Monday, February 29, 2016
Russia and France in running for new Indian carrier ( Source- Russia & India Report)
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| INS Vikramaditya (Credits- Indian Navy) |
Source- Russia & India Report
India intends to announce a tender for purchase of a new aircraft carrier with 54 aircraft aboard, the French military newsletter TTU stated. According to the publication, the Indian Navy is seeking to purchase an aircraft carrier with a total displacement of 65,000 tons, length of 300 metres, width of 70 metres, and equipped with a nuclear power plant.
According to the Russian military blog bmpd, maintained by employees of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), India is planning to build another aircraft carrier, to be called the ‘Vishal,’ in a domestic shipyard, with foreign assistance.
According to the blog, the main contenders for this contract are France and Russia, because the tender conditions would stipulate compatibility of the air wing of the future ship with the aircraft already in service with the Indian Air Force and Navy. This condition among carrier-based fighters can only be met by the Russian MiG-29K, currently used on the Russian-built Indian aircraft carrier ‘Vikramaditya’, and the French Rafale M, harmonized with the land modification of this machine, which the Indian Air Force will be buying in the near future.
It is possible that a carrier-based version of the fifth generation fighter FGFA, currently being designed for the Indian Air Force, could be built in the future, based on the Russian T-50 project (Prospective Airborne Complex of Frontline Aviation – PAK FA). Earlier in February, a report came out on development of a carrier-based variant of the fifth generation fighter aircraft for the Russian Navy (Prospective Airborne Complex of Ship-borne Aviation – PAK SA).
Information was released in the summer of 2015 that claimed the Indian Navy had sent a request for construction of an aircraft carrier to four potential contractors, among which were Russia, France, Britain, and the United States.
The Indian Navy currently has two aircraft carriers; the 45,000-ton Vikramaditya, (rebuilt from 2004 to 2011 from the former Soviet carrier Admiral Gorshkov), which entered into service in 2013, and the 28,000-ton aircraft carrier ‘Viraat’, formerly the British aircraft carrier Hermes, built in England in 1959, and bought by India in 1985. ‘Viraat’ will be replaced in 2018 by the new 37,000-ton aircraft carrier ‘Vikrant’, which is now being completed in India with Russian and Italian assistance. The Vikrant will also be equipped with Russian-built MiG-29K jets.
First published in Russian by Lenta.ru
© RUSSIA & INDIA REPORT ( ALL RIGHTS RESERVED)
Original link to the article- http://in.rbth.com/economics/defence/2016/02/26/russia-and-france-in-running-for-new-indian-carrier_570929
Japan: The Next Major Player in the Taiwan Strait? ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Emily S. Chen)
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| JDS Kirishima ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / United States Navy) |
Source- The National Interest
Author- Emily S. Chen
In his recent talk with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken, China’s Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office Zhang Zhijun reiterated Beijing’s cross-Strait policy. Beijing will continue to uphold the 1992 Consensus, which accepts “one China” but allows strategic uncertainty surrounding its precise definition, resolutely opposes to any form of secessionist activities seeking Taiwan independence and firmly safeguards national sovereignty and territorial integrity. As Taiwan’s president-elect Tsai Ing-wen and her traditionally pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) still decline to accept the “One-China” principle of the 1992 consensus, the future of cross-strait relations is fraught with uncertainty. While it is important for the DPP to find “a mutually acceptable mode of interaction between Taiwan and the mainland,” changes of the strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific region and the close people-to-people relations between Taiwan and Japan have given Tsai Ing-wen a new opportunity to cooperate with Japan in the cross-Strait issues, which currently involve only Taiwan, China and the United States.
A Changing Strategic Environment in the Asia-Pacific
Since the Obama administration announced its “pivot”—later termed the “rebalance”—to the Asia-Pacific region in 2009, the United States has focused on strengthening and modernizing its alliance with Japan. The new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (“the Guidelines”), which was announced in April 2015, has reinforced alliance cooperation without preset geographical limits and enabled “seamless and effective” alliance responses to security threats. Japan’s enactment of two new security bills later that year has also expanded the scope of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF)’s activities overseas and broadened the areas in which they can operate. This enhancement of Japan’s defense posture allows Japan to play a greater role in the regional security, which seems to create a strategic environment from which Taiwan could benefit in managing ties with Beijing.
That said, to what extent the United States and Japan will cooperate in the event of a Taiwan Strait contingency so far remains ambiguous. Although the Guidelines and the security bills signal an expansion of Japan’s military role abroad, they did not explicitly mention the areas of alliance cooperation have extended to the Taiwan Strait. How much Taiwan can actually benefit from these changes of strategic situations thus sees limitations. Instead of sitting and waiting for a more favorable international environment, the Taiwan government can take the initiatives to turn the tide in its favor.
Deepening the Friendship
The Taiwan government can capitalize on a growing cordiality between the Japanese and Taiwanese people to make Japan a bigger player in the cross-Strait issues. It is hoping that with a deep affinity with the Taiwanese people that is formed in the Japanese society, a pro-Taiwan momentum will emerge. Along with the help of Taiwan-friendly bipartisan caucus in the Diet, the strong force of public opinion can press the Japanese government to adopt a more active response to a Taiwan contingency.
Based on the reasoning, the new Taiwan government’s Japan policy can be two folds. First, the policy can encourage frequent people-to-people exchanges between Japan and Taiwan to increase positive views of Taiwan in the Japanese society. Currently, a regular people-to people exchange between the two sides is underway. On bilateral visits, the most recent data released by Japan Tourism Agency showed that Taiwan, following China and South Korea, is the third favorite destination among Japanese travelers. It is worth noting that while the number of the Japanese tourists to China and South Korea has been declining since 2010, the number of Japanese visitors to Taiwan each year has grown. Taiwan’s Tourism Bureau also reported that Japan was the most favored destination for Taiwanese travelers in 2015. Continuous people-to-people exchanges between Taiwan and Japan have benefited people’s positive impressions toward each other. According to a 2011 survey released by Taipei Economic & Cultural Representative Office in Japan, 67 percent of Japanese respondents expressed that they felt close to Taiwan, which was 10.8 percentage points higher than in 2009. The same survey also showed that 91.2 percent of the respondents reported that the Taiwan-Japan relations were on good terms. Increasing favorable views on Taiwan can help generate a strong force of public opinion in Japanese society, which can influence the Japanese government in crafting its Taiwan policy.
In addition to building a pro-Taiwan momentum in the Japanese society, the Taiwan government should be in frequent contact with Taiwan-friendly bipartisan caucuses in the National Diet in Japan. Because lacking an understanding of the complexity of the cross-Strait relations, the Japanese public’s positive sentiments for the Taiwanese people may not automatically turn into people’s active support for Japan to play a greater role in the cross-Strait issues. According to a 2015 survey conducted by The Genron NPO, when the Japanese public was asked if they support the use of American force in a military conflict between Taiwan and China, public opinion in Japan is divided: 28 percent would support the deployment of U.S. forces and 25.1 percent oppose it. Significantly, 45.9 percent of the Japanese people said they “don’t know.” In the same survey, a relevant questions asking the likelihood of a conflict between China and Taiwan, a sizable one third of the Japanese people answered they “don’t know” either. The poll results indicate that while more than a simple majority of the Japanese people feels close to the Taiwanese, the Japanese public is still unfamiliar with the cross-Strait issues. To effectively convey Taiwan’s political appeals, the Taiwan government also needs to rely on the Taiwan-friendly bipartisan caucuses, which have better understanding of the cross-Strait issues and can directly put pressure on the Japanese government.
In fact, the exchanges between the caucuses and the new Taiwan government are in progress. In a meeting with Tsai Ing-wen on January 27, Keiji Furuya, chief executive of the Japan-ROC Diet Members’ Consultative Council (“Nikkakon”) said that the caucus will support Taiwan in its efforts to participate in the second round of the TPP negotiations. Even during the presidential campaign, Tsai Ing-wen visited Nikkakon in Japan to emphasize the importance of strengthening the Japan-Taiwan relations.
Instead of managing the relationship with Japan at only the official level, Taiwan has been maintaining a close non-governmental, working-level relations with Japan. Against the backdrop of a strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance and an expanded Japan’s defense scope, Taiwan can provide incentives to make Japan play a greater role in the cross-Strait issues. Taking advantage of a pro-Taiwan momentum in the Japanese society can be a way to effectively pressure the Japanese government to support Taiwan in its political appeals.
About the author- Emily S. Chen is a Silas Palmer Fellow with the Hoover Institution, a Young Leader with the Pacific Forum CSIS and a Non-Resident Fellow with the Center for the National Interest. She holds a Master’s degree in East Asian Studies and a focus on international relations at Stanford University. Emily tweets @emilyshchen.
Original link to the article- http://nationalinterest.org/blog/japan-the-next-major-player-the-taiwan-strait-15343
Sunday, February 28, 2016
Saturday, February 27, 2016
China’s ‘Informationised Warfare’: Impact On The Region – Analysis ( Source- Eurasian review / Author- Richard A. Bitzinger)
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| Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Kremlin |
Source- Eurasia Review
Author- Richard A. Bitzinger
China’s People Liberation Army (PLA) has been undergoing profound transformation since at least the turn of the century. These changes have permeated every facet of the PLA – technological, organisational, and doctrinal. The ongoing reorganisation of the PLA – including the putative reorganisation of its military regions; the creation of joint commands; the strengthening of top-down leadership by the Central Military Commission (CMC); and the establishment of a national Rocket Force – underline the Chinese leadership’s commitment to establishing a modern military system with Chinese characteristics.
With Chinese leaders expressing their desire to develop their country into a maritime power, Beijing has also begun to demonstrate its resolve to follow through with its declarations to build a force that is capable of fighting – and winning – “informationised” wars.
Informationisation and Power Projection
“Informatisation” (xinxihua) means that information technologies, especially those capabilities relating to command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), are considered paramount to expanding military effectiveness. This entails, among other things, dominating the electromagnetic spectrum through integrated network electronic warfare as well as exploiting technological advances in microelectronics, sensors, propulsion, stealth, and special materials to outfit the PLA with precision-strike weapons, including ballistic and anti-ship or land-attack cruise missiles.
In short, the PLA, in its long transition from People’s War to limited local wars under conditions of informatisation, was seeking to move from being a platform-centric to a more network-centric force, or one where the crucial characteristic of the force is the network linkages among platforms, as opposed to the platforms themselves.
The most recent stage of Chinese warfighting doctrine was revealed in the PLA’s most recent defence white paper, Chinese Military Strategy, published in May 2015. It places an even greater emphasis on informationisation and makes it central to operational concepts. According to the 2015 white paper, the PLA will continue to de-emphasise land operations, all but abandoning People’s War (except in name and in terms of political propaganda), particularly in favour of giving new stress and importance to sea- and airpower: “The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests.”
As a result, the PLA Navy will gradually shift towards a combined “offshore waters defence” and “open seas protection” while China’s air force would, according to its most recent defence white paper, “shift its focus from territorial air defence to both defence and offence, and build an air-space defence force structure that can meet the requirements of informationised operations”.
Dual Trends
It would be premature to argue that China will catch up with the defence-technological state-of-the-art any time soon. For all of its talk of becoming an “informationised” military, the PLA is still a decidedly platform-centric force, albeit one that is still in the process of becoming more network-enabled.
The process itself has been evolutionary: old weapons and military equipment were gradually replaced, as they were modified and upgraded, or else supplemented by and subordinated to more technologically advanced systems. Nevertheless, the PLA, backed by the Xi regime, appears to be progressing toward becoming a truly informationised armed force – a long-term strategy, to say the least.
At the same time, the domestic political culture in China increasingly emphasises a sense of victimisation and subsequent entitlement. More and more, Chinese foreign policy is driven by a populist nationalism, fuelled by an “official narrative of [Western] humiliation”. This perception of national victimhood has spurred Beijing into becoming ever more intransigent in pressing its territorial claims in the adjoining seas, such as its illegal artificial island-building campaign.
These dual trends – the modernisation of the PLA in its embrace of extremely high-technology warfare, together with an increasingly assertive regime in Beijing that believes it is due its place in the sun – denote a China that is less and less willing to support the status quo in the Asia-Pacific. It also implies a regional great power that is increasingly willing to use force or the show of force in support of its national interests. Most of these developments have been remarkably recent, taking place within the past decade or so.
This is the challenge that most threatens the current security calculus in the Asia-Pacific. In this regard, Washington’s response – in terms of the rebalance and its FONOPS (freedom of navigation operations) in the South China Sea – are vital markers in messaging Beijing as to how far it should go in its newly aggressive behaviour. In dealing with China, engagement and containment are the conjoined twins of policy; given China’s recent conduct, it might be time for a bit more of the latter.
About the author- Richard A. Bitzinger is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Military Transformations Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. This Commentary is based on a recent article by the author published in Policy Forum, which can be accessed here: http://www.policyforum.net/china-taking-warfare-hi-tech.
Original link to the article- http://www.eurasiareview.com/27022016-chinas-informationised-warfare-impact-on-the-region-analysis/
Undersea Crisis: China Will Have Nearly Twice as Many Subs as the U.S. ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Dave Majumdar)
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| USS Annapolis ( Credits- Wikimedia Commons/ United States Navy) |
Source- The National Interest
Author- Dave Majumdar
The United States Navy needs more attack submarines to meet its global commitments. Worldwide, the service is only able to provide the Pentagon’s regional combatant commanders with less than two-thirds the number of submarines that they need.
“The threats in the undersea environment continue to go up,” Vice Adm. Joseph Mulloy, the service’s deputy chief of naval operations for integration of capabilities and resources told the House Armed Services Committee’s seapower and projection forces subcommittee on February 25.
The U.S. Navy—which has roughly 52 attack submarines—is on track to have 41 attack boats by 2029. The Chinese, meanwhile would have “at least 70, and they’re building,” Mulloy said. “You get back into the whole quality versus quantity issue, but at the same time the Russians are also building. . . and they build much higher-end submarines.”
Sean Stackley, assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition, told the subcommittee that the service needs more boats, but there is no easy way to increase the size of the undersea fleet. “We have a compelling need for additional attack submarines,” Stackley said. “Today, we have 52 boats, a requirement for 48, we have a valley of 41 boats in the 2030s, we start falling below the line in the late 2020s.”
The current problem with having too few submarines stems from decisions made in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War. For many years during the 1990s, the U.S. Navy built no new submarines. “That valley exists because of the years we didn’t build any submarines and a long period of building one submarine a year,” Stackley said.
The Navy has started the long process of rebuilding the strength of its submarine fleet, but it will take decades. “We got up to two boats a year starting in 2011,” Stackley said. “Everything that has come together on the Virginia program to get cost in the right direction, and now those boats are delivering two per year, ahead of schedule, under budget and they’re out there performing. They’re our leading edge.”
But the Navy’s submarine plans will face serious complications when the service has to start building the new Ohio-Replacement Program ballistic missile submarines in 2021. The Navy’s plan is to build one Virginia-class attack boat and one Ohio-Replacement boat per year while the twelve boomers are constructed. “We will still continue with two boats per year but one of those is going to be an Ohio-Replacement. That helps contribute to the shortfall in submarines, frankly,” Stackley said. “The first time we hit that is going to be in 2021. So we’ll get two boats a year for a ten year period, then we’re going to dip back down to one, come back up to two, dip back down to one as we build Ohio-Replacements, and we’ll be at one a year for a while. That’s not good for the nation.”
Stackley said that the Navy’s plan has less to do with strategy than with fiscal realities. The Ohio-Replacement submarines are extremely expensive with each boat projected to cost as much as $8 billion. “It is as much about affordability as anything else, because of the significant investment Ohio-Replacement is going to require,” Stackley said.
The Navy recognizes that it is going to face a budgetary train wreck in the years past 2021. The service is working with industry to reduce the cost of the new ballistic missile submarine to help pay for another Virginia-class attack submarine. “We’ve got to find an alternative to try to stave off that shortfall,” Stackley said. “We’re trying to identify, can we generate savings in the way we build the Ohio-Replacement to help to fund and finance that additional submarine in 2021?”
That extra submarine is vital to mitigate the Navy’s global submarine shortfall. “The most important boat in terms of trying to mitigate the impact associated with that shortfall is the 2021 boat, that second Virginia in that year,” Stackley said.
About the author- Dave Majumdar is the defense editor for the National Interest. You can follow him on Twitter: @davemajumdar.
Original link to the article- http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/undersea-crisis-china-will-have-nearly-twice-many-subs-the-15335
Pakistan Reels With Internal Unease Regarding CPEC Implementation ( Source- The Diplomat / Author- Umair Jamal)
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| Gwadar port ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Umargondal) |
Source- The Diplomat
Author- Umair Jamal
In Pakistan, controversy continues to grow around the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a multi-billion dollar economic agreement between the China and Pakistan that promises to build an economic trade corridor along the length of Pakistan, connecting western China to the Arabian Sea. Specifically, the corridor aims to connect Gwadar port in Balochistan to China’s Xinjiang region through a network of highways, railroads, and pipelines, spread over 3,000 kilometers.
For energy-starved Pakistan, the project is likely to add more than 25,000MW of electricity capacity across the national grid through different energy-related projects. If implemented successfully, CPEC has the potential to transform Pakistan into a thriving economy. However, its successful implementation is only possible if there is internal political unity among all of Pakistan’s provinces. This requirement, unfortunately, is difficult to achieve, putting the entire project in jeopardy.
Traditionally, Pakistan has experienced bitter inter-provincial relations in addition to difficult core-periphery relations. The prevailing controversy over CPEC is a glaring illustration of this chronic problem, which has only harmed Pakistan’s development.
While Pakistan’s federal government has repeatedly said that CPEC is a national project, the country’s outer provinces have raised concerns about the unfair distribution of resources under the project. In a recently held All Parties Conference (APC), Balochistan’s opposition parties maintained that a great deal of the energy projects under CPEC were transferred to Punjab. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), meanwhile, has also raised similar concerns.
The western route of CPEC remains at the center of all the controversy. The federal government on many occasions has promised to build up the western route, which would benefit Balochistan and KP. However, its implementation remains unlikely. Despite the government officially inaugurating the construction of the western route a few weeks ago, opposition parties from smaller provinces maintain that the actual map of the route has been altered.
Gwadar, which is arguably the centerpiece of this development project, remains a neglected area on the country’s periphery. The port is set to become a future economic hub. “The whole area has been captured by the government with local people pushed aside,” said a local resident of Gwadar area. This apparent unfair distribution of resources will further push away angry Baloch leaders, who have rebelled against the federal government before because of similar issues.
Moreover, Pakistan’s federal government has promised to raise a special military force to protect construction along the CPEC route, but many believe that this is not a viable solution as far as security is concerned. “The corridor passes through what is currently the heart of the insurgency,” said the economic adviser to Balochistan’s chief minister. He added that the notion that two special brigades formed by the army will be enough to protect road traffic is “laughable.”
For Pakistan, this proposed corridor is not only important for economic reasons, but also for other strategic and political reasons. Pakistan has managed to convince China about the operational viability of this project amid several internal challenges, including its unstable internal security situation to national separatist movements, which threaten CPEC very directly.
So far, the outer provinces have mainly expressed their apprehensions through democratic dialogue, but the situation might escalate if their legitimate concerns are not addressed quickly. While there is no denial about the strategic significance of CPEC for Pakistan at the state level, its successful implementation remains a dream at this point as controversies and disputes arose before construction could even begin in earnest. If the federal government wants to implement CPEC successfully, it needs to address all the outstanding concerns of the smaller, outer provinces. It cannot afford to let Punjab and Sindh dominate the process.
Original link to the article- http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/pakistan-reels-with-internal-unease-regarding-cpec-implementation/
Friday, February 26, 2016
South China Sea: Beijing Is Winning, but Here's How to Retake the Initiative ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Peter Layton)
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| PLAN Type- 54A Frigate ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / United States Navy) |
Source- The National Interest
Author- Peter Layton
China is once again causing concern in the South China Sea, this time by moving surface-to-air missiles to the Paracel Islands.
Over several years, this dispute has evolved into a clash of opposing strategies, with China steadily expanding its territorial, economic and military footprint in the South China Sea while other countries counter with either “balancing” or “rules-based order” strategies. So far, China's strategy has proved more successful. Why have these “balancing” and “rules-based order” strategies failed? What strategies might succeed?
Balancing strategies stress building greater relative power, usually militarily. A state can then threaten or employ violence to dissuade an adversary from taking unwanted actions. An example is Vietnam, which is modernizing its naval and air forces, improving its paramilitary forces (Coast Guard and Fishing Patrol Agency), purposefully strengthening relationships with India, Russia, Japan and the United States, and expanding its defense industry. Less obviously, the freedom of navigation transits through the South China Sea by U.S. Navy warships are also examples of balancing with the implicit threat of armed response in the event of trouble.
Such strategies, however, play to China’s strengths, and so far have been easily countered.
In any test of relative power, China has advantages over all those involved in the South China Sea dispute except the U.S. (and even here, some predict China’s GDP will surpass America’s in time). Moreover, while a significant proportion of the world’s merchant shipping transits the area, much of it is en route to China. So China has the greater stake in this dispute, and thus greater credibility. The notion of waging a war with China over ownership of small islands in the South China Sea therefore seems far-fetched. The costs would be too high, the returns too low.
Even so, China is using a carefully calibrated blend of naval, private and commercial means in its territorial expansion to make the use of military force in response appear grossly inappropriate. How to respond for example, when a ship on a freedom of navigation transit is stopped by picketing fishing boats. China’s sophisticated approach is well-calibrated to control the situation without giving others cause to resort to armed conflict. And behind all this lies the fact that, for many countries involved in the South China Sea dispute, China is their major export market. This economic “carrot” provides a ready bargaining tool for rewarding or punishing states as needed.
If balancing is not a credible strategy, others emphasize a focus on a rules-based order to constrain China's actions. Such an order envisages states agreeing to be bounded by particular rules so that all benefit.
China counters by arguing that it abides by the rules, but that only some rules are pertinent. In China’s view, the disputed islands were lawfully returned after World War II under the 1943 Cairo Declaration and 1945 Potsdam Proclamation. Others insist the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea should hold sway. China counters that it is not a party to the San Francisco Treaty and signed UNCLOS with specified reservations applying to the South China Sea issue. China is therefore “observing international law in the true sense.”
China's stance has regional resonance. For instance, China avoids arbitration at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over seabed boundaries, just as Australia has done with its smaller neighbor Timor Leste. The Philippines has sought an ICJ ruling against China’s island grabs, with China responding by declaring it will ignore the result. Again, such a stance is not unusual: Japan is ignoring an ICJ ruling on whaling in the Southern Ocean.
China appears determined to seek a zero-sum outcome. It wants territorial ownership of the islands it claims, so cooperative strategies in which benefits are shared among all parties appear impractical. So if 'balancing' and 'rule of law' are both ineffective strategies, what will influence Chinese policymakers? Two different approaches to impose costs on China for its behavior in the South China Sea appear possible.
The first strategy would be to target specific issues the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is particularly sensitive about. The fundamental aim of the CCP is regime survival, which hinges both on retaining popular legitimacy and on repression. To this end, the state maintains the “great Chinese firewall,” suppresses dissenters, censors news and rewrites history. Today’s CCP leadership is particularly sensitive to threats to the political status quo, creating pressure points that could be exploited by states wanting to influence China's behavior in the South China Sea. Meeting the Dalai Lama, openly discussing China's human rights problems, supporting a free press, assisting open internet access or vigorously marketing China’s true history are all options.
Linking the CCP’s domestic legitimacy deficit to the South China Sea dispute could be expected to meet substantial push-back. But strategy is about bargaining, and without imposing costs, Beijing is unlikely to change its mind. China is itself quite adept at using linkage strategies. As Krista Wiegand showed, between 1978 and 2008 China linked claims on Japan’s Senkaku islands to other issues some twenty-six times, gaining numerous concessions.
The second approach would aim to constrain China’s future freedom of action. China has defended its land reclamation activities in the South China Sea as providing new ports and airfields for regional search-and-rescue and disaster relief operations. Recently, Foreign Minister Wang went further, declaring: “China stands ready to open these facilities to other countries upon completion.” This offer could be accepted. A public diplomatic effort could be mounted to permanently place UN or ASEAN facilities and personnel on the islands to undertake civilian disaster relief tasks indefinitely. The islands would then be reconceptualized not as China’s exclusive property but rather as new territory shared with the world for all nations’ benefit. China’s use of the islands for military activities would be sharply constrained.
Either approach could form the basis of a new strategy to replace the current failing ones. On the other hand, if imposing costs is considered to not be worth the outcomes, then it might be wiser to accept China’s South China Sea fait accompli. Continuing with the present ineffectual responses seems unwise. Chinese decision-makers could learn the wrong lessons and come to believe that assertive strategies are the most efficacious way to get favorable outcomes. A China that learns the wrong lessons might be worse than a China that gains the control it seeks over the South China Sea.
About the author- Peter Layton is a Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University. A retired RAAF Group Captain, Layton has extensive experience in force structure development and taught national security strategy at the U.S. National Defense University. This article first appeared in the Interpreter.
Original link to the article- http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/south-china-sea-beijing-winning-heres-how-retake-the-15327
Thursday, February 25, 2016
Look out, China: India's Lethal Ballistic Missile Sub Is Ready to Go ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Dave Majumdar)
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| INS Arihant ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Indian Navy) |
Source- The National Interest
Author- Dave Majumdar
New Delhi’s first indigenous nuclear-powered submarine has passed all of its sea-trials and is ready to be formally inducted into the Indian Navy. According to Indian media reports, the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine has been undergoing a series of diving tests and weapons trials over the past five months.
“It has passed all tests and in many things has surpassed our expectations,” a senior India Navy official told the Economic Times. “Technically the submarine can now be commissioned at any time.”
Called the Arihant, the 6,000-ton displacement submarine—which draws heavily from Russian technology—carries twelve indigenous K-15 Sagarika missiles with a range of 435 miles. Or, alternatively, it can carry four K-4 nuclear-tipped ballistic missile—each with a range of 2,200 miles. However, unlike U.S. ballistic missile submarines, the Indian vessel also has a hunter-killer role and will be armed with a host of torpedoes and anti-ship missiles. It is powered by an eighty megawatt pressurized water reactor and can reach a submerged speed of twenty-four knots.
Though Indian crews trained on a Russian Akula-class (Project 971 Shchuka-B) in preparation to man Arihant and the submarine draws on Russian technology, the boat is half the size of Akula. Further, the Arihant design does not seem to bear much physical resemblance to its Russian forebearer—at least externally.
Two more Arihant-class submarines are currently under construction at the shipyards in Visakhapatnam. The follow-on vessels will be larger and incorporate improvements over the lead boat. Arihant is the first of five nuclear–powered ballistic missile submarines that India is planning to build. The first-in-class boat reportedly cost $2.9 billion to complete.
Meanwhile, India is proceeding with the design work on a new class of nuclear-powered attack submarines. Six indigenous nuclear-powered attack boats are currently planned, but there are very few details available about those designs. Presumably, like the Arihant, the new attack submarines will be based on technology gleaned from the Russian Akula-class (Project 971 Shchuka-B). India has leased one such boat, which is called INS Chakra and may lease another Akula in the near future.
While Arihant is probably a good first step, India is likely to have its work cut out for it to eventually build boats that rival American or Russian designs.
About the author- Dave Majumdar is the defense editor for the National Interest. You can follow him on Twitter: @davemajumdar.
Original link to the article- http://www.nationalinterest.org/blog/look-out-china-indias-lethal-ballistic-missile-sub-ready-go-15312
Wednesday, February 24, 2016
America’s Next Move in Asia: A Japan-South Korea Alliance ( Source- The National Interest /Author- McDaniel Wicker)
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| Image credits- VOA |
Source- The National Interest
Author- McDaniel Wicker
North Korea’s latest rocket launch has led officials in both Seoul and Tokyo to call for a strong response. In light of Pyongyang’s numerous provocative actions, the United States’ closest allies in East Asia are rightly concerned about the regime. These concerns require Washington to act decisively to emphasize its commitment to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and, more broadly, across the Asia-Pacific region. Toward this end, the current alliance structure must be revamped to create a stronger defense partnership between the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea. A stronger trilateral alliance would ease the overall strain on the United States’ defense capabilities. Moreover, current geopolitical realities make such alliance-building more possible now than at any time in recent memory.
Until recently, close cooperation between South Korea and Japan seemed impossible. Historical strains dating back to Imperial Japan’s occupation of the Korean Peninsula weighed heavily on the relationship, and Seoul’s attempts to grow closer to Beijing worried many in Tokyo.
Today, however, prospects for ROK-Japan cooperation are increasing. Following the first official meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Korea President Park Geun-hye in November, the two countries reached an agreement at the end of the year on the long-disputed “comfort women” issue—Japan would apologize for sex slavery during World War II and ROK would finally let the issue rest—removing one of the most salient obstacles to better relations. North Korea’s recent provocations have further accelerated the thaw in relations between Tokyo and Seoul by reinforcing the need for both to work together to counter Pyongyang.
The United States has treaty obligations to defend both South Korea and Japan, with military personnel based in both. Thanks to the comfort women agreement and the improving relationship between Park and Abe, the latest provocations by the North offer a unique opportunity to reshape the security landscape in Northeast Asia. While the United States has long managed defense relations through the so-called “hub and spoke” system of bilateral ties centered around Washington, the Obama administration should use its final year to move toward a new trilateral security relationship to enhance security in the region.
The Case for a New Security Alliance
The challenges to security in the Asia-Pacific require a more dynamic approach than exists today. For one, Pyongyang’s successive nuclear provocations have made clear China’s lack of real influence over Kim Jong-un. Chinese officials have long claimed they have little leverage, and their statements increasingly ring true. Even though China does not want a nuclear-armed North Korea, evidenced by its lead nuclear negotiator’s recent visit to Pyongyang, it also has legitimate concerns about implementing harsh sanctions that could potentially destabilize North Korea. Without any clear course of action, it seems unlikely China can lead the North back to the Six Party talks, and therefore other means for bringing Pyongyang to the negotiating table must be explored. Close U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral ties could serve as new leverage to restart dialogue.
Moreover, enhanced cooperation between Washington, Tokyo and Seoul would also help to solidify the progress made with comfort women agreement. Both Park and Abe are facing a domestic backlash from the deal, but agreement to pursue trilateral ties with the United States would show good faith with one another and with the United States. Such mutual trust is key to fully normalizing relations between Tokyo and Seoul.
Enhanced trilateral relations would also increase trust in U.S. commitment to the region. Policymakers in South Korea have expressed feelings of isolation and worry in recent weeks and there have even been calls for the South to develop its own nuclear deterrent. Others in Seoul have fretted over Japan’s recent defense reforms and expressed concerns of remilitarization. Both notions are extreme, but it speaks to an undercurrent of insecurity throughout South Korea. A trilateral alliance would alleviate such worries by reaffirming the United States’ commitment to the Peninsula’s stability and clarifying Japan’s role in regional security.
In Tokyo, meanwhile, legislators have expressed feelings of isolation, especially as ROK leaders have warmed to China. China’s rapid military modernization and increasingly assertive actions have created a sense of vulnerability in Japan, while a lack of firm commitment from its nearest neighbor has only exacerbated this feeling. They have been a driving factor for Abe’s defense reforms, including Japan’s new security legislation. Still, prospects for greater Japanese military engagement has faced domestic opposition among voters who prize their pacifist history since 1945 and fear that legacy will soon be gone with the prime minister’s plan to create a more robust defensive capability. Tighter trilateral relations could assure both camps. With its strongest partner, the United States, and its nearest democratic neighbor, South Korea, standing beside it, Japan would be both less isolated and more likely to remain peaceful through the benefits of mutual defense.
In weighing the benefits of stronger trilateral coordination, the Obama administration would be wise to consider the gains the United States stands to make as well. With the United States, Japan and ROK working increasingly as one, U.S. forces would be shouldering less of the burden. Stronger partners results in an ease of effort for all. Furthermore, a stable U.S.-ROK-Japan alliance provides the foundation for stability in East Asia—one of the chief aims of the U.S. rebalance to Asia.
Peace and security in the Asia Pacific are paramount for continued U.S. prosperity, but trilateral U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation alone will not ensure regional stability. In fact poor execution could have a destabilizing effect by making China and North Korea feel encircled and threatened. North Korea’s singular focus on survival may lead to a backlash to any action that seems threatening to its survival. In order to counteract such worries, the United States must accompany any trilateral agreement with clear messaging about U.S.-Japan-ROK intentions. One additional way to reassure Pyongyang would be an honest effort at negotiations, which would signal Washington’s desire for stability rather than overhauling the regime.
Achieving the full potential of the Asian Century necessitates a robust alliance between the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Admiral Harry Harris, the commander of U.S. Pacific Command, recently alluded to this need when he described Japan and Korea as the “cornerstone of our Asia policy” while speaking in Washington. He understands these countries are unequivocally our two most important allies in the region and called for stronger and closer trilateral integration. Such multilateral partnership still faces many obstacles in both Japan and South Korea, but areas of progress abound in missile defense, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, maritime domain awareness and security, and intelligence sharing, to name a few. True trilateral partnership will not come quickly, but the sooner all three nations begin taking small steps, the sooner the ultimate goal can be reached.
About the author- McDaniel Wicker is an Asia securities fellow at the Wilson Center.
Original link to the article- http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-next-move-asia-japan-south-korea-alliance-15301
Tuesday, February 23, 2016
The Right Way to Sanction China ( Source- The National Interest / Authors- Zack Cooper & Eric B. Lorber)
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| Credits- VOA |
Source- The National Interest
Author- Zack Cooper & Eric B. Lorber
OVER THE LAST five years, the United States has struggled to influence Chinese behavior. Washington’s responses to Beijing’s increasingly assertive activities—ranging from economic espionage to artificial island construction—have been largely ineffective. Yet U.S. leaders are now considering a new option: economic sanctions. Conventional wisdom holds that the U.S.-Chinese economic relationship is “too big to fail” and that Washington therefore has little economic leverage with Beijing. Indeed, U.S. policymakers should be realistic that extensive sanctions against China would be unwise and infeasible. Nevertheless, certain limited, conduct-based sanctions may be able to shape Chinese behavior at an acceptable cost.
The surprising aspect of the debate in Washington over whether to sanction China is that it took so long to emerge; within the last decade, the United States has sanctioned every one of its major national-security concerns other than China. Iran, Russia, North Korea and terrorist groups have found themselves facing not only U.S. unilateral sanctions, but extensive international sanctions regimes. Acknowledging the need for more effective policy options, President Barack Obama issued an executive order providing the Treasury Department authority to sanction state and nonstate actors—including Chinese entities—engaging in malicious cyber activity. Last year, the administration threatened to impose sanctions on a number of Chinese persons in the lead up to President Xi’s state visit. Likewise, various presidential candidates have suggested that the United States impose sanctions against Chinese agencies or businesses involved in cyber attacks against economic targets.
Yet China is not Russia or Iran, and trying to impose an extensive sanctions regime on Beijing would be both unwise and ultimately ineffective. Given China’s global economic importance—notwithstanding its recent economic troubles—U.S. policymakers would struggle to attract the international support required to implement an extensive sanctions regime in response to cyber attacks or regional coercion. In addition, unlike the Russian or Iranian economies, which are dependent on energy exports, the Chinese economy is highly diversified and would be much more resilient to sanctions. Even if such sanctions could be constructed, China has the economic heft and political influence to hit back and do real damage to both U.S. companies and broader U.S. interests. If Beijing viewed extensive economic sanctions as an effort to undermine the economic basis of the Chinese Communist Party’s rule—particularly in the aftermath of China’s recent economic stumbles—Beijing’s response could be highly escalatory. In short, China’s global importance and its enormous economy inoculate it against the type of extensive sanctions levied on Russia and Iran.
Nevertheless, the United States has a set of more targeted economic options for shaping Chinese behavior. These options would need to be limited and designed to deter or reverse specific destabilizing activities undertaken by Chinese individuals, companies or agencies. While these options are far from perfect, they may provide policymakers better responses than threatening to use military force—or watching idly as China alters the status quo.
STARTING IN THE mid-2000s, the United States began employing highly sophisticated and targeted economic sanctions. Washington found new ways to pressure rogue actors by leveraging the dollar’s importance in the world financial system, private firms’ reputational concerns and the fact that the United States is the hub for many technologies necessary for economic development abroad. The construction of sophisticated sanctions regimes effectively rehabilitated sanctions as an effective tool of foreign policy after they fell out of favor in the late 1990s.
In the case of Iran, the United States used its position as the financial capital of the world—and its largest market—to force foreign companies to abandon their business with the Islamic Republic. The U.S. Treasury Department threatened companies with a choice: either do business in U.S. financial markets (and have access to U.S. dollars for transactional purposes) or do business in Iran. A large number of foreign firms consequently ceased doing business with Iran, exerting economic pressure on the Islamic Republic. This ability to impose biting sanctions was—at least in part—responsible for bringing Iran to the negotiating table and ultimately concluding the nuclear deal.
Similarly, the United States has imposed sophisticated sanctions on Russia that target Moscow’s ability to refinance its massive external debt and prevent its firms from developing key energy resources. These sanctions leverage U.S. asymmetric advantages, such as technological superiority and attractive capital markets. The sanctions prevent U.S. energy companies from providing Russian firms with cutting-edge technologies to develop difficult-to-reach oil resources. U.S. and European Union sanctions also prohibit Western financial firms from dealing in new Russian debt or equity with more than a thirty-day maturity period. This makes it difficult for Russian companies to secure the necessary financing to service the country’s massive debt.
Policymakers have seen the powerful impact of these sanctions and concluded that they can be used to address a wider range of foreign policy issues. As U.S. Treasury official David S. Cohen noted in a 2014 speech, “[f]inancial power has become an essential component of our country’s national security toolkit. That fact may mean that we are called on to use it more frequently and in more complex ways than we have in previous decades.”
Not surprisingly, U.S. policymakers have grown more interested in employing sanctions to counter Chinese activities. White House officials have threatened to sanction perpetrators of cyber attacks. Likewise, policymakers have investigated whether sanctions could blunt China’s increasingly assertive maritime activities. Based on public statements and private discussions, it is clear that the administration is moving closer to employing economic leverage to shape Chinese behavior.
Yet effectively using extensive sanctions to deter Chinese economic espionage and maritime assertiveness is likely to prove difficult. First, imposing extensive sanctions would be politically difficult within the United States. Most U.S. policymakers recognize that China’s rise presents many opportunities for the United States. China’s economic dynamism has pulled hundreds of millions out of poverty and energized regional and global economies. Beijing’s growing political influence could help alleviate shared problems such as climate change and nuclear proliferation. China’s increasingly capable military could even cooperate with the United States to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation and peacekeeping operations abroad.
For these reasons, the Obama administration has attempted to focus its relationship with China on shared interests rather than divergent perspectives. Imposing extensive economic sanctions on China would seriously damage bilateral ties. For example, to authorize sanctions against China for its activities in the South China Sea, U.S. law requires the president declare a national emergency in response to an unusual and extraordinary threat to the United States. While such a declaration is pro forma under most U.S. sanctions programs, declaring that China’s actions pose an extraordinary threat to the United States would be a major political step and appears unlikely during the current administration.
Second, building international support for extensive sanctions would be treacherous, if not impossible, barring a severe Chinese escalation. U.S. efforts to pressure Iran to the negotiating table were successful because they were international. Similarly, U.S. sanctions on Russia have caused significant economic pain because they are multilateral. In both cases, European and Asian allies and partners coordinated with the United States to bring economic pressure to bear. Without this cooperation, both Iran and Russia would have been able to blunt the sanctions. Given China’s large economy and political importance, many of these countries would be unwilling to impose sanctions under anything but the most extreme circumstances.
Third, the Chinese economy is inherently more resilient than smaller or more sector-specific economies like those of Russia and Iran. China’s economic weight alone means that extensive sanctions would not only take a bite out of Chinese growth, but would damage the global economy. Moreover, China plays a critical role in the international trading system as a manufacturer of finished products. Finding alternative manufacturing centers would take time. Unlike the energy markets, which were able to respond relatively quickly to sanctions on Russia and Iran, trade with China is inherently less flexible. In short, China’s size and market position insures it against the exercise of U.S. asymmetric economic leverage.
Fourth, China’s response to sanctions could be very damaging. Unlike Russia or Iran, China could severely harm U.S. economic interests and those of U.S. allies and partners, both in the region and around the world. Despite the repeated use of sanctions since the end of the Cold War, the United States has never imposed them on a country with substantial economic response options. Beijing, on the other hand, could adopt both symmetric and asymmetric responses. China could impose sanctions on U.S. companies, or make it significantly more difficult for certain U.S. companies to do business in China. Numerous U.S. businesses have already encountered political challenges to operating in China, which have caused some, like Google, to withdraw from mainland China despite its huge market. Similarly, in recent months, China has threatened to impose so-called secondary sanctions on U.S. defense manufacturers that provide arms to Taiwan as part of a newly announced U.S. package, cutting these companies off from Chinese markets. Beijing could do the same to U.S. allies’ and partners’ businesses, and levy additional economic measures, such as restricting key exports to or imports from those countries. Such responses accord with China’s traditional use of subtler forms of economic statecraft.
U.S. sanctions would also risk retaliation through horizontal escalation in other domains. China might adopt measures to undermine U.S. centrality in the global economic system, such as efforts to undermine confidence in the U.S. financial system or to more rapidly shift away from dollar-based trade and investment. Alternatively, China could increase the pace of land reclamation and militarization in the South China Sea or more frequently confront U.S. ships and aircraft operating in international waters and airspace. China could also become less cooperative on a host of other issues that are important to U.S. interests, from climate change to the nuclear deal with Iran.
Erecting extensive sanctions against China would be unwise and infeasible, but more limited sanctions may shape Chinese behavior with fewer negative effects. In particular, measures designed to deter internationally recognized “bad conduct” by Chinese individuals, companies and agencies—
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| Image credits- VOA |
particularly those who commit economic espionage—could be effective. On the other hand, sanctions are likely to be less useful in maritime disputes involving ambiguous territorial claims.
When considering specific sanctions, policymakers should ask five questions. First, do existing authorities provide mechanisms for sanctioning the actors responsible? Second, would sanctions be sufficiently powerful to compel these or future actors to change their behavior? Third, would foreign partners cooperate in levying such sanctions? Fourth, how might the adversary respond and how damaging would these responses be? Fifth and finally, would the imposition of sanctions reinforce or undermine norms of good conduct and strengthen or weaken the long-term viability of the overall U.S. sanctions position? The answers to these questions vary depending on the specific sanctions under consideration:
Countering Chinese economic espionage: The attractiveness of carefully targeted sanctions is most clear in the cyber realm. The United States has already raised concerns about cyber espionage against private corporations and the Department of Justice has indicted five Chinese military hackers. The Federal Bureau of Investigation reported that cyber espionage increased by 50 percent in 2015. U.S. officials have pointed the finger at China for some of the most egregious attacks—including the massive hack of the Office of Personnel Management in which Chinese persons stole security-clearance information for over twenty million U.S. citizens. Although President Obama and President Xi announced a “common understanding” that neither government would engage in cyber economic espionage, early reports suggest that government-sponsored Chinese hackers have continued what has been called “the greatest transfer of wealth in history.”
Chinese actors engaged in theft of U.S. intellectual property could be designated under existing U.S. authorities, which would effectively prevent them from doing business in U.S. markets or with U.S. companies. Although this punishment might not force domestically focused Chinese companies to change their behavior, it would send a signal to companies with a U.S. presence that engaging in such activity entails significant risks. Such sanctions could be coordinated with efforts to protect trade secrets to demonstrate the seriousness of U.S. concern to Chinese leaders.
From an international perspective, targeted sanctions might prove attractive to other developed economies suffering from persistent Chinese cyber espionage. The economic damage from the sanctions themselves would be limited in developed countries because Chinese firms stealing intellectual property are hampering growth abroad. In addition, the risk of China implementing its own sanctions on economic espionage would be limited because U.S. law already prohibits this type of economic espionage. Moreover, Chinese groups already conduct sustained cyber attacks on U.S. businesses, so sanctioning a number of these actors might not substantially change the frequency or fierceness of intrusions. There is no doubt that China could take action in other domains, but targeted designations could set U.S. red lines and make clear that the United States and its partners are willing to take a more forceful stance to uphold norms of good conduct in cyberspace.
Countering Chinese economic coercion in maritime disputes: Another potential area for targeted sanctions is in response to Chinese economic coercion in disputed maritime zones. Beijing has sought to consolidate control of the South China Sea by constructing a “Great Wall of Sand” on disputed maritime features. In addition, China has used coast guard and fisheries vessels to push other claimants out of disputed waters in the East and South China Seas. Beijing has also used its own economic statecraft to limit tropical fruit imports from the Philippines and rare-earth exports to Japan in response to clashes over maritime claims. Finally, questions are mounting about whether Chinese investments, from the port of Darwin in Australia to the island of Saipan in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, might be intended to alter U.S., ally or partner behavior in peacetime, or change military options in a conflict.
Countermeasures have already been applied in several of these cases. For example, the United States, the European Union, and Japan brought and won a case at the World Trade Organization arguing that China had applied export quotas on rare-earth elements in 2010. Meanwhile, the United States has criticized construction on disputed features and operated platforms within twelve nautical miles of some features. Nevertheless, the pace of construction has accelerated in recent months.
At the moment, U.S. officials do not have existing mechanisms to sanction businesses engaged in bad behavior in maritime disputes. Yet, there are several tempting targets for sanctions, most notably China Communications Construction Company Dredging (CCCCG), which conducted dredging at disputed South China Sea features, and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which moved an oil rig into waters disputed with Vietnam. Further, China has reportedly invited private or semiprivate firms to invest in building the infrastructure on a number of these reclaimed islands. U.S. officials could obtain the legal authority necessary to sanction CCCCG , CNPC or other Chinese entities if the president were to declare a national emergency related to China’s destabilizing actions in the region. This would no doubt be seen as a significant escalation.
Nevertheless, sanctioning entities involved in construction or development in disputed areas could alter their calculus, disincentive destabilizing conduct and thereby decrease tensions in the long-term. Detailed understandings of these firms and their domestic political connections within China would be required, but there are reasons to believe that they might be responsive to outside pressure. For example, CCCCG and CNPC are already listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and CCCCG was reportedly planning a new listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. However, CCCCG has delayed its initial public offering in Hong Kong, allegedly because the Exchange asked a number of questions about dredging activities in the South China Sea. CCCCG or CNPC could find their business partnerships damaged and their ability to deal in U.S. dollars curtailed if they were added to the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially Designated Nationals List. This would in turn harm the companies’ value, affect their ability to raise funds and impact their operations. Such efforts might not stop Chinese coercion in the South China Sea, but they would impose a cost both on the Chinese companies involved and on Beijing’s reputation.
However, even if U.S. targeted sanctions were effective in pressuring specific firms to change their behavior in the South China Sea, some major obstacles would remain. First, other countries in the region have previously engaged in similar activities, so it might be difficult to build robust international support to impose truly biting sanctions. Additionally, the United States would have to decide whether to impose similar sanctions on other countries’ firms operating in disputed waters. Moreover, Chinese leaders could offset private losses incurred by U.S. sanctions, which would limit their effectiveness. Furthermore, China could respond asymmetrically by escalating in other domains in which Beijing has more leverage.
BEIJING’S INCREASINGLY assertive behavior is triggering a global debate about potential responses. Unfortunately, diplomatic and even military measures have thus far appeared largely ineffective at deterring destabilizing Chinese activities in cyberspace and maritime zones. Washington’s growing debate about applying other foreign-policy tools, including sanctions, is therefore inevitable. Indeed, the mere discussion of sanctions could itself prove a valuable deterrent.
In considering sanctions on Chinese individuals and entities, American policymakers should be realistic about their likely effectiveness. Applying an extensive international sanctions regime on China would be unwise and infeasible, so sanctions would have to be more limited and targeted. Moreover, unlike the recent sanctions on Russia and Iran, which were relatively low risk, sanctioning China carries substantial risk of damaging political and economic blowback. Nevertheless, a carefully calibrated economic response may be effective in altering Chinese behavior, and targeted sanctions on certain Chinese actors would demonstrate to Beijing that Washington is serious about upholding international rules and norms, and that is willing to accept some risk to do so. Beijing is already using economic leverage to change the behavior of U.S. national security and business leaders, as well as that of U.S. allies and partners. Washington shouldn’t be afraid to respond in kind.
About the authors- Zack Cooper is a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a doctoral candidate at Princeton University, and a member of the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance board of advisors. Eric Lorber is a senior associate at the Financial Integrity Network, an adjunct fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and a senior advisor at the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance.
Original link to the article- http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-right-way-sanction-china-15285
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