Sunday, May 29, 2016

India, Russia agree to export BrahMos to third countries ( Source- Russia & India Report / Author- TASS)

Brahmos Missile ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Author- Anirvan Shukla)

Author- TASS

India and Russia have agreed 'in principle' to export the world's fastest anti-ship cruise missile, BrahMos, to third countries - the UAE, Vietnam, South Africa and Chile, Praveen Pathak, spokesman for BrahMos Aerospace - the developer of the missile, told TASS on Friday.

"The several structural changes were made in the defence exports policy and these were yielding results. As far as the BrahMos missile is concerned, talks with countries like UAE, Chile, South Africa and Vietnam are in advanced stages," he said.

"Since Russia is the partner country in the BrahMos joint venture with its consent discussions with several other countries, including Philippines, South Korea, Algeria, Greece, Malaysia, Thailand, Egypt, Singapore, Venezuela and Bulgaria have now been taken to the next level," he said.

пустым не оставлять!!
FGFA may be armed with BrahMos cruise missiles
The UAE
According to him, "BrahMos Aerospace is expected to ink the deal with UAE by the year end as both India and Russia have good relations with the country and there is conflict of interest there, hence there will no problems in exporting the missile to that country."

Vietnam, China
"In the case of Vietnam, China has expressed its reservations against India's policies to supply weapons. In the South China Sea, China and Vietnam are locked in a conflict over maritime boundaries. We expect that those friendly nations with whom neither India nor Russia have any conflict would be keen on buying these missiles," he said.

BrahMos
BrahMos was developed jointly by India’s Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyenia (NPOM), which in 1998 established the company BrahMos Aerospace. The name BrahMos is a portmanteau formed from the names of two rivers, the Brahmaputra of India and the Moskva of Russia.

The BrahMos supersonic missile develops a speed of Mach 3. An upgraded model capable of reaching Mach 6 speed is currently being tested. According to BrahMos Aerospace, the missile has flight range of up to 290 km with supersonic speed all through the flight, leading to shorter flight time, consequently ensuring lower dispersion of targets, quicker engagement time and non-interception by any known weapon system in the world. It operates on ‘Fire and Forget Principle’, adopting varieties of flights on its way to the target. Its destructive power is enhanced due to large kinetic energy on impact. Its cruising altitude could be up to 15 km and terminal altitude is as low as 10 meters. It carries a conventional warhead weighing 200 to 300 kg.

Compared to existing state-of-the-art subsonic cruise missiles, BrahMos has: 3 times more velocity, 2.5 to 3 times more flight range, 3 to 4 times more seeker range, 9 times more kinetic energy. The missile has identical configuration for land, sea and sub-sea platforms and uses a Transport Launch Canister (TLC) for transportation, storage and launch.

First published by TASS.

© RUSSIA & INDIA REPORT ( ALL RIGHTS RESERVED)



IAF Chief Arup Raha Praises Indigenous Fighter Jet LCA Tejas After First...

This is How a Bloody U.S.-China War Could Start ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Chen Pokong)

USS John C Stennis ( Image credits- United States Navy)

Author- Chen Pokong

Editor's note: The following is a translation of Chapter 14 of the book If the U.S.and China Go to War《假如中美开战》 by the author and analyst Chen Pokong. The current volume was published in Chinese in 2013 and was later translated to Japanese.


The chapter sketches the hypothetical beginnings of a conflict scenario between the United States and China. In it, the U.S. responds to provocative Chinese cyberattacks by launching one of its own, tearing down the Great Firewall. In response, Chinese authorities clamp down Internet access completely, which America quickly responds to. Ultimately, regime-organized street violence endangers the lives of American consular staff, and U.S.-China relations quickly descend from the current modus vivendi to outright hostilities.

While both the United States and China can be expected to avoid going to war, it’s by no means difficult to imagine a scenario in which such a war might break out. Let’s consider such a development from the perspective of a young Chinese computer technician named Xiaolu:

After returning home from work one Friday evening, Xiaolu follows his usual practice of turning on his home computer and preparing to access his favorite overseas websites through proxies that will help him break through the Chinese government’s internet firewall. To his great surprise, he finds himself able to freely browse the Voice of America website without a proxy. He tries the BBC Chinese-language website, and then Radio Free Asia, Epoch Times, Boxun, the Chinese-language websites of the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. . . surfing all of them with ease, he wonders if there’s some bizarre fluke in the system. He quickly telephones a friend and tells him to give it a try, and the friend reports the same experience. Overjoyed, Xiaolu contacts all of his friends and tells them to log onto the internet as fast as they can.

The situation continues the next day, and China’s streets and microblogs are abuzz with the news. People wonder if the Chinese government has suddenly decided to lift its internet blockade, and if this means political reform has also been launched.

Xiaolu stays glued to the internet all the next day and evening, too excited to sleep until he finally drifts off near dawn. By the time he awakens, the sun is high and the clock shows that noon is approaching. Luckily it’s still the weekend, and Xiaolu doesn’t need to be at work. Rolling groggily out of bed, he slouches over to his computer and goes online again, only to see a blank wall. Not only the foreign websites, but even China-based websites have disappeared and have been replaced with a uniform message of “Page not found.” Shocked, disheartened and angry, Xiaolu wonders what happened. He turns on his television just in time to hear a CCTV presenter read out this news bulletin:

“The United States has used the pretext of alleged Chinese hacker attacks on American websites to blame on the Chinese government and People’s Liberation Army. These baseless accusations originate from the pathological fantasies of certain individuals in the United States, and we have always categorically refuted them. The United States is now using the pretext of ‘freedom of information’ to interfere with China’s normal internet operations and oversight. This is a genuine cyberattack and a blatant cyberinvasion. It is a plot to overturn the Chinese government.

Interfering with and sabotaging China’s internet is a brazen violation of Chinese sovereignty and dignity. It is a last-ditch effort by American hegemonism to obstruct China’s rise following its failure to impose ‘peaceful evolution.’”

Xiaolu now understands that his earlier access to overseas websites was due to the United States playing a technological wild card that destroyed China’s internet blockade. His current inability to go online is due to the Chinese government taking the drastic step of cutting off all internet access after losing its “Great Firewall” to America’s technical superiority.

Through his shortwave radio, Xiaolu hears an announcement by the U.S. government:

“Safeguarding freedom of expression and freedom of information is a universal value. The United States of America firmly upholds the Chinese people’s freedom of information, the deprivation of which is an infringement of fundamental human rights. . . .”

Related reports and discussion show that the cyber operation, codenamed “Airborne Freedom” and launched by the United States, is in fact retaliation for a cyberattack by China. China has for some time been carrying out cyberattacks and cyberespionage against U.S.-based websites, and repeated warnings from Washington to end the attacks have met with only temporary pullbacks by Beijing, followed by renewed onslaughts. Reaching the end of its patience, the United States has finally decided to take action, and a full-scale cyberwar has been launched between China and the United States.

With internet access cut off, Chinese netizens begin taking to the street to express their indignation, their eyes directed straight forward or upward to signify their silent protest. The Chinese government issues an announcement: “The relevant departments have cut off internet access only as a temporary measure and as the only option. The United States, which launched a cyberattack to interfere with and sabotage normal internet operations in China, must take full responsibility.”

On the third night, internet access is miraculously restored. Strangely, however, unlike before, only overseas websites can be accessed, and almost no China-based websites. Xiaolu is initially baffled, but after surfing overseas websites, he gains an understanding of how the situation has developed.

It turns out that after the Chinese government cut off all internet access, the United States used satellite technology to provide wireless internet service to China. Operation Airborne Freedom has entered its second phase. The U.S. government explains its rationale: “We first of all need to ensure that American organizations in China as well as the U.S. Embassy and consulates can continue to access the internet. . . . At the same time, we are helping the Chinese people to freely access information. . . .”

The Sina and Sohu microblogging websites that Chinese netizens normally use have ceased operation, and have been replaced by internationally dominant social media such as Facebook and Twitter. The Chinese Baidu search engine has stopped working, but Google is available as a substitute, and Chinese netizens rejoice.

The next day, the Chinese government plays a new card. The State Council issues a “Notice Regarding the Suspension of Internet Access”:

“Malicious interference and sabotage by hostile overseas forces resulting in severe chaos in the arrangements for our country’s internet management has aroused mass outrage among the people. In order to ensure state security and normal information access, from this day forward the relevant departments will carry out comprehensive inspection, maintenance and rehabilitation of the internet. During this time, internet access will be suspended throughout the country.

Specific provisions are as follows:

1. Any work unit or individual who without authorization accesses the internet will be subject to confiscation of his computer, a fine, dismissal from employment or other penalties.

2. Any individual who uses the internet to create or spread rumors or to transmit reactionary information, and in particular any individual who incites opposition or subversion of the government, will be held criminally liable.

3. All internet cafes will be temporarily closed until further notice.

4. Sales of computers must be registered under the purchaser’s name. . . .”

Over the next few days, China’s netizens continue to enjoy access to overseas websites, and there is an explosive increase in satirical comments about the Chinese government on Facebook, Twitter and overseas Chinese internet forums. Rumors spread of police in some localities going door-to-door to examine internet browsing histories. Official media begin reporting on some people being investigated and having their computers confiscated. Overseas media report that rights defenders are being summoned and warned by the police, while some dissidents have been placed in criminal detention on allegations of using the internet to create or spread rumors to incite subversion of the government.

Mobilized by netizens through Facebook and Twitter, increasing numbers of people begin standing in the streets with their eyes directed forward or upward in what come to be known as “stand-ins.” Internet posting proclaim: “The Chinese people have stood up!” As another day passes, police are mobilized in a massive operation during which they physically push people away from “stand-ins.” Some protesters who resist are arrested. Four police officers grab Xiaolu by his arms and legs and carry him off as he struggles and yells out, “The Chinese people have the right to stand up!”

China’s PLA Daily publishes a commentary entitled “Cyberinvasion is a War of Aggression,” which states:

“We must point out that cyberinvasion is a war of aggression. We sternly warn the American hegemonists that today’s China is not the China of 1840; today’s China is not a China that can be bullied or trampled upon. Under the leadership of the great Chinese Communist Party, we have achieved economic liftoff and military modernization that will bring about the great revival of the Chinese people. Our country and our people have the capacity to defend our homeland. In the face of serious provocation, the full force of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army will resolutely follow the Party’s command and is prepared to go to war at any time in retaliation against any who dare aggressive action against our country’s sovereign rights and interests. We are prepared at all times to fight and to emerge victorious in repelling a frontal assault by the invaders. . . .”

In contrast to this hard line, the tone of some official scholars is more temperate. In an Associated Press interview, a professor of international relations at Renmin University of China appeals for calm on both sides. He urges the Chinese and U.S. governments to sit down for a face-to-face exchange of views on the mutual accusations of cyberattacks, and to resolve the conflict through dialog and negotiation to prevent the conflict from escalating out of control.

Prohibitions on internet access are implemented in government organizations, state-owned enterprises and all schools, libraries and other public bodies. Even so, how can the authorities control 500 million netizens and 300 million bloggers? Most netizens ignore the prohibitions and continue to access the internet at home. Internet access is unstable and intermittent, but the wireless internet service that the United States is providing to China has not been cut off.

After “stand-in” protests against the Chinese government have been suppressed for two days, anti-American protests suddenly break out in Beijing, with hundreds of people gathering around the U.S. embassy, shouting out anti-American slogans, denouncing the United States for sabotaging China’s internet and demanding an end to the U.S. cyberinvasion. Similar protests quickly follow in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Wuhan and Shenyang, where people gather around U.S. consulates and yell out slogans while waving the five-starred red flag of the People’s Republic of China. “Down with American hegemonism!” “We vehemently denounce American sabotage of China’s internet!” “Resolutely beat back the U.S. cyberinvasion!” “Creating chaos in China has ulterior motives!” Given the uniformity of the slogans and banners throughout the country, outsiders quickly realize that these protests have been orchestrated by the Chinese government.

Further anti-American protests break out in other cities over the next two days. The number of participants grows from hundreds to thousands, and in Beijing and the rest of China’s largest cities, the protests rapidly evolve into smashing and looting. People begin throwing rocks, bricks and bottles at U.S. consulates; some set American flags on fire and toss them into consulate compounds, while others overturn vehicles and set them alight. Black smoke rises everywhere as cheers break out among the crowds. Bystanders scream in terror and run off.

Apart from occasionally yelling or motioning for people to desist, the Chinese police officers stationed around the consulates spend most of their time standing idly about as rocks, bricks and bottles fly over their heads into the consulate compounds, and no one is arrested.

On Facebook and Twitter, netizens all over China expose the identities of local police officers, city managers and joint defense officers who are masquerading ordinary citizens to lead protests and take part in the smashing and looting.

Washington sends a diplomatic notice to Beijing strongly protesting the violent demonstrations at the U.S. embassy and consulates, and demanding that the Chinese government take measures to protect American citizens and facilities. A foreign ministry spokesman responds that the Chinese government does not approve of the radical actions around the consulates and appeals to the Chinese public for calm. At the same time, he points out, “The problem must be resolved at its source”; the U.S. government needs to immediately cease its cyberinvasion and end its interference and sabotage of China’s internet before peace can be restored.

The news media report that a U.S. aircraft carrier, the USS George Washington, has led the Seventh Fleet out of Japan’s Yokosuka naval base toward the East China Sea to form a joint force with the USS Nimitz battle group patrolling the South China Sea.

As night approaches, the U.S. consulate in Chengdu comes under siege, and someone starts hurling Molotov cocktails into the consulate compound and main building. The consulate catches fire, and flames spread rapidly as smoke billows against the night sky. Suddenly excited and terrified cries go up: “He’s dead! He’s dead!”

International media report that the U.S. consul general stationed in Chengdu has fallen victim to the violent protests. Foreign governments issue statements condemning the atrocity. It’s reported that he attempted to lead consulate staff out the back door to safety, only to be discovered by the protesting mob. Chinese nationals employed at the consulate came under verbal and physical attack by protesters cursing them as “traitors” and “American running dogs.” When the consul general tried to protect two female staff, he was struck in the head with a brick. Also falling victim were five consular staff, including two Americans and three Chinese, all of whose bodies were set alight by the screaming mob.

The next day, five more American aircraft carriers, including the USS Abraham Lincoln, USS Ronald Reagan, USS Carl Vinson, USS Harry S. Truman and USS George H.W. Bush, converge and move at speed toward Chinese waters.

The Sino-U.S. War has begun. . . .

About the author- Chen Pokong is a veteran of the Tiananmen Square democracy movement; he has authored over ten books, writes a regular column for Radio Free Asia, and is regularly invited to speak on Voice of America Chinese. This chapter was translated by Stacy Mosher, a translator and editor based in New York City.

© THE NATIONAL INTEREST ( ALL RIGHTS RESERVED)

Friday, May 27, 2016

ISRO RLV-TD video captured from Bhuvan visualisation application


India pressing Russia in space market ( Source- Russia & India Report / Author - Yuri Karash, Vzglyad)

Image credits- ISRO


Author- Yuri Karash, Vzglyad

A couple of decades ago, the assumption that India was capable of claiming a part of the launch services market would have appeared too bold. Launch services had been securely divided between the US, Russia and Europe. At that time, India was only "learning" to fly into space, building sub-orbital vehicles, and light-class carriers that could deliver a few dozen kilograms of load to a low Earth orbit.

The technology is not for everyone

The situation changed in the early 1990s. India then developed and commissioned the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), a middle class launch vehicle, which has performed 35 test flights to date, of which all but one have been successful and one has been partly successful., making the PSLV’s reliability rating almost 95%, placing it on par with the best Russian, US and European carriers.

The most major achievement of the Indian space programme has been the successful launch of the ‘Mangalyaan’ (Mars orbiter mission) automatic vehicle into Mars’ orbit in September 2014.

Russia has made a contribution to development of Indian space vehicles.

Russia, India, China may create joint orbital station
Glavkosmos and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) were close to an agreement in 1991 on Russia selling KVD-1cryogenic engines and technologies for manufacture in India. However, despite India’s claims that the engines were necessary only for its peaceful space exploration programme, Washington considered the deal a violation of the "Missile Technology Control Regime" (MTCR).

In modern warfare, the use of rockets with cryogenic engines is not effective because of the long time it takes to refuel these vehicles with liquid oxygen and hydrogen. However, cryogenic engines can still be mounted on long-range ballistic missiles of load carrying capacity.

The White House and Capitol Hill thought India would try any means to build nuclear weapon carriers for strikes on Pakistan, and that would force the latter to begin developing a similar "baton". The nuclear arms race in South Asia would be escalated.

At that time Russia could not be accused of violating the MTCR, since it acceded to the regime only in 1995. However, following the "strategic partnership" rules, which were formally present in Russian-American relations in the 1990s, the Yeltsin government conceded to Washington and refused to transfer technology to India for production of rocket engines (the engines were provided).

For Russia, the consequence of this step was joining the ISS programme, while India was the forced to develop its own cryogenic engine for the SLVs needed for the withdrawal of payloads, including into geostationary orbit. (GSLV)

India has coped well with this task, and gone to higher strengths in this century.

In this regard how can one not remember the "thank you", which Mao Zedong said to Khrushchev in the 1960s, which made him refuse to supply ballistic missiles and related technology to China. That refusal saw China create its independent space programme.

Russia must choose between the ISS and its own orbital station
Quality, not quantity
The idea of reusable space technology is experiencing a renaissance. The greatest success is achieved by the SpaceX company, which has built and is operating the CR "Falcon 9" with a reusable first step. Europe, developing RN "Ariane-6" with returned propulsion, operates in the same direction.

India, which has now successfully tested the RLV-TD launch vehicle with a reusable first step, is also part of this list. While this is not at a fully operative stage, but a technological demonstrator not intended for actual re-use, "the first step is the hardest." India expects that use of partially reusable carriers will reduce the cost of space launches by around 10 times.

It is unclear whether the idea of a rocket carrier with a reusable step confirms the economic viability of such equipment. One of the main arguments "against" the idea are excessive loads experienced during the landing stage. After landing, the step will have to be completely disassembled to ensure suitability for re-use, and this could level out the economic benefits of reusability.

A similar argument could have been applied to the Wright Brothers airplane, which was very fragile, and needed sorting out after two or three flights. But humanity opted for the aircraft, and not the ‘montgolfier’ balloons. As it turned out, humanity was not mistaken.

It is unlikely that India has become a serious competitor for Russia in the global launch services market. However, the Indian space agency is seeking to build designs and techniques corresponding to the most recent trends in global rockets.

This, however, is not true for Russia. The project to build a space rocket system with a reusable first step has been withdrawn from the draft of the Federal Space Program (FCP) for the years 2016-2025. It will be built in 2030 at best.


First published in Russian by Vzglyad

Russia’s Pacific Pivot: The Moscow-Beijing Shadow Boxing Continues ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Miles Maochun Yu)

Russian Cruiser Slava ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / United States Navy)


Squeezed in Europe by U.S-led sanctions and robust NATO reactions in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea, Russia is now finding itself in a prime position to exploit the unfolding geopolitical dramas stirred up by China in East and Southeast Asia. Moscow has proactively demonstrated its determination to play a leading role in shaping the outcome of the highly explosive regional conflicts, at the expense of Beijing and potentially Washington as well.


Until recently, President Vladimir Putin’s strategic priorities had heavily favored Europe and the Middle East, culminating in his reckless actions in destabilizing Ukraine, and his wholesale political, diplomatic, and military backing of Syria’s Assad regime. Asia Pacific has always been an important component of the Kremlin’s geopolitical calculation, but due to Russia’s multi-layered economic and strategic interests with regional states at rivalry with each other, it had been relatively content to adopt a balanced approach to various hot-button issues. Russia’s general tendency has been not to articulate positions on territorial disputes and to refrain from active association with one side or the other, thus leaving China and the U.S. to play the dominant roles in deciding the outcome of the region’s many conflicts.

That Russian approach changed in late April when Russian and Chinese Foreign Ministers, Sergei Lavrov and Wang Yi, issued an unprecedented joint statement in Beijing, voicing—among other things—common objection to the U.S. role in settling the South China Sea disputes, thereby breaking the Kremlin’s pattern of avoiding joint positions with Beijing on China’s various territorial issues.

But Beijing’s giddiness over this new Russian partnership in its crusade against U.S. involvement in the South China Sea disputes, and the dismay felt by some of China’s old foes and Russia’s traditional friends in the Asia Pacific region, such as Vietnam, proved short-lived. Between May 19 and May 20, Mr. Putin held a party for the leaders of the ASEAN member states at his favorite resort in Sochi, Russia. Hailed by TASS as “the biggest international event in Russia in 2016,” the Russia-ASEAN summit was aimed directly at China’s increasing economic and strategic dominance in Southeast Asia, and most astonishingly, siding unequivocally with the ASEAN nations against China’s position in the heated South China Sea disputes.

The Sochi Declaration is decidedly anti-China in its wording, containing almost identical positions to those steadfastly held by ASEAN nations and the United States, such as that they (i.e., Russia and ASEAN nations) resolve to “ensure maritime security and safety, freedom of navigation and overflight and unimpeded commerce; promote self-restraint, non-use of force or the threat to use force and the resolution of dispute through peaceful means in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law.”

After delivering such a broadside against China on the South China Sea dispute, Mr. Putin also spoke triumphantly of Russia’s agreements with ASEAN nations to import Russian energy resources, let Russia build nuclear power plants, construct railroads, and operate the GLONASS satellite positioning system in the ASEAN region, all of which have been China’s economic and technological priorities. Mr. Putin then ebulliently told reporters that “there has not been a single disagreement (among the participants of the Russia-ASEAN Summit).”

China should also be further agonized by the seemingly inevitable rapprochement between Moscow and Tokyo, as both Mr. Putin and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe are getting closer than at any time since the end of World War II to reaching an official agreement on the Northern Territories dispute.

On the Korean Peninsula, the Kremlin seems determined to use all of its diplomatic muscle and political capital on both Pyongyang and Seoul to exert more and more influence, especially to extend the Trans-Siberian Railway, which has already reached inside North Korea, all the way to South Korea, thus connecting Western Europe to the far corner of East Asia.

Russia’s active posture in Asia Pacific is also welcome news to some of Moscow’s traditional friends that are also China’s regional adversaries, especially Vietnam and India, which—in order to counter China—remain two of the world’s largest importers of Russian weapons, from nuclear and conventional submarines, aircraft carriers, to advanced combat aircraft and air defense missile systems.

Some nations caught in the midst of the China-U.S. crossfire are also relieved to find an active Russia as a new go-to safe place in Asia Pacific. Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia, long agonized by acting as a scorned Beijing puppet within the brotherly ASEAN community, eagerly asked Mr. Putin while in Sochi to renew Moscow’s erstwhile strategic interest and heavy investment in his country’s reconstruction begun in the 1980s in the immediate aftermath of the overthrow of the murderous Khmer Rouge regime of Pol Pot.

All in all, Russia’s gain in Asia Pacific is China’s loss. The decades-old Moscow-Beijing shadow boxing continues.

This story originally appeared in on the Hoover Institution’s Military History in the News Channel.

© THE NATIONAL INTEREST ( ALL RIGHTS RESERVED)

China’s Chengdu-Lhasa Railway: Tibet and 'One Belt, One Road' ( Source- The Diplomat / Author- Justin Cheung)

Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Jan Reurink
Source- The Diplomat

Author- Justin Cheung

It is no secret that Tibetan independence movements have long drawn the ire of Chinese authorities. Alongside heightened rhetoric in recent years over Tibetan unrest and the growing publicity of riots and self-immolations, China has sought to augment its capacity for crackdown in the restive province.

The swiftness of Chinese response to previous swells of separatist sentiment is best illustrated in the 2008 Tibetan unrest. During that time, the BBC reported that within days of the start of anti-government riots, over 400 troop carriers of the People’s Armed Police were mobilized. Ultimately, the speed with which the Chinese government was able to ferry troops into sites of unrest was a crucial factor in quelling the upheaval.

In more recent times, China’s “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) policy – Xi Jinping’s plan to expand the reach of Chinese trade routes to Europe through a land route in Central Asia and a sea route through the Indian Ocean and around the horn of Africa – has taken center stage as a cornerstone of modern Chinese foreign policy. Access to Pakistan and Central Asia are crucial to ensure the success of these trade routes, which incidentally must start or pass through Tibet or Xinjiang, historically separatist provinces. This has put particularly urgent pressure on the Chinese government to bring stability to its westernmost regions.

Furthermore, the implementation of the OBOR policy comes at a critical time for China. Recent downturns in economic growth and output have put leaders such as Xi Jinping in a bind, spending a great deal of political capital to restrict and cripple any seeds of social dissent. On a geopolitical level, ensuring robust strategic control over Tibet has never been more essential, for both propaganda and economic reasons.

With that said, China’s newly planned Chengdu-Lhasa railway – over 2,000 km of tracks – would serve as a crucially efficient connection between Sichuan province in central China with the heart of Tibet. The construction of the railway was recently announced; such an infrastructural feat would facilitate rapid travel between the two locations, bringing a multi-day trip down to just fifteen hours. A recent report by The Economist cited a Chinese expert as saying the railroad could be feasibly completed by 2030.

The implications of this railway’s construction are particularly diverse, but they all center on a particular purpose: expedited control. In an age where social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook can cause riots to explode into revolutions overnight (see: the Arab Spring), China must ensure that its ability to quickly muster a physical military presence can match the speed of modern rebellions. The Chengdu-Lhasa railway provides a means of quickly mobilizing armed forces and also facilitates the movement and migration of Han Chinese from more central regions of China into Tibet, a policy that China has long pushed in order to smother ethnic dissent.

This is not the first time that China has used “railway power projection” to assert its power in Tibet or Xinjiang. However, it is the most recent and the most ambitious project thus far. Most importantly, the timing of this undertaking highlights the effort and investment that Chinese leaders are willing to make to ensure that the crossroads of its budding OBOR policy remain firmly under Chinese control. Tibet is an important starting point for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and an equally important entryway to the Central Asian states where trade through the Caspian, Caucasus, and to Europe must begin.

As such, the construction of the Chengdu-Lhasa railway is separate from previous Chinese attempts to quell separatist movements. This time, there is much more at stake. The railway plays an important duality in optimizing China’s foreign and domestic geo-policy today: the necessity of political stability within its borders to ensure economic success from the outside.

About the author- Justin Cheung is a student in Stony Brook University’s 8 Year BE/MD Engineering Scholars for Medicine Program. He has been published in the Center for International Relation’s International Affairs Forum as well as in Soft Matter and ACS Macro Letters. 

© THE DIPLOMAT ( ALL RIGHTS RESERVED)

India Would Win with Trump ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Abhijnan Rej)

Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Jasper Rautell Balle

Author- Abhijnan Rej

Last week an enterprising, and unknown, far-right outfit in New Delhi performed a traditional Hindu puja, literally praying for a Donald Trump presidency. The Washington Post took this to mean that Trump has fans in India despite his tasteless rants about outsourcing. Britain’s Guardian quoted the fringe leader behind the religious ceremony describing Trump as “our hero.” The Hindu right’s Islamophobia is one that The Donald surely shares. They too, like Trump, are keen on restoring some putative long-lost national glory.


But a far more sophisticated argument, beyond the trope of Islamic terrorism, can be made about the desirability of a Trump presidency for India. Simply put, the accession of Donald Trump to the White House offers India greater strategic space. It reduces the chances of India becoming collateral damage in American interventionism. A retrenched America will also provide a much-needed impetus to New Delhi’s notoriously status-quoist foreign-policy establishment to proactively shape the region through assertive statecraft. As disruptor-in-chief, Trump may, in fact, inadvertently herald the era of India as a great power.

Despite valiant efforts to present it as otherwise, Donald Trump’s foreign policy lacks coherence, the most generous reading being that of a defensive realist’s. But bits and pieces do offer a window into Trump’s thinking about the world. For one, he is sharply critical of America’s interventionist foreign-policy postures, principally in the Middle East. This suits India fine. Beginning in 1991, when the first Iraq war contributed to a serious balance-of-payment crisis in India, to having to evacuate its citizens from Yemen in 2015—and the fallout of that much-cheered liberal cause, the Arab Spring—America’s (and its allies’) penchant for starting wars and exacerbating fault lines have often come with a real cost to India. India’s energy security is contingent on a stable Middle East, even if that means status quo ante there.

The U.S.-sanctioned upending of that region in the guise of democracy promotion has been contrary to India’s national interests as well as beliefs. India’s discomfort with Western interventionism was articulated clearly during the Libyan crisis when Hardeep Singh Puri, then India’s permanent representative to the UN, noted that the responsibility to protect “cannot turn out to be a tool legitimizing big power intervention on the pretext of protecting populations from the violations of human rights and humanitarian law.” This stands in curious contrast to Hillary Clinton’s flippant remark—“We came, we saw, he died”—about Qaddafi. Given that Clinton now enjoys the endorsement of the neoconservative establishment, given the choice between the devil and the deep blue sea, India would be better off with Trump in the White House.

There is also a sense that the Democratic establishment is, deep down, rather hesitant to confront China, given the deep economic leverage that country seems to have over the United States. This state of affairs was summed up pithily by Hillary Clinton in a remark to Australia’s then prime minister Kevin Rudd in 2009 when she asked: “How do you deal toughly with your banker?” Washington’s long-standing policy, or rather gamble, of securing good behavior from Beijing by integrating it into the global economic order while maintaining American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific is not paying off. Chinese activity in the East and South China Seas continues unabated. Its “Belt and Road” initiative is perhaps the greatest exercise in “hard-wiring” the world has ever seen, to use Indian foreign secretary S. Jaishankar’s description.

America’s closest European allies are stakeholders in the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. (India is the second-largest stakeholder in that bank.) Germany’s “special relationship” with China, strengthened since the financial crisis of 2007–09, has brought the two countries closer than ever. With even its closest allies hedging, the Obama administration appears to be nervous about offending the Chinese. Witness the recent reports about National Security Advisor Susan Rice issuing a gag order on military leaders regarding South China Sea disputes ahead of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, which Xi Jinping attended. This gag order was seen as being directed at Pacific Command chief Adm. Harry Harris who, at a high-profile security conference in New Delhi in early March, had called for reviving the quadrilateral initiative between the United States, Australia, Japan and India.

For would-be allies like India, a divided house on China can be, and is being, read as mixed messaging. Trump’s position on China is not clearer than, say, his position on how to manage America’s budget, but again, the broad contours are known: he is not hesitant to adopt coercive measures to bring down Chinese competitive advantage when it comes to trade, even if that comes at a cost to American consumers. If Trump is indeed serious about this—and, as with all things Trump, that’s a big “if”—such measures will signal to countries like India that America means business when it comes to China. Trump’s ascendancy to the White House will also seal the coffin on a U.S.-Chinese grand bargain, along the lines of a G2 that Obama and Clinton fantasized about early in the first term of the Obama presidency.

Finally, Trump has called into question America’s long-standing alliance systems, NATO in particular. Implicit in his thinking is the free-riding nature of the Atlantic security architecture. The gist of Trump’s suggestion is that Europe needs to shoulder more responsibilities for its security. Were he to apply the same thinking to the Asia-Pacific, the Japan-centric U.S. alliance in the region would most likely be called to question. Trump is unlikely to come to Japan’s aid in any case, whether over the disputed Senkaku islands or elsewhere; Japan, in event of a Trump presidency, will look to a newer set of allies to balance China. This would naturally led to the emergence of a new coalition of Asian powers, in which India plays a significant, if not leading, role.

Beyond this, India’s greatest gain from a Trump presidency would be a much-needed impetus to shed its passivity when it comes to shaping the regional security architecture. It goes without saying that an anarchic international system in which a leading pole retrenches poses tremendous challenges for smaller powers. However, a Trump presidency is what could finally push India from its current status as a balancing power to that of a leading one. It remains to be seen how New Delhi makes lemonade out of the lemon that is Donald Trump.

About the author- Abhijnan Rej is a Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Views are personal.

© THE NATIONAL INTEREST ( ALL RIGHTS RESERVED)

Tuesday, May 24, 2016

Top 10 Countries with most Destroyers, Submarines and Frigates in the Wo...

Russia, India to have consultations on Indra-2016 in June ( Source- Russia & India Report / TASS)

Indira series of joint Indo-Russian exercises ( Image credits- Wikimedia Coomons / Mil.ru)

A second round of consultations on planning the Russian-Indian war games Indra-2016 will be held in India in June, Col Alexander Gordeyev, the chief press officer of Russia's Eastern Military District said on Tuesday.

"At the second planning conference that will be held in India, representatives of the Eastern Military District and the Indian Armed Forces will coordinate a calendar of the war games, the types and quantities of weapons and the procedure for the handover of arms, equipment and specialized technologies to the Indian army servicemen who will take part in the maneuvers," he said.

Avia Indra-2014 teaches pilots tactics and precision
The Russian-Indian anti-terrorist exercise Indra-2016 will take place in the second half of 2016 on the Sergeyevsky training ground located in the Far-Eastern Primorsky (Maritime) territory.

In the course of the maneuvers, mechanized infantry units of the combined-arms army of the Eastern Military District stationed in the Primorsky territory and India's Kumaon infantry regiments will practice the formation of a joint grouping of troops under a UN mandate and will simulate the planning and practical conduct of an antiterrorist operation.

Russia will commit two mechanized infantry companies, as well as mortar, self-propelled howitzer and multiple-launch rocket system batteries, one in each case, air defence, reconnaissance, and chemical units.

India will provide two company-level tactical groups.

All in all, the exercise will involve about 500 servicemen on both sides, Russian defence officials said.


First published by TASS.

© RUSSIA & INDIA REPORT ( ALL RIGHTS RESERVED)


China's March Towards Military Dominance in the South China Sea ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Dean Cheng)

PLAN Type- 54A Frigate Daqing ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Simon Yang)

Author- Dean Cheng

There is a lot going on in Southeast Asia. The United States has conducted another freedom of navigation operation in the area of several disputed islands. The American Aegis destroyer USS William P. Lawrence sailed within 12 nautical miles of the artificial Chinese island built atop Fiery Cross Reef.


Because Fiery Cross Reef began as a “high tide elevation (HTE),” (meaning: a rock) it is entitled to a 12 nautical mile zone of territorial waters.

The United States therefore chose to conduct an “innocent passage,” sailing across the 12 nautical mile zone with its radars off, helicopter grounded, and weapons aimed fore-and-aft. Its main challenge to the Chinese was conducting its passage without giving the People’s Republic of China prior notification.

So, the administration continues to conduct freedom of navigation operations at a desultory pace, with nearly five months intervening since the last operation.

The administration continues to try and avoid outright challenging China’s claims.

Thus, it conducts “innocent passage” near HTEs (rocks and islands that legitimately project a 12 nm territorial water zone), rather than freedom of navigation activities near places like Subi Reef and Mischief Reef (where China has also built airstrips), which, as low-tide elevations (LTEs), cannot legally claim any territorial waters.

This freedom of navigation operation occurs in the shadow of recent elections in the Philippines. The winner, Rodrigo Duterte, has talked about approaching the PRC for its own deal.

Like President Obama when he first took office in 2009, Duterte wants to offer China an “open hand.” He has indicated he is willing to engage in direct bilateral talks with the Chinese government on resolving their mutual claims to the South China Sea.

What steps he might take in this regard remain uncertain, especially as the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague is expected to issue a finding in the next few months. It also raises questions about how far the newly revived US-Philippines military cooperation efforts will now extend.

Malaysian press, meanwhile, reported that Kuala Lumpur has agreed to focus on the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” and the completion of a South China Sea Code of Conduct as the means of resolving its dispute with Beijing.

That these measures have yet to bear fruit or resolve the ongoing tensions despite years of discussions suggests that Malaysia is more interested in reaching its own accommodation with Beijing than an actual expectation of a different result.

The Malaysian approach may have been encouraged by China’s reaction to the American freedom of navigation operations.

In response to the American destroyer’s passage, the Chinese deployed a destroyer and two frigates.

In addition, two Chinese fighters and a Chinese airborne early warning aircraft were also soon on the scene. Given that China constantly insists that it has not militarized the South China Sea, such a display of force suggests that when China has completed its military preparations of the islands—most other states will be clearly outmatched.

Obama, meanwhile, has had little to say about developments in the region.

One can only hope that he will clarify what American policy is, in the face of Chinese assertiveness and growing regional tension.

This piece first appeared in The Daily Signal here.

© THE NATIONAL INTEREST ( ALL RIGHTS RESERVED)


The Indian Ocean Won't Be a 'Nuclear Free Zone' Anytime Soon ( Source- The Diplomat / Author- Ankit Panda)

Arihant Class SSBN ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / GAGAN@BRF)
Source- The Diplomat

Author- Ankit Panda

Sartaj Aziz, adviser to Pakistan’s prime minister on foreign affairs, presented an interesting proposal to the Pakistani Senate on Thursday. He said that he would consider having Pakistan introduce a resolution at the United Nations that would urge the body to declare the Indian Ocean a “nuclear free zone.” Leaving aside the fact that the United Nations isn’t in the business of declaring nuclear weapon free zones, Aziz’s comments reflect increasing anxieties in Pakistan about India’s burgeoning sea-based nuclear deterrent.

With the first of Arihant-class of domestically designed ballistic missile submarines rolling out and testing underway of Delhi’s K-4 submarine-launched ballistic missiles ongoing, Delhi is coming closer to operationalizing its sea-based deterrent. (The K-4 has been test launched from the Arihant‘s on-board silos, as I discussed last month.)

Aziz is well aware of these developments. ”Apart from this air defence system, India has also recently conducted tests of nuclear capable, submarine based K4 ballistic missiles. Simultaneously large nuclear powered submarines are being built to carry these nuclear armed missile as a part of its second strike nuclear capability,” he told the Senate, according to a report in Dawn.

Unfortunately, for Pakistan, the United Nations won’t be able to solve this problem anytime soon. Moreover, India won’t be the only country looking to operate nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in the waters of the Indian Ocean. China started operating Song- and Shang-class submarines in the Indian Ocean in 2014, according to the U.S. Department of Defense. Ostensibly, Beijing’s upcoming first overseas military facility—in Djibouti—will play a role in support submarine logistics.

According to the U.S. Defense Department’s most recent report on China’s military, four Chinese Jin-class SSBNs—China’s first sea-based deterrent as well—are operational. These submarines currently operate out off the People’s Liberation Army-Navy’s submarine base at Hainan Island, in the South China Sea, but Beijing may look to have its SSBNs patrolling the Indian Ocean soon enough.

As Bonnie Glaser and Matthew Funaiole highlight in a recent post, China’s Jin-class SSBNs, while giving Beijing its first credible sea-based second strike ability, are far from perfect. (Admittedly, neither is the Arihant.) In particular, the Jin-class, according to the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, has been found to be noisier than some 1970s-era Soviet SSBNs.

Given that China’s chosen to arm these with the relatively range-constrained JL-2 SLBM (with a 7,500 km range), the SSBNs would have to “travel undetected through several crucial chokepoints into the Pacific Ocean in order to strike the continental United States,” write Glaser and Funaiole. (India’s K-4 is more constrained by range yet, featuring an operational range of 3,500 km.)

The Pacific route might not be the best way for China to put its JL-2 within striking range of U.S. targets. The far reaches of the Indian Ocean, into the Gulf of Aden, offer another appealing region for Chinese SSBN patrols. The JL-2′s range just about brings the United States’ eastern coast into range. With the potential for submarine logistics support at Djibouti and perhaps even Gwadar in the Pakistan down the line, the Indian Navy might not be the only one in the region looking at the Indian Ocean for its SSBNs.

Unsurprisingly, amid increased Chinese sub-surface activity in the Indian Ocean, we’ve seen the United States and India deepen their anti-submarine warfare cooperation. Moreover, Delhi has started extending its maritime patrol and surveillance capabilities further southward; it sent a P-8I Neptune aircraft to the Seychelles earlier this year.


With India’s Arihant-class on the verge of commissioning and Chinese SSBNs possibly on the way to supplement the PLAN’s existing hunter-killer and nuclear attack submarines, the Indian Ocean won’t become a “nuclear free zone” anytime soon. Islamabad could look to build up its own undersea nuclear capabilities, but, as I’ve discussed before, that’ll be limited by a range of factors.

About the author- Ankit Panda is an editor at The Diplomat. He writes on security, politics, economics, and culture. Follow Ankit on Twitter, Google+, and LinkedIn, or get in touch via email.

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