South China Sea: No Win-Win for China and US ( Source- The Diplomat / Authors- Bernard Fook Weng Loo and Koh Swee Lean Collin)

Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / United States Navy

Source- The Diplomat

Author- Bernard Fook Weng Loo and Koh Swee Lean Collin

In October 2015, the U.S. Navy announced that it was preparing to send a surface combatant to sail within 12 nautical miles – what the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) recognizes as the territorial waters of littoral states – of the artificial islands that China has been constructing in the South China Sea. On October 27, the USS Lassen, an Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer, patrolled within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, in the Spratly Islands.

As Ashton Carter, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, said, “Make no mistake, the United States will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, as we do around the world, and the South China Sea will not be an exception.”

The move has potentially serious consequences for the security and stability of the South China Sea and Southeast Asia, especially when one considers the more intrusive nature of prospective U.S. Navy intelligence-gathering activities so close to the artificial islands. The U.S. Navy risks creating a situation where there is no win-win solution for either the United States or China.

At least two possible scenarios eventuate from this policy position: One, China is forced to back down and lose any credibility as a great power that has overcome its Century of Humiliation; or two, the U.S. ultimately gives way on future freedom of navigation patrols, undermining at best the credibility of its security guarantees to its allies and security partners in the Asia-Pacific.

Legal and Strategic Aspects of the Artificial Islands

The problem of the artificial islands is complicated. One, its legal status is contested. The U.S. holds to the position that there is no 12 nautical mile limit that China can claim around these artificial islands, as the original features are not islands as defined by UNCLOS. Of course, the U.S. position is potentially weakened by the fact that it has yet to ratify UNCLOS. On the other hand, as Chinese President Xi Jinping said in his recent visit to the U.S., China’s claim of sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea dates back to “ancient times.” Clearly, China is not about to budge on its claims of sovereignty over the islands and reefs of the South China Sea.

Two, these artificial islands are geostrategically very important. Sitting in the center of the South China Sea, whoever controls the waters around these artificial islands potentially controls the entire South China Sea. Indeed, Carl Thayer argues that “China is slowly excising the maritime heart out of Southeast Asia.”

It is true that Xi, however, also pledged that China will not “militarize” the artificial islands. However, as Bonnie Glaser noted, while Xi’s statement might be “new language,” it is nevertheless unclear what exactly “militarization” means: “No fighters using the air strips? No deployment of missiles?” These questions remain unanswered.

The Strategic Symbolism of the U.S. Decision

The U.S. move may be an attempt to weaken China’s position in its various territorial disputes with other regional states. The U.S. holds to the position that in the case of China’s territorial dispute with Japan, Chinese coastguard vessels routinely sail within 12 nautical miles of the disputed islands. This U.S. announcement is therefore a reflection of these Chinese actions, and may undermine the legality of the artificial islands as a sovereign part of China. There is therefore a symbolism inherent in this U.S. decision, to demonstrate the bankruptcy of China’s claims.

Of course, there is another potential narrative at work, one that stems from the so-called geopolitical pivot that the first Obama administration had announced in 2011. In this case, a U.S. naval presence in the South China Sea is itself not potentially problematic, but merely the manifestation of this supposed geopolitical pivot. Such deployments might therefore be merely gestures designed to reassure its allies and security partners of the continued commitment of the U.S. to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

Implications for U.S. Intelligence Gathering against China

It is well known that Beijing has long been especially concerned about close-in surveillance conducted by U.S. military aerial assets near Chinese coasts, especially above the Chinese-claimed exclusive economic zones (EEZs). China’s response to the U.S. Navy’s EP-3 signal intelligence aircraft in April 2001 off Hainan Island is instructive of Beijing’s disapproval of what it perceives as activities that impinge upon its national security interests. As South China Sea tensions rise, the number of aerial incidents involving Chinese interceptors and U.S. surveillance aircraft has surged.

The higher frequencies (thus shorter wavelengths) that modern electromagnetic transmitters such as radars and communication systems operate on necessitate signal intelligence platforms to operate closer to these transmitters. Having in the past performed such intelligence gathering activities within China’s EEZs, moving even closer to the artificial islands where military infrastructure development is reportedly taking place is akin to upping the ante and could therefore be perceived as even more provocative. For one thing, unlike an aerial asset, the surface warship can loiter in the area for longer durations. This allows the vessel’s signal intelligence systems a greater chance to intercept more detailed, and possibly more precise, technical information about the electromagnetic transmitters installed on the Chinese-occupied features, since variable marine environmental conditions coupled with distance may attenuate the signal quality.

Not only that, a vessel deployed at such close proximity to the coast allows it the opportunity to glean a more diverse range of technical intelligence, such as visual information that satellite or aerial imagery may fail to observe. On the above counts, therefore, deploying a surface vessel instead of an aerial platform so close to the sensitive sites becomes particularly disconcerting to the Chinese. In December last year, a Vietnamese warship reportedly sailed within a few hundred meters of Chinese-occupied Johnson South Reef to observe ongoing construction activities. It was later shooed away by a Chinese frigate. A similar standoff may potentially repeat itself when the U.S. Navy begins to sail within 12 nautical miles of those artificial islands and begin to conduct perceivably more intrusive intelligence-gathering activities.

Likely Outcomes?

The U.S. decision, together with China’s unwillingness to compromise on its South China Sea claims, has created a potential winner-take-all situation. It is difficult to see how a win-win situation could eventuate. The reality is that neither China nor the U.S. can back down without losing credibility and face.

If the U.S. ultimately gives way, it risks losing credibility in the eyes of its allies and security partners in the Asia-Pacific region. It would undermine the U.S. role as the principal security guarantor – something that most states in the Asia-Pacific are at least tacitly comfortable with. For allies like Japan and South Korea, this may force them to subsequently choose between continuing to rely on a patently unreliable security guarantor, moving towards a more conciliatory or positive stance with regards to China, or seeking to enhance their existing military capabilities. For Japan, the nuclear weapons option will be tempting – and quickly achievable, by most assessments. At the very least, the third option will likely bring about a Sino-Japanese arms race, a prospect that surely few states in the region would welcome.

Likewise, China cannot afford to back down from its South China Sea claims: Doing so would undermine China’s great power status and would force China to revisit its so-called Century of Humiliation. It is difficult to see how China could accept such an eventuality.

Of course, neither scenario has to end in a great power war. Proper diplomatic management, together with crisis management mechanisms if a crisis erupts, can prevent a Sino-American war from breaking out. But it does raise the possibility that incidents and close encounters between the two armed forces, something that has become commonplace, might also spark conflict. And while both countries have managed their bilateral relationship well thus far, this does not provide any guarantees against the worst-case scenario.

What this therefore means is that it becomes all the more important that a solution – one that is not winner-takes-all in nature – needs to be found. Both China and the U.S. need to find a way in which both can walk away without making too many sacrifices on their respective core interests. Whether or not such a win-win solution can be found remains to be seen.

About the author- Bernard Fook Weng Loo is Associate Professor and Coordinator of the Master of Science (Strategic Studies) Degree Programme, and Koh Swee Lean Collin is Associate Research Fellow at the Maritime Security Programme of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Original article was published here @ The Diplomat

Russia's Lethal Su-35 Fighter vs. China's J-11: Who Wins? ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Dave Majumdar)

Sukhoi SU-35 S ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Aleksandr Medvedev)

Source- The National Interest

Author- Dave Manjumdar

While the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker series was originally developed in the Soviet Union to counter the American F-15 Eagle air superiority fighter, the design has evolved beyond what its designers might have imagined. Variations of the Flanker are not just built in Russia; China has its own knock-offs.

Russia produces myriad variations of the Flanker that range from the relatively basic Su-30M2 to the top-of-the-line Su-35S Flanker-E. But moreover, there are a host of Chinese-made copies of the Flanker. And China continues to tinker with the design to develop ever more advanced and creative variations of the original Soviet design. Most of these Chinese knock-offs are unlicensed derivatives that Beijing reverse engineered and modified from the original Russian hardware. Indeed, it’s not beyond the realm of possibility that Chinese and Russian derivatives of the Flanker will be fighting over sales in the coming years. One can easily imagine a scenario where Sukhoi’s Su-35 goes head-to-head with the J-11D in a future export battle.

Overall, for now at least, Russian-built Flankers retain the technical edge over their inferior Chinese copies. Sukhoi’s Su-35S is by far the most capable version of the Flanker that has been built to date. It has advanced avionics, a much-improved airframe and new motors with three-dimensional thrust vectoring. It’s a very capable fighter that—if fielded in numbers—would be a potent threat to Western air forces. Other Russian Flanker variants like the Su-30SM and Su-34 are also very capable warplanes.

But the Chinese are catching up—they’ve gone beyond just reverse engineering and have started to branch off into original works of their own. Indeed, a senior U.S. industry official once told me that the Chinese are starting to embark on an aerospace “renaissance.” The main problem for the Chinese is that they are woefully behind on engine technology. While Chinese engineers are able to build working engines in the lab, they are not able to build reliable production jet engines. It remains their single biggest Achilles’ Heel.

While the Chinese are almost certainly catching up on aircraft avionics and sensors, it is not clear how capable their systems are. It is evident that the Chinese are developing passive electronically scanned array radar and active electronically scanned array radars, but how close those systems are to “prime time” is not clear. Similarly, the Chinese are developing their own electronic warfare systems, infrared search and track and electro-optical targeting systems. But there is very little data on how those systems might perform in the real world—even if the brochures are impressive. Given that the Chinese are relative novices at building indigenous combat aircraft and their subsystems, it is highly likely that most of the original Russian-built Flanker variants are still superior to Beijing’s knock-offs.

Nonetheless, Beijing’s aerospace industry has produced an impressive array of Flanker clones. In addition to the original J-11, J-11A and the indigenized J-11B—China is working on advanced derivatives including the J-11BS, J-11D and the J-16 strike fighter. The Chinese have also developed the J-15 carrier-variant from a prototype of the Su-33 Flanker. The three most capable Chinese Flankers are the J-15, J-11D and J-16.  The J-11D is in many respects the Chinese equivalent of the Su-35—but it is overall less capable with inferior maneuverability and inferior avionics and powerplant. But it’s probably cheaper—and might be an attractive export product if the Chinese could craft operationally useable engines. But that’s still a ways off.

China will eventually be able to compete with and even one day surpass Russia in the military aviation industry. The Chinese have a lot of money and they are willing to spend it on developing their capabilities. The Chinese are also more than willing to steal any technology that they don’t already possess—and that helps save development time and money. Moreover, now that they have more or less picked Russia clean of any useful technological innovations, Beijing is focusing on raiding the U.S. defense-aerospace sector for American technical knowhow.

But ultimately, China is clearly hamstrung by a lack of indigenous innovation and horrendously bad quality controls—one of the many reason Beijing continues to fail in it is efforts to build a working jet engine. Until Beijing perfects jet engines, its aerospace industry will not be able secure customers independent of Russia.

Dave Majumdar is the defense editor for The National Interest. You can follow him on Twitter: @davemajumdar.

Original article published here @ The National Interest

Why Russia chose India over China to develop T-50 stealth fighter ( Source- Want China Times)

Sukhoi PAK-FA ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Alex Beltyukov)

Source- Want China Times 

While China is considered a key partner for Russia, Moscow is turning to India to jointly develop the T-50 fifth-generation stealth fighter to prevent Beijing from stealing its advanced technology, our sister paper Want Daily reports.

China has had a reputation for stealing technology from Russia since the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, China became one of the chief buyers of Russian-built Su-27 fighters and Russia allowed the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation to open up a production line to build the fighter for both the PLA Air Force and Navy, which was known as J-11.

China subsequently acquired a license from Russia to upgrade the J-11 into the more advanced J-11B. However, China became a potential challenger in the export market for military aircraft when it began to sell the aircraft to other nations.

To avoid Chinese engineers back-engineering its technology and claiming it as their own, Russia has chosen China's regional competitor India to develop the T-50 fighter together. Though India does not have the technology to develop a fifth-generation fighter, it can contribute through financial support.

China is working on its own stealth fighters, the J-20 and J-31.

Original article was published here @ Want China Times 

Evaluating India-Africa Maritime Relations ( Source- The Diplomat / Author- Abhijit Singh)

INS Mysore D-60 ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Indian Navy)

Source- The Diplomat

Author- Abhijit Singh

On October 26, leaders of 54 African nations gathered in New Delhi for the third edition of the four-day India-Africa Forum Summit – an event billed in the Indian media as India’s most ambitious outreach program towards Africa. On the eve of the high-level conclave, reports indicated that Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s proposed launch of “a new era of India-Africa relations” included a plan for the comprehensive development of Africa’s littorals. In keeping with India’s expanded focus on Africa’s maritime economic potential, commentary in the media suggested, the Indian government was keen to formalize a wide-ranging maritime partnership.

Indeed, the past few years have witnessed a reorientation in India’s nautical outlook towards Africa. With increasing emphasis on developing maritime relationships with Mozambique, Kenya, Tanzania, Madagascar, Seychelles and Mauritius, India has reached out to African states through offers of greater military aid, capacity-building and training assistance. With its economic engagement in the African continent growing rapidly, New Delhi has also sought to widen its sphere of influence in the Western Indian Ocean. In a display of a more purposeful maritime diplomacy, Indian naval ships have increased their port visits to Africa’s East coast and smaller Indian Ocean island states.

Yet, India’s essential approach to maritime cooperation has revolved around anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. While it has provided security assistance to small island states in the Indian Ocean (undertaking regular patrols in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Mauritius and Seychelles, carrying out hydrographic surveys, even providing assistance in the establishment of a coastal radar network) the Indian Navy’s larger security initiatives have been animated by the need to safeguard energy and resource shipments in the waters off Somalia. Consequently, India’s most significant achievement in Africa has been the naval escorting of more than 3000 merchantmen since 2008, in the pirate-infested waters off the Horn of Africa.

Not surprisingly then, India’s security role in the Africa’s continental littorals has struggled to move beyond the set parameters of anti-piracy collaboration. With Indian naval ships constantly involved in collective maritime patrols in the Gulf of Aden and the East African coast, capacity building efforts – in terms of the provision of security and surveillance assets and critical technology to African navies and coast guards to help them perform basic constabulary functions – have remained rudimentary.

New Delhi’s inability to raise its security game in Africa, however, is only a smaller adjunct to its wider failure to leverage Africa’s huge maritime economic potential. With rising economic development and the gradual integration of African states into the global economy, Africa’s maritime sector has shown great promise. But even as African institutions and governments come together in a rare show of unity to secure the nautical commons, New Delhi has been lacking in its appreciation of Africa’s maritime developmental needs.

More crucially, Africa’s efforts to evolve a harmonizing vision for the continent’s economic sector have received little help from New Delhi. In January 2014, the African Union announced an Integrated Maritime Strategy- 2050 and “Plan of Action,” outlining a blueprint to address the continent’s maritime challenges for sustainable development and competitiveness. The strategy, meant to systematically address Africa’s maritime vulnerabilities, marked a declaratory shift away from a period of self-imposed sea blindness. While the plan differed from the individual maritime strategies of Africa’s other security communities – each having their own unique vision of comprehensive maritime developmental – there was hope that experienced maritime partners like India would assist in reconciling key divergences to develop a more coherent maritime vision for the continent.

Unfortunately, security discussions in New Delhi have continued to revolve almost exclusively around India’s political influence along the Africa’s Indian Ocean Rim. With a rise in pirate attacks in the Gulf of Guinea and India’s inability to contribute substantively to West Africa’s security needs, an impression has been created that New Delhi remains reluctant to provide security assistance in spaces deemed geopolitically unimportant.

Gulf of Guinea Piracy

Since 2012, the Gulf of Guinea has emerged as one of the most pirate-infested waters in the world, posing an urgent security threat to the maritime environment. Following a substantial decline in Somali piracy, growing attacks on the West coast of Africa have caused great public alarm. With an assault on local shipping nearly every second week, the Gulf of Guinea has emerged as the new epicenter of global piracy.

Attacks in the Gulf, however, have followed a template different from that observed in the waters off Somalia. On the east coast of Africa, pirates captured ships and crews for ransom, venturing deep into the Southern and Western Indian Ocean. In contrast, attacks on West African shipping have been localized, with assailants mostly targeting anchored vessels for cash and cargoes of fuel. But this has also meant that assaults are better planned, with gangs working to a precise strategy including short attack spans and foolproof get-away methods.

The lead role in tackling piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has been played by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Commission. The thrust of its efforts has been to establish a better system of regional surveillance and joint patrolling. In March this year, with the help of international assistance, the ECOWAS setup a multinational maritime coordination center (MMCC) for a maritime zone christened Pilot Zone E. The new center covers West Africa’s most sensitive security hot-spots, spanning a vast region comprising Benin, Niger, Nigeria and Togo and was deemed an important milestone in the implementation of the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS).

As expected, India did not offer any assistance for the creation of the new station. New Delhi seems oblivious to the fact that West African states have been seeking credible partners in the maritime domain. Assistance was forthcoming only from the U.S., European Union and the International Maritime Organization, but the Indian Navy is poised to offer greater patrolling assets and remote surveillance systems to monitor the endangered maritime spaces. India’s maritime policymakers, however, haven’t displayed the strategic imaginativeness to generate goodwill and political capital in West Africa by offering greater capacity-building assistance.

The Way Ahead

It is now clear that Somali piracy cannot be the pivot of India’s maritime security efforts in Africa. With piracy levels in the waters of Somalia dipping dramatically, the Indian Navy needs a fresh approach to the continent. In its new role, hard-security contribution is likely to be subordinate to capacity building efforts. As the rise in armed attacks in the Gulf of Guinea have shown, the malady afflicting African coastal states today isn’t so much the lack of security at sea, but the absence of authority and governance, exemplified by insufficient institutional capacity and an underdeveloped maritime economy.

Today, there is a growing realization among Africa’s coastal states that their major maritime challenges stem from a lack of effective governance in the maritime commons. It is the illegal capture of resources – overfishing in the African EEZs, rampant exploitation of the seas, drug smuggling, arms trafficking, and the widespread pollution of coastal waters – that has thwarted African efforts to build an effective maritime governance system. Africa needs not only maritime administration frameworks and the local capacity to enforce regulations, but also a model for sustainable “blue-economy” development that does not result in the destruction of its natural maritime habitat. In this, it could benefit from India’s assistance.

There is now a developing view among Indian analysts and policymakers that India’s growing maritime influence, and African expectations of increased commitment by partner states in supporting regional maritime initiatives, leaves New Delhi with little option but to bolster its involvement in coastal Africa. India’s recent stress on security in the South Western Indian Ocean – through its capacity building efforts in the Indian Ocean archipelago, as well as its flagship endeavor, the IBSAMAR exercises – shows that New Delhi has been recalibrating and updating its maritime policy towards Africa.

If India hopes to partner Africa in striving for a prosperous future, it must work with it in the creation of a maritime system. Through infrastructure creation and the strengthening of legal frameworks and institutions, New Delhi can join with African states in the effective governance of Africa’s maritime commons. India’s guiding text is the African Union’s Agenda-2063 document spelling out Africa’s vision over the next five decades, aligned closely with its own “development goals” and “international aspirations.”

But New Delhi is also aware that other than hard security tasks, it must play a role in developing a comprehensive continental strategy that can improve the lives of African people by creating a model of sustainable maritime development.

About the author- Abhijit Singh is a fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses at New Delhi. He can be followed on @abhijit227.

Original article was published here @ The Diplomat 

USS Lassen
 ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons/ United States Navy)

Source- Want China Times

President Xi Jinping of China is faced with a dilemma on how to respond to a US Navy vessel's patrol close to two reefs controlled by China in the disputed South China Sea, Ding Shuh-fan, director of the Institute of International Relations of National Chengchi University in Taipei said Tuesday.

The USS Lassen sailed to waters within the 12 nautical mile territorial limit claimed by China around the artificial islands China has built on Subi and Mischief reefs earlier in the day in a challenge to China's territorial claims to uphold freedom of navigation.

Ding said both China and the US will maintain their "fight without breaking" strategy, meaning exercising self-constraint to avoid further escalation of tensions while continuing to compete with each other.

Ding said the US is fully justified in its action based on legal principles as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea states that foreign vessels, both military and civilian, are allowed innocent passage through territorial waters.

By deploying a vessel within 12 nautical miles of the two reefs, the US means to "deny China's claim of sovereignty over the waters," Ding said, adding that Washington would accuse Beijing of violating international law if China takes any move to intercept the US vessel.

If China fails to react strongly, it would mean that Xi accepts the international law, but that would unavoidably cause domestic doubts about Xi's leadership in foreign affairs, making it very difficult to face domestic hawks like the PLA general Luo Yuan, who has said that China must deal heavy blows to those who break through the battle lines of the country's national interests.

Ding said that to some extent, the rise of Chinese nationalism has placed China and the rest of the world in a perilous situation, and it would substantiate the "China threat thesis" if Chinese vessels were sent to confront or collide with US ships.

The USS Lassen, a guided-missile destroyer based in Yokosuka, Japan, has left the waters without encountering any Chinese military action.

Spokesperson for China's foreign ministry Lu Kang said the USS Lassen "illegally entered the waters of China's Spratly islands," and the relevant authorities have "monitored, followed and warned" the vessel and lodged a protest against what it described as an "irresponsible US action."

The islands of the South China Sea, an area rich in natural resources, are claimed in whole or in part by Taiwan, China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.

To enhance its substantial control of the South China Sea, China from September 2013 launched land reclamation projects on several reefs and has built extensive facilities including airstrips. Beijing claims the installations are for mainly civilian and humanitarian purposes, despite their obvious military applications.

Original article appeared here @ Want China Times

Stealing their Thunder: India to offer Tejas fighter to Sri Lanka ( Source- Want China Times)

HAL Tejas ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Subharnab)

Source- Want China Times

India plans to export its LCA Tejas multirole fighter to Sri Lanka to compete with the JF-17 Thunder or FC-1 Xiaolong multirole fighter developed jointly by China and Pakistan, according to a senior officials from Colombo, the Sunday Observer, an English-language weekly based in Colombo, reported on Oct. 25.

Air Marshal Gagan Bulathsinghala, commander of Sri Lanka Air Force, will visit Pakistan next month to learn more about the Thunder, as Sri Lanka wants new supersonic fighter jets to strengthen its air defense. However, air force officials said Bulathsinghala's visit to Pakistan is only a routine official visit. The nation has not made a final decision about purchasing the fighter from Pakistan.

Pakistan and Myanmar are the only two operators of the JF-17, developed jointly by the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex and China's Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group. Since China does not produce the fighter for the PLA Air Force, Pakistan is responsible for opening the export market for the plane. Sri Lanka does not face a direct aerial threat from any of its neighbors, leading public opinion in the country to question whether such a purchase is necessary.

However, officials from the Sri Lanka Air Force insists on the need for advanced fighter jets to deal with a variety of possible threats. While Pakistan is seeking to promote the sale of the Thunder to Sri Lanka, India offers its its Light Combat Aircraft known as the Tejas developed by Hindustan Aeronautics.

While the Thunder has already entered service with the Pakistan Air Force, the Tejas is still undergoing trials in India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has stressed the Tejas should be an indigenous fighter developed and produced locally, though the fighter still uses a British-made engine, the Sunday Observer noted. The Tejas will eventually become a rival for the Thunder in combat capability, according to defense industry assessments.

Original article appeared here @ Want China Times 

Malabar 2015: Strategic Power Play in the Indian Ocean ( Source- The Diplomat / Author- Abhijit Singh)

Image credits- Indian Navy

Source- The Diplomat

Author- Abhijit Singh

Earlier last week, India and the United States held the 19th edition of Exercise Malabar, a joint naval exercise, in the Bay of Bengal. This year, the interactions were an improvement over previous engagements, owing not only to the closely coordinated nature of combat drills, but also because of the presence of Japanese navy that took part in an Indian Ocean iteration of the Malabar for the first time in eight years. Importantly, the interaction has transitioned from being an India-U.S. bilateral engagement into a formal structured trilateral exercise, which maritime analysts say may be aimed at countering growing Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean.

An abiding symbol of warming strategic relations between the U.S. and India, Exercise-Malabar is the most wide-ranging professional interaction the Indian Navy has with any of its partner maritime forces. Even so, the decision to include Japan as a permanent member came as a surprise, considering that New Delhi has for long resisted overtures from the U.S. to broaden the scope of the interaction.

As expected, China made its displeasure apparent, with the Global Times cautioning India against attempts at building an anti-China coalition in the Indo-Pacific region. Chinese analysts believe that India’s “multi-vectored diplomacy” does not allow New Delhi the option of confronting Chinese military power in the Indian Ocean. Even so, India did raise the tempo of its participation in the Malabar, perhaps at the behest of the United States, whose deployment of the aircraft carrier (USS Roosevelt) and a nuclear attack submarine (USS City of Corpus Christi) subtly pressured New Delhi into sending the INS Sindhudhwaj (Kilo class submarine) and a P8 long-range patrol aircraft for the exercises.

More worrying for China was the inclusion of Japan in an India-U.S. naval exercise, a move some observers say revives the prospects of a “maritime quadrilateral.” In its original avatar in 2007, the “quad” – consisting of the navies of the U.S., India, Japan and Australia – had drawn strong criticism from Beijing. So strident, in fact, had China’s reaction been that to maintain cordial relations with Beijing India and Australia had been forced to clarify their position. Almost a decade later, however, growing PLA-N aggressiveness in the South China Sea seems to have reversed the consensus on keeping the peace with China.

Last month, the Indian Navy (IN) embarked on a much publicized week-long maritime engagement with the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) in the Bay of Bengal – the first meeting of the two navies for a bilateral operational exchange in the Indian Ocean. The composition of the participating contingents – especially the presence of a Collins-class submarine and a P8 maritime surveillance aircraft – suggested an anti-China focus. Significantly, the AUSINDEX was held within weeks of Australia’s trilateral engagement with Japan and the U.S. in the Southwestern Pacific in July, raising the possibility of a potential alliance of democracies to counter Chinese military activity in the Indian Ocean Region.

Speculation about an emerging “security quartet” in the Asia-Pacific gained further momentum after the visit of the Australian Defence Minister Kevin Andrews to New Delhi in early-September. Addressing a public gathering, Andrews observed that the current Australian government was open to participating in a four-sided security initiative with the U.S., Japan and India, provided it were invited by New Delhi to do so. A few weeks later, Richard Verma, the U.S. ambassador, seemed to echo that sentiment when he urged New Delhi to assist the U.S. in securing the global commons – affecting a transition from “balancing power” to “leading power.”

To be sure, neither statement made any mention of a Chinese maritime presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Yet, their central message was clear: A strong maritime relationship with India is the key to the preserving the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. While the U.S. and its allies remain prepared to share the bulk of the burden of “securing the Asian commons” – as the U.S. ambassador seemed to suggest – India is expected to protect the sub-continental littorals from growing Chinese influence.

It isn’t as if New Delhi has not considered of the implications of formalizing multilateral maritime exercises in the Indian Ocean. India has good reason to be wary of Chinese military presence in the IOR.  Since May this year, when a Chinese Yuan-class submarine visited Karachi, New Delhi has been worried over the possibility of a Chinese takeover of its maritime neighborhood. In the garb of anti-piracy operations, Indian observers believe, Chinese submarines have been performing specific stand-alone missions – a process meant to lay the groundwork for a rotating but permanent deployment in the IOR. More importantly, Indian observers say the deployment pattern of PLAN submarines reveals a plan to secure access in contested spaces, facilitating greater “open-seas” presence – an operational imperative outlined in Beijing’s 2015 defense white paper. That such a tactic is at work was corroborated by India’s Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) recently, when it reported an alarming rise in attempts by Chinese naval ships to get close to Indian territorial waters.

Equally significant for New Delhi is the China’s growing amphibious warfare capability. After Beijing announced its defense white paper in May 2015, recent PLA-N exercises have had an amphibious component, including ground assault drills by marine forces. Chinese naval contingents have conducted a series of island defense exercises this year, deploying dedicated amphibious task-forces in the Western and Far-Eastern Pacific. Even PLA-N anti-piracy deployments in the Indian Ocean have included the Type-71 class amphibious vessels, suggesting an aspiration for greater littoral presence. Indian analysts point out that China’s growing expeditionary capability can only be counteracted by the United States’ substantial amphibious assets, which is why the Malabar this year is reported to have laid emphasis on littoral operations.

India’s reliance on the United States to curtail China’s Indian Ocean ambitions, however, has a significant downside. With the U.S. Navy now conducting maritime patrols within the 12-mile territorial zone around China’s recently reclaimed islands in the disputed Spratly archipelago, maritime tensions in the Pacific are at an all-time high. In response to Washington’s rebalance to Asia, Beijing has hardened its maritime posture in the Western Pacific. From an Indian perspective, the United States’ endorsement of “freedom of navigation” patrols in the South China Sea might leave China with little option but to expand its military maritime presence in the wider Indo-Pacific – if only to show the U.S. and its allies that Chinese maritime power cannot be contained within China’s near-seas.

As India reorients its maritime posture to cater to the new realities of Asia, there is a realization that maritime stability remains hostage to the growing overlap of the strategic ambitions of regional states. India’s maritime managers are acutely conscious of the likelihood of future contingencies arising out of greater strategic imbalances in the Asian commons. The Malabar-2015 and AUSINDEX, therefore, need to be seen as part of a broader collective effort to preserve the balance of maritime power in the Indo-Pacific littorals.

About the author- Abhijit Singh is a research scholar at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses and looks at Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean. He is co-author of the book Indian Ocean Challenges – A Quest for Cooperative Solutions. 

Original article was published here @ The Diplomat

Russia to lease another nuclear sub to India in December ( Source- Russia & India Report)

Akula class SSN Vepr ( Source- Wikimedia Commons / Ilya Kurganov)

Source- Russia & India Report

An agreement on leasing another Russian nuclear-powered submarine to India is to be signed at the Russian-Indian summit in December, a source at India’s Defense Ministry told TASS.

The possibility of leasing a second submarine from Russia will be studied when India’s Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar will visit Moscow next week," the source said. "Parrikar will hold talks on this strategic project with his Russian counterpart Sergey Shoigu. After the ten-year contract is signed another two or three years will be required for upgrading the submarine in keeping with India’s requirements," he said.

Over the past 45 years Russia and India have established reliable, time-tested strategic ties in the field of defence. India’s armed forces are equipped with Soviet and Russian military hardware 70%, the source said, adding that Russia had always provided its best military hardware to India.

A Russian military source at the Russian embassy in New Delhi has confirmed to TASS the negotiations on leasing the Kashalot K-322 nuclear power submarine of project 971

Kashalot K322 ( Image credits- Russian Navy)

Shchuka had entered the final phase.

"If the contract is signed, it will be the third Russia-built submarine handed over to the Indian Navy," he said. "For the first time India leased a Russian nuclear submarine for ten years back in the early 1980s. In 2012 the Indian Navy leased Russia’s K-152 Nerpa submarine of project 971. This is a customary and well-tested way of cooperation by our countries in the military-technical sphere."

According to the Russian source, the submarine will undergo fundamental upgrade in line with the customer’s requirements at the Amur shipyards, where it is at the moment. The repair, upgrade and testing work and the Indian crew’s training are to be completed by 2018.

Original article was published here @ Russia & India Report

Emad: Iran’s New Ballistic Missile Amid The Nuclear Deal – Analysis ( Source- Eurasia Review / Author- Debalina Ghoshal)

Iran's new EMAD MRBM (Credits- Internet image)

Source- Eurasia Review

Author- Debalina Ghoshal

Iran recently test-fired the ‘Emad’, a precision-guided medium-range surface-to-surface ballistic missile. The missile has a range of 1700 kms and a payload capacity of 750kgs. Any missile above a 500 kg payload is considered nuclear capable. Emad is liquid-fuelled but with improved accuracy and maneuverable re-entry vehicles for evading enemy defence systems. This improved accuracy is extremely important if Iran is to deliver a conventional payload. The missile is also reported to carry thrusters for course correction. Reports suggest that this missile is an improved version of the liquid-fuelled Shahab missiles.

The maneuverability is achieved by steering warheads that can perform last minute maneuvering even at the terminal phase. According to Iranian Defence Minister Hossein Dehghan, Emad is Iran’s first ever missile that can be guided and controlled until the missile hits the target. The missile’s survivability is enhanced by road mobility with the help of the Transporter Erector Launcher (TELs).

There have been reports that the Iranian Parliament has approved the nuclear deal with the US and that the deal has also been approved of by the Guardian Council of the Constitution. Ever since the deal was finalised in July 2015, Iranian hardliners have been apprehensive of the conventional arms embargo imposed on Iran – which also includes an embargo on the development of ballistic missiles.

One of the probable reasons why the missile was test-fired just prior to the approval of the nuclear deal was probably to prove a point that under no circumstance can the nuclear deal hinder Iran’s progress with its ballistic missile program. This is also clearly evident from Dehghan’s statement where he said, “We don’t ask anyone’s permission to enhance our defence power or missile capability and will firmly pursue our defence plans, particularly in the field of missile…Emad is one of the outstanding examples of this.”

Despite UNSC sanctions on the country since 2003, Iran has already progressed with its ballistic missile development program and its cruise missile development program. Earlier this year, Iran test-fired the Soumar, a sophisticated long-range cruise missile, while the nuclear negotiation process was ongoing. Both missiles are expected to enter service by 2016.

Furthermore, this year, Iran unveiled the extended range Fateh missiles that now have a range of 500kms. However, while Iran’s missile capabilities could put several of its adversaries at threat, Iran claims that its missile development is meant for its defence and is not aimed at any specific country. According to Dehghan, the missile would only add to peace and strategic stability in the region and also enables the country to display its technological prowess. Iran is also concentrating on solid-propelled ballistic missiles with a 2500km range, called the Sejjil missiles. Last year, Iran had also test-fired the Barani ballistic missiles which are capable of being fitted with Multiple Re-entry Vehicles.

Therefore, Iran is not only making progress with its missile systems but these missiles could be capable of evading enemy missile defence system. The ability of the missile to evade the ballistic missile defence systems of its adversaries could put the US’ European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) system at threat. The US under the EPAA has decided to field its missile defence system and related components in NATO countries to be able to counter the Iranian ballistic missile threat.

While the new Iranian ballistic missile is a liquid fuel propelled missile – which is technically hazardous to prepare – many other states such as Russia and China have also concentrated on liquid-fuelled intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).

This could be because in comparison to the solid-fuelled missiles, the liquid-fuelled missiles have a higher launch-weight to throw-weight ratio, which provides the missile with a longer range. This could precisely be a reason why Iran could, in future, concentrate on liquid-fuelled missiles for its ICBMs, should it develop the same.

However, this week’s missile test by Iran will certainly draw international criticism from Israel and also from the US. While many analysts could suggest including the issue of ballistic missiles into the nuclear deal, it is only advantageous to not to include the same in the deal. The nuclear deal does not contain any restrictions for Iran on the development of ballistic missiles per se. It is only the UNSC that imposes an embargo on Iran’s conventional weaponry development. Therefore, such missile tests should not hinder the progress of the nuclear deal that has been much lauded by the international community and truly upholds the essence of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. If Iran’s ballistic missile development program is to be checked, there should be separate regional framework to ban missile development in the West Asian region.

 About the author- Debalina Ghoshal, Research Associate, Delhi Policy Group

Original article was published here @ Eurasia Review

Beyond the F-35: 3 Things Canada Should Consider For Its Next Fighter ( Source- The National Interest / Author- James Hasik)

F-35 ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / United States Navy)

Source- The National Interest

Author- James Hasik

Last week’s federal electoral victory by Canada's Liberals probably means the end of the F-35A as a prospective fighter jet for the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF).

The immediate bad news accrues to Lockheed Martin, which stands to lose $6 billion in future revenue, and its remaining customers, for whom smaller volumes will mean as much as one percent more per production aircraft. The remaining longer-term question is what this means for Canada; U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch, after all, called the decision “stupid.”  But it’s not that prime minister-designate Justin Trudeau is outrightly refusing the stealthy airplane. Rather, he’s promising an open competition on a much smaller budget, presumably now for a twin-engined jet, which pretty much restricts the race to Boeing’s F-18E/F Super Hornet and Dassault’s Rafale C/B. The philosophies behind those aircraft designs differ markedly from that behind the F-35 Lightning II, so what else the Canadian military buys must now change as well.

How different, and what to buy? Former Canadian military procurement chief Alan Williams wrote recently in the Ottawa Citizen that if the JSF were right for Canada, it presumably could win an open competition. If the competition were actually designed to elicit best value for money—there’s a history of tailoring requirements towards preferred solutions in the Department of National Defence (DND)—then value must consider the plane as part of a war-fighting system. The technical complexity of the F-35 was embraced years ago in the design process as an intendedly superior substitute for the operational complexity of coordinating the activities of more specialized aircraft and weapons. So, if the DND will now step away from that Swiss Army knife approach, it will need to add a few blades elsewhere to get the job done. Three ideas come to mind:

First, if buying the F-18, consider putting some EF-18Gs in that order:

This is exactly what the Australian Defence Department is doing for the RAAF—whether it eventually buys the F-35 or not. The EF-18G Growler is Boeing’s adaptation of its twin-seat Super Hornet as a radar-hunting defense-suppression aircraft. In 1992, the US Air Force would show carts explaining why stealth bombers didn’t need that escort. Now, we’re less certain that even F-35s can do without them, so squadrons of F-18s should form up on them when flying forward. Forgo those, and RCAF fighters will be circling S-300 missile batteries from at least a hundred miles.

Second, buy some precision standoff weapons:

The term cruise missiles might not sit well with all the Liberals’ supporters, but don't feel bad—the RAAF is buying them, and now you’re stuck needing them too. There are plenty of options on the market for both maritime and land attack, including the Joint (Naval) Strike Missile from Kongsberg, the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile from Lockheed Martin, the Storm Shadow from MBDA, and the KEPD 350 from MBDA and Saab. Stealth aircraft might be able to overfly the latest missile batteries on their way to drop gravity bombs; Super Hornets and Rafales shouldn’t try. With the right missiles, though, they shouldn’t need to.

Third, if you’re buying the F-18, consider the F-18F; if the Rafale, consider the Rafale B (Bi-place):

The extra seat in those aircraft does slightly reduce range and maneuverability, but the F-35 wasn’t long on either attribute anyway. Range might be important over the Far North, but 437 Squadron does have its five Airbus tankers at CFB Trenton. More sharply, even in an Article 5 war with China, the RCAF will probably not be flying feet dry towards Beijing, so range won’t matter like it will for the USAF and the US Navy. But one of the great things about the Canadian military for NATO as a whole is that it’s not the American military. Canadian politicians' distinct view of Canada’s interests has recurrently led the Canadian military to specialize in things that American politicians and generals often overlook. That’s how the US Army got the Stryker—by looking north at the Canadian Army’s LAV fleet—and that vehicle performed very well in Iraq and Afghanistan. A whole fleet of twin-seat fighter-bombers , whose back-seat observers could specialize in coordinating close air support, would do the alliance well while the USAF is trying to dump the A-10C and everyone else is going single-seat.

For truth is, the U.S. military will shortly need a new plan too. As U.S. Senator John McCain said this week, its plans to buy 2,443 F-35s are “out of whack with budget realities.” Indeed, the F-35 is eating the budget, and the Pentagon may need in a few years to choose more clearly between ships, troops, and fighter jets. As my colleague August Cole asked the other day, “in 2025, would you rather have an extra dozen F-35s, or a pair of modern military icebreakers?” The incoming prime minister has firmly communicated that he favors frigates over stealth fighters. Whatever fighters he does buy, I just ask that they come equipped for the task.

About the author- James Hasík is a senior fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, where this piece first appeared.

Original article published here @ The National Interest

Revealed: China's Forgotten Maritime Compromise ( Source- National Interest / Author- Issac B. Cardon)

Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / NASA)

Source- The National Interest

Author- Issac B. Cardon

China has nine maritime neighbors (including Taiwan) but no settled maritime boundaries, due in part to Beijing’s unwillingness to specify its maritime claims. Only one partial exception to this imprecision exists: a boundary agreement with Vietnam to delimit the northern part of the Gulf of Tonkin and a fishery agreement establishing a joint fishing regime in that area, both reached in 2000.

The agreements offer both positive and negative lessons. At a minimum, they provide important precedents that should be more widely appreciated – foremost among them that it is possible for China to come to the bargaining table on maritime disputes. Meanwhile specific lessons can be applied to China’s bilateral maritime disputes with Japan, Vietnam, and the Koreas. Unfortunately the Tonkin agreements support only modest expectations for resolution of the complex, multilateral Spratly Islands disputes.

First, the good news:

1. The Tonkin agreements might have enabled future deals:

Leaders in both China and Vietnam authorized their diplomats to negotiate formal boundaries governing about 36,000 square nautical miles of productive fisheries and potentially lucrative hydrocarbons. The deal emerged from three separate rounds of negotiation (1974, 1978-1979, and 1992-2000), with the last being a whole-of-government effort featuring input from senior party leaders, provincial governments, various stakeholder agencies, and technical and scientific experts. Importantly, growing familiarity between negotiators did not breed contempt – rather, it helped establish organizational and individual connections that were indispensable to the final settlement. Wang Yi, the current PRC foreign minister, was China’s lead negotiator and presumably knows what is required, politically and organizationally, to achieve future settlements. Comparable, substantial investment of official time and political energy is possible and necessary for future deals.

2. China made significant compromises:

The 21 geographic points constituting the Sino-Vietnamese boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin divide it into two unequal parts, with 53.23 percent of the water lying on the Vietnamese side of the line. This compromise by China reflects the relative length of the Vietnamese coastline and the position of Bach Long Vi Island. That island was once the subject of a Sino-Vietnamese sovereignty dispute put to rest in 1957 when Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai dropped the Chinese claim. That strong Chinese leaders were once willing to make a deal over sovereignty that later facilitated a boundary resolution is a valuable precedent.

3. UNCLOS provided guidelines, but was not determinative:

The conclusive round of Sino-Vietnamese negotiations (1992-2000) was facilitated by the parties’ informal agreement in 1993 that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) would furnish the basic principles to be applied to resolving maritime boundary disputes. They also agreed that international practice, equity, and relevant circumstances would be given appropriate weight in negotiations. The parties did not use their respective interpretations of the law of the sea as take-it-or-leave-it demands for comprehensive settlement. Rather, international law furnished several focal points for the two parties (who had not yet even ratified UNCLOS) to cooperate and delimit their respective territorial seas, exclusive economic zones (EEZs), and continental shelves. This nuanced approach to legal norms allowed them to reach agreement even while “shelving” pesky problems such as rights over non-living resources like oil and gas.

4. The agreement gave partial effect to islands and reduced maritime entitlements:

The states’ overlapping EEZs in the area were given less than the maximum 200 nautical miles prescribed in UNCLOS. Further, Vietnam’s Bach Long Vi and Con Co Islands were given 25 percent and 50 percent effect, respectively, in drawing the demarcation line for those EEZs. This compromise established an immensely valuable precedent for future negotiations over Chinese maritime boundaries in the East and South China Seas. Partial effects would be especially valuable in the bilateral dispute with Japan over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, which lie at the very southern end of a long potential maritime boundary and could be effectively ignored in delimitation. This move might prove even more useful in the bilateral dispute with Vietnam over the Paracel Islands, where mutual agreement to reduce (or ignore) entitlements for the Paracels would allow extension of the Tonkin demarcation line through that disputed area without addressing the question of sovereignty over the islands.

5. Domestic objections did not scuttle the deal:

Nationalist sentiments ran high in both China and Vietnam after the deal was announced. The four-year lag between the parties’ signing the agreements (2000) and putting them into effect (2004) is partly attributable to public protests, media criticism, and bureaucratic resistance to the compromises on both sides. Leaders in both countries mustered the political will to conclude the deal in spite of strong domestic objections, and could do so again if they truly wanted to.

Now for the bad news.

1. The boundary agreement covers only a small area:

Though better than envisioned in the original talks, which covered about one third of the maritime space eventually delimited, the roughly 300-mile line eventually established bisects only a small fraction of the disputed area. No official talks about extending the line have been reported, and subsequent practice south of the delimited area has not been cooperative.

2. The agreement did not involve disputed features: 

Notwithstanding the 1957 Chinese concession on Bach Long Vi, China and Vietnam established their maritime boundary in the Tonkin Gulf by neglecting (both geographically and diplomatically) complex issues arising from sovereignty disputes. Although the “partial effects” precedent can mitigate that complexity and narrow the scope of disputed zones, the fact remains that China would need to muster significantly greater political courage to even begin talks that might touch upon its “indisputable” sovereignty claims over features in the South and East China Seas.

3. Implementation of the fishery agreement is iffy:

The Tonkin boundary agreement is permanent and requires no implementation, but the fisheries agreement has a 12-year lifespan (and a 3-year automatic extension), and must be constantly upheld in practice if it is to be meaningful. Based on limited reporting, implementation has not been an overwhelming success. The effectiveness of an international maritime boundary depends largely on the activities of vessels, especially private fishing vessels, from both sides. Judging from collapsing fish stocks in the South China Sea, rampant illegal fishing, and frequent conflicts between law enforcement and private fishermen from China and Vietnam, the agreement’s terms are still mostly aspirational. The only permanent organ established by China and Vietnam to manage implementation is a Joint Fishery Committee tasked with managing a Common Fisheries Zone. It meets once or twice per year to consult on conservation and utilization of fishery resources, but has had little verifiable success in making fisheries and law enforcement cooperation the norm in the delimited area.

4. The agreed boundary relied on a historical treaty not a generic principle:

The delimitation line in the Tonkin agreement does not strictly apply any standard that can be replicated for other disputed boundaries. The agreed boundary does not appear to be based on an equidistant line between the two coasts, but rather on an 1887 Sino-French treaty that provided a mutually agreeable starting point for delimitation. Unfortunately, given the ambiguity of the post–World War II disposition of islands in the East China Sea and the existence of multiple, contradictory historical bases for claims in the South China Sea, the “historical treaty” precedent is inapplicable to outstanding disputes.

5. Sino-Vietnamese diplomatic relations are more robust than others:

In spite of deep historical distrust between China and Vietnam, the long-standing relationship between their respective Communist parties greatly aided the negotiation process. By contrast, China’s diplomacy with Japan is badly under-institutionalized and frequently interrupted by nationalism and other domestic pathologies. The intensive, institutionalized negotiations required for successful boundary agreements would pose a special problem in that deeply fraught bilateral relationship. So too with the Philippines, toward which China is particularly negative after Manila launched arbitration proceedings that Beijing considers illegitimate. Negotiations with Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia would present less severe diplomatic obstacles, but any settlement with them would require negotiations with other, less amenable parties to be practically meaningful.

6. China was in a more compromising mood in the 1990s:

Between 1991 and 1999, China signed 11 boundary agreements that fully or partially settled seven disputes along its land borders. One of those was the Chinese land boundary with Vietnam, with which the maritime boundary agreement was associated. Unfortunately for China’s neighbors, that compromising mood is only a fond memory. Today China appears less vulnerable and more confrontational than in the wake of the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and the diplomatic isolation that followed the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. Nationalism concerning the East and South China Sea disputes is not new, nor is it necessarily more virulent or uncompromising, but China’s position has hardened and its capacity to enforce its claims and dictate terms of future settlements has increased.

On balance, the Sino-Vietnamese boundary and fishery agreements are a promising sign that China is capable of substantial compromise in maritime disputes. The agreements established several precedents that ought to be remembered and publicized. Modesty about the agreements’ wider applicability is also necessary. Still, Chinese leaders and experts, in particular, should be encouraged to review the diligent process and salutary outcome of that earlier era of diplomatic compromise as they set out to stabilize China’s troubled maritime frontier and secure a peaceful rise.

This piece first appeared in AMTI’s website here.

Original article was published here @ The National Interest