Thursday, June 30, 2016

Can America Crush Russia's A2/AD 'Bubbles'? ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Dave Majumdar)


Russian Iskander Missile ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / A.Savin)

Author- Dave Majudar

The United States has the right tools to take on Russian anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zones in the European theatre, but it does not have enough capacity to take on Moscow’s new bastions head-on. Moreover, the U.S. military is overly reliant on air power to defeat those emerging threats.


“We have the tools, but we do not have nearly enough of them—and the speed that we would need to eliminate these A2/AD bubbles—to be able to deploy our forces is going to be controlled by the depth of the bench of how we can attack those A2/AD forces,” retired U.S Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, former commander of U.S. European Command told an audience at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on June 29. “Right now, we’re almost completely dependent on air forces and aviation assets in order to attack the A2/AD problem.”

But air power might not be enough. Breedlove suggests that U.S. ground forces should play a role in taking on the Russian A2/AD threat. “We need more long-range, survivable, precision strike capability from the ground,” Breedlove said. “We need dense capability—like the dense A2/AD networks that we face.”

However, Breedlove did not address if the ground-based capability he seeks would be compatible with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which prohibits ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. It is possible that Breedlove was suggesting a weapon that falls within the confines of the INF treaty—similar to the Russian Iskander-M.

Breedlove also suggested that NATO should examine the possibility of setting up its own offensive A2/AD capabilities. Breedlove said he regards Russian A2/AD zones to be inherently offensive in nature and suggests the U.S. should respond in kind. “Do we create our own anti-access/area-denial capability?” Breedlove asked. “That is a big decision.”

Evelyn Farkas, who until recently served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, said that while Moscow has been modernizing its forces—compared to the United States—the Kremlin’s planned military investments of about $700 billion over 10 years are relatively paltry. However, Russia has been strategic with its outlays. “It’s not as if they’re modernizing across the board,” Farkas said. “But they’re doing it in a very clever way, and so they’re increasing their capabilities in certain key conventional areas...cruise missiles, the air defense systems etc. Which are causing quite a problem for us.”

Lisa Sawyer Samp, a senior fellow at CSIS’ International Security Program, said that the U.S. capability gap with regard to Russia is real, but it is regionally focused in Central and Eastern Europe. Moscow simply cannot go toe-to-toe with Washington across the globe as the Soviet Union once did. “I want to be clear that the Russian military is not a Goliath,” she said. “It cannot outmatch the United States across global battlefields. It does, however, possess advanced capabilities—that as currently arrayed—could plausibly challenge the United States and its allies regionally.”

Samp said that there are three key areas where Russia either already has or is starting to gain an advantage. One is A2/AD, the second is combined arms warfare and the third is cyber and electronic warfare. “These capabilities will have to be factored in future Army planning [and] procurement priorities.”

While U.S. and European officials have voiced their alarm over Russian nuclear saber rattling, Farkas said that she does not believe the Russian “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine necessarily focuses on tactical nuclear weapons employment. “It’s actually not that, it’s denying your adversary the ability to get in to intervene in an ongoing or imminent military action that the Russian government wants to take,” Farkas said. “So can they use cyber means, they can use space, they can do anything to basically escalate the situation to a point where the United States or other European allies might say: ‘oh, we’ll keep out of that.’”

Nonetheless, Farkas conceded that “de-escalation” could potentially involve a nuclear demonstration or even nuclear use. “But I don’t see it necessarily being about nuclear,” she said.

About the author- Dave Majumdar is the defense editor of The National Interest. You can follow him on Twitter @DaveMajumdar.

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Tuesday, June 28, 2016

Why the BrahMos armed Sukhoi is bad news for India’s enemies ( Source- Russia & India Report / Author- Rakesh Krishnan Simha)


IAF SU-30 MKI ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons)


India has signalled its intent to strike enemy targets with devastating force early on in a conflict. On June 25 a modified Indian Air Force Sukhoi Su-30MKI aircraft carried a Brahmos-A (Air) supersonic cruise missile aloft for the first time, marking an important milestone in the development of the missile ahead of further flights and firing tests.

The twin-seat multirole fighter took off from the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd airport in Bengaluru and conducted a 45 minute sortie with the missile attached to its underbelly. Developed jointly by India's Defence Research & Development Organisation and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyeniya, Brahmos-A is a modified variant of its basic configuration. "It features several design refinements, which include a lighter propulsion system (reduced to 2,500 kg from 3,000 kg) as well as redesigned fins and nose cap," reports Janes Defence Weekly.

Strategic strike force

In September 2010 India’s newly constituted tri-services Strategic Forces Command (SFC) submitted a proposal to the Defence Ministry for setting up two dedicated squadrons of aircraft comprising 40 Su-30MKI air dominance fighters. The task of this “mini air force” is to deliver nuclear weapons.

The picture became clearer in October 2012 when the Cabinet Committee on Security green lighted a programme to carry out structural and software modifications on 42 Su-30MKIs and acquire 216 air-launched Brahmos missiles. Until then, the Brahmos – the product of an India-Russia joint venture – was for exclusive use by the Navy.

FGFA may be armed with BrahMos cruise missiles

In March 2015 the SFC received the first of these 42 Sukhois equipped with the air launched version of the supersonic BrahMos. This is the first time that the SFC, which at present depends on the Indian Air Force (IAF) for delivering nuclear weapons under its command, is acquiring its own aerial assets.

Currently, India’s nuclear delivery system is based on land-based ballistic missiles such as the Agni and Prithvi plus the IAF’s nuclear-capable Mirage 2000, Su-30 MKI and Jaguar fighter-bombers. The final element of the nuclear triad, submarine-launched ballistic missile, is still being tested.

Individually, the Su-30 and Brahmos are powerful weapons. But when the world’s most capable fourth generation fighter is armed with a uniquely destructive cruise missile, together they are a dramatic force multiplier.

The BrahMos’ maximum speed of 3700 km per hour speed – literally faster than a bullet – means it hits the target with a huge amount of kinetic energy. In tests, the BrahMos has often cut warships in half and reduced ground targets to smithereens. The Sukhoi’s blistering speed will add extra launch momentum to the missile, plus the aircraft’s ability to penetrate hardened air defences means there is a greater chance for the pilot to deliver the missile on to its designated targets.

Likely targets

Considering that India’s primary enemy is Pakistan and that country’s chief backer is China, against which India has fought two conflicts – losing in 1962 and winning in 1967 –  these two countries are the obvious targets.

Against Pakistan, the targets are obvious. A two-squadron attack using most of the SFC’s air assets can within minutes utterly cripple the country’s command and control centres; nuclear power plants, including the Kahuta ‘Death Star’ where the majority of the “Islamic” bombs are manufactured; the Sargodha Central Ammunition Depot west of Lahore where these warheads are stored; ballistic missile bases in Gujranwala, Okara, Multan, Jhang and Dera Nawab Shah; Pakistani Army Corp headquarters in Rawalpindi; the Karachi Port, Pakistani’s only major harbour and its Naval HQ; and ordinance factories that manufacture tanks and fighter aircraft.

The supersonic Brahmos armed with a conventional warhead can theoretically penetrate hardened command, control and communication centres. However, if required the missile’s conventional warhead can be replaced with miniaturised nukes. A pre-emptive nuclear strike will therefore ensure that Pakistan’s offensive capability is effectively neutralised and it is never again a threat to India.

Against China, the Sukhoi-Brahmos one-two punch seems counter-intuitive as Chinese targets are located deep inland or on the coast. However, the Su-30MKI has a maximum range of 3000 km (extendable to 8000 km with in-flight refuelling). Now add the Brahmos’s 300 km reach and India can hit targets 3300 km inside China.

Why the Sukhoi-BrahMos option?

The Su-30MKI is an obvious choice. The SFC does not want untested fighters but the ones which can be relied upon to deliver nuclear-tipped missiles. The aircraft has a titanium airframe strong enough to fly a high-speed terrain following profile. The batch of 42 Sukhois will also have hardened electronic circuitry to shield them from the electromagnetic pulse of a nuclear blast.

India gets two new BrahMos regiments

Having a dedicated aircraft for the nuclear attack role offers India’s war planners strategic flexibility and increases the odds of success. Because ballistic missiles are used only as a weapon of last resort, they cannot really be deployed at will. Once released, they cannot be recalled and if shot down are not easily replaced.

Fighter aircraft, on the other hand, can perform repeated sorties and be directed to bomb targets as they move. For instance, if Pakistan moves it warheads out of Sargodha depot, which is presumably under constant watch by Indian satellites, the Sukhois can be vectored against a column of Pakistani trucks transporting their nuclear cargo.

The SFC’s mini air force of 42 Sukhois can also launch their missiles against Pakistani targets from within Indian airspace or while flying over international waters, thereby complicating the enemy’s defences. It is a lot easier for India to destroy Pakistani war fighting capability because not only is Pakistan relatively smaller but it has also concentrated its defences in one province, Punjab.

Because heavy modifications were necessary for integrating such a heavy missile onto the Su-30MKI, initially it seemed to make little sense to deploy a single missile. Aviation Week reports that initially even Sukhoi was reluctant to go along. That prompted HAL to go solo, but Aviation Week says Sukhoi eventually came on board, in 2011. The Russian side provided HAL with technical consultancy especially for the modifications to the fuselage in order to accommodate the 9-metre-long missile.

“Work is also underway on a modified lighter and smaller-diameter version of the BrahMos for deployment on the Indian navy's MiG-29K and, potentially, the Dassault Rafale,” says Aviation Week.

And signalling the country’s immunity from western sanctions, DRDO scientists say the 300 km cap on the missile’s range will be removed. The next generation Brahmos is likely to be a longer range weapon. And with the planned increased in speed, the missile will have considerably enhanced kinetic energy despite its smaller size optimised for relatively smaller aircraft such as the MiG-29.

That’s really bad news if you are in the Sukhoi-BrahMos crosshairs.


(This is an updated version of Rakesh Krishnan Simha’s post published in April 2015.)

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Indian military ships arrive in Vladivostok on unofficial visit ( Source- Russia & India Report / Author- Sputnik)

Image credits- Indian Navy

Author- Sputnik

The Indian military ships have arrived in the Russia’s Far East city of Vladivostok on an unofficial visit, where they will be staying for four days, the Russian Eastern Military District's press service said Monday.

"Today a group of ships of the Indian Navy arrived in Vladivostok on an unofficial visit," district's spokesman Igor Maiborodov said.


Indian sailors were met with repeated salute by the Pacific Fleet command, the honor guard company and orchestra of the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet.

The sides pointed out the increased communications between the countries’ fleets.

The Indian delegation is set to lay wreathes to the eternal flame at the memorial complex of Military Honor of Pacific Fleet, participate in sport competitions with their Russian counterparts and take part in a number of cultural events.

First published by Sputnik.

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China-India Relations After the NSG Plenary ( Source- The Diplomat / Author- Deep pal)

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Chinese President Xi Jinping
( Image credits- Flickr/ MEA, Govt of India)


Source- The Diplomat

Author- Deep Pal

Few analysts following developments at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) plenary in South Korea expected India’s membership bid to sail through. As the dust settles, what is clear is that Xi Jinping’s China differs considerably from Hu Jintao’s China. The latter did not want to stand alone; the former is on the path to establishing China as the challenger in the global order – and understands that such a project is necessarily a lonely pursuit.

Beyond the arguments of whether or not joining the NSG accords India additional advantages, what stood out over the past month is the Modi government’s impressive ability to set a concrete objective, and pursue it with great coordination. While Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar was leading India’s charge in Seoul, the prime minister himself brought up the issue with Xi in Tashkent. This ability to strategize and cogently act is a key takeaway and must be utilized moving forward.

For India, what transpired in Seoul is much more than just a reflection of China’s attitude towards India’s aspirations – it is about how India is seen as a power by others around the globe. While China raised the bogey of “due procedure,” some others reportedly saw logic. Some among them, like Switzerland had promised support to India as recently as a few weeks ago; others included Brazil, India’s partner in BRICS.

While this is not the first time that China has taken a stand inimical to Indian interests, this time is markedly different. It is now unequivocally clear that China objects to Indian aspirations of being a bigger player in the global order. There are indications that it is concerned about how India will react – the Chinese Foreign Ministry has unilaterally claimed that developments in the NSG meeting won’t affect the relationship. In the NSG meeting though, it expended little political capital blocking India.

The challenge ahead for India then, is two-fold: First, manage the relationship with China, which is likely to begin immediately. For example, in multilateral forums where the two work together, such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, climate talks, or the World Trade Organization, India will be especially cognizant that China will pursue a strategy to primarily benefit itself. It is likely that Indian representatives will be extra vigilant against making concessions, and pursue their own negotiations, possibly independent of China’s initiatives.

This brings us to the second challenge: The need to project the image of a confident India by removing ambivalence about how it sees its place in the world. Going by reports from Seoul, there is work to be done on this front. India has no time to be coy and equivocal anymore; to be granted exceptions, it will have to demand them as a principal rising power in the 21st century. India may be less powerful than China economically and militarily but it will continue to be a substantial power throughout the coming years. Additionally, its enduring appeal will continue to be in its democratic policy, and the fact that it allows a multiplicity of views and opposing political opinions. If Modi indeed believes all that he says about India’s stature in the world, it needs to reflect not only in his speeches, but also in his foreign policy.

For India to accomplish this, two prior conditions need to be fulfilled. First, the economy must be allowed to grow at the current pace without systemic shocks. Second, as anyone with the slightest exposure to Indian foreign policymaking knows, the country has been its own greatest enemy by being hesitant and postponing taking hard decisions. While changing this overnight is difficult, the foreign policy elite will now need to act decisively, and cease fence-sitting. Only by presenting itself as a smart and confident power in the its neighborhood will India be able to come across as a sure-footed global player.

The Way Forward

To begin with, India will have to understand that China’s approach to foreign policy based on the concept of leverage. During Rajiv Gandhi’s seminal 1988 visit, China signaled that it was keen on developing the relationship without working to resolve the border issue immediately. China believed that India was keen to resolve the matter, which it gave it leverage. It is now incumbent on India to do the same by inserting itself in situations where China has high stakes – situations that challenge its aspirational move toward the top of the global order. India must do this with finesse, ensuring it does not spite China directly. For one, rebuilding the relationship since the 1980s has been useful in many aspects (like managing the border question) – letting all that slip is unwarranted. Second, unlike other powers, most notably the United States, India occupies the landmass contiguous to China, which comes with an additional motivation to calibrate its actions. With these caveats in place, India should approach its China policy with eye on three timeframes: immediate, mid-term, and long-term.

The Short Term

In the immediate term India must not lose any opportunity to integrate itself with China’s neighborhood in Asia. An opportunity is going to present itself in early July when the verdict for the Philippines’ arbitration case on the South China Sea comes out. India must utilize the opportunity to integrate itself with Southeast Asian nations and squarely back the rule of law and international norms. India must emphasize that the question of “due procedure,” used with great dexterity by China in Seoul, cannot be applied selectively.

It must also once and for all abandon the question of maintaining equal distance from the United States and China. As is evident, as a big, rising economy, India is unlikely to get concessions that China benevolently doles out to smaller players in the region. Under these circumstances, India must step up its cooperation with the United States. This does not necessarily mean losing its ability to make independent policy decisions – as the last decade and a half has demonstrated, the Indian establishment is capable of maintaining strategic autonomy in policymaking while stepping up engagement with the United States.

While the NSG plenary meeting was underway, the Indian finance minister was in Beijing seeking Chinese investment. Established processes like this, including the functioning of frameworks set in place for issues like trade or border management, must continue seamlessly. Simultaneously though, India can start remedying its vast trade deficit by introducing non-tariff barriers against unimportant items, and gradually expanding the list. It can instead ramp up Chinese investment in the country in big projects, such as in the infrastructure sector, developing leverage in the process by tying them to Chinese support for India on important international issues.

The Medium Term

In the medium term, India needs to understand that while its non-ascension to the NSG fits Pakistan’s agenda, China’s actions are primarily to maintain and advance its own superiority. With this is context, India must vigorously de-hyphenate itself from Pakistan while elaborating on its place in the global order to other countries. This would mean desisting from mentioning Pakistan as a comparative example at all times. The threat from terrorism emanating out of the country into the region notwithstanding, few aspects of India’s rise have to do with Pakistan anymore. If India’s policymakers need to bring up a neighbor while discussing regional ambitions, it must be China. This will serve two purposes: One, it will further integrate India with the larger concerns in the Asia-Pacific. More importantly, followed rigorously, this will amply elucidate to other countries where India’s priorities lie – in being a rising power in the region where the other competitor is China. For this to be achieved, India will need to coordinate its signaling carefully – in private as well as in public.

The coming months are likely to see increases Indian activities in the Indo-Pacific. The navy has been directed to conduct more joint exercises with navies in Southeast Asia as part of its Act East policy. This comes right after the annual U.S.-India Exercise Malabar that now permanently includes Japan. It has recently established a two-plus-two dialogue mechanism with Japan, and this would be an appropriate opportunity to set up similar mechanisms with other countries. The Indian navy has recently stated its objective of shaping “a favorable and positive maritime environment, for enhancing net security in India’s areas of maritime interest.”

An inexpensive way of accomplishing this is by expanding military and political ties with players in the region. India already maintains and repairs Vietnamese defense platforms, and has been training its pilots. With the latest developments, indications are that New Delhi might finally move forward on selling supersonic Brahmos cruise missiles to the country. Additional security arrangements are underway – the Thai prime minister’s visit earlier in June was marked by agreements to cooperate in defense and maritime areas. The Singaporean prime minister and Indonesian president are also scheduled to visit in the next few months with similar agendas.

The Long Term

The longer term measures are obviously ones that will require the most effort as well as administrative and political capital. The primary strategy in this lies in exploiting China’s discomfort over the Tibet question. India must quietly integrate Tibetan leaders into its national narrative, as it did by inviting the prime minister of the Tibetan Government in Exile to Narendra Modi’s inauguration, or the way ministers shared the stage with the Dalai Lama for his 80th birthday. In the longer run this will allow it to have a greater say during the likely turmoil in the post-Dalai Lama scenario.

India must work to socially, politically, and economically integrate Arunachal Pradesh and other parts of northeast India with the rest of the country. This will mean developing infrastructure in the border with China along with sustained efforts to improve education and employment opportunities in the region as a whole. Considering the extent to which former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to the state displeased China, the process can begin with continuing visits by Modi. Nothing will peeve China more than seeing a content and prosperous “South Tibet” as part of India. At the same time, it will send out a positive message about Indian state capacity.

About the author- Deep Pal is a Non-Resident Fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research, and a doctoral student at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of the organizations. Deep can be followed on Twitter @DeepPal_

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Why the US Navy Should Fear China's New 093B Nuclear Attack Submarine ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Dave Majumdar)

PLAN SSN ( Credits- Internet image)

Author- Dave Majumdar

Is China’s new Type 093B nuclear-powered attack submarine on par with the U.S. Navy’s Improved Los Angeles-class boats?


At least some U.S. naval analysts believe so and contend that the introduction of the new People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarines is an indication of just how quickly Beijing is catching up to the West.

“The 93B is not to be confused with the 93. It is a transition platform between the 93 and the forthcoming 95,” said Jerry Hendrix, director of the Defense Strategies and Assessments Program at the Center for a New American Security—who is also a former U.S. Navy Captain. “It is quieter and it has a new assortment of weapons to include cruise missiles and a vertical launch capability. The 93B is analogous to our LA improved in quietness and their appearance demonstrates that China is learning quickly about how to build a modern fast attack boat.”

Other sources were not convinced that Beijing could have made such enormous technological strides so quickly—but they noted that the topic of Chinese undersea warfare capability is very classified. Open source analysis is often extremely difficult, if not impossible. “Regarding the question on the Type 093B, I really don’t know, anything is possible I suppose, but I doubt it,” said retired Rear Adm. Mike McDevitt, now an analyst at CNA’s Center for Naval Analyses. “I have no doubt that the PLAN has ambitions to at least achieve that level of capability and quietness.”

Though the Seawolf and Virginia-classes have surpassed the Improved Los Angeles-class as the premier U.S. Navy attack submarines, such older vessels will remain the mainstay of the service’s undersea fleet for many years to come. If the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s newest boats are able to match the capabilities of the U.S. Navy’s shrinking undersea fleet, Washington could be in serious trouble. Indeed, the U.S. Navy already anticipated that it could be facing-off against a Chinese submarine fleet that is nearly twice its size, but not as technically capable.

The U.S. Navy—which has roughly 52 attack submarines—is on track to have 41 attack boats by 2029. The Chinese, meanwhile would have “at least 70, and they’re building,” Vice Adm. Joseph Mulloy, the service’s deputy chief of naval operations for integration of capabilities and resources told the House Armed Services Committee’s seapower and projection forces subcommittee on February 25.  “You get back into the whole quality versus quantity issue, but at the same time the Russians are also building...and they build much higher-end submarines.”

In a 2016 report to Congress, the Pentagon noted that Beijing continues to upgrade and expand its submarine fleet: “China continues to improve its SSN force, and four additional SHANG-class SSN (Type 093) will eventually join the two already in service. The SHANG SSN will replace the aging HAN class SSN (Type 091). These improved SHANG SSNs feature a vertical launch system (VLS) and may be able to fire the YJ-18 advanced anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM). Over the next decade, China may construct a new Type 095 nuclear-powered, guided missile attack submarine (SSGN), which not only would improve the PLAN’s anti-surface warfare capability but might also provide it with a more clandestine land-attack option.”

The problem, however, is if Hendrix’s assessment is correct and future Chinese submarines are only slightly less capable than the Virginia or Seawolf-class vessels, the Navy could be in trouble. The technological edge the U.S. Navy—which is already woefully short on attack boats—is counting on might not be sufficient to counter Chinese numerical superiority. However, the service is continuing to improve the performance capabilities of its submarines on a continual basis. Nonetheless, one former U.S. Navy undersea warfare officer suggested that the service would come to regret having truncated the high-performance submarine-hunting Seawolf-class at three boats and focusing instead on the more multi-role Virginia-class.

Aware of the coming attack boat shortfall, the U.S. Navy is hoping to boost its attack submarine fleet by continuing to build two Virginia-class vessels per year even while it builds the next-generation Ohio Replacement Program ballistic missile submarine. However, if the Chinese are truly catching up technologically, Congress might consider accelerating the attack submarine build rate to the maximum capacity of America’s two nuclear-capable shipyards. At the same time, the U.S. Navy might have to accelerate the development of the next-generation successor to the Virginia-class, which has been tentatively designated the SSN(X) program and is scheduled to enter service in 2044.

Dave Majumdar is the defense editor of The National Interest. You can follow him on Twitter @DaveMajumdar

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Sunday, June 26, 2016

HAL Tejas : Why India is replacing Russian R-73 missile with Israeli Pyt...

India in SCO to boost connectivity, ties with Russia ( Source- Russia & India Report)

Image credits- VOA


At the 45-minute long meeting with Vladimir Putin on Friday afternoon, his last official engagement before he left Tashkent, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi expressed gratitude and thanks to the Russian President for his support in getting India into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

India, along with Pakistan, was formally accepted as a new member at the Ufa summit of the SCO in July last year, when Russia was chairing the SCO. Having signed the Memorandum of Obligations, a mandatory requirement by which New Delhi accepted all the obligations by which the other member countries of the SCO abide, India is now a member. During the course of the year, before the next Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, India (and Pakistan) will further sign around 30 more instruments of accession in various sectors of cooperation and attend the 2017 summit as full members.

"India is glad to be a member of the SCO & looks forward to fruitful outcomes particularly in the field of economic cooperation through SCO," Modi said on his official Twitter account. “Cooperation with Central Asia is of great importance for India”, he added.

In his address to the SCO leaders, the Indian Prime Minister said, “India is not new to the region. Our historic linkages with you are centuries old. And, it is not just geography that connects us. Our societies have been enriched by links of culture, cuisine and commerce. 

SCO becomes powerful force in Eurasia: Secretary General

They form the bed rock of our modern day relationships with Russia, China and the countries of Central Asia”, Modi said.

During their meeting, President Putin told the Indian Prime Minister that India is a special and privileged partner and that there is long standing friendship between Russia and India. He welcomed India signing the Memorandum of Obligations of SCO.

India’s entry to the SCO in 2017 would lead to even “closer Russian-Indian cooperation”, President Putin said. "This will provide us with an opportunity for closer work with our Indian friends, now at the floor of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization," the Russian President said.

He said he was looking forward to India's Chairmanship of BRICS, which has grown in influence. Prime Minister Modi said India, as the chair of BRICS this year, would keep up the momentum generated during the Russian presidency of BRICS last year and aim for closer cooperative ties.

"We put high hopes on your leadership in this organization," President Putin said. India’s presidency would also promote "consolidation of this recognized international organization, whose influence is continuously growing," the Russian President added, according to TASS.

The two leaders discussed cooperation in civil nuclear energy, partnership in the gas and petrochemicals sector. They also discussed how to take their cooperation in the space sector ahead, an Indian government spokesman said.

Among the crucial issues they discussed was how to raise the levels of bilateral trade. Matters relating to trade and investment were raised and officials were urged to come up with innovative suggestions to raise economic cooperation. The Indian PM mentioned the first BRICS Trade Fair, to be held in October in New Delhi, in this context, as a means to showcase improved economic ties.

Regional issues were discussed, particularly the situation in Syria and Afghanistan, sources told RIR. Both leaders expressed the view that the violence had to be curbed and the spread of the terrorist influence in the region halted. ‘Brexit’ and its fallout on the global economic scene did not come up in the conversation.

Both leaders also spoke of “age old cultural linkages” and agreed to find ways of further invigorating cultural and people to people ties.

Modi also thanked Putin for Russia’s strong support for India’s application to enter the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). India did not gain entry at the NSG plenary session in Seoul, which ended Friday, but will keep pushing for admittance.

The presidency of the SCO passed in 2016 from Russia to Uzbekistan. Regional security and the issues of economic cooperation are among the priorities of SCO, a political, economic and military alliance, founded in 2001, that includes Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Nepal receives SCO dialogue partner status
India and Pakistan, which enjoyed Observer status in the organisation since 2005, will come on board as full members from the next summit in 2017.

“The SCO is a group which brings together countries of our extended neighbourhood. We have been working with other SCO members in several fields. We have been talking to them in working groups relating to trade, transport, culture and terrorism and so on and we hope that our engagement in these areas will intensify through this. The SCO is a major group in terms of countries that have a huge potential in terms of energy. In fact, there is a talk of an SCO energy club emerging so we will wait and see how that develops,” said Sujata Mehta, Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs.

Asked about areas of cooperation within the SCO, Mehta said, “Cooperation in the area of security is part of the subject matter of the SCO…All countries which are members SCO cooperate with each other. In fact there is a regional anti-terror mechanism that is formally established within the SCO, and we too will be part of that,” she said. 

Earlier, in an interview with the Chinese news agency Xinhua, President Putin said the admission of India and Pakistan to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) will make the SCO a more powerful, influential and popular association in the region and worldwide.

"Indeed, as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization expands its areas of operation and its membership through the participation of the powerful countries I have just mentioned [India and Pakistan], it turns into a very powerful international association that commands respect and is relevant both in the region and worldwide," Putin said in an interview with Xinhua news agency, prior to his visit to China. He travelled to China from Uzbekistan, after the SCO summit.

"At the summit held last year in Ufa, Russia, we decided to admit to the SCO another two states, India and Pakistan. We are to formalize this decision at the Tashkent meeting [on June 24]. We will also consider the intentions of other countries to join our work," he said.


"The international environment is complicated and multifaceted, and issues are not resolved by the mere fact that countries with different approaches to and views on various international challenges join our Organization. However, as we expect, their accession does create conditions for the issues to be resolved," Putin told Xinhua.

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These 5 Countries Will Dominate the Global Economy in 2030 ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Samuel Rines)

Bombay Stock Exchange
 ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Elroy Serrao) 


Author- Samuel Rines

Will today’s five largest economies—China, the United States, India, Japan and Germany—maintain their places between now and 2030? Or will see a reshuffling?


China has already passed the United States in terms of Purchasing Power Parity Gross Domestic Product (PPP GDP)—a method of measuring the relative purchasing power of a nation used throughout this piece. Granted, this is only one measure of wealth, and much of China remains poor, but it illustrates that measurement matters. By other measures, such as current dollar GDP, the United States is still the largest economy, and it is likely that U.S. economic dominance will continue.

The United States has a few advantages in remaining a top economic power. Unlike China, the United States has already pivoted from manufacturing toward services, thereby reducing its reliance on exports for growth. And the ability to hydraulically fracture lessens the United States’ reliance on global energy markets and Middle Eastern stability, something that was not true a decade ago.

For its part, China will certainly remain a top-five economy, but it will not overtake the United States in terms of GDP per capita—a measure of wealth versus size. The two primary headwinds for China maintaining are the need to reform its banking system, and the pivot to a more consumer-driven society. Neither is simple to address on its own, never mind in tandem.

China’s banking system is laden with nonperforming loans. The extent of the issue is unknowable, due to the opacity of the institutions, but the suspicion is that the need to recapitalize and expunge the balance sheets is imminent and stark. Tackling, and ultimately solving, the issue will consume resources that would be better used to transition the economy from infrastructure building and investment to services.

By 2030, China may find itself in a similar position to where Japan is today—a significant global economic player going nowhere quickly while aging rapidly. Unlike Japan, China will be a particularly poor position to pause its growth, given that it will be at best a middle-income nation.

This so-called “middle-income trap” is unforgiving, but the middle-income trap is not a middle-income decline. It is rare for nations to fall back significantly, which is what it would take for China, or the United States, to fall out of the top five. Therefore, the battle for spots in the top five will be fought from third to fifth place, positions currently held by India, Japan and Germany. The captivating question is who will fall out, and who will rise to replace them.

Using the International Monetary Fund’s PPP GDP figures, the United States and China have economies that are more than double that of third-place India.  Nonetheless, it will take a serious twist of fate for India to be replaced in the top five. India’s tailwinds are numerous, its headwinds are manageable and, unlike most the rest of the world, India is a relatively young country. It also has the tailwind of needing to build the necessary infrastructure to be a twenty-first-century economy. And, at less than 70 percent according to the IMF, India does not have the government-debt-to-GDP burden that hinders the growth of many countries (meaning that there is some room for fiscal policies to encourage growth).

Not everything is falling precisely into place for India at the moment, though. The World Bank Group ranks it 130th in its “Doing Business” rankings. But this is also low-hanging fruit for India, and addressing it would accelerate growth. India is a large economy needing only simple fixes to continue its growth.

Japan and Germany, meanwhile, are in far more tenuous positions, with Russia, Brazil and Indonesia on their heels and the dark horse, Mexico, not too far behind either.

Japan suffers from nearly every economic ill possible. Its population is aging, its government is heavily indebted and monetary policy has been constantly easing for the better part of two decades. But even with no end in sight to the stagnation, Japan will not be replaced as a top-five economy.

For Germany, a deciding factor on who rounds out the top five will be the extent of the deepening of economic integration within the European Union (and whether or not it is considered an economy on its own) or whether it weakens or dissolves. While unlikely to resemble the United States, the EU will probably still be around in one form or another, and the German economy will remain a dominant force. However, the EU is unlikely to have integrated enough, even by 2030, to be considered an economic entity in itself. Instead, it will continue as an amalgamation of countries in a similar economic arrangement as NAFTA, with more mutual oversight.

And this leaves Germany at risk of being overtaken. With growth of only slightly better than 2 percent per year, it will be difficult for Germany to fend off the economies that are rapidly catching up to it. One problem for Germany will be maintaining its current account surplus with the rest of Europe over time. Without the current account surplus, Germany would be forced to wade through a painful rebalancing of its economy.

Indonesia will likely surpass both Russia and Brazil, and will likely be at least approaching Germany around 2030. Indonesia, similar to India, has a host of factors on its side including a young population (average age of about twenty-eight) and a favorable geographic location between China, Australia and India, which allows it to benefit from the growth of all three, or pivot toward one. Even with China slowing, Indonesia is not expected to slow its pace of growth significantly, according to the IMF.

Mexico is currently the eleventh-largest economy in the world, and it may surprise. Partially a derivative of its proximity to the U.S. market, and partly due to preferential trade treatment with its northern neighbor, Mexico is the economy to watch. Granted, it is currently well behind Russia and Brazil. But it is more advantaged through NAFTA and, potentially, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Russia is currently isolated, Brazil is mired in a political and economic mess, and both are reliant on commodities for their growth.

So, this leaves us primarily with the status quo. The United States, China and India will not be dethroned. And, despite the catch-up by fast-growing economies like Indonesia and Mexico, Japan is likely to remain a top-five economy—but Germany will not. Indonesia, and possibly Mexico, will surpass Germany by 2030. The major economies will see little churn, but immediately below there will be plenty of upheaval. The current commodity price sag will cause many previously fast-growing economies to play catch-up over the next decade while rivals benefit. This would mean that four of the top five economies would be located in Asia—food for thought.

About the author- Samuel Rines is the Senior Economist and Portfolio Strategist with Avalon Advisors in Houston, TX​.

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The 5 Most Powerful Navies of 2030 ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Kyle Mazokami)

Image credits- Indian navy

Author- Kyle Mizokami

The most powerful navies in 2030 will be a reflection of the broader state of the world. Some countries are invested in preserving the current international order, and see naval power as a means to maintain it. Other emerging countries are building navies commensurate with their newfound sense of status, often with an eye towards challenging that order.


The eastward shift in naval power will continue in 2030, a product of both declining defense budgets in Europe and growing economies in Asia. While the most powerful navies of the Cold War were concentrated largely in Europe, by 2030 both China and India will be on the list, with Japan and South Korea as runners-up also fielding large, modern naval forces.

Ship-wise, there are two classes that will define the most powerful navies: aircraft carriers and ballistic missile submarines. Aircraft carriers reflect the need to maintain a global, or even regional, power-projection capability. Ballistic-missile submarines reflect a maturation and diversification of a country’s nuclear arsenal, with an eye toward maintaining a second-strike capability in case of surprise attack. More than any other type, those two will define naval power in the early-to-mid twenty-first century.

The United States

The United States, the dominant naval power worldwide in 1945, will continue to dominate the seas eighty-five years later. By 2030 the Navy will be halfway through its thirty-year shipbuilding plan and have built three Gerald R. Ford–class aircraft carriers to begin replacing existing Nimitz-class carriers. Amphibious ship numbers should be slightly higher than current numbers, and the first ship in class to replace the Ohio ballistic missile submarines should enter service in 2031.

In surface combatants, all three Zumwalt-class cruisers will be in service—assuming the program remains fully funded—and the Navy will have built thirty-three more Arleigh Burke–class destroyers. A next-generation version of the Littoral Combat Ship will enter production in 2030.

Under current plans the U.S. Navy should reach its three-hundred-ship goal between 2019 and 2034, but after that period the number of surface combatants begins to drop. These plans also assume a higher than average shipbuilding budget, while at the same time the service must compete with the budget demands of other services—particularly the Air Force—and domestic programs. While U.S. naval superiority isn’t ending any time soon, the period after 2030 will be a critical one.

The United Kingdom

The Royal Navy of 2030 will be paradoxically the smallest and yet most powerful in the history of the United Kingdom. A combination of two new aircraft carriers, restoring fixed-wing flight to navy after a forty-year hiatus, and a fleet of ballistic-missile submarines will keep a numerically inferior Royal Navy in the top five.

The Royal Navy’s surface fleet, currently at nineteen destroyers and frigates, will shrink even further to six Type 45 guided-missile destroyers and eight Global Combat Ship frigates. The number of nuclear-powered attack submarines will remain constant at seven.

The Royal Navy is responsible for the UK’s nuclear deterrent and currently operates four Vanguard-class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines, each equipped with sixteen launch tubes for Trident D-5 missiles. The Vanguard class is expected to be replaced with the Successor class starting in 2028.

The UK’s sea-based power projection capability will be in the form of the Queen Elizabeth–class of aircraft carriers. The two conventionally powered ships, Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales, will each displace sixty-five thousand tons fully loaded and capable of carrying up to fifty aircraft. Aircraft will include the F-35B Lightning II fighter and Merlin, Wildcat, Chinook and Apache helicopters. The two carriers will optionally double as amphibious transports capable of carrying up to nine hundred Royal Marines or troops of the Army’s Sixteenth Air Assault Brigade.

China

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) of 2030 will continue to build on the ground broken by the PLAN of 2016. Currently, China has four major ship hulls it seems to be content with: the Type 052D guided-missile destroyer, Type 054A frigate, Type 056 corvette and Type 071 amphibious transport. All four are mature designs in large-scale production that will form the bulk of the fleet in 2030.

By one prediction, by 2030 the PLAN will have ninety-nine submarines, four aircraft carriers, 102 destroyers and frigates, twenty-six corvettes, seventy-three amphibious ships and 111 missile craft, a whopping 415 ships in total, to approximately 309 in the U.S. Navy of 2030. This would put China in a solid position as the world’s largest navy by number of ships—though not by total ship tonnage.

Could China really reach 415 ships? Such a total would probably require twice as many submarines to be produced annually, a boost in destroyer production to achieve a net gain as older designs age out, and a huge increase in amphibious ships. It would also require two more carriers than are currently in service or under construction. Reaching such a goal would require a substantial increase in the PLAN’s budget—at a time when the Chinese Communist Party is finally applying the brakes to defense-budget increases.

Other ships under construction will form China’s fleet in 2030 are the Type 055 destroyer and Type 001A aircraft carrier. A new ballistic-missile submarine to supplement and eventually replace the Type 094 Jin class is also likely. The 094 class is notoriously noisy underwater and not a particularly good place to put a fraction of China’s three hundred or so nuclear warheads.

India

The Indian Navy will be the second (or third, if you count Russia) Asian navy on this list. India has recently begun pouring enormous resources into its naval service, and as a result by 2030 could have one of the top five navies on the planet.

Barring unforeseen naval developments in other countries, by 2030 India will have the second largest carrier fleet in the world, with three flattops. If all goes according to plan, India should have three aircraft carriers: Vikramaditya, Vikrant and Vishal, together fielding a total of about 110–120 aircraft.

India will also have at least nine destroyers, including two guided missiles of the Kolkata class, three of the Delhi class, and four of the in-construction Visakhapatnam class. This is one less than what India has at present, and the number of hulls will have to increase if India is serious about protecting three aircraft carriers. Roughly two-thirds of the Indian Navy’s frigate fleet is modern enough to make it to 2030, particularly the Shivalik and Talwar classes, but India will have to increase the number of frigates overall—especially if Pakistan is serious about putting nuclear weapons on submarines.

India is in the process of standing up a sea-based leg of its nuclear triad, with the first ballistic missile submarine, Arihant, expected to be operational soon. Three Arihant subs are planned and an overall “boomer” fleet of six submarines is expected.

Russia

The combination of a downturn oil prices and Western sanctions from its annexation of the Crimea will put a crimp in Russia’s economic stride for the near future. After economic growth of up to six percent annually, the bear is in recession with no immediate end in sight. A plan to replace 90 percent of Russian military equipment, including ships and naval equipment, has stalled.

By 2030, Russia’s position on this list will be in large part due its ballistic missile submarine fleet. Eight Borei submarines, each carrying twenty Bulava missiles, will be in service, forming the second-largest ballistic-missile submarine fleet in the world.

The rest of the Russian Navy is slouching toward oblivion, with a dwindling number of large surface combatants, submarines and a single, decrepit aircraft carrier. Yet there’s still hope: before the money ran out Moscow had big plans for its navy, and if were to somehow find funding, a number of interesting projects could be pursued.

Project 23000E, or Shtorm, would be a nuclear-powered carrier 330 meters long and displacing one hundred thousand tons, making it the closest competitor to a Ford-class carrier. Nuclear-powered, the carrier will embark up to one hundred aircraft, including a navalized version of the PAK-FA fifth-generation fighter.

There’s also the gigantic Lider-class nuclear-powered destroyer. At 17,500 tons and two hundred meters long, the Lider class is more akin to a cruiser than a destroyer. Armament will consist of sixty antiship cruise missiles, 128 antiaircraft missiles, and sixteen antiship guided missiles. The first ship is scheduled to begin production in 2019, with twelve entering service by 2025—an ambitious shipbuilding schedule to say the least.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami.

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