Saturday, April 30, 2016
China Blocks US Aircraft Carrier John C. Stennis Access To Hong Kong Port ( Source- Eurasia Review / Author- MINA)
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| USS John C. Stennis ( Image credits- Flickr / United States Navy) |
Source- Eurasia Review
Author- MINA
China has denied a US request for an aircraft carrier group led by USS John C. Stennis to make a port visit to Hong Kong, the US State Department said on Friday, confirming earlier media reports.
Pentagon spokesman, Commander Bill Urban, said another US warship, the USS Blue Ridge, was currently in Hong Kong on a stop-over and the US expected that to continue.
Urban added that the request for a Hong Kong visit by the carrier and its strike group, which have been patrolling the South China Sea, was recently denied, despite a “long track record of successful port visits to Hong Kong.”
The Chinese government, as well as the country’s embassy in Washington did not comment.
The warship requested a port call permit early on Thursday.
The South China Morning Post newspaper, citing the Chinese Foreign Ministry, reported that port calls by US warships and military aircraft had to be approved on a “case by case basis in accordance with sovereignty principles and specific circumstances.”
Aircraft carrier John C. Stennis, two destroyers, two cruisers and a Japan-based US Seventh Fleet flagship sailed into the waters of the South China Sea in early March, to counter the presence of China. The latter has territorial disputes over islands in the South China Sea, rich in deposits of natural resources, with Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. To assure its claim over the disputed territory, Beijing has been rapidly setting up defense installations in the area.
Beijing has repeatedly warned against US interference in the region. Despite this the US Navy is actively opposing the Chinese initiative, deploying additional warships to the disputed zone and conducting maneuvers near artificial Chinese islands and flying over them, citing “freedom of navigation” as an excuse.
Earlier this month China accused the US of “sabotaging regional peace” after the Pentagon chief announced a military buildup in the Philippines. Speaking in the Philippines on April 14, US Defense Secretary Ash Carter said the US will keep nearly 300 troops in the Philippines through the end of the month, despite completing the joint military drills. He added that US troops will have combat aircraft and helicopters at their disposal. ” In response the Chinese Foreign Ministry said in a statement that military exchanges by relevant countries should not target third parties and much less support a few countries in challenging China’s sovereignty and security.
About the author- MINA is the Macedonian International News Agency
Original link to the article- http://www.eurasiareview.com/author/mina/
Friday, April 29, 2016
Zvezdochka shipyard in Severodvinsk ready for Sindhukesari ( Source- Russia & India Report / Credits- Alexander Yemelyanenkov, RIR)
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| Credits- http://www.losbarcosdeeugenio.com/credit_en.html |
Source- Russia & India Report
Author- Alexander Yemelyanenkov, RIR
Another diesel-electric submarine owned by the Indian Navy, the Sindhukesari, will be in the Zvezdochka ship repair centre for repairs in Russia later this summer. It is being awaited at the Severodvinsk centre, where five similar Russian- built submarines of the Indian Navy were earlier sent to undergo repairs and modernization.
The India Embassy in Moscow sent a delegation headed by the naval attaché Commodore Tarun Sobti recently for an inspection visit to Severodvinsk, RIR has learnt. The authorized Indian representatives have checked the enterprise’s industrial and consumer sites for readiness to receive the Sindhukesari diesel-electric submarine for repair.
During the visit, Sobti examined the ship lifting facilities and main production plants, which will be involved in the repair of the Indian submarine, Eugene Gladyshev, official representative of the CA Zvezdochka, said. The inspection crew paid special attention to the readiness of the premises designed to house the submarine crew, officers of the observation group and their families, as well as to the social and sports infrastructure sites - the Belomorets stadium, the indoor ice arena and our Science and Technology Centre.
Russia, India discuss second nuclear submarine
The decision to send another Indian Navy submarine for repair to Russia was made after a thorough analysis of all the "pros" and "cons", in particular taking into account the “Make in India” national programme. RIR has learnt that two of the four Indian submarines included in the programme for modernized factory repairs will undergo these ‘refit’ procedures at Indian shipyards with technical participation and help from the Russian Zvezdochka.
The question about another one remains open. The Sindhukesari diesel-electric submarine, will be repaired in Severodvinsk. This integrated solution will reduce the total repair time to allow all four submarines to return to the Indian Navy’s combat forces as quickly as possible.
Under the contracts earlier concluded by Zvezdochka, no more than 26 months were allowed for repair of submarines of this type.
This time too, the deadlines are rigid. At the shipyard, they are sure that they will cope. However, the representatives of the Indian side as the customer, decided to personally verify the actual readiness of the Russian shipyard to receive the Sindhukesari submarine for repair. After this inspection, the arrival of the ship to Severodvinsk has been confirmed in June 2016.
Original link to the article- http://in.rbth.com/economics/defence/2016/04/29/zvezdochka-shipyard-in-severodvinsk-ready-for-sindhukesari_589325
America's Navy Is Spread Too Thin ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Nikolas K. Gvosdev)
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| USS America, LHA-6 ( Credits- Wikimedia Commons / United States Navy) |
Source- The National Interest
Author- Nikolas K. Gvosdev
Earlier this month, I had the privilege of being on a panel as part of the Naval War College’s Regional Alumni Symposium, discussing the strategic importance of the Black Sea region, along with Michael Kofman of the Center for Naval Analysis and Chris Marsh of the School of Advanced Military Studies. After all, as Marsh noted, the Black Sea is assuming much greater importance as part of China’s ambitious “one road, one belt” system, designed to link the Asia-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic worlds—a point made graphically clear by Parag Khanna’s “connectography” maps, while Kofman called attention to Russia’s new power-projection capabilities emanating from Crimea. Yet for all our eloquence in calling for the Black Sea to assume greater importance in American strategic thinking, equally compelling cases were being made for why additional U.S. attention and resources need to be deployed in the Mediterranean, the Baltic Sea and the Arctic Ocean. And without the ability to instantaneously transport equipment and personnel from one area to another, the United States must either massively increase its defense and security expenditures to increase its presence in all theaters, trust that allies will finally meet the challenge and increase their own spending to fill in the gaps, or accept risks in certain areas.
Most likely, however, the United States will continue with its “talisman” approach of the last several years: the assumption that stretching existing resources thinly across a wide front guarantees that there is a token American presence, which will prove sufficient to dissuade any challengers from taking action. The problem here, of course, is that small numbers of U.S. personnel and equipment are enough to “fly the flag,” but are not in any position to decisively change the local balance of forces. A handful of U.S. ships cannot simultaneously engage in missile defense activities, deter the Russians, intercept migrants and quarantine security threats from spreading, while a small number of U.S. ground personnel can only effectively serve as a trip wire—and if the trip wire has no back-up, then its effectiveness is further reduced.
It has become a strategic truism that the United States must find a way to “rebalance” or “pivot” among its obligations in the European, Pacific and Middle Eastern theaters of operation. However, this can gloss over an equally important problem: how to balance the American commitment within each of these regions. It is not enough to consider the need to shift forces between the principal regions of the world, but also where these forces will be stationed. In Asia, where should U.S. attention be paid—the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, the Southeast Asian archipelago or the Indian subcontinent? In the Middle East, is the challenge the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Iran and the Persian Gulf, the problems on the Arabian Peninsula, the fate and trajectory of Egypt, destabilizing trends in the Maghreb—or will we see, as every previous administration and Secretary of State has done, a focus in the last year on the holy grail of solving the Israeli-Palestinian problem?
The problem in Europe, for instance, is that there are now several simultaneous crises that affect the security of the Euro-Atlantic community: the migration crisis across several parts of the Mediterranean, the internal cohesiveness of the European Union amid economic challenges and the ability of Russia, on the basis of home-ground advantage, to quickly mobilize and feint in several different regions at once. The United States does not have the luxury of prioritizing one challenge over the others—or to have the prescience to determine which crisis is the one most likely to flare at any given time.
For the past two years, much of the attention has focused on a possible Russian threat to the Baltic states—the risk of a quick incursion that could not be swiftly met and blocked by the Western alliance. This has led to modest increases in spending, and greater discussion of the infrastructure needs for projecting American and allied power into eastern and central Europe. The increased focus on this sector, however, has meant less attention in the Arctic and the Black Sea, where Russia is also putting down new markers. China’s arrival as a Mediterranean player is slipping through the cracks. Some have raised concerns that the real threats from the south that could doom the EU and NATO are being ignored because of the overemphasis on the Baltic theater, with warnings that “the alliance risks coming up dangerously short on the threats that matter most to most of Europe and thus to NATO. . . if NATO fails to define a strategy for its southern challenges, it could slip into strategic irrelevance.”
The strategic guidance upon which U.S. defense planning has been based has been rendered inoperative by recent events. Europe is neither quiet nor stable, and the United States is not extricating itself from the Middle East in order to free up resources to support an Asia-Pacific rebalance. Moreover, there are multiple, overlapping challenges in all of these areas. The United States has not been served by a reactive approach that rushes from crisis to crisis. The only way for the United States to forge a coherent set of policies is to begin to prioritize what areas are most critical for U.S. security and interests—and to make clear to allies and partners that America’s ability and willingness to continue to plug the gaps when others fail on meeting their commitments is waning. The Warsaw NATO summit occurs at a time when many allies, despite their rhetoric of concern about the threats facing the alliance, still have not increased their defense and security spending, assuming that, as usual, Washington will pull it out of the bag at the last minute. That dynamic has to change if the alliance is to be in a position to project strength and reassure its members.
In a post–Cold War world, the United States has gotten used to the localized crisis, where the full force of U.S. attention could be directed. It is time to regain the more global attitude that characterized U.S. strategic thinking—of being able to “walk and chew gum at the same time”—and to prioritize and resource accordingly.
About the author- Nikolas K. Gvosdev, a contributing editor at the National Interest, is also a non-residential senior fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
Original link to the article- http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-navy-spread-too-thin-15979
Is it Obvious Why India Cares About Nuclear Weapons? (Source- The Diplomat / Author- Robert Farley)
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| Agni Missile ( Credits- Wikimedia Commons / Antônio Milena (ABr)) |
Source- The Diplomat
Author- Robert Farley
Do states acquire weapons because of security needs or out of a desire for prestige? Analysts have asked this question about a wide range of weapons, including advanced fighter jets, nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, battleships, and (perhaps most importantly) nuclear weapons. On the prestige side, nuclear weapons convey modernity, power, and a spot in the “room where it happens”–particularly prestigious because the room only holds a few countries. On the security side, nuclear weapons can provide a last ditch alternative against a superior foe.
The question of weapons and prestige has bedeviled political scientists and the answer seems to be: “Both, but more of one or the other under particular circumstances.” Recent work by Jayita Sarkar (reviewed by Sumit Ganguly) helps contribute to this question, at least in the context of India’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Sarkar argues that recent documentary evidence supports a security-oriented explanation for the Indian nuclear weapons program. Indian nuclear insecurity, and in particular, the detonation of a Chinese hydrogen device in 1967, convinced India that it could not defend against the PLA without the assistance of nuclear weapons. India’s commitment to non-alignment made the country particularly vulnerable, as it could not depend on either a Soviet or a U.S. nuclear guarantee.
Sarkar’s research appears compelling with respect to the arguments that carried the day in Indian national security debates. However, documents may not tell the entire story. In particular, we need to wonder how precisely the causal mechanism of “prestige” functions. It may be that prestige concerns operate primarily as a means of distinguishing between different security-based arguments. “We need nukes because China has nukes” works on two levels: as a security concern and as an evaluation of national pride and civilizational capacity. In such a case, it would be difficult to distinguish between arguments that carried the day because of purely security concerns and arguments that won because of a synergistic combination of military and prestige concerns.
To give another example, India has pursued carrier aviation for much longer than China, despite somewhat similar economic and security conditions. The reasons for this are manifold, but may stem in part from the ancestry of the Indian Navy; it is the offspring of the Royal Navy, and as such carries an appreciation of impressive capital ships within its DNA. China’s PLA Navy draws its naval heritage from much different sources, making the aircraft carrier less relevant as a vehicle for national prestige. Whether these differences would manifest in documentary statements, rather than in difficult-to-observe mindsets, is hard to say, however.
In any case, India is surely sensitive to its status as a nuclear power. The Indian nuclear deterrent now serves not only as a deterrent to China, but also as a check on Pakistan. But just as Chinese nukes spurred the Indian program, India’s nuclear weapons made it difficult for Pakistan to do anything but follow suit.
About the author- Robert Farley is a senior lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He is author of The Battleship Book. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination, and can be found on twitter at @drfarls.
© THE DIPLOMAT ( ALL RIGHTS RESERVED)
Original link to the article- http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/is-it-obvious-why-india-cares-about-nuclear-weapons/
Wednesday, April 27, 2016
Conflicting reports on Russian sale of S-400 to India ( Source- Russia & India Report / Author- RT.COM)
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| S-400 Triumf ( Credits- Wikimedia Commons / Соколрус) |
Source- Russia & India Report
Author- RT.COM
Russia and India are yet to sign a contract for the supply of advanced S-400 air defence systems, a senior Russian official said in response to an Indian claim, which said the deal was already signed.
“The contract has not been signed yet,” the head of Russian state-owned technology giant Rostec Sergey Chemezov said.
Earlier Rao Inderjit Singh, Minister of State for Defence Production of India, said the deal was already signed. Singh is attending an international security forum in Moscow.
Russia's Defence Ministry has not yet commented on the reports.
The S-400 is the latest and most advanced of the long-range surface-to-air missiles produced by Russia. The Russian military is the only operator of the system, but China and India are expected to be the first foreign nations to receive it.
Media reports in 2015 said that India wants to buy five S-400 battalions.
Russia recently delivered a previous-generation S-300 variant of the air defence system to Iran, implementing a key defence deal between the two countries after lengthy discussions.
First published by rt.com.
Original link to the article- http://in.rbth.com/economics/defence/2016/04/27/russia-india-sign-contract-to-supply-s-400-missile-defence-system_588609
Will Beijing's South China Sea 'Land Creation' Lose it the Peace? ( Source- The National Interest / Author- James Goldrick)
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| Image credits- VOA |
Source- The National Interest
Author- James Goldrick
China's leadership faces difficult decisions in the South China Sea. China is at some risk of achieving what it sees as a military success at the price of losing the peace.
There is increasing evidence that its land creation (for they are not 'reclamation') activities in the South China Sea are developing a network of bases that will support fixed sensors, such as radars and underwater arrays, as well as the operations of air and seaborne surveillance units. The cumulative effect intended by Chinese planners appears to be to make it too dangerous during a conflict for other nations, most notably the US, to conduct significant military operations in the area, whether on, under or over the South China Sea; and certainly to make sure that none will go undetected in peacetime.
China's goal is to be able to regard the sea areas south of Hainan Island as a safe haven for its naval forces,particularly its submarines, as well as a jumping off point for more distant operations.
This is not a welcome development for the Americans, who have labeled the artificial islands, with some accuracy, as being a 'Great Wall of Sand'. The number and size of the installations is also a concern for the other claimants to the South China Sea and an unwelcome confirmation of China's increasingly powerful maritime capabilities. But the islands themselves do not represent the core of the problem, which China has created for itself, by folding its military intent into a narrative of China's historic claims to the sea areas and an ambiguous assertions of 'sovereign rights'.
However unwelcome, the new creations, considered as artificial installations, represent a fait accompli with which other nations can live with (and will have to live with). The Americans will take account of their capabilities in formulating their own operational concepts, just as they do for other 'anti-access' strategies and technologies. Notably, in a high intensity conflict, such 'unsinkable (but also immovable) aircraft carriers', located as they are in known positions so far from the Chinese mainland, would be high on any targeting list and very vulnerable.
What matters much more is what China's other actions now, and in the future, mean for its long-term relationship with maritime Southeast Asia. The development of yet another artificial island on Scarborough Reef and the declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone over the South China Sea by China would certainly raise further tensions.
The real danger, however, is that China will take its notion of 'sovereign rights' over the South China Sea too far and that Chinese paramilitary forces will be employed to eject fishing vessels and other units of the littoral nations, probably starting with the Philippines. This may happen as an emotional response to an unfavorable finding in the Philippines case by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, but it could also be driven by the progressive collapse of the South China Sea's fish stocks. Chinese fishing interests are well aware that their catches are diminishing. The Hainan provincial government has admitted that it has provided substantial subsidies to its fishermen to allow them to operate further afield and for more extended periods. Both regional and central governments are likely to come under considerable pressure to do even more for their fishermen and this may extend to direct action against their competitors.
If China ejects other nations from the area, Beijing will indeed be at risk of losing the peace. Contrary to suggestions that its dominion over the South China Sea would be accepted as a fait accompli, the reverse will be the case. It will not be forgotten and it will not go away. The other claimant nations will be forced to live with a boundary that cuts them off from their own historic areas of activity — a boundary that is barely out of sight of their own coasts. Resentment can only fester, both at a local level in the various nations' coastal communities, and at the national level in countries which are particularly sensitive to any perceived infringements of their national sovereignty.
As a country that seeks to be a leader in both the region and around the globe, China would do well to consider this slowly ticking time bomb. It is true that the Chinese leadership have to manage the nationalist views of their own population. These views may be a dragon largely of their own creation, but are no less real because of that. Nevertheless, it is time for China to finesse its policies for the South China Sea with a sensitivity that has so far been absent from much that it has done. In the end, the South China Sea must remain what it always has been, a shared space.
This piece first appeared in The Lowy Interpreter here.
Original link to the article- http://www.nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/will-beijings-south-china-sea-land-creation-lose-it-the-15953
Tuesday, April 26, 2016
Moscow and Tehran re-look at bilateral strategy ( Source- Russia & India Report / Authors- Sergey Strokan, Maxim Yusin, Kommersant)
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| Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Hamed Malepkour |
Source- Russia & India Report
Author- Sergey Strokan, Maxim Yusin, Kommersant
Once sanctions over Iran were lifted earlier this year, Russia strongly activated its contacts with the Iranian administration. Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani's ended a visit to Moscow on April 20, while the Russian capital is set to host Iranian Defence Minister Hossein Dehghan later this week. Despite these pas-de-deux and apparent honeymoon, Russia and Iran's approaches to a series of issues are increasingly different.
The Iranian speaker appeals to Moscow and Eurasia
Parliamentary Speaker Larijani ended his first visit to Moscow after sanctions on Tehran were lifted amidst unusual circumstances last week. The main objective of his visit was to participate in the first conference of parliamentary speakers of Eurasian countries.
Revoking sanctions against Iran: gainers and losers
"We see crises in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen. The question is who created all these problems with terrorism? An important factor is America's use of terrorists," Larijani said, addressing colleagues from 19 countries, many of whom have partnership relations with Washington.
Clearly unprepared to have the Moscow conference of Eurasian speakers turn into an anti-American forum, Chung Ui-hwa, Chairman of the South Korean National Assembly was forced to call on everyone to "refrain from discussing sensitive issues in order to bring everyone's positions closer."
At a press conference after the event, Larijani continued criticizing external forces, commenting on the failure of the talks in Doha.
"The question related to the fall in oil prices is an intrigue behind which everyone knows who stands," he said, making it clear that it was not Iran which was to blame for the situation in the oil market after having refused to freeze oil production, but its opponent, Saudi Arabia.
Heavily criticizing the US and its regional allies, Larijani also spoke of the importance of Russian-Iranian interactivity. "Last year about ten of our ministers came to Russia and ten Russian ministers visited Iran. Our countries are cooperating in the regulation of crises."
Iranian Defence Minister Dehghan will participate in the International Security Conference in Moscow later this week, between April 26 and 28.
Allies with reservations
Despite official assurances of mutual warmth, Moscow and Teheran have recently discovered several reasons for mutual dissatisfaction.
First, this concerns the Syrian conflict. For Russia it is important not to get bogged down in the war and to complete its military operation on time, establishing the reputation of a peacekeeper. Teheran, however, does not intend to go anywhere. For Iran the Syrian conflict is one of the fronts of the geopolitical battle with the US, Saudi Arabia and other Sunni powers.
"The contradictions between the two countries have still not surfaced, since they have common tactical objectives that are determined by the necessity of regulating the situation in Syria. Nevertheless, these contradictions exist and will only grow," remarked Grigory Kosach, Professor of History, Political Sciences and Law at the Russian State University for the Humanities. For Iran, President (Bashar al) Assad's regime is the only force that can be in power in Damascus.
New Iran-China ties threaten Russian interests
"In turn, Russia has frequently made it clear that for Moscow the most important thing is to preserve stability and integrity of the Syrian government, but it is the people that will decide who will be in power."
In this impasse, one of the decisions the Syrian government made, without consulting Russia, was to hold parliamentary elections on April 13.
Sources close to the Kremlin did not hide that this "initiative" was not perceived with much enthusiasm in Moscow. Teheran, however, welcomed the elections.
Another irritating factor in Moscow and Teheran's relations were the different approaches to the prices on the world oil market. Experts in Moscow believe that Teheran's uncompromising position was one of the reasons for the failure of the talks in Doha.
Finally, as was expected, Russian business has lost its monopoly in the Iranian market after the sanctions were lifted. Iran is now flooded with competing European and American companies. Teheran is not giving any privileges to its Russian allies. Past achievements do not count - competition begins with a clean slate.
First published in Russian by Kommersant.
Original link to to the article- http://in.rbth.com/world/2016/04/25/moscow-and-tehran-re-look-at-bilateral-strategy_587775
Is China A Neocolonial Power In Africa? – Analysis ( Source- Eurasia Review / Author- Alvin Cheng- Hin Lim)
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| Silk Route (Image credits- Wikimedia Commons) |
Source- Eurasia Review
Author- Alvin Cheng- Hin Lim
China-bashing has predictably reemerged as a familiar theme in the current 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, with the frontrunners of both parties attacking China for having committed a myriad of alleged outrages against U.S. interests.1 Hillary Clinton, the Democratic frontrunner, is of special interest, as she had prominently accused China of engaging in neocolonialism in Africa during her 2011 visit to Zambia in her position at the time as U.S. Secretary of State.2 The Chinese have not forgotten this slight, and the state-owned Xinhua news agency recently published an opinion piece critiquing Clinton’s accusation of China’s alleged neocolonialism, concluding that:
“Accusing China of being a neo-colonialist in Africa puts the biased West in an absurd scenario where the robber acts like the cop.”3
As I recounted last year, China has indeed been very active with its various economic projects in Africa. To briefly recap: “Recent examples of such projects include China Railway Group’s Light Railway in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the first phase of which was recently completed; China Railway Construction Corporation’s Abuja-Kaduna railway in Nigeria, which was completed in December 2014, and which is the first phase of a larger railway modernization project connecting Lagos with Kano; and the Lobito-Luau railway in Angola, also built by China Railway Construction Corporation, which will eventually be connected to the Angola-Zambia and the Tanzania-Zambia railways. Likewise, Chinese engineering firms … are constructing airports across the continent, including airports in Angola, Comoros, Djibouti, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, and Togo. Apart from the transportation sector, Chinese companies are also involved in Africa’s energy sector, including hydropower dams in Ethiopia and Uganda; biogas development in Guinea, Sudan and Tunisia; and solar and wind power plants in Ethiopia, Morocco, and South Africa. Other economic sectors Chinese companies are actively involved with in Africa include agriculture, construction, healthcare, mining, and industrial manufacturing. A recent count estimates over 2,000 Chinese companies are engaged across almost every country on the African continent.”4
Does this intense level of economic engagement count as neocolonialism? Gordon observes that the relationship of neocolonialism is one of “political-economic domination” such that “there is no viable cultural, economic, or military opposition to the hegemonic weight of the current ‘world order.’” The world order today is Euro-American, and its hegemony was won through not just the collapse of the Soviet Union and its socialist satellites at the end of the Cold War, but also the “years of successful political, economic, and military destabilization of Third World sites of resistance.”5 Such efforts at destabilization continue in our contemporary era, as can be seen in the 2011 Western intervention against Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in Libya, which in turn led to the strengthening of African jihadi groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Boko Haram, and which in turn has led the U.S. to establish a network of secret military bases across the African continent to fight its War on Terror.6
Mason reminds us of Hu Jintao’s 2006 pledge to double China’s development aid to Africa, and of the subsequent surge in Chinese investment in infrastructure construction on the continent. Indeed, Chinese aid is more attractive for African governments compared to that offered by the West as it famously comes without the preconditions for political or economic reforms usually imposed by Western donors.7 Memories of the painful experience during the 1980s across Africa of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) and the World Bank’s structural adjustment policies looms over the Nigerian government’s recent decision to seek infrastructure loans from the Chinese government rather than the IMF.8 Such memories echo Sartre’s warning that neocolonial efforts to emphasize the economic benefits accruing from colonial reforms are in fact intended to disguise the reality of political domination.9 Indeed, development aid from China has allowed developing countries such as Cambodia to avoid having to adjust their political and economic orders to satisfy the demands of Western donors.10
Mason suggests that the increased Chinese emigration to Africa that has accompanied the increase in Sino-African economic engagement mirrors the “white settlement and rule in Africa” that occurred during the colonial era, and focuses in particular on the economic impact of Chinese merchants in Africa, who “sell goods made in China,” as well as that of their African counterparts who travel to markets in Guangzhou and elsewhere in China to purchase goods for sale back in African markets.11 This influx of cheap goods from China has been known to “drive out traditional suppliers” and “undermine the local economy.”12 Dixon notes that the removal of trade barriers following Nigeria’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 1995 led to a flood of imported goods from China, and this in turn led to mass closures of local factories that were unable to compete with the cheaper Chinese products. The resulting deindustrialization of northern Nigeria laid the economic conditions for the rise of the Boko Haram insurgency which still afflicts the region today.13 However, this by no means represents the inevitable outcome of local industries in Africa confronting global competition. Brautigam cites examples of local African entrepreneurs in countries like Kenya, Lesotho, and Madagascar who were able to successfully compete against Chinese and other foreign imports, in some cases thanks to the human resource development and technology transfer provided by Chinese industrial investment in their countries.14
A related claim that is commonly presented in the media about China’s alleged neocolonial exploitation of Africa is that China and its firms have been engaged in a massive land grab on the continent. In Brautigam’s calculation, if all these media reports were accurate, Chinese companies would own 6 million hectares, or 1% of Africa’s total arable land. However, the actual figure is closer to just 240,000 hectares. As she explains: “Discouraged by poor infrastructure, political instability, and the sober realization that profits were likely to prove more elusive than hoped, Chinese firms came, explored, and then often went elsewhere—most often to countries in China’s border regions: Russia, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia.”15
The small actual size of Chinese-owned farmland in Africa also disconfirms related accusations of China’s alleged neocolonial plot to transform Africa into a farm to feed the hungry masses back home in China. Recent trade data shows that China is currently importing most of its food commodities like maize and soybeans from major non-African agricultural exporters like the U.S. and Brazil. Indeed, the development of Africa’s food producers into major global food exporters will require significant investment in agricultural modernization, which means the countries concerned will have to do more to attract much-needed investment from international agricultural firms like those of China.16
With regard to journalists and researchers repeating false claims about China’s agricultural activities in Africa, similar examples can be found in reports of Chinese loans to African states. A 2011 report from Fitch Ratings calculated that loans issued to Sub-Saharan African states between 2001-10 from the Export-Import Bank of China amounted to 67.2 billion USD, “overtaking World Bank lending of USD54.7bn to Africa for the same period.”17 This claim would subsequently be repeated elsewhere. Mason, for example, repeats the claim that Chinese aid to Africa exceeded that of the World Bank.18 The suggestion that China has been inundating Africa with cheap money has various implications, including the neocolonial image of China purchasing influence from impoverished African governments. However, the Fitch claim is wrong. A recent study of Chinese loans to Africa from Johns Hopkins University’s China Africa Research Initiative (CARI) shows that a more accurate estimate of Chinese loans to Africa during 2001-10 would be 30.5 billion USD, or less than half of Fitch’s estimate. Indeed, China’s growing pledges of development aid, including concessional loans, should be differentiated from the loans that are actually agreed upon and accepted, especially since a “growing number of countries … have suspended or canceled Chinese offers of credit lines.”19 As the authors of the CARI report recount of their analysis:
“Of the 1,223 reports of Chinese loan financing that we analyzed, only 56% actually materialized and are being used. The rest turned out to be mistakes, hopes, rumors, cancelled, or real loans—but not from China.”20
Looking beyond Africa, this trend of misreporting China’s global activities is most glaringly seen in alarmist reports of China’s alleged attempts to subvert the existing Euro-American world order by creating a parallel constellation of international institutions.21 In the case of the new international financial institutions (IFIs) set up by China, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the New Development Bank (NDB) set up by China with its BRICS partners, China has always asserted that these are intended to supplement rather than replace the existing constellation of IFIs.22 Indeed, the modest nature of the first projects to be funded by the AIIB and the NDB confirms that this is the case.23 Beyond the shores of Africa, China is also not exhibiting the behavior of an aspirational neocolonial power.
Original link to the article- http://www.eurasiareview.com/26042016-is-china-a-neocolonial-power-in-africa-analysis/
Japan Won't Build Australia's Submarines (But That's Not a Win for China) ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Sam Roggeveen)
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| HMAS Rankin (Credits- Wikimedia Commons / United States Navy) |
Source- The National Interest
Author- Sam Roggeveen
So Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbll has announced that the next generation of Australian submarines will be built by French firm DCNS.
The big political story is that this announcement will help secure the Government a number of South Australian seats in the upcoming election. The big strategic story is not so much who won this bid but who lost it: Japan. The Interpreter has debated exhaustively the strategic implications of this decision: would a sub deal with Mitsubishi Heavy Industry bring us closer to Japan? Would we form a quasi-alliance that might entangle us in Japan’s increasingly fractious relationship with China? What does that mean for our China-exposed trading industry?
Over coming days we may well see stories emerge of Chinese relief at this decision, and maybe even implications that Australia has buckled to Chinese pressure not to choose the Japanese bid. But one thing to keep in mind as you read these stories is that Australia is still doubling the size of its submarine fleet from 6 to 12. Whether the contractor is French, German, Japanese or other, that is still a substantial statement of Australia’s strategic anxieties, which inevitably center around China’s long-term intentions.
Granted, it will be decades before we actually field a 12-submarine fleet, and as I have argued previously, it may not make much difference to the larger strategic balance, which is shifting away from Australia. But nevertheless, it is a dramatic gesture which we might find alarming had it been made by any of our close neighbors.
Perhaps the reason our neighbors have not expressed concern is that they understand perfectly well what this build-up is about. They too are alarmed at the growth of Chinese power and its increasing assertiveness in the region. And they too recognize that submarines are highly effective tools to counter that growing military strength.
In the end, none of this may matter to China, since its growth trajectory, and its tenacity and resolve, may see it gradually assert its authority over the South China Sea and beyond, whether countries like Australia re-arm or not. As Hugh White has written, the question is ultimately about the balance of wills, rather than the balance of arms. But if the military capabilities of US allies such as Australia do weigh on Chinese decision-makers, then today’s announcement should be cause for reflection in Beijing, not celebration.
This piece first appeared in The Lowy Interpreter here.
Original link to the article- http://www.nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/japan-wont-build-australias-submarines-thats-not-win-china-15934
Monday, April 25, 2016
Changing The Legal Status Of Iran’s Ballistic Missiles – OpEd ( Source- Eurasia Review / Author- Reza Nasri)
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| Shahab-3 Ballistic Missile Source- Wikimedia Commons / Hossein Velayati) |
Source- Eurasia Review
Author- Reza Nasri
After the conclusion of Iran’s nuclear deal with world powers, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a major change has taken place in the legal status of “Iran’s missile activities,” which has received less attention from critics of President Hassan Rouhani at home. Before JCPOA, Iran’s missile activities were considered “illegal” both from the viewpoint of the “international law” and from the standpoint of the United States’ domestic legal system and within both legal frameworks, “violators” were exposed to heavy punishments. However, following the nuclear agreement, Iran’s missile activities have been rendered “legal” within framework of international law and are now considered illegal solely under domestic laws of the United States (which no country, including Iran is obligated to follow suit with).
This development is considered an important and significant achievement for Iran both from legal and political viewpoints. This is especially true as many administrations in the United States – along with their Western allies – intended since the beginning of the “nuclear crisis” to take advantage of the opportunity of Iran’s nuclear case being considered by the United Nations Security Council in order to “disarm” this country and cause Iran’s missile activities to remain illegal within “the international law system” to create and maintain international consensus against Iran and take subsequent strategic advantage of it. However, the nuclear negotiating team of President Rouhani’s administration managed to strip American strategists of their “international law” leverage – which is one of the most important tools of “multilateral diplomacy” for all countries – and make their strategic projects and legal inroads on Iran limited to the use of the United States’ “domestic laws.”
Objectification of international law to disarm Iran
In fact, the approach taken by the United States and some of its Western allies to objectify the mechanisms of international law (especially the Security Council as an international institution) in order to disarm Iran became more evident than before after adoption of the Security Council Resolution 1737 in 2006.
In fact, American officials looked upon Iran’s nuclear case as a carrier to promote their project, which was aimed at disarming Iran and weakening its military might, and every once in a while, they were not shy about admitting that they would take advantage of international system’s mechanisms in order to achieve their goal. It is famously said that during early years after Iran’s “nuclear crisis” began, John Bolton, the United States former ambassador to the United Nations – took part in the annual meeting of the biggest pro-Israel lobby in Washington, describing the UN Security Council as a wrench in the U.S. foreign policy toolbox. During the same address, he promised the audience that he would take advantage of this tool with full strength in order to oppose what he called Iran’s ambitions.
Pursuant to this logic and after adoption of the Security Council Resolution 1747 (in 2007), and finally, with the adoption of Resolution 1929 (in 2010), the toughest and most strongly-worded form of arms limitations and restrictions were imposed on Iran’s missile program by the Security Council. According to Resolution 1929, all countries were required to “take all necessary measures” – which in the jargon of the United Nations is a code word for military action – in order to prevent development of Iran’s missile program. The then administration of Iran – which had taken some sort of reductionist approach to mechanisms of international system and head of that administration was famous to have described the Security Council resolutions as “scrap paper” – was unable to evaluate legal, political and security consequences of such resolutions – which were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter – and could not prevent their adoption in time.
Subsequently, in later years, while throughout the nuclear talks and even in the text of the Geneva Agreement reached in 2013, reference was made to the necessity of dismantling “all multilateral sanctions” imposed on Iran, Western countries tried to make a distinction between Iran’s “missile sanctions” and other sanctions and urged Iran to take part in separate talks over the country’s missile program. Of course, the administration of President Rouhani strongly opposed that suggestion.
From Resolution 1929 to Resolution 2231
The interesting point is that despite all ploys and efforts made by the United States, and the West in general, Iran’s negotiating team, led by Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, finally managed to take the issue of Iran’s ballistic missiles out of the JCPOA document and conduct negotiations over Resolution 2231 (which was supposed to be the Security Council’s confirmation of JCPOA) in such a way that Iran’s missile activities – unlike the text of Resolution 1929 – would not be considered as “violation of international law” or “violation of the Security Council resolutions” anymore. In fact, through determined effort of Rouhani administration’s nuclear negotiating team, the harsh and binding language used in Resolution 1929 on Iran’s missile activities was replaced with an “encouraging” and nonbinding language in Resolution 2231 and the phrase “the Security Council decides…” (as existed in Resolution 1929) was replaced with the phrase “the Security Council calls upon….”. Even this call by the Security Council was merely related to those missiles, which are clearly “designed” for the purpose of delivering nuclear weapons. In the meantime, the phrase in Resolution 1929, which required all countries to take “all necessary measures” to prevent development of Iran’s missile program, was taken out of the text of Resolution 2231 and even a specific period of time was considered for the lifting of the abovementioned proposed restrictions. In another successful legal measure, even the issue of Iran’s “ballistic missiles” – which existed in the main text (or the executive part) of Resolution 1929 – was taken out of the main text of Resolution 2231 and was transferred to Paragraph 3 of “Annex B” to show that following the conclusion of JCPOA, the Security Council attached far less priority and importance to the “issue of ballistic missiles” of Iran.
Although when Resolution 2231 was adopted, some domestic critics of the Iranian administration said that such measures were useless and put stress on the futility of the resolution, but the legal impact of these changes – from Resolution 1929 to Resolution 2231 – can be, in fact, seen in the latest reaction shown to Iran’s missile drills by “international community.” After the Islamic Republic Guards Corps conducted the latest round of its missile tests in March and after the US government took the case to the Security Council session, not only the majority of international legal experts defended Iran for commitment to its international obligations, and not only the European Union’s member countries and even the government of the United States admitted to compatibility of Iran’s missile activities with the text of JCPOA, but the representative of Russia – as a permanent member of the Security Council – clearly said in the same session that according to the text of Resolution 2231, Iran has been only “called upon” to avoid developing its missile program and such a “call” cannot be considered as an “inviolable” issue.
In fact, the mere expression of this official interpretation of Resolution 2231 by a permanent member of the Security Council and on the open floor of this body, was a very important development, which insured Iran’s missile drills against any harm from the UN sanctions and practically prevented this body from being used as an instrument by hostile countries with regard to Iran’s missile issue.
For this reason, we are currently witnessing that the United States and some Western governments – which once adopted binding resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter against Iran’s missile program – now find themselves stripped of any international law leverage and when faced with Iran’s missile drills, they only resort to such symbolic measures as “writing letters” to the UN secretary general as well as rotational chairmen of the Security Council and filing merely “political” complaints. The interesting point is that even when writing such letters, they simply talk about “possible incompatibility” of Iran’s missile activities with Resolution 2231 without saying anything about such activities being certainly a “violation of the resolution.”
Outlook of Iran’s missile program
Undoubtedly, at present, the political and legal atmosphere is much more in Iran’s favor than any time before. As said previously, hostile governments have been to a large extent stripped of their “international law” leverage and other forceful mechanisms of international institutions in reaction to Iran’s missile activities. On the other side, international system and organizations (including the United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency), unlike the past, have thrown their weight behind positions taken by those who support JCPOA and the political current that seeks to reduce tensions with Iran. Meanwhile, the United States has been limited to tools available in its “domestic legal system” in the face of Iran’s nuclear program. At the same time, following the conclusion of JCPOA, the US administration and Congress have been facing important legal and political limitations even for taking advantage of their domestic legal system, because according to JCPOA – and also due to the new atmosphere governing international political system, which is getting shaped in favor of Iran – the United States cannot reinstate nuclear sanctions under other excuses.
In the meantime, since Iran’s missile activities are no more considered as “illegal” under the international law, if the United States government or Congress decide to impose secondary sanctions on Iran in response to the country’s missile program, they will most probably face much more obstacles and opposition than before for getting other countries in line with their sanctions. At present, international atmosphere does not allow for creating tensions with Iran and imposing illegal restrictions on the country. For this reason, anti-Iran groups in Washington are sparing no effort to restore the past securitized atmosphere against Iran, provide grounds to get the Security Council involved in the case of Iran’s military activities (like the model that was applied to Iraq), and create anti-Iranian consensus like what existed in past years. Therefore, we are currently witnessing that this current is trying to magnify the so-called “Iran threat,” distort Iran’s motivations with respect to regional countries, and turn the issue of Iran’s “ballistic missiles” into a major headline in international media in order to bring back the anti-Iran atmosphere that they crave to see restored.
Countering measures taken by anti-Iran current
Resolution-BrullIn the face of such measures, in addition to strengthening of political and trade relations with other countries (especially with European states), it is necessary for Iran’s diplomatic apparatus to take serious and solid steps in the field of public diplomacy as well, especially taking into account that under election campaigning conditions in the United States, extremist slogans against Iran and efforts made to magnify Iran’s missile threat will be in high demand.
A few necessary measures can be mentioned in this regard. The first step is show of empathy by all political actors and factions with the country’s foreign policy apparatus and making efforts to reduce “political cost” for those state agents, who are on the front line of contact with the world’s public opinion. In other words, it is necessary for the issue of “public diplomacy” to be viewed as a strategic leverage inside the country, so that, measures taken by Iranian diplomats with the goal of capturing the “hearts and minds” of people of the world – especially people of the United States – would not have political costs for them inside the country.
The second step is to take advantage of the legal opportunity and the capacity that exists in Washington and other Western capitals to set up lobbies, as well as media and support organizations. Lobbies supporting Iran’s interests in Washington can play a great role as peripheral actors to shape the public opinion and affect the relevant political process. In doing this, the population of Iranians living in the United States – especially their young generation, which enjoys extraordinarily high capabilities and potentials – can be reckoned on as a potentially important force, which can be very effective in impressing the public opinion in the United States provided that the Iranian government makes more effort to improve the quality of its relations with this population.
The third step is to create necessary grounds to allow the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – as the most expert, most competent and most experienced institution in the field of public diplomacy – to be the sole authority in charge of conveying Iran’s message, expressing Iran’s foreign policy, and making contacts with the public opinion in other countries. Any lack of discipline in the field of public diplomacy in Iran and plurality of those centers and circles that “convey messages” to Iran’s audiences outside the country has been constantly one of the weaknesses, which has been taken advantage of by hostile currents against Iran. The time remained of the US President Barack Obama’s administration in office is the most suitable opportunity to enforce some of these policies and take necessary preliminary steps for possible confrontation with these hostile measures in the future.
About the author- Reza Nasri, Law Expert from Geneva’s Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (HEI)
Original link to the article- http://www.eurasiareview.com/25042016-changing-the-legal-status-of-irans-ballistic-missiles-oped/
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