The Lethal A-10 Warthog: A Nuclear Bomber? ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Joseph Trevithick)

Image source- Wikimedia Commons / Author- USAF

Source- The National Interest

Author- Joseph Trevithick

Despite what the Pentagon and senior Air Force leaders might say, the A-10 Warthog is far from a “single-purpose airplane.” But dropping nuclear bombs might be one of the things the low- and slow-flying attackers actually can’t do.

But the Air Force once briefly considered the idea.

In December 1975, Secretary of Defense Bill Clements wanted to know how much it would cost to modify F-15 and F-16 fighter jets so they could carry atomic weapons. Two months later, the Air Force sent back data on what it would take to upgrade those two types of aircraft—or the A-10—with nukes.

“For your information, we have also provided similar cost data on the A-10 aircraft,” states an unclassified memo War Is Boring obtained from the Air Force Historical Research Agency. “The estimated cost to make 275 A-10s nuclear-capable is $15.9 million.”

The total amount—equivalent to more than $65 million today—would cover developing and testing the required equipment, and installing it on the Warthog fleet.

The flying branch’s calculations included systems needed to support B-43, B-57 and B-61 bombs.

At the time, these three bombs were the standard nuclear weapons for aircraft in the U.S. military. If a shooting war broke out in Europe, America’s NATO allies would have gotten access to these weapons, too. Newer versions of the B-61 remain in service today.

Obviously, the Air Force never ended up arming the A-10s with nukes.

But Clement’s desire for more nuclear-armed aircraft is hardly surprising. During the Cold War, the Pentagon expected to use nuclear bombs, artillery shells and missiles to fend off a Soviet invasion of Europe.

“As new aircraft are coming online in the 1970s, their use as nuclear delivery aircraft would have been discussed,” Air Force historian Brian Laslie says. “Tactical delivery of nuclear weapons was surely to be in planning documents for a European theater conflict.”

For many in Washington, the devastating power of atomic arms was the only way to deter the Kremlin. On paper at least, Moscow and her Warsaw Pact allies had a terrifying advantage in sheer numbers of tanks and other armored vehicles.

“Since 1968 the USSR has built over 65,000 armored vehicles for maneuver—nearly four times as many tanks as the United States, some three times as many armored infantry carriers,” warned a recently declassified Central Intelligence Agency article published in 1980.

But why the Air Force would offer up a nuclear-armed A-10 as a potential solution isn’t entirely clear.

While the Warthogs boast an impressive and unequaled array of ground attack capabilities, the straight-winged strike planes are poorly suited at best—and a death trap at worst—for a nuclear bombing run.

“This is a ‘could versus should’ question,” says a senior Air Force weapons and tactics planner, who spoke to War Is Boring on the condition of anonymity. “Certainly, the A-10 could have been modified for nuke delivery.”

“However, the more to the point question is whether or not it should have,” adds the official, who is also a former Warthog pilot. “In my opinion, I can see practically no reason to do so.”

The problem is that while the aircraft certainly could have delivered the bombs to their intended targets, the pilots probably couldn’t make it back alive. The Warthog’s slow speed, so valuable when supporting troops on the ground, could have easily turned the entire affair into a suicide mission.

While the exact specifics are classified, a B-61 bomb can likely create a fireball almost a mile wide, according to data from nuclear historian Alex Wellerstein’s Nukemap Website.

The approximate radius of the air blast from the weapon going off—where “most residential buildings collapse, injuries are universal [and] fatalities are widespread”—would extend more than three miles from ground zero, Wellerstein’s site adds.

Fast-moving fighter jets would have trouble escaping the aftermath of these massive explosions. On a nuclear mission, the Air Force expected its fighter pilots to fly toward their targets at altitudes greater than 30,000 feet before lobbing bombs at the enemy.

With the bombs flying in an upward arc onto the target, the method would hopefully give the aircraft enough time to fly clear of the blast. But it’d still be a close call. The slower A-10s probably wouldn’t make it.

“The fact that F-15E Strike Eagles and other fighters would have had difficulty egressing [the area] after nuclear delivery indicates that any A-10 using nuclear weapons would not have survived,” Laslie says. “I just don’t think any nuclear delivery profile would have been sufficient for an A-10.”

The A-10 pilots would have had to hope for the best. But weapons fitted with a timed fuze might have bought just enough time for the Warthogs to get away from the impact site.

“Here’s one possibility … a last-ditch mission profile intended to blunt a Warsaw Pact breakthrough along the German border,” the Air Force officer suggests as one reason for sending the Warthogs on a nuclear mission.

Needless to say, the Air Force didn’t recommend strapping atomic weapons to the A-10s. Nor is there any record that the Air Force considered the idea ever again.

“I do not think I ever heard this capability discussed,” the former A-10 pilot says. “My guess is that we would have had a good laugh at the idea had it ever come up.”

The consensus appears to be that lobbing nuclear bombs is one thing the venerable Warthogs can’t—and shouldn’t—do.

Original published at War Is Boring, click the link: http://warisboring.com/articles/the-a-10-could-have-become-a-nuclear-strike-plane/

To read the article at The National Interest- http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-lethal-10-warthog-nuclear-bomber-13736

Is It Time to Bring Back the Battleships? ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Robert Farley)

USS Iowa ( Image source- Wikimedia Commons / Credits- United States Department of Defense)

Source- The National Interest

Author- Robert Farley

Is it time to bring back the battleship? 

For decades, naval architects have concentrated on building ships that, by the standards of the World Wars, are remarkably brittle. These ships can deal punishment at much greater ranges than their early 20th century counterparts, but they can’t take a hit. Is it time to reconsider this strategy, and once again build protected ships? This article examines how these trends came about, and what might change in the future.

Why We Build Big Ships

The label “battleship” emerges from the older “ship of the line” formulation, in the sense that a navy’s largest ships participated in the “line of battle” formation that allowed them to bring their broadsides to bear on an opposing line. After the development of ironclad warships, the “battle ship” diverged from the armored cruiser based on expectations of usage; “battleships” were expected to fight enemy “battleships.” The modern battleship form settled around 1890, with the British Royal Sovereign class. These ships displaced about 15,000 tons, with two heavy guns each in turrets fore and aft, and steel armor. The rest of the navies of the world adopted these basic design parameters, which provided a ship that could both deal out and absorb punishment. The process of ensuring survivability was simplified, in these early battleships, by the predictability of the threat. The most likely vector of attack in the late 1890s came from large naval artillery carried by other ships, and consequently protective schemes could concentrate on that threat.

The limitations of fire control meant that lethality didn’t increase much with size; HMS Lord Nelson, laid down 15 years later, displaced only 2000 tons more.  On roughly the same size hull, however, HMS Dreadnought took advantage of a number of innovations developed in the ensuing years, and with ten heavy guns became a far more lethal platform at roughly similar cost to previous ships. As a consequence, the survivability of smaller battleships dropped substantially, even against naval artillery.

From that point on, lethality and survivability increased dramatically with ship size, and the navies of the world responded accordingly. By 1915 the first line battleships of the Royal Navy would displace 27,000 tons; by 1920 the world’s largest battleship (HMS Hood) displaced 45,000 tons.  In 1921 international agreements would constrain warship size, although the Germans and Japanese in particularly imagined battleships of staggering proportions.

Why the Big Ships Went Out of Style

With the advent of the age of airpower (and missile power), size no longer dramatically increased lethality for surface warships. At the same time, a proliferation of threats made ensuring survivability more difficult. The huge battleships of the Second World War could not survive concerted air and submarine attack, and could not punch back at sufficient range to justify their main armament. Except for aircraft carriers, where lethality still increased with size, naval architecture took a turn for the petite. The chief surface ships of the U.S. Navy (USN) today displace less than a quarter that of the battleships of World War II.

Post-WWII ships also, broadly speaking, discarded the idea of armor as a means of ensuring survivability. There remains considerable debate as to how traditional battleship belt (side) armor could resist cruise missiles. Cruise missiles generally have less penetrating power than the largest naval artillery, although they have other advantages. Deck armor proved a more serious problem, and the demands of ensuring survivability from bombs, pop-up cruise missiles, and (more recently) ballistic missiles quickly outpaced the improved lethality of a large, heavily armored ship.  And perhaps most importantly, no one figured out how to eliminate (as opposed to ameliorate) the problem of underwater attack; torpedoes continued to pose a lethal threat to even the most heavily armored of warships.

Which isn’t to say that people haven’t tried. Several navies have played with the idea of large surface warships since the end of World War II. The Royal Navy considered redesigning and completing at least one member of the Lion class, abandoned in 1939. Studies eventually determined that the level of deck armor necessary to protect the ships from bombs would prove prohibitive. The Soviets maintained plans to build traditional gun-toting battleships into the 1950s, when the death of Stalin ended such a fantasy. France completed Jean Bart in 1952, and kept her in partial commission into the 1960s as a training and accommodation ship.

A new wave began in the 1970s, when the Soviet Union started construction on the Kirov class heavy missile cruisers, which quickly took on the name “battlecruisers.” The USN responded, in part, with the refurbishment of the four Iowa class battleships, which acquired long range missiles but remained in service for only a few years.

More recently, Russia, the United States, and China have all considered the construction of large surface warships.  The Russians periodically promise to build new Kirovs, a claim to take as seriously as the suggestion that Russia will build new Tu-160 strategic bombers.  One of the proposals for the CG(X) program involved a nuclear powered warship approaching 25,000 tons. The media has treated the Chinese Type 055 cruisers as a similar super-warship, but reports now indicate that the ship will displace around 12000-14000 tons, somewhat smaller than the US Zumwalt class destroyer.

What Has Changed?

Big ships still have some lethality advantages.  For example, bigger ships can carry larger magazines of missiles, which they can use for both offensive and defensive purposes.  Advances in gun technology (such as the 155mm Advanced Gun System to be mounted on the Zumwalt class destroyer) mean that large naval artillery can strike farther and more accurately than ever before.

But the most important advances may come in survivability.The biggest reason to build big ships may be the promise of electricity generation. The most interesting innovations in naval technology involve sensors, unmanned technology, lasers, and railguns, most of which are power intensive. Larger ships can generate more power, increasing not only their lethality (rail guns, sensors) but also their survivability (anti-missile lasers, defensive sensor technologies, close-defense systems). The missile magazines that large ships can carry although them to draw together these elements and lethality and survivability better than their smaller counterparts.

What about a true successor to the classic battleship, designed to both deal out and absorb punishment?  Advances in materials design have certainly increased the ability of other military systems (most notably the tank) to survive punishment, and a serious effort to create an armored ship would undoubtedly result in a well-protected vessel. The problem is that passive systems need to protect a ship from a wide range of different attacks, including cruise missiles, torpedoes, ballistic missiles, and long-range guns. Keeping a ship well-protected from these threats, all of which it could anticipate facing in an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) situation, would likely prove cost-prohibitive. It’s also worth noticing that while the battleships of yore could continue to sail and fight despite heavy damage to their various components, modern warship carry far more sensitive, deeply integrated technology, systems that might react poorly to otherwise-survivable ballistic missile strikes.

Parting Shots

Big ships with heavy armor are unlikely to solve the A2/AD dilemma.  However, big ships with effective systems of defense components, combined with a large number of extremely lethal offensive systems, can go a long way toward defeating a system of anti-access systems. In this sense, the “battleship” could return, although it will play a role more like a classic monitor (intended to fight against shore-based systems) than a line-of-battle-ship. And these new “battleships” will survive less because of their ability to absorb hits, than to avoid hits altogether.

About the author: Robert Farley is an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination and The Diplomat. Follow him on Twitter:@drfarls.

Link to the original article: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/it-time-bring-back-the-battleships-13734

Russia and China: Planning to Build Aircraft Carriers Together? ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Harry J.Kazianis)

Varyag being towed to China ( Image source- Wikimedia Commons / Credits- United States Naval War College)

Source- The National Interest

Author- Harry J.Kazianis

Could Beijing and Moscow’s budding friendship be moving towards the joint development of some of the most sophisticated types of naval vessels on the planet?

A recent report may indicate that China and Russia might be considering a big leap in military cooperation: the possibility of jointly developing an aircraft carrier.

Such an idea was raised in a recent piece in the Wall Street Journal near the very end of an article detailing Moscow’s struggles to develop advanced military hardware thanks to economic challenges.

The piece states specifically, “Russia has touted what it calls a strategic alliance with China, which may develop into plans to build a joint aircraft carrier.”

The articles continues, explaining that:

“A defense industry official, however, said China is raising its demands, and wants a controlling stake in the project.

‘We both tout the benefits of our friendship,’ the official said. ‘But the truth is, the Chinese are playing hardball.’”

With Russia now on the cusp of finally selling China the advanced Su-35 fighter, could both sides now be contemplating co-development of what some see as the ultimate weapon on the high-seas?

Reasons For and Against

There are a number of very basic reasons such a collaboration simply won’t happen.

Russia:

The reasons why Moscow would avoid such a partnership are straightforward.

First, Russia might simply not have the money for such a financially draining endeavor. Modern aircraft carriers cost billions of dollars to design, test and manufacture. Such a possibility seems silly when one considers that Moscow is struggling to modernize its military with other expensive pieces of hardware in the face of economic sanctions and sagging oil prices.

Conversely, Russia might be tempted into such a partnership if China was willing to help finance and develop Moscow’s efforts to create a new supercarrier. Such a carrier, widely reported in the press, would easily cost billions of dollars to create and could drain Russia’s military budget. But if Beijing was willing to pony up much of the costs, with Moscow willing to share the technology, it could prove to be quite tempting.

However, would Russia really want to give even more advanced military technology to China that could someday be used against them if relations with Beijing were to sour?

China:

Beijing could be swayed to work with Russia on a carrier project for a number of different reasons.

Aircraft Carrier development for China has been a top priority for several decades. As I noted back in 2011:

“Back in 1985, China purchased the World War II era Australian carrier HMAS Melbourne for a disposal fee, only to halt its break up for several years to study its design. The Chinese also purchased three Soviet era carriers in the 1990’s from Russia and the Ukraine: the Kiev, Minsk and Varyag. The Kiev and Minsk were indeed eventually turned into amusement parks. However, the Chinese studied both carriers carefully in their ongoing efforts to develop carrier technology. While both carriers possessed nowhere near the capabilities of modern US nuclear carriers, any secrets or technology the Chinese could learn on the cheap would have proved useful for later vessels. Spending millions initially instead of billions later so they could learn from others’ successes and failures would only have benefitted Chinese military planners and speeded up their efforts.”

But Beijing’s efforts did not stop there:

“...The Varyag, the most famous of their ‘casino’ acquisitions, was purchased [from Ukraine] in March 1998 for $20 million dollars. The Chinese company that purchased the vessel had strong ties to the Chinese military, and the then Varyag would become trapped in limbo for over 15 months. Turkish officials wouldn’t allow the carrier to move through the Dardanelles, citing a long-standing rule of not allowing carriers passage through the straits.  It has been rumoured that China then offered Turkey more than $360 million dollars in a nicely crafted ‘tourism and economic aid package’ to allow the passage of the presumed floating casino."

But the Varyag never was kitted out with slot machines or craps tables [to turn the carrier into a floating casino,as was the supposed reason for the sale]. Instead, the Soviet era carrier was completely stripped down and recreated into a more modern aircraft carrier.”

To this day, China has only the rebuilt former Varyag, now rechristened Liaoning, to show for its years of efforts. Even if China were to build multiple carriers, with Russia or on its own, one must remember that a carrier is not a stand-alone weapons platform. One must protect the carrier with assets that can ward off submarines, missiles and other forms of military power that could sink the floating airfield—costing additional billions more. At a time when the Chinese economy is starting to sour, would Beijing want to throw billions of dollars into such a project?

Is the Age of the Carrier Over?

There could be an even more powerful reason that a Sino-Russo carrier development project never gets off the ground: the march of technology.

As we have seen from China itself, many nations have developed weaponry specifically targeting aircraft carriers. While various types of missile platforms have been around for decades that have challenged the carrier’s dominance, their proliferation to many countries around the world—and in larger numbers—could certainly be an argument for Beijing and Moscow to spend their money elsewhere.

As Jerry Hendrix noted in a report for the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) back in 2013 when talking about China’s DF-21D, or "carrier-killer" and the threat it posed to U.S. carriers:

“Using a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV) placed on a CSS-5 missile, China’s Second Artillery Division states that its doctrine will be to saturate a target with multiple warheads and multiple axis attacks…”

Hendrix then notes the frightening cost advantage:

“While the United States does not know the cost of this weapons system, some analysts have estimated its procurement costs at $5 million to $11 million. Assuming the conservative, high-end estimate of $11 million per missile gives an exchange ratio of $11 million to $13.5 billion, which means that China could build 1,227 DF-21Ds for every carrier the United States builds going forward.”

So the question seems quite simple: Why would China place billions of dollars into carriers with Russia or even on its own when it is working to undermine the military utility of such a weapons platform in the first place?

Closing Thoughts:

Call me skeptical, but I don’t think we are going to see Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin standing dockside glouting over a jointly developed aircraft carrier anytime soon. While both nations have many areas in which to strengthen cooperation, carriers aren’t likely to be one of them.

Harry J. Kazianis serves as Executive Editor of The National Interest and a Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at the Center for the National Interest. He is the co-author and editor of the recent Center for the National Interest report: Tackling Asia’s Greatest Challenges - A U.S. Japan-Vietnam Trilateral Report. 

Original link to the article: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russia-chinas-next-big-deal-building-aircraft-carriers-13732

Top 10 Richest Countries in 2050. (updated in 2013)

TOP 4 MILITARY POWERS IN ASIA [FullHD 1080p] | 2015

Happy Onam

Image source- Wikimedia Commons / Author- Challiyan

Wishing all my readers a very happy and a prosperous Onam

Russia and Reliance Aerospace to make 200 helicopters in India ( Source- Russia & India Report)

Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Author- Зимин Василий

Source- Russia & India Report

The Russian government is providing a major boost to the Indian government’s ‘Make in India’ programme by choosing Reliance Defence & Aerospace (RDA) for a joint venture enterprise to build 197 units of the Kamov 226T helicopters in India.  According to media reports in the ‘Times of India’ and ‘Business Today’ on Friday (August 28) quoting informed sources, RDA has been chosen for the project to manufacture 197 helicopters for the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force.

According to the Times of India, under the agreement signed between Reliance Helicopters, Russian Helicopters and RosoboronExport, the official agency for defence exports of the Russian defence ministry, Reliance Helicopters will be the lead integrator for a licensed production arrangement with transfer of technology from Russia. According to the newspaper’s sources, the Reliance Group will have a majority 51% stake in the joint venture, while the remaining 49% will be held by the Russian government. 

The media reports said the project is to be executed under a new joint venture, for which the chosen Indian partner is a newly set-up helicopter wing of Reliance Defence, which, in turn, is a subsidiary of Reliance Infrastructure. The process to acquire the industrial licence and the land to house the manufacturing unit is underway. The Maharashtra state government has reportedly identified land for the project which will house the Reliance Group's proposed plant to manufacture the helicopters at Nagpur. 

The order to manufacture the almost 200 helicopters is valued at close to $1 billion. This is among the largest deals under the "Make in India" programme, and will see the manufacture of 197 Kamov 226T choppers to replace the ‘Chetak’ and ‘Cheetah’ fleets owned by the Indian Armed Forces.  Those helicopters have been operating for close to 30 years in frontline operations for the Indian armed forces, particularly in difficult, high-altitude terrains like the Siachen glacier, the sources noted.

The RDA is the defence segment of the Indian billionaire Anil Ambani-led Reliance Group, which was formed after the Indian government allowed private Indian companies to acquire rights to manufacture defence hardware last year.

During his visit to India in December 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin had pushed for the Ka-226T at his summit meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Having agreed to make these helicopters in India, Russia was offered an initial deal for manufacture of almost 200 of these helicopters, with the potential to increase the number by another 400."We are committed to actively participating in Prime Minister Modi's ‘Make in India’ and 'Skill India' programmes," the spokesperson for Reliance Defence said when asked for the company's comment on the deal, which involves manufacture of these light utility helicopters in the country. "The manufacture of both military and civil helicopters, to meet the needs of the country is a significant part of this commitment," the spokesperson said.

After extensive talks, the Russian government communicated to India that it will be implementing the project in a joint venture with an Indian company. The deal also involves transfer of technology and the partner Moscow chose for the project is Reliance Helicopters.

The Pipavav Defence Shipyards, also a part of the Anil Ambani – led Reliance Group, was selected by Zvyozdochka Shipyard of Russia to modernise 24 EKM 877 submarines in India. The RDA acquired the controlling stake in Pipavav shipyards earlier this year. The company was also selected by United Shipbuilding Company of Russia for the manufacture of four Talwar-class frigates, according to sources quoted in ‘Business Today.

Original link to the article- http://in.rbth.com/economics/defence/2015/08/28/rusia-and-reliance-aerospace-to-make-200-helicopters-in-india_393195

China-Russia Naval Ties And Balance Of Maritime Power In Asia – Analysis ( Source- Eurasia Review / Author- Abhijit Singh / IDSA)

Image source- Wikimedia Commons / Credits- Kremlin

Source- Eurasia Review

Author- Abhijit Singh / IDSA

One of the more interesting aspects of Asian maritime politics is the Russia-China naval relationship. Both are major maritime powers with considerable stakes in regional security. Like Beijing, Moscow has sought to safeguard its maritime interests in strategically vital spaces in the Asia-Pacific by initiating a military modernisation programme aimed at projecting a strong national image. Significantly, despite having common areas of interest and operations, the PLA Navy and the Russian Navy have managed to maintain a smooth working relationship, which has only been getting stronger with time.

The nautical synergy was on ample display when the Russian and Chinese navies embarked on their latest maritime interaction. “Joint Sea 2015 II”, which began in the Sea of Japan on August 20, is a naval exercise of unprecedented operational integration and a workout menu that features live-firing drills, anti-submarine operations, close-support combat drills and even joint-beach landings. The sheer magnitude of the exercise – in terms of the size of the fleets involved, the duration of engagement, and the nature of joint drills – makes it a remarkable undertaking. With 16 surface ships, two submarines, 12 naval aircraft, nine amphibious vehicles fielded by the Russian navy, and six warships, six helicopters, five fixed-wing aircraft and ambitious assets from the Chinese side, this is arguably the largest maritime exercise the two navies have ever been involved in.

It is the presence of 500 Chinese marines, however, that is the event’s most striking feature. After the Chinese defence white paper announced an expeditionary template of operations in May 2015, recent PLA-N exercises have had an amphibious component, including ground assault drills by marine forces. The PLA-N has also conducted a series of island defence exercises, involving the deployment of dedicated amphibious assets in the Western and Far-Eastern Pacific. In keeping with the new focus on expeditionary operations, the participating contingents are scheduled to stage a joint amphibious and airborne landing.

A follow-up to ‘Joint-Sea 2015’ – a smaller naval exercise held in the Mediterranean Sea and Black Sea in May 2015 – the ongoing interaction is ostensibly aimed at countering America’s strategic dominance of maritime-Eurasia. Russian and Chinese leaders believe that the US is the central destabilising factor in the region’s geopolitics and that it is involved in a systemic containment of Moscow and Beijing. By staging close-combat naval exercises, they hope to warn Washington that its days of lording over maritime-Asia are numbered.

To be sure, China and Russia have their political differences. Russia has had its concerns about Chinese encroachments in the Russian Far-East and the loss of Central Asia to China’s growing influence. However, following Moscow’s isolation in Europe after its annexation of Crimea, President Putin has had to acquiesce to growing Chinese ambitions in Russia’s zone of influence. In return, he hopes to clinch massive oil and gas deals, albeit at terms favourable to Beijing. In order to diversify Russian energy export markets away from Europe, Putin has had little option but to develop an asymmetric strategic partnership with China, granting the latter vital concessions and the status of a special ally.

Yet, Russia isn’t unduly worried. Ever since Moscow and Beijing signed an agreement in December 1992 on military technology cooperation, China has purchased more defence items from the Russian Federation than from all other countries combined. These include Kilo class submarines, Su-27 aircraft, Sovremenny class destroyers, and many varieties of munitions and missiles. Although Beijing’s dependence on Moscow for military platforms has reduced since 2006, Russia has continued the supply of vital maritime stores and equipment. For Russia’s strategic elite, growing maritime operational ties with China are a logical progression of the military relationship.

The trajectory of recent maritime exercises, however, suggests that the partnership has exceeded the original template of military cooperation. The naval drills are significant not only for the size of the contingents involved, but also for the quality of interaction, which now seems as comprehensive as the US Navy’s many structured drills with its Asia-Pacific partners. Needless to add, the maritime relationship has benefited from a huge political investment. Chastened by the West for Russian aggression in Ukraine, particularly the seizure of the Crimea, Putin has taken a personal interest in nurturing maritime ties with China. Beijing, in search of an ally to mount a counter-US Pivot strategy, has been happy to play along.

The nautical parleys also reveal the abiding connection between geopolitics and maritime strategy. The Sino-Russian maritime relationship is the product of a certain geopolitical context in which both countries have been feeling strategically vulnerable to US military pressure. Their evolving maritime strategy has been a reflection of regional maritime politics, which they sense is being orchestrated to Washington’s advantage. With territorial disputes in littoral-Asia serving as a focal point of maritime strategy, Russia and China have also watched US allies – Japan Philippines and Vietnam – bolster their military presence in the Asia-Pacific with a growing sense of alarm. Russia has responded by formally co-opting China as a ‘core partner’ in its new maritime doctrine, thus signalling a desire for greater maritime influence in the Asia-Pacific.

The symbolism of recent Sino-Russian maritime engagements is both notionally and functionally instructive. The military exercises have helped bolster the Sino-Russian strategic relationship, while reinforcing deterrence against perceived adversaries. By conducting the interactions in spaces dominated by America and its allies, Russia and China have sought to defy the US-led maritime order. Their choice of venue for the joint exercises has been equally symbolic. The May 2014 interaction was held in the Mediterranean and Black Sea – a NATO preserve, and a theatre virtually alien to the Chinese navy. And the Sea of Japan where the present exercises are being held has rarely seen a full-fledged Chinese naval deployment. Not only are these theatres considered politically off-limits for the Russian and Chinese navies, these are regions where the participating contingents run the risk of an accidental skirmish with other regional navies.

In material terms too, the drills have a significant implication. Through close-combat exercises, the Chinese and Russian navies have been able to bolster their ‘interoperability’ in the Asian littorals. Harmonising equipment functioning and standard operating procedures, the two navies have gained familiarity with functional methodologies specific to each other, while also finessing maritime doctrine for territorial defence and developing a logistical plan for joint operations.

The material and operational gains are, however, dwarfed by the strategic pay-off for Russia and China. The maritime exercises have provided a framework by which Russia and China can develop their individual and collective defensive capabilities. Intensive combat-oriented operations also serve to signal a shift in the strategic balance of Asia. While the US is still the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific, growing Chinese and Russian nautical interaction heralds the beginning of a multi-polar maritime order in Asia.

For India, maritime intimacy between Russia and China holds significant implications. In recent times, both Russia and China have expanded their strategic interaction with Pakistan. China’s decision to include the development of Gwadar port in the first phase of the proposed $46 billion corridor, as well as the impending contract for the transfer of eight Yuan class submarines make it Pakistan’s principal maritime partner and patron. Russia too has been deepening its defence ties with Pakistan, much to India’s chagrin. A growing Sino-Russian-Pakistani maritime nexus in the IOR poses a challenge to India’s influence in the Indian Ocean and heralds a potential change in the Asian balance of maritime power.

IDSA: The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) is a non-partisan, autonomous body dedicated to objective research and policy relevant studies on all aspects of defence and security. Its mission is to promote national and international security through the generation and dissemination of knowledge on defence and security-related issues. IDSA has been consistently ranked over the last few years as one of the top think tanks in Asia. View all posts by IDSA 

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/China-RussiaNavalTiesandtheBalanceofMaritimePowerinAsia_asingh_270815.html

Original link to the article- http://www.eurasiareview.com/28082015-china-russia-naval-ties-and-balance-of-maritime-power-in-asia-analysis/#comment-503484

A Military Game of Chicken in the South China Sea? ( Source- The Diplomat / Author- Pilin Fen-Kok)

Image credits- United States Navy

Source- The Diplomat

Author- Pilin Fen-Kok

Despite China’s protestations against discussing the issue, the South China Sea was front and center at this month’s meetings between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other regional players in Kuala Lumpur. Amid criticisms of China’s island-reclamation activities, the U.S. and China continued to trade accusations that the other is militarizing the South China Sea. Meanwhile, China maintained its objection, to no avail, to internationalizing the South China Sea issue through the involvement of non-ASEAN members.

The ship has sailed on both fronts. Now, more than ever, the South China Sea has become both a military and international issue. Given how all parties appear to have dug deeper into their positions, the situation looks unlikely to change anytime soon.

While Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi told his ASEAN counterparts that China has halted its reclamation of artificial islands on atolls and reefs in disputed parts of the Spratly Islands, it is proceeding with the construction of military installations on some of those islands.

Alarmed by the unprecedented scale on which China has conducted its reclamation activities (and is seeking to project force from these reclaimed features), the U.S., the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and others have engaged in a flurry of maritime patrols and joint exercises. The Chinese navy itself recently conducted large-scale air and sea drills, although it states that those were routine drills planned far in advance and not aimed at any third parties.

Southeast Asian countries are also building up their maritime military capabilities as part of a broader trend of increased defense spending in the region. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, defense expenditures in Southeast Asia rose by 44 percent, in real terms, between 2005 and 2014, reaching $35.9 billion in 2014. Vietnam, whose territorial claims overlap the most with China among all Southeast Asian claimants, increased its defense spending by 128 percent during this period and by 9.6 percent in 2014 alone.

Efforts to manage and contain tensions in the South China Sea are also now involving players beyond the territorial claimants—China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei—and, for that matter, ASEAN, which is still negotiating a code of conduct with China.

The U.S. involved itself several years ago, when then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said at an ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi in July 2010 that the United States has a “national interest” in freedom of navigation and would be willing to facilitate multilateral talks on the South China Sea issue.

Japan, which is involved in a territorial dispute with China in the East China Sea, has lent its political support to Vietnam and the Philippines, has proposed to participate in surveillance patrols in the area, has provided a patrol vessel to Vietnam and may do likewise to the Philippines—actions that could threaten Japan’s tenuous rapprochement with China. Australia, India and most recently, Britain, have also voiced concerns about the situation in the South China Sea.

Given the $5 trillion in global trade that passes through the South China Sea, the international attention is unsurprising, especially if the ability to navigate vital shipping routes could be compromised. However, the varying definitions of “freedom of navigation,” particularly as it relates to permitted (especially military) activities in exclusive economic zones (EEZs), have been an ongoing source of contention, prompting China to articulate its position on the limits to freedom of navigation following the ASEAN meetings.

Between the U.S. and China, such differences have already given rise to several dangerous incidents at sea and in the air over the years. These include the deadly collision between a U.S. navy EP-3 surveillance plane and a Chinese J-8 fighter jet in 2001, the 2009 harassment of the USNS Impeccable by Chinese vessels, and more recently, the buzzing of a U.S. navy P-8 plane by a Chinese J-11 fighter jet in 2014. (All these episodes occurred off the coast of Hainan.)

Even as external parties have become more vocal about their concerns, they have made it a point to distinguish between taking an interest in managing the situation and choosing sides on the territorial claims themselves. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel drew that distinction when he remarked that the U.S. remains neutral about the merits of the sovereignty claims but is “not neutral” when it comes to the resolution of disputes in accordance with international law. Yet he has also shown how delicate that balance is, having previously publicly questioned the legal validity of the nine-dashed line, which forms the basis of China’s territorial claims.

A greater source of potential conflict is what now appears to be an increasing propensity of all parties to turn to military deterrence to defend their interests in the South China Sea. This trend will be difficult to reverse as long as each side perceives others to be raising the stakes—which makes the implementation of maritime confidence-building measures (CBMs) all the more important at this juncture.

The most significant CBM would be a binding code of conduct between ASEAN and China, negotiations on which are proceeding slowly. On the more immediate front, China and ASEAN are reportedly in discussions to establish a hotline to deal with emergencies in the South China Sea. The United States and China are making good on their November 2014 agreements on two sets of military confidence-building measures, regarding the notification of major military activities and rules of behavior for air and maritime encounters. As part of this process, both governments are aiming to agree on an annex on air-to-air encounters by September 2015, to complement the rules on at-sea encounters that have already been agreed upon.

More broadly in the region, the U.S., Chinese and other navies have begun practicing the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea during joint exercises or routine maritime operations.

But CBMs alone are not sufficient if the default position is still to undertake risky behavior. Such risky behavior could be in the form of reckless or aggressive actions by vessel crew that lead to inadvertent conflict. Tensions could also escalate when parties act on threat assessments based on suspicion or a lack of clarity regarding the other’s strategic intentions.

In short, CBMs that seek to avoid or mitigate the risk of maritime clashes need to be accompanied by efforts to facilitate an environment that constrains the tendency for conflict. Such efforts could include: toning down inflammatory rhetoric and breaking the vicious cycle of alternately ratcheting such rhetoric up and down; encouraging constructive behavior, or at least discouraging (or refraining from) provocative behavior (the latter is formalized in the ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea); and maintaining open channels of communication through which all sides are willing to explain their respective positions on the issues and talk to, not past, one another.

As the meetings in Malaysia showed, those are tougher to materialize: Harsh rhetoric abounded, and the countries could not agree on the halting of provocative actions. Yet, an alternative would be a much more dangerous scenario that would allow such differences to play out in a game of military “chicken” in and above increasingly crowded waters.

About the author- Piin-Fen Kok is director of the China, East Asia and United States program at the EastWest Institute. This piece was originally published on the EastWest Institute website. 

Original link to the article- http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/a-military-game-of-chicken-in-the-south-china-sea/

Russia's Lethal Stealth PAK-FA T-50 Fighter: High Hopes, Big Price Tag ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Harry J. Kazianis)

Sukhoi PAK-FA ( Image source- Wikimedia Commons / Credits- Dmitry Zherdin)

Source- The National Interest

Author- Harry J. Kazianis

Reports in the Russian media, if accurate, have made a bold claim: Moscow’s PAK-FA T-50 fighter could be much closer to joining Russia’s air force than many expected. However, economic pressures and technological challenges could be a big bottleneck to the program going forward.

In an article by Russia Today, it was reported that “in 2016 the Russian Air Force will get ready to put the first production models of the stealth fighter jet into service.”

RT added: “All weapons and technical innovation in design for the PAK-FA are promised to be ready by 2020, which, among others, will include 12 types of missiles alone, six of which are to be ready by 2017. Some of the PAK-FA missiles will be hypersonic, with most designed specially to fit into fighter’s inner bays so as not to interfere with its stealth characteristics.”

Many in Western circles feel the advanced fifth-generation fighter could be quite capable and a big upgrade for Russia’s air force.

“The analysis that I have seen on the PAK-FA indicates a pretty sophisticated design that is at least equal to, and some have said even superior to U.S. fifth-generation aircraft,” former U.S. Air Force intelligence chief Lt. Gen. Dave Deptula told TNI back in December of last year. “It certainly has greater agility with its combination of thrust vectoring, all moving tail surfaces, and excellent aerodynamic design, than does the F-35.”

Others who are in the know also agree the jet could prove quite sophisticated, rivaling the best Western fighter jets.

“Performance-wise it certainly looks to compete with the Raptor,” one senior military official with extensive experience on U.S. fifth-generation fighters told TNI, also back in December.

But Can Russia Afford It?:

While the PAK-FA certainly has potential, the biggest challenge—just like with the American F-22 and F-35 fifth-generation fighter programs—seems to be cost.

Several months ago, Russia cut its initial order from over fifty planes to just twelve. The most likely reasons for such a move? Western sanctions that are taking a big bite out of the Russian economy along with low oil prices.

Yuri Borisov, Russia’s deputy defense minister for armaments, explained back in March that  “Given the new economic conditions, the original plans may have to be adjusted.” He noted that “It is better to have the PAK FA kept as a reserve, and later move forward, while squeezing everything possible for now out of the 4+ generation fighters.”

And Just How Good Will the “Tech” Be?

While cost will be a factor, there is also the question of how strongly Russia can put together one of the big advantages the F-35 seems to hold: sensor and data fusion, along with advanced avionics.

“The real question is can the Russians achieve the same degree of data fusion and networking capabilities of the F-22A and F-35—right now I’d put my money on the U.S. and our allies in that regard,” Deptula explained to TNI in December.

When it comes to the question of avionics, an industry source told TNI the PAK-FA is closer to a Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet or F-16E/F Block 60 than an F-22 or F-35. “Some may claim that the PAK-FA is a 5th gen. fighter, but it's more of a 4.5 gen. fighter by U.S. standards,” the industry official said.

About the author: Harry J. Kazianis serves as Executive Editor of The National Interest and a Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at the Center for the National Interest. He is the co-author and editor of the recent Center for the National Interest report: Tackling Asia’s Greatest Challenges - A U.S. Japan-Vietnam Trilateral Report. You can follow him on Twitter: @grecianformula and on Linkedin.

Original link to the article: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russias-lethal-stealth-pak-fa-t-50-fighter-high-hopes-big-13718

Will China's Economic Collapse Save the South China Sea? ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Minxin Pei)

Chinese Finance Minister Lou Jiwei ( Credits- Internet image)

Source- The National Interest

Author- Minxin Pei

Not too long ago, the Chinese economy appeared to defy both gravity and doomsayers. Despite years of unbalanced growth, Beijing has managed to rely on investment to power its economy and keep growth high. The country’s binge on credit since 2009, which has brought the debt-to-GDP ratio close to 300 percent, a perilous level for an upper-middle income country, has not triggered a financial crisis. Its real estate bubble, perhaps the largest the world has ever seen in terms of completed but unoccupied residential housing, is leaking air but has yet to crash totally.

It was this appearance of economic invincibility that has emboldened the Chinese government to embark on an ambitious but highly-risky new foreign policy in the last few years. Many Chinese elites saw the United States and the rest of the West as in inexorable decline and China’s rise unstoppable. Hubris has led to the adoption of economic and security policies that would certainly make the late Deng Xiaoping turn in his grave. Instead of maintaining a low profile, Beijing has greatly extended its economic commitments abroad and begun openly challenging the U.S.-led security order in East Asia.

On the economic front, China has committed over $100 billion to capitalize the Asian Infrastructure Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank, and the New Silk Road Fund, a set of financial institutions and vehicles designed to extend Chinese influence abroad and actively compete against existing international financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. In the developing world, China has also bet heavily on exploiting natural resources and large infrastructure projects. In Latin America, China has loaned out nearly $120 billion since 2005. In Africa, Chinese investments and development loans are estimated to have exceeded $100 billion. Faced with a rival backed by nearly $4 trillion in foreign currency reserves, all the West could do was to worry privately but complain publicly about China’s inadequate environmental and human rights practices in its investment activities abroad.

The boldest step China has taken in the context of its apparent economic strength is, without any doubt, its approach toward territorial and maritime disputes in East Asia. While previous leaders deliberately shelved the intractable and potentially dangerous disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea, the current Chinese leadership has taken a far more confrontational approach in the belief that, with its growing economic strength and military power, China no longer needs to be deferential to the interests and sensitivities of the United States and its allies in the region. As a result, in the last two years, China has escalated tensions by establishing a controversial Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and built several large artificial islands in the contested waters of the South China Sea.

Now that China’s economic engine is finally stalling and its weaknesses are inescapably visible, the obvious question is whether China can continue to sustain its assertive foreign policy. Based on past Chinese behavior and existing hard constraints, it seems that, if there is anything positive coming out of China’s economic unraveling, it will be a less assertive foreign policy.

Despite the enormous foreign policy risks taken by President Xi Jinping, cautious pragmatism has been the modus operandi of Chinese leaders in the post-Mao era. Xi’s three predecessors, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, were all keenly aware of the disparity of power between China and the West, particularly the United States. As such they made substantial foreign policy concessions when China’s economic weakness dictated a cooperative foreign policy. For example, Deng did not allow the issue of American arms sales to Taiwan to block the development of U.S.-China commercial relations. Jiang exercised enormous restraint over the Taiwan issue in the late 1990s so that the United States could support China’s entry into the WTO.

If Chinese growth in the short-term requires more exports to the West, it is inconceivable that Beijing can succeed in this task while sticking to its aggressive policies in the South China Sea.

At the same time, declining economic fortunes at home will also significantly limit Beijing’s capacity to finance its grandiose and risky economic projects in the developing world. Given the falling commodity prices and the dubious economic justifications for these projects, we should expect a wave of defaults in the coming years, both embarrassing Beijing and testing its ability to pour money down a rabbit hole.

Most importantly, continuing economic weakness will necessitate redeploying China’s limited financial resources to sustain domestic growth. Since the Communist Party’s rule rests on its economic performance, if President Xi is forced to choose between external glory and regime survival, no one should doubt which choice he will make.

So the silver lining in China’s economic maladies is that Asia’s new sick man is not as threatening as when he was strong.

About the author- Minxin Pei is the Tom and Margot Pritzker ’72 Professor of Government at Claremont McKenna College and a non-resident senior fellow of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Original link to the article- http://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-chinas-economic-collapse-save-the-south-china-sea-13713