/north-koreas-new-anti-ship-missile-no-cause-for-alarm/

China and the South China Sea Resource Grab ( Source- The Diplomat/ Author- Dr. Michael Fabinyi)

Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Author- Voice of America

Source- The Diplomat

Author- Michael Fabinyi

Much recent political commentary has focused on the dispute between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. There is widespread recognition that a key driver of the dispute is competition over the region’s natural resources. This has led prominent commentators such as Robert Kaplan to warn of the likelihood of “Finlandization.” Yet, despite ongoing legal arguments, China currently has access to important natural resources in the Philippines. While international actors debate the legal status of Chinese and Philippine claims, China is continuing to “change the facts on the ground” in terms of access to resources. It does this through conventional rhetorical pressure and military means in the South China Sea, and by other modes of access to resources, including favorable trade arrangements and poaching. While attention does obviously need to be paid to legal developments and conventional military pressure in the South China Sea, policymakers need to focus also on how contests over natural resources are currently unfolding in other contexts.

A conceptual focus on “access,” as opposed to the narrower view of “property,” is important in understanding these natural resource contests. In their seminal article on access, Jesse C. Ribot and Nancy Lee Peluso argue for a broader understanding of how people are able to obtain the benefits of resources. While formal and legitimate property rights are one mode of access, access in practice can include a far wider variety of mechanisms. These are not necessarily always perceived as legitimate, and can include social processes such as trade relations, social relations, and power.

Oil and gas are the most valuable natural resources in the South China Sea, and thus the most high-profile. But fisheries resources constitute an insufficiently recognized economic and symbolic element of the dispute between China and the Philippines. Fisheries resources in this region not only represent current economic value, but also see fishermen forming the “human front line” of the dispute between China and the Philippines. They are used as pawns by governments in their efforts to legitimize their claims: in the court of international public opinion, fishermen are easier to defend than naval boats. They form a fundamental part of what Robert Haddick influentially described as China’s “salami-slicing strategy,” which involves “the slow accumulation of small actions, none of which is a casus belli, but which add up over time to a major strategic change.”

The dispute between China and the Philippines has simmered for many years, but has become particularly intense since July 2012, when a Chinese naval frigate ran aground at Half-Moon Shoal. This shoal lies 60 nautical miles off the coast of Palawan province, the westernmost province of the Philippines that faces the South China Sea. In May 2014, eleven Chinese fishermen were apprehended at Half-Moon Shoal; nine of them were eventually sentenced with fines of $102,000 in November. In 2013, the Philippines submitted a case to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Through this action the Philippines has adopted a strategy of appealing to external actors and institutions (such as the U.S. and international law) in order to try and gain legitimacy for its claims of property.

China has been blunt and intimidatory in response. Instead of engaging in debate about the legitimacy of property claims, China has obtained de facto access to the fisheries resources of the Philippines. China employs three important mechanisms to achieve this access: the conventional assertion of sovereignty backed up by military threats in the South China Sea; trade; and poaching.

Sovereignty and Force

Throughout recent disputes with the Philippines, China has refused to engage in debate about the potential legitimacy of the claims. Instead, it has relied on repeated assertions of sovereignty within the area of the nine-dash-line. China labeled the apprehension of Chinese fishermen in Half-Moon Shoal in 2014 as a “provocative” and “premeditated” act that “severely violates China’s sovereignty and maritime rights.” China has refused to participate in the arbitration process launched by the Philippines, arguing in a December 2014 position paper that the goal of the process was simply to put political pressure on China.

China has built up its military capability in the region through a program of land reclamation on several reefs. Analysts Janes has called this “the most significant change to the South China Sea dispute since the 1988 Battle of Johnson South Reef.” According to satellite imagery, since August 2014 China has been reclaiming land at Fiery Cross Reef, large enough for a 3,000-metre airstrip. The reef had previously been underwater, and the only habitable structure had been a platform constructed by the Chinese PLA. According to Janes, “this facility appears purpose-built to coerce other claimants into relinquishing their claims and possessions, or at least provide China with a much stronger negotiating position if talks over the dispute were ever held.” China responded to this analysis with the assertion that the construction was for “search and rescue” and “intelligence gathering.”

The two recent incidents at Half-Moon Shoal, and debate over the legal details of the dispute, have drawn attention away from the broader context in which China is already obtaining access to many resources in the South China Sea and the Philippines. Trade in high-value fisheries resources is particularly prominent here.

High-Value Fisheries Trade

Trade patterns provide an important illustration of how China has obtained access to Philippine fisheries resources, but in a way that is unsustainable and unregulated and provides limited economic benefit to the Philippines.

Philippine exports of fisheries products to China and the Hong Kong SAR have grown rapidly over the past five years, from $49 million in 2009 to almost $129 million in 2013 – an average annual growth rate of 33 percent. However, in 2013 the Philippines imported only $60 million worth of fisheries products from China. The Philippines thus exports more than twice as much as it imports when measured by value. Hong Kong SAR alone accounted for around 16 percent of the value of total fish exported from the Philippines in 2011 (much of the high-value seafood imported into mainland China is trans-shipped via Hong Kong). While the quantity of fish by weight imported into the Philippines from China is significant, the Philippines exports far more high-value fish. Indeed, of all the countries of the Coral Triangle region, the Philippines has the largest difference between exports and imports when measured by value: exports have an average value of $3,000 per ton, while imports average less than $1,000 per ton.

This fisheries trade structure is exemplified by tropical reef fish, which are exported live to China. This live reef-fish trade is an important fishery in the region, worth approximately $1-2 billion. It has a notorious reputation because of its environmental and social impacts. The targeted species in the trade are long-lived, slow-growing species of fish at the top of the food chain that are particularly vulnerable to pressure of overfishing. Several species are now listed as threatened or endangered as a direct result of the trade. Cyanide is commonly used to catch the fish, which not only increases fishing pressure but also destroys corals. The trade is thus closely linked to the overfishing of tropical reef fish, and the widespread degradation of coral reefs in the Philippines.

Fisheries exports to China constitute an important economic activity for the Philippines, but the structures of the trade benefit Chinese traders far more than Philippine fishermen. The tropical reef-fish trade is largely financed by Hong Kong- or China-based traders, who invest capital all the way along the commodity chain to fishermen in remote islands. A recent value-chain analysis of leopard coral grouper from Palawan province by the Asian Development Bank suggested that because of the patterns of investment from Hong Kong-based traders, fishermen, and the Philippines as a whole only captured 20 percent of the value along the entire chain, and that prices were largely determined in Hong Kong and China. While the trade structures of high-value fish mean that fishermen obtain the smallest proportion of benefits from the fishery, they will bear the greater proportion of the long-term costs of the trade resulting from overfishing and environmental degradation.

Poaching

Governance of fisheries resources in the Philippines is weak, characterized by low capacity and high levels of corruption. This allows China (and other actors) to utilize an even more direct mode of access to fisheries resources: poaching.

Poaching in Philippine waters by Chinese fishing vessels is a common occurrence. Between March 1995 and May 2014 in the province of Palawan, 95 vessels were held, of which 42 were Chinese, and 1,164 people were detained, of whom 640 were Chinese. While poaching may be viewed as unimportant in terms of scale, it highlights Chinese access to exceptionally high-value and endangered species. For example, one high-profile case involving the Chinese vessel Hoi Wan in late 2006 involved more than 300 live Napoleon wrasse, a fish that sells for more than $600/kg in Beijing restaurants. This species of fish is endangered and declines rapidly wherever it is fished. Other common products poached are turtles, corals and shark fins, the trade in all of which is prohibited in the Philippines. Common poaching zones include important turtle breeding grounds and some of the richest coral reefs in the world. Indeed, most of the poaching occurs in waters that do not lie in the disputed zones of the South China Sea, but are well within the Philippines – such as the world-renowned diving destination Tubbataha Reef National Marine Park.

A weak judicial system in the Philippines and political pressure from the Chinese often thwarts successful prosecution of poachers. Environmental groups have long protested against pressure from the Chinese authorities in these cases, despite some recent successful high-profile prosecutions. Indeed, the vast number of poaching incidents in the waters around Palawan and the Philippines do not usually reach this stage, and go formally undocumented.

Weaknesses in Philippine governance thus effectively create the conditions for what economist Mancur Olson described as “roving bandits” to thrive. As marine scientist Fikret Berkes and others have influentially theorized, increasing demand for fisheries resources has resulted in resource exploitation patterns that overwhelm the capacity of local institutions to respond. Chinese fisheries trade patterns and poaching exemplify this process.

Trends

Natural resources are a major driver of the dispute between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. Fisheries represent a particularly important resource, for both their economic and symbolic value.

International commentators are rightly paying much attention to the legal and military elements of the dispute over the South China Sea. But unfortunately this focus means that little attention has been paid to the full range of mechanisms used by China to access natural resources. China is increasing access to resources not only through the more conventional means of assertions of sovereignty, but also through unequal trading patterns and poaching. China’s mode of access to Philippine fisheries resources is unregulated and unsustainable. While legal and military confrontations may dominate the headlines, the broader context of natural resource contestation is more fundamental. A conceptual focus on access, as opposed to property, helps us to understand these trends.

In arguing for attention to be directed to China’s access to natural resources in the Philippines, it is important not to generalize. China’s relationship with the Philippines is far more negative than that with many other countries with whom it trades for natural resources. As a recent report by the Lowy Institute also highlights, generalizing about a generic “Chinese” strategy in the South China Sea is complicated by the diverse range of Chinese actors that operate here.

However, there are important indications that the trends in resource access outlined above will only intensify in coming years. First, the increasing openness of the Philippine economy to trade with China – supported by the China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement that came into effect in 2010 – suggests that unequal trade arrangements will continue and broaden to other sectors. Governance in the Philippines remains weak, and is incapable of dealing with “roving bandits.” Second, while the focus here has been on how fisheries resources are targeted by China, oil and gas remain up for grabs, and in purely economic terms are far more valuable. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, as Elizabeth Economy notes in her recent Foreign Affairs article, President Xi Jinping has stoked nationalism in China. Because of the strong links between the Philippines and the U.S., nationalism directed against the Philippines and Filipinos is of a particularly intense nature. As the Chinese economy slows in coming years, nationalism will likely only grow as the regime seeks to displace public frustration to external sources.

All these factors suggest a need for attention to be directed not only to the legal and military aspects of disputes in the South China Sea, but also to the broader context in which China actually accesses natural resources.

About the author- Dr. Michael Fabinyi obtained his PhD at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the Australian National University (ANU) in 2009. He is currently employed as a Branco Weiss – Society in Science Fellow at the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies, James Cook University. He has conducted more than eighteen months of ethnographic fieldwork in Philippine fishing villages, and since 2012 has been based in Beijing, undertaking research at Chinese seafood markets and restaurants.

Original link to the article- http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-and-the-south-china-sea-resource-grab/

The Battle for Maritime Asia Heats Up ( Source- The National Interest/ Author- Richard Javad Heydarian)

Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Author- Mike Russia)

Source- The National Interest

Author- Richard Javad Heydarian

Despite earlier hopes for a sustained de-escalation in maritime tensions in the Western Pacific, China has once again kicked off the year with a bang. In 2014, China reaffirmed its commitment to securing its territorial claims in the South China Sea by imposing new maritime regulations off of the coast of Hainan, which imperiled the fishing rights of other claimant states such as Vietnam. This was followed by a series of increasingly aggressive maneuvers in the Second Thomas Shoal, culminating with the Chinese Coast Guard vessels’ decision to effectively lay siege to the Filipino marine forces stationed in the area.

Over the past few weeks of this year, China has continued to up the ante by allegedly ramming three Filipino fishing boats navigating close to the Scarborough Shoal, which is located 123 miles west of Subic Bay in the Philippines and 560 miles away from nearest Chinese coastline. China forcibly wrested control of the contested feature in mid-2012, and has since cordoned off the whole area — in complete contravention of a mutual-disengagement agreement, brokered by the Washington, at the height of the Scarborough Shoal standoff. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei deflected criticism of China’s actions by accusing Filipino fishermen of bumping into each other, supposedly necessitating the deployment of a Chinese Coast Guard dinghy to investigate the matter. Implying that the Philippines should be held accountable for irresponsibly turning a blind eye to supposedly provocative maneuvers by its citizens in Chinese-claimed areas, the Chinese Foreign Ministry urged the Philippines’ government to “enhance supervision and allocation of its own fishermen to prevent such an incident from happening again.”

Efforts at calming maritime tensions in the Western Pacific in late-2014, particularly in November, didn't necessarily result in any concrete agreement or even an informal understanding between the Philippines and China on how to manage their maritime disputes. The two sides are yet to negotiate a single hotline between their relevant agencies, particularly naval and coast guard forces, underscoring the precarious dearth of confidence-building mechanisms between the two parties. Bilateral ties have been further embittered by the ongoing legal standoff at The Hague, with the Arbitral Tribunal awaiting Manila’s additional legal arguments by March. Only then will the tribunal decide whether it can exercise jurisdiction over the Philippine-China maritime disputes, and whether China’s expansive claims and territorial posturing violate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China has vehemently opposed any compulsory arbitration vis-à-vis its territorial claims in the Western Pacific. Therefore, both parties are sticking to their guns in the absence of any tangible progress at resolving their maritime disputes. This marks a regression in China-Philippines bilateral ties, with neither party significantly altering its respective strategy in the South China Sea.

The ASEAN Chips In

Frustrated by China’s continued provocations well within the Philippines’ 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario made impassioned remarks ahead of his meeting with colleagues from across Southeast Asia in late January, urging the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to show greater resolve and internal unity. He argued that China’s aim to “establish full control” over the South China Sea represents a “watershed” moment for ASEAN’s credibility. During the Foreign Ministers Meeting (FMM) in Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, Del Rosario also brought up the topic of China’s expansive construction activities in disputed areas, encouraging fellow ASEAN members to “reach out to the international community to say to China that what it is doing is wrong – that it must stop its reclamation activities at once.” According to a Filipino defense source’s estimate, China has completed almost 50 percent of its reclamation project in the Fiery Cross, a strategic feature in the contested Spratly chain of islands. This chain will likely host its own airstrip by the end of 2015 — a potential prelude to the imposition of a Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone in the South China Sea.

Underlining the urgency of the matter, Del Rosario tried to dissuade neighboring countries from ignoring a "critical issue in our own backyard." ASEAN’s current chair, Malaysia, took the Philippines’ protests into consideration, with Malaysian Foreign Minister Anifah Aman stating that the participants in the two-day FMM “shared the concern raised by some foreign ministers on land reclamation in the South China Sea.” As an active claimant state, with extensive energy exploration activities in the South China Sea, Malaysia has also been alarmed by China’s increasingly assertive posturing across the South China Sea. It is no wonder then that Kuala Lumpur is expected to leverage its largely constructive ties with China to revive long-stalled talks over a Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea.

With Singapore taking over as the country coordinator for ASEAN-China relations in August 2015, there is growing hope that there will be a more proactive push by ASEAN on the CoC front. Since last year, Singaporean officials have quite uncharacteristically sounded progressively perturbed by Chinese posturing in the South China Sea, and calling for a rule-based resolution to the disputes in the South China Sea. Singapore’s Foreign Minister K. Shanmugan has sought to reassure neighboring states, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam, of his country’s commitment to address growing worries over how “the progress on the CoC was a little muted compared with the way land reclamation was being carried out.” He expressed Singapore’s “common goal to try and do as much as we can to try to get to a proper document on [the] CoC." While there is no assurance that the ASEAN will wield enough resolve to force China back to the negotiating table over the CoC in the coming months, there are, at the very least, growing signs that all key Southeast Asian countries have refused to ignore Chinese territorial expansionism.

Underlining the urgency of the matter, Del Rosario tried to dissuade neighboring countries from ignoring a "critical issue in our own backyard." ASEAN’s current chair, Malaysia, took the Philippines’ protests into consideration, with Malaysian Foreign Minister Anifah Aman stating that the participants in the two-day FMM “shared the concern raised by some foreign ministers on land reclamation in the South China Sea.” As an active claimant state, with extensive energy exploration activities in the South China Sea, Malaysia has also been alarmed by China’s increasingly assertive posturing across the South China Sea. It is no wonder then that Kuala Lumpur is expected to leverage its largely constructive ties with China to revive long-stalled talks over a Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea.

Middle Powers Step In

Since last year, especially after the historic presidential election that saw the victory of populist candidate Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”), Indonesia has also increasingly toughened its stance on the South China Sea territorial disputes, especially in light of growing concerns over Chinese designs on the oil-rich Natuna Islands in northern Indonesia. Indonesia has been ramping up its defense spending, which is set to double in coming years. Indonesia has also been increasing the number of patrol vessels used against illegal fishing within its waters. Having established a new Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs, the Jokowi administration aims to better protect 5.8 million square kilometers of Indonesian waters against a $900 million illegal fishing trade mostly conducted by foreign vessels. Jakarta has forged ahead with a new and increasingly aggressive “Sink the Vessels” maritime protection approach to confront 5,000 illegally operating vessels within Indonesian waters.

The Jokowi administration hopes to finally establish a Sea Security Agency (Bakamla), an overall coordinating organization that would oversee and streamline Indonesia’s fragmented maritime policy. The new agency, which was mandated by a presidential decree in 2013, will be crucial to Jokowi’s vision of transforming Indonesia into a “global maritime nexus.” Finally, Indonesia is signaling that it means business in the South China Sea.

In the East China Sea, the latest satellite imagery suggest China is building a new military base, a heliport with 10 landing pads and wind turbines in the center of Nanji Island, which is situated about 186 miles away from the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The latest construction activities complement China’s existing military assets close to the disputed features, particularly the Luqiao base, which hosts the PLA Navy Air Force's East Sea Fleet 4th Division, 12th Regiment, where Chengdu J-10A fighter aircraft are stationed.

Japan has responded in kind with its own counter build-up on Yonaguni Island, located about 93 miles south of the disputed islands, which is set host a coastal surveillance radar unit, while a small marine corps-style force will be stationed at Nagasaki. Reflecting growing U.S.-Japan military coordination in face of Chinese assertiveness, Admiral Robert Thomas, commander of the Seventh Fleet and the chief U.S. Navy officer in Asia, divulged Washington’s request for Japan to extend its air patrols all the way into the South China Sea, since Chinese military and paramilitary forces “overmatch their [Southeast Asian] neighbors” and “allies, partners and friends in the region will look to the Japanese more and more as a stabilizing function.”

Fortunately, Japan and China are, at the very least, back on the negotiating table, with a flurry of high-level dialogues among their naval, coast guard, air force and defense ministry representatives in recent weeks. This raises hopes for the establishment of more effective and timely crisis management mechanisms in the area. The Abe administration is applying a “constrainment strategy,” combining an increasingly muscular foreign and defense policy with institutionalized high-level dialogue with China.

Progressively cozy relations between Washington and New Delhi represent another crucial dimension to the maritime disputes in East Asia. Since 2012, Indian officials have repeatedly underlined New Delhi’s growing determination to protect its interests (i.e., energy investments in Vietnamese-claimed waters) and ensure freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. After President Obama’s latest state visit to India, the U.S. and India issued a Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, expressing their shared position on “the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea.”

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Courting greater U.S.-India cooperation on common areas of concern, including China, the Obama administration reiterated Washington’s support for India’s bid for a permanent seat at the U.N. Security Council and growing voting shares within Bretton Woods Institutions. Furthermore, and perhaps most crucially, Obama upgraded bilateral ties with India in the realm of civilian nuclear technology and advanced military procurements. More than ever, India is distancing itself from its age-old “non-alignment” mindset in favor of a closer strategic partnership with the U.S. and its key allies such as Japan.

Overall, it is clear that China is determined to forge ahead with its controversial construction activities across contested waters, encouraging peripheral states to also ramp up their defense and diplomatic posturing. It is increasingly unlikely China is open to compromise. Swiftly and surely, China is eviscerating every ounce of diplomatic goodwill it studiously generated in late-2014, when President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang so energetically courted the broader Asia-Pacific neighborhood and sought to convince everyone of China’s supposedly peaceful rise.

About the author- Richard Javad Heydarian is an Assistant Professor in international affairs and political science at De La Salle University, and a policy advisor at the Philippine House of Representatives. As a specialist on Asian geopolitics and economic affairs, he has written for or interviewed by Al Jazeera, Asia Times, BBC, Bloomberg, The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, The Huffington Post, The Diplomat, The National Interest, and USA TODAY, among other leading international publications. He is the author of How Capitalism Failed the Arab World: The Economic Roots and Precarious Future of the Middle East Uprisings (Zed, London), and the forthcoming book The Philippines: The US, China, and the Struggle for Asia’s Pivot State (Zed, 2015). You can follow him on Twitter:@Richeydarian.

Original link to the article- http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-battle-maritime-asia-heats-12286

Watch Out, China: India Is Building 6 Nuclear Attack Submarines ( Source- The National Interest/ Author- Akhilesh Pillalamarri)

INS Arihant ( Source- Indian Navy)

Source- The National Interest

Author- Akhilesh Pillalamarri

The Indian government will be launching a major naval expansion soon that will include the indigenous construction of seven stealth frigates and six nuclear powered attack submarines. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s cabinet approved plans to build the 13 new ships at about a cost of one trillion rupees or about $16 billion on Tuesday.

The expansion would triple the size of India’s nuclear submarine fleet and comes on the heels of Narendra Modi’s pitch to increase the proportion of indigenous defense production in India. In a recent speech, Modi said that he would like the percentage of domestic procurement in India to increase to 70 percent. According to The Times of India, this decision comes at a time when India has a “critical necessity” to boost its “overall deterrence capability” in the Indian Ocean, especially the region stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca.

India’s move is widely understood to be aimed at countering China and its alleged “String of Pearls” strategy as well as increasing Chinese naval forays into the Indian Ocean. India was spooked last year when two Chinese submarines docked in Sri Lanka.

India’s plans to procure six nuclear powered attack submarines (SSN) are also in line with regional trends where many nations are building up their undersea fleets as a way to counter Beijing’s growing naval might. Many see China’s lack of anti-submarine warfare capabilities as its Achilles’ heel. India already operates one Russian-built nuclear submarine and it is currently building an indigenous one. The latter is likely to be a ballistic missile nuclear submarine (SSBN) rather than a SSN.

In addition to its nuclear submarines, India also operates some fourteen diesel-powered attack submarines. The backbone of the fleet is its ten Kilo-class Type 877EM (Sindhugosh-class), which are being fitted to carry the Klub/3M-54E Alfa cruise missile system. Delhi also operates four of the German-built Shishumar-class Type 209/1500 subs.   

About the author- Akhilesh Pillalamarri is an assistant editor at the National Interest. You can follow him on Twitter: @AkhiPill

Original link to the article- http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/watch-out-china-india-building-6-nuclear-attack-submarines-12276

China Stresses Ties With New Sri Lankan Government ( Source- The Diplomat/ Author- Shannon Tiezzi)

Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena
 ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Author MaithriPala Sirisena Official)

Source- The Diplomat

Author- Shannon Tiezzi

While Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena is in India on his first official trip abroad, Beijing wants to make sure no one thinks China is being left out. With Sirisena in India, China’s Foreign Ministry announced that Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera will travel to China at the end of February.

As Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying pointed out, Samaraweera will be the first cabinet minister from Sri Lanka to visit China since Sirisena’s government took office. “Both sides attach great importance to the visit,” Hua said, adding China’s “hope that the visit by Foreign Minister Samaraweera will be an opportunity for the two sides to exchange views on the development of China-Sri Lanka relations under the new circumstances.”

Those “new circumstances” – namely, the election of a new president – had some observers wondering whether Colombo would seek to distance itself from China. Under former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, the Sri Lankan government concluded a number of deals with China, including increased defense cooperation and a Chinese-funded port project in Colombo as part of the “Maritime Silk Road.” Before his election, Sirisena had promised to reconsider the wisdom of heavy reliance on Chinese support.

As events have shown, however, Sirisena’s strategy does not involve cutting ties with Beijing completely. As The Diplomat reported earlier, Sirisena’s government has promised to move forward with the Chinese-funded Colombo Port City project in order to avoid any “misunderstanding” with the Chinese government.

China, for its part, exudes confidence that it will continue to enjoy a strong relationship with Colombo no matter who is in charge “China and Sri Lanka are neighbors of long-lasting amity. The two countries have forged a strategic partnership of cooperation based on sincere mutual assistance and generations of friendship over recent years,” a Foreign Ministry spokesman said upon the news of Sirisena’s election.

In a congratulatory message to Sirisena, Chinese President Xi Jinping said, “I am willing to make concerted efforts with the Sri Lankan side to keep lifting the China-Sri Lanka strategic cooperative partnership to higher levels.” On February 4, in a message congratulating Sri Lanka upon its National Day, Xi called the China-Sri Lanka relationship “unshakeable.”

As a sign of China’s eagerness to continue working with Sirisena’s government, Assistant Foreign Minister Liu Jianchao visited Sri Lanka on February 5 (not coincidentally, the same day that Colombo announced it would allow China’s port project to go ahead). In a meeting with Foreign Minister Samaraweera, Liu defended China’s investment in Sri Lanka. Such projects “meet the international and domestic demand of Sri Lanka and can bring tangible benefits to the Sri Lankan people,” Liu said, expressing China’s hope that the projects will be allowed to continue. Liu also told Samaraweera that the “Chinese side believes that the new government of Sri Lanka will stay firmly committed to its friendly policy towards China.”

For his part, Samaraweera expressed Sri Lanka’s appreciation for the “priceless assistance” China has provided for Sri Lanka’s economic and social development. He added that the Sirisena government “welcomes China’s investment and assistance.”

Contacts with China are continuing apace under Sirisena’s administration. Sirisena is in India right now, but he will likely visit China in the near future; Samaraweera’s upcoming trip to Beijing will help lay the groundwork. With that in mind, China isn’t overly worried about Sirisena’s travels in India this week.

About the author- Shannon Tiezzi's main focus is on China, and she writes on China’s foreign relations, domestic politics, and economy. Shannon previously served as a research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation, where she hosted the weekly television show China Forum. She received her A.M. from Harvard University and her B.A. from The College of William and Mary. Shannon has also studied at Tsinghua University in Beijing.

Original link to the article- http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-stresses-ties-with-new-sri-lankan-government/

China’s 'One Belt, One Road' To Where? ( Source- The Diplomat, Author- Lucio Blanco Pitlo III)

Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Author- Henry Le 

Source- The Diplomat

Author- Lucio Blanco Pitlo III

The celebrated revival of the Silk Road would seem to herald the return of China’s charm offensive, winning over neighbors and other countries in the region through increased trade incentives and transport connectivity. If developing a sound soft power strategy is the mark of a rising world power, does this mean China is on its way? Certainly, in the wake of recent episodes of differences and disputes, the initiative should be seen as a welcome development. Nonetheless, some countries along the envisioned route remain wary and skeptical of the real intentions behind this offering, as well as the possible unfavorable conditions that may be attached to it. In addition, while Beijing tends to highlight its economic credentials, the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (hereinafter, SREB/MSR) has strategic, political and security implications that participating countries would also be advised to consider.

China lives in a tough neighborhood, sharing a long contiguous land border with Russia and India (with which it has unresolved land boundary disputes) and a common sea boundary with Japan (with which it has unresolved territorial and maritime disputes). As such, SREB/MSR could possibly be seen as a strategy to circumvent any encirclement or containment that a hostile power in concert with other states may undertake to harm China’s interests.

The SREB/MSR project with its land and maritime path components promises to better connect China with the Middle East, Africa and Europe through its landlocked neighbors in Central Asia and the littoral states of Southeast and South Asia. It spreads the risk by multiplying access routes, thus reducing China’s vulnerabilities. The system of ports, railways and roads, which have variously been completed, or are under construction or being proposed, will enable China to diversify the routes by which it can secure the transport of oil and gas and other essential goods needed to sustain China’s economy. It enhances the country’s energy and economic security and mitigates the risks attendant to transporting fuel and goods through unstable, unsecured or unfriendly channels. For instance, the establishment or proposed establishment of transport corridors via Pakistan (through the Chinese-operated Gwadar Port, and then by proposed railway to link the Sino-Pakistani-built Karakoram Highway and ultimately western China), Myanmar (through the Kyaukphyu Port then through the railway and pipeline to Yunnan, which are under construction) and Thailand (through the proposed Chinese-funded Kra Isthmus project) will enable China to reduce its dependency on the Strait of Malacca chokepoint. Developing pipelines to get oil and gas directly from Russia and Central Asia  to power western China also reduces its reliance on the volatile Middle East.

Meanwhile, by linking the economies of Central Asia with western China, Beijing brings further development and stability to restive and relatively underdeveloped Xinjiang and Tibet and cuts off any potential support that Uygur dissident groups may seek from fellow Muslims in Central Asia. Hence, SREB/MSR goes far beyond simply sharing economic prosperity – it has obvious political and security underpinnings. And viewed from this vantage point, its China-centrism is very evident.

However, SREB/MSR also ushers in a lot of opportunities for countries along the way. Countries in need of financing to establish new ports or related transport infrastructure or to upgrade existing facilities would welcome news of a willing new sponsor or financier. China’s longstanding policy of no-strings attached would be popular with states that have limited access to capital and technology because of foreign-imposed sanctions or stringent governance requirements set by regional or international lending institutions. Increased regional connectivity would boost trade and commerce, allowing participating countries greater access to the huge China market, while attracting much-needed investments especially now that China had just become a net capital exporter. The emergence of China expands the roster of potential partners to which developing and underdeveloped states along the projected SREB/MSR route can turn. But for China to entice more countries to join, it has to address some important points.

For one, the increasing presence, role and interest of China in maritime Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia is becoming a source of discomfort for, respectively, the United States, India and Russia, which have long dominated these regions. SREB/MSR would draw these regions ever closer into China’s orbit and an observer may well wonder whether this will will eventually evolve into some sort of exclusive club led by China, intent on displacing other regional trade or economic arrangements founded and led by other regional powers. Countries in the region, in turn, which wish to diversify their partners and develop a balance or hedging strategy are now realizing that they can play one power against the other to exact maximum concessions from both. Indeed, some countries are beginning to make this a practice (Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Maldives in relation to China and India, the former Soviet Union republics in Central Asia in relation to China and Russia, and Southeast Asian states like Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in relation to China and United States). But this will only work so long as these regional arrangements are not mutually exclusive, meaning that membership in SREB/MSR does not necessarily require that they forego participation in new or existing regional organizations. SREB/MSR should be seen as a means to complement and not to compete with or dislodge existing regional cooperation frameworks.

Moreover, in the same way as countries in these regions do not want to be seen as taking part in any effort to contain China, thus compromising their burgeoning economic relations with Beijing, they also do not want to be perceived as facilitating Chinese efforts to check a rival. For example, Indian Ocean Region (IOR) states with warming relations with China would surely not welcome the thought of being seen by New Delhi as an appendage to Beijing’s “String of Pearls” strategy. China should reassure would-be participating countries that SREB/MSR will not be used as a geopolitical ploy to outmaneuver a rival power. Otherwise, countries will hesitate to participate, particularly if pressured by regional powers.

Similarly, there is the fear about the possible dual-use nature of MSR ports and facilities. For example, the recent visit of a Chinese submarine in Colombo, the rumored establishment of a Chinese naval base in Marao Atoll, Maldives, and Pakistan’s invitation for China to set up a naval base in Gwadar all raise fears that China’s presence in the IOR is not confined to just building and operating commercial seaports. If regional rivals see MSR as a strategy that would eventually lead to basing rights or easy access for PLA-N, they may take steps to discourage countries from participating in it, if not directly acting against it.

Second, China has to address the persistent notion that SREB/MSR is too China-centric and that other participating states will reap only marginal benefits. Will the ports and related transport infrastructure financed, built or operated by Chinese entities only service or handle China-bound cargo or those coming from China only? If host countries will be deprived of independent action in the management of said ports, it will only reinforce the image that SREB/MSR caters only to Chinese interests. Thus, it is important for Beijing to identify its stakes commensurate with its investments. While China may rightfully request for some preferential access in light of its investment, shutting off SREB/MSR ports to other countries may limit the revenues that host countries are able generate. It may also tie the host country too closely to Chinese trade volume and possible future exigencies. China will contribute in furthering economic regionalization by opening SREB/MSR ports to all participating states and even to non-participating states for that matter. For instance, China could offer access to Gwadar Port, the nearest seaport to Afghanistan and Central Asia, as one incentive to obtain Central Asian participation in SREB/MSR. The port could then be the conduit for these landlocked countries to export their products abroad, as well as obtain imports therefrom, thereby giving them a stake in securing the port and the terrestrial transport backbone that connects to it.  Thus, in defining the nature and terms of SREB/MSR investments, China has to take into serious account the interests of the host country. This would entail delicate compromise and negotiations since different countries would have different sets of  national priorities and valuations.

Finally, China has to address the question of which country will provide the security for NSR ports and related facilities. Will MSR membership by countries along the proposed route permit the deployment of PLA-N or Chinese coast guard vessels in IOR and maritime Southeast Asia? For IOR, this would create anxiety on the part of India, as well as the United States. For South China Sea (SCS) littoral states, on the other hand, the specter of Chinese naval and coast guard assets patrolling vital shipping sea lanes and waters adjacent to MSR ports may dissuade them from participating lest it be seen as jeopardizing their own territorial and maritime claims in the disputed sea. Territorial and maritime disputes generally cloud the judgment of many states, compelling them to disregard even obvious economic advantages. To address this, China may consider boosting maritime security cooperation with SCS states to jointly secure MSR infrastructure. This may include funding to support exercises and operations on search and rescue, combating maritime piracy and terrorism, responding to maritime pollution and marine environment degradation, and or even involving joint management of shared fisheries resources and joint development of offshore oil and gas and seabed minerals.

Most of the details of SREB/MSR remains sketchy and this may be to China’s disadvantage. The concept could easily be hijacked or maligned by other parties even before it takes off. Some may say that it is hollow rhetoric or a pledge without basis or enduring political and economic commitment. It will be difficult to entice countries to participate in an undertaking they know so little about. For these reasons, China will need to articulate the fundamental tenets of SREB/MSR to give more substance to all the grand policy talk. Of course, the fact that many details of SREB/MSR remains hazy could also have an upside –countries still have the opportunity to help shape its architecture in a way that is more agreeable and beneficial to all.

About the author- Lucio Blanco Pitlo III is a member of the Philippine Association for China Studies (PACS). He is a former Research Assistant at the University of the Philippines Asian Center and a former Technical Assistant at the Philippine National Coast Watch Council Secretariat. The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not represent that of his present and past affiliations. 

Original source to the article- http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/chinas-one-belt-one-road-to-where/