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Why ISIS Could Destroy Itself ( Source- The National Interest, Author- Paul R. Pillar)

ISIS Militia ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons/ Author- Menendj)

Source- The National Interest

Author- Paul R. Pillar

The fortunes of the extreme and violent group known variously as ISIS/ISIL/Islamic State seem to have changed markedly during the past few months. This summer the group was commonly portrayed, amid much alarm, as a relentless juggernaut that was scooping up so much real estate that it was a threat to overrun Baghdad and much else far beyond. But the progress that was so frightening to follow in maps in the newspaper has stopped. The juggernaut has stalled. There will be endless debate about the causes of this change of momentum, ranging from military measures that the United States has taken to the somewhat more enlightened policies of the Iraqi central government. These and other influences have their effects, but the larger phenomenon of the decline of ISIS—decline not just that has happened so far but is yet to come—can be explained most of all by the group's own policies and practices.

The abhorrent and inhumane methods of the group are a major part of that explanation. Just as we abhor such methods, it should be no surprise that most people in the Middle East abhor them, too. Methods such as the highly publicized killing of individual captives have, besides terrorizing ISIS's adversaries, increased the prominence of the group and probably impressed would-be foreign recruits by showing that ISIS is the meanest, baddest, and most consequential organization engaged in the conflicts in Iraq and Syria. But living under the rule of such a vicious group can be at least as repulsive to the locals as watching it from afar is to us. Such a way of exercising power locally is ultimately not a good way to win support. We saw a similar reaction in an earlier phase of the Iraqi civil war.

It behooves us to learn what we can, as those charged with directly confronting ISIS evidently are trying to do, about the basis for whatever appeal the group does have, and especially about any appealing ideas it offers. The good news is that ISIS offers hardly anything in the way of such ideas. It cannot become an ideological lodestar the way Osama bin Laden and his al-Qa'ida did, because ISIS offers nothing as original as Bin Laden's idea of hitting the far enemy as a way of getting eventually at despised near enemies. The appeal of ISIS to its recruits has been based not on ideology but on directly and brutally establishing facts on the ground. The appeal reduces to the principle that everybody loves a winner. But ISIS has stopped winning. It is like a shark that must keep moving forward to survive, but it is not still moving forward.

The establishment by ISIS of a de facto ministate was widely seen as an accomplishment and a sign of strength, but it also is a vulnerability. If you run a state, you are expected to make the trains run on time, and you will lose popularity if you don't. ISIS is demonstrating that it lacks the ability to manage a state, and people in the areas it controls—including even Raqqa, Syria, the major city it has held the longest—are suffering from a collapse of public services. Trying to run, however unsuccessfully, the ministate also represents for the ISIS leadership a drain on attention and resources that might otherwise be used for expansion.

The proclamation of a caliphate, although it has had some value for the group in impressing and attracting foreign recruits, lacks the sanction and recognition that in the eyes of the vast majority of Muslims such a move is supposed to have. Mainstream Muslim scholars and religious authorities have avoided anything that even hints at recognition. Some fundamentalist Salifis have even likened ISIS and the moves it has made to extremist outcasts at the time of the Prophet. To the extent that the self-styled caliphate is seen more as a usurpation of Muslim aspirations than a fulfillment of them, the proclamation of a caliphate will turn out to be more of a liability than an asset.

When an adversary is hurting his own cause, generally the most effective thing to do is to stand aside and not get in the way. This is true of political debate, civil wars, and many other forms of conflict. The United States cannot get entirely out of the way of this one, insofar as it can do a few things that, tactically and on a piecemeal basis, limit the short-term harm that ISIS inflicts. But taking a longer-term and more strategic view, which recognizes how ISIS is hurting its own cause, for the United States to do less rather than trying to do more (especially more that is visible and kinetic) is apt to be the wisest course. Injecting new focal points for controversy and collateral damage, on the basis of which ISIS can make new appeals, is apt to slow the process of the group greasing the ramp of its own decline. It also is apt to make the United States more of a direct target of whatever harm the group is still able to inflict.

About the author- Paul R. Pillar is Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University and Nonresident Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution.  He is a contributing editor to The National Interest, where he writes a blog.

Original link to the article- http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/the-self-destructive-ways-isis-11940

INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY REIMAGINED – ANALYSIS ( Source- The Eurasia Review, Author- Neelam Deo)

Image credits- Flickr / Narendra Modi Official ©

Source- The Eurasia Review

Author- Neelam Deo

The end of 2014 and the middle of Narendra Modi’s first year as prime minister is an opportunity to compare the style and substance of the foreign policies of his government with those of the previous dispensation. The contrast is most apparent in the energy and attention that has been invested in international relations, rather than in the direction. After all, while core national interests—such as border security and development—endure, the manner of pursuing them can indeed change.

Modi’s articulation of his vision of the country has included new elements like the “Make in India” campaign; he has also brought a greater speed and intensity to the pursuit of foreign policy objectives such as attracting foreign direct investment to promote manufacturing in India. In pursuing the goal of industrialisation, Modi has shed some of the ideological elements of “third-worldism” and non-alignment, which were the signature of the previous government.

His government’s decisive foreign engagements have already changed international perceptions. The change is most visible in India’s relationships with the U.S. and Pakistan, though the outcome of his proactive engagement with China remains ambiguous. The differences between Modi’s and the previous governments approaches to these three critical bilateral equations are discussed in the following sections:

U.S.

Although it was the UPA government that signed the India-U.S. nuclear agreement in July 2005, it remained passive about implementing the deal. The new government has so far not been able to move ahead on amending the nuclear liability legislation, but it has been outspoken about the importance of a good relationship with the U.S.

Modi has proactively intensified interactions—the best proof of which is U.S. President Barack Obama’s acceptance of the invitation to be the chief guest at the Republic Day parade in New Delhi in 2015, which will make it an unprecedented second visit to India by a serving U.S. president.

The importance explicitly placed by this government on India-U.S. ties stems from several factors such as India’s need for U.S. investment and access to its technology. Good relations with the U.S. also usually translate into good relations with its allies such as Australia, Japan and west European countries, which in turn bring strategic support and increased investments from all these countries.

Washington’s capacity to influence Islamabad is another critical factor in the India-U.S. relationship. Additionally, in India’s experience, good relations with the U.S. tend to relieve pressure from China.

China

Previous risk-averse governments were oversensitive about Chinese reactions to India’s positions on the border issue. In a clear departure, the Modi government has overtly reached out to China. The first foreign leader that Modi received was Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi. In turn, China has responded positively, as was evident in the warmth during President Xi Jinping’s India visit in September, and his calls for a solution to the contentious border issue.

Although Modi’s admiration for China’s economic growth was noticeable during the meeting with Xi, the outcome of this diplomacy with China is still ambiguous. This is because Beijing has combined offers of investment in India’s infrastructure with consistent probing on the northern border; and it continues to pressure members of SAARC to promote Chinese membership to reduce India’s influence in the grouping.

Pakistan

Modi took the initiative on Pakistan by inviting Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (and other South Asian leaders) to his swearing-in ceremony in May 2014, and later by calling off high-level talks when Pakistan high commissioner Abdul Basit’s meeting with separatists clearly disregarded a démarche from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.

Modi has also implemented a policy of strong military retaliation—rather than mere condemnation and exhortation—to provocative acts on the border, and he virtually isolated a domestically diminished Pakistan at the recent SAARC Summit. In contrast, the previous government sought to maintain a dialogue with Islamabad—often under pressure from Washington—even during times of strained bilateral relations.

Forecast for 2015

Modi’s efforts will be vindicated if investments begin to flow into India in 2015. That will depend as much on diplomacy as on internal reform, on whether industrial production can pick up, and on oil prices—which together determine India’s fiscal deficit, levels of inflation, and other economic indices.

In the past, Indian governments have all stated that alleviating poverty is a major policy objective—for which conducive international equations and a peaceful neighbourhood are necessary conditions. Modi has tried to bridge domestic and foreign policy by pushing for economic growth through industrialisation that involves FDI and foreign manufacturing in India. These, in turn, can address poverty.

After a busy international itinerary in 2014, Modi’s foreign policy will now be better executed by focusing on legislating reforms at home, such as the Goods and Services Tax and banking sector reforms, in order to propel the Indian economy towards higher growth.

 About the author-  Neelam Deo is Co-founder and Director of Gateway House. She has been the Indian Ambassador to Denmark and Ivory Coast with concurrent accreditation to several West African countries. This feature was written for Gateway House.

Original link to the article- http://www.eurasiareview.com/29122014-indias-foreign-policy-reimagined-analysis/

Africa’s Moment, Dashed Again ( Source- The National Interest, Author- Samuel Rines)

A mobile advertisement van in Uganda ( Source- Wikimedia Commons / Author- Future Atlas), Attribution- Future Maps

Source- The National Interest

Author- Samuel Rines

Booming commodity markets and plenty of foreign investment made it appear that Africa was (finally) about to have its moment.  It was to be the new growth engine emerging to take the reins as Asian economies matured. Data from the World Bank indicate that Africa’s Gross Domestic Product has risen by 77 percent this century through 2013, with some of the larger Sub-Saharan nations performing exceedingly well. In total, Sub-Saharan nations have more than doubled their GDP and a few countries have tripled it. As commodity prices marched relentlessly higher, Africa stood a chance of becoming the latest economic miracle.

But it was not meant to be. The old plagues of Dictators and Dutch Disease were only masked by the commodity boom. As China’s infrastructure investments wane and low (at least relative to recent history) oil prices settle-in, many African nations will struggle to replace their commodity revenues with something more sustainable. It is far more difficult to foster cultures of innovation and knowledge than it is to exploit minerals or low cost labor. Africa has yet to truly industrialize, nevermind create knowledge industries.

Financial pundits have been keen to write about the happenings in Russia with the dramatic decline in the ruble and a boisterous leader blaming the West. But they have largely overlooked the consequences of lower oil and a stronger dollar on one of Africa’s more politically stable and economically successful countries—Nigeria. Nigeria is Africa’s largest exporter of crude oil, which in the past has been mostly a good thing. As oil slid and the U.S. dollar steadily strengthened in recent months however, it has a become source of pain.

The naira—the Nigerian currency—is now at an all-time low to the dollar, and Central Bank has been unable to halt the slide thus far. In response, Nigerian stocks are down around 30 percent in 2014, and trading restrictions are being put in place.  Nigeria is in a particularly tight spot due to its reliance on oil for its economy—the government receives 80 percent of its revenues from oil and gas exports—but it is not alone. A strong dollar causes capital flight from the continent, and damages domestic currencies. The Fed tightening of the late 1970 and 1980s caused several African currencies to collapse, and their economies required bailouts.

Many of Africa’s internal problems are sadly familiar. Education reached only a limited segment of the population 40 years ago, and, though there are more children in school now, they do not appear to be receiving a quality education.

There is the ongoing problem of militancy on the continent, which often times ignores political boundaries. Two of the more successful nations, Nigeria and Kenya, struggle to cope with Islamic extremist groups from outside their borders. Kenya is unfortunate enough to reside below the failed Somali state, and al-Shabab can attack with little interference. Nigeria struggles to thwart Boko Haram. These threats will not dissipate quickly, and Nigeria’s government, strapped for cash, may become increasingly vulnerable.

Despite the headlines, positives exist. For instance, the Ebola outbreak appears to have been corralled, if not contained, though not quickly and certainly not without a fair number of hiccups. Sub-Saharan Africa is home to about a billion people, and while the developed world is rapidly aging and stuck with expensive social safety nets ,Africa’s people are young—more than 60 percent under the age of 25. This also poses a problem as well though. Income and wealth inequality in Africa is dramatic. As households struggle with economic instability, they must not only gain but maintain middle class status.

Granted, commodity prices may begin to rise again soon. But the recent swoon illustrates the problem that, while commodity exports are an easy path to economic growth, the reversals can be hard and fast. Eyebrows should have been raised after Ghana and Zambia called for an International Monetary Fund bailout earlier this year, but few seemed to notice. China made a significant number of investments in African resources.  As China scales back its infrastructure investment however, it will be more difficult for African countries to convince Chinese leaders to continue investing.

The Fed, in essence, may have spoiled the 1970’s version of the African moment. Now the continent faces not only a stronger U.S. dollar as global monetary policies diverge, but a total collapse in energy prices. The African moment appears to have passed the continent by, again.

About the author- Samuel Rines is an economist with Chilton Capital Management in Houston, TX. Follow him on Twitter @samuelrines.

Original link to the article- http://nationalinterest.org/feature/africa%E2%80%99s-moment-dashed-again-11924

Who Should Worry About Pakistan’s School Carnage? ( Source- The Diplomat, Author- Malik Siraj Akbar)

Taliban man beating beating women ( Source- Wikimedia Commons/ Author- RAWA)

Source- The Diplomat

Author- Malik Siraj Akbar

Pakistan has a unique relationship with terrorism: It is safe ground for terrorist training and offensives, it is a regular victim of terrorism, and, at the same time, it is a state that is perceived as an apologist and a justifier of terrorism. Pakistan’s complicated struggle with jihadists is no clearer than now in the aftermath of the Taliban school massacre in Peshawar that killed more than 130 children.

It is not the right time, some may argue, to point fingers at the Pakistani army and intelligence agencies, which for years have had connections with and even supported the same jihadist elements that carried out the attack. After all, most of the children who were killed in the Peshawar attack by the Taliban were presumably from military families. Some would insist that tragedies like this one should convince the world that the Pakistani army is paying a heavy price for its engagement in an operation against the Taliban – a Taliban spokesman confirmed that the attack was meant to avenge an ongoing operation against them in the country’s tribal regions bordering Afghanistan.

The core problem with the army’s commitment to the fight against the Taliban is that not everyone in the ranks of the armed forces is fully convinced that this is Pakistan’s war. The soldiers are not fully motivated to fight this war because they believe that their bosses are killing “fellow Muslim brothers” on the instructions of the Americans, while the real decision-makers in the army and the intelligence agencies believe that absolute abandonment of the jihadist ideology may lead to catastrophic consequences for Pakistan’s long-term interests in Afghanistan and the disputed territory of Kashmir.

In other words, the Pakistani military strategists refuse to concede that they have lost control over the jihadists. Meanwhile, the architects of the pro-jihad policy suffer from an overconfidence syndrome and mistakenly believe that they are still fully capable of shutting down the jihadist franchise whenever they wish to do so. If that is true, then, according to the army’s standards, the Peshawar attack is not the worst that could happen.

Tragedies like the Peshawar school massacre need explanation but they do not get clear answers because their aftermath is heavily dominated by emotions. But a grand tragedy as big as the Peshawar carnage does provide the Pakistani government with a unique opportunity for self-reflection. Seen from past experience, such as the high profile shooting of the pro-education teenage campaigner Malala Yousafzai by the Taliban, the Pakistanis have missed opportunity after opportunity.

Not only are there too many distractions that always deflect attention from an earnest national debate about sincerely fighting the Taliban, there are powerful pressure groups, such as the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, a right-wing party led by former cricketer Imran Khan. People like Khan, an ardent supporter of Pakistan’s negotiations with the Taliban, are highly influential in confusing the Pakistani masses, especially young people, about whether the Taliban deserve political accommodation or whether they should be eliminated. Khan and his supporters might be correct that military operations cannot solely resolve the Taliban challenge. However, Khan’s rise has taken Pakistan’s Taliban challenge to a more advanced or possibly even irreversible level where, for the first time, the Taliban have strong political supporters and defendants in mainstream politics.

The war on terror and the continued Taliban slaughter of Pakistani citizens have given birth to an educated yet highly nationalistic and confrontational youth. While they do not endorse the senseless Taliban killings of innocent citizens, they are also weary of the Western media’s reporting of these incidents. These young Pakistanis are highly agitated about their country’s depiction in foreign media outlets. I often attend events where Pakistani exchange students and visitors speak to American audiences. There is a unanimous plea in their presentations: We are not terrorists. I empathize with them but I also strongly believe Pakistanis should have brutally honest conversations about the role of Islam and Islamic religious schools in promoting these violent ideologies. Pakistan truly has a problem with Islam and it needs to be addressed.

Islamic scholars like Reza Aslan consistently argue that Islam is too diverse a religion and it is unfair to blame all Muslims for the actions of some terrorists who happen to be Muslim. If one is to agree with Aslan’s point that Islam is too diverse then we should also agree that there is something wrong with the Islam of Pakistan, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia. The Muslims in these countries will only inflict more pain and loss on their people if they do not start a debate about the role of Islam in their societies and how it serves as an umbrella to protect all kinds of criminal activities.

After all, in countries like Pakistan, there is a widespread support base for jihadists in the name of Islam. They are allowed to publicly collect charity for their operations and have a sophisticated infrastructure to train new recruits.

Last month, Syed Munawar Hassan, the former head of Pakistan’s largest Islamic party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, publicly called for “armed fighting for the sake of Allah.” Strangely, Pakistan has taken no action against such brazen promoters of violence among the general public. Some of the worst jihadist and sectarian demagogues, including Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, the head of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, which carried out the deadly terrorist attack on a Mumbai hotel, easily find airtime on the country’s top news channels.

With so much tolerance and immunity offered to hate-speech makers and inciters of violence within Pakistan’s political, social, and media circles, there is barely anything the international community can do while Pakistan fights the worst battle it has faced since its inception in 1947. There are no external solutions to end religious extremism. It is a battle the Pakistani government and the people have to own, fight, and win.

The Peshawar school attack makes clear that Islamabad not neither defeated the Taliban, nor are they going anywhere in the foreseeable future. The world, particularly Pakistan’s neighbors, should watch to see how Pakistan responds to the attack. Pakistan’s inaction or failure to fight radical Islam should genuinely worry Afghanistan, India, China and Iran – all neighbors of Pakistan who are dealing with Islamist movements of varying degrees.

Malik Siraj Akbar is an Edward Mason Fellow at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. Twitter: @MalikSirajAkbar

Original link to the article- http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/who-should-worry-about-pakistans-school-carnage/

Is the Peshawar Attack a “Game Changer”? (Source- The International Policy Digest, Author- Saira Banu)

Image credits- Wikimedia Commons/ Author- Open Street Maps

Source- The International Policy Digest

Author- Saira Banu

On December 16, 2014, Pakistan witnessed the worst terrorist attack in its history in which innocent children were brutally targeted. Seven Pakistani Taliban militants stormed the Army Public School in Peshawar and killed 132 children and 9 staffers.

The banned Pakistani Taliban terrorist organization, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), immediately claimed responsibility for the attack and called it revenge for Operation Zarb-e-Azab – the Pakistan’s Army offensive in North Waziristan that started in June of 2014. TTP spokesman, Muhammad Umar Khorasani, said, “The army targets our families. We want them to feel our pain.”

Following the attack, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced that there will be no distinction between good and bad Taliban and the government described the attack as a “game changer.”

Army Chief General Raheel Sharif visited Afghanistan and demanded Kabul hand over Maulana Fazullah, the TTP chief, who is believed to be hiding in the border areas between the two countries. Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to enhance their military and intelligence cooperation against terrorist elements. However, there are unconfirmed reports that the Pakistan Air Force killed Maulana Fazullah on December 20.

Pakistan has a history of using militants as proxy worriers in its struggle against India in Kashmir. During the Cold War, backed by the US and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan created a vast structure of religious schools “madrassas” to train Mujahideen fighters against the Soviets in Afghanistan. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States abandoned Pakistan to deal with the mess.

In the 1990’s Pakistan turned these Mujahideen fighters against India in Kashmir and also supported the Afghan Taliban to gain control of Kabul. Pakistan wanted to have a friendly government in Kabul that would support Pakistan and stay neutral in its conflict with India.

After 9/11, Pakistan decided to support the United States against the Taliban and al Qaeda, which turned the Taliban against Pakistan. Until the attack on the school, Pakistan had distinguished between “good” and “bad” Taliban, in which “good” Taliban fight only against India and Afghanistan while “bad” Taliban attack within Pakistan and want to replace the Pakistani government with an Islamic regime to implement Sharia law.

The TTP was formed in 2007 and operates along the Pak-Afghan border. Despite American pressure Pakistan was reluctant to take action against the TTP. In a recent interview, the former Director General of the ISPR said that in 2010 a decision was taken to launch an operation against the TTP. However, former Army Chief Ashfaq Pervez Kayani balked because he believed that it was not possible to secure a friendly Afghanistan without the help of the TTP after the US withdrawal.

In June 2014, the TTP managed to pull off deadly attack on the Karachi airport, which left 28 dead, including 10 militants. Their plan was to hijack planes and destroy government installations but security forces killed the attackers before they were able to implement their plan. After the attack Army Chief Raheel Sharif decided to initiate Operation Zarb-e-Azab against the TTP in North Waziristan. The TTP leadership fled to the Kunar and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan.

The post-Peshawar attack scenario shows some positive signs, including an agreement with Kabul to enhance cooperation but it still does not show any paradigm shift vis-à-vis India. Despite the fact that the TTP claimed responsibility for the attack, Hafiz Saeed (allegedly involved in the 2008 Mumbai attack), Hamid Gul (instrumental in creating the Taliban during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan), and Pervez Musharraf, blamed India for the attack.

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, despite his anti-Pakistan and hardliner reputation, strongly condemned the attack and he appealed to all schools in India to observe two-minutes of silence “as a mark of solidarity.” Two days after the attack, Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi, the leader Lashkar-e-Taiba and one of the masterminds of Mumbai attacks in 2008, was granted bail citing a lack of evidence. After India’s protest, Islamabad detained Lakhvi for another three months under the Maintenance of Public Order Act. As India currently stands with Pakistan, this move erodes their confidence in Pakistan and raises suspicion.

The brutality of the Peshawar attack should prompt Pakistan to rethink its preoccupation with India. India does not constitute a daily threat to Pakistan, but extremist groups do. Pakistan’s policy to tolerate extremist groups that have an anti-India agenda is not sustainable. All terrorist and extremist organizations are interlinked ideologically and there is a flow of manpower between them. There is a need to crack down on these groups and dismantle the ideological and material infrastructure of Jihad.

As India and Afghanistan mourn with Pakistan in the wake of the school attack, it is time to cooperate and collectively eradicate the cancer of terrorism from the region. Pakistan’s army offensive operation to eliminate the TTP is a positive step but it should not tolerate other extremist elements. Pakistan should avail itself of this opportunity to work with India and Afghanistan to form a collective front against all types of extremism. The horrors of this recent attack should be enough to shake the collective conscience of the political and military forces to rethink Pakistan’s security policy along the lines of eradicating extremism and poverty with education and economic development.

About the author- Saira Bano is a PhD candidate in the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies (CMSS) at the University of Calgary, Canada.

Original link to the article- http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2014/12/25/peshawar-attack-game-changer/

INDIA AND ESCAP JOIN FORCES TO STRENGTHEN EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS FOR NATURAL DISASTERS ( Source- The Eurasia review)

Aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami at Aceh, Indonesia ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons/ Author- AusAid)

Source- The Eurasia Review

The Government of India and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) announced Friday a major new contribution of US$ 1 million to the ESCAP Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Tsunami, Disaster and Climate Preparedness in Indian Ocean and Southeast Asian Countries.

The Asia-Pacific region remains highly vulnerable to coastal hazards such as tsunamis, tropical storms and storm surges. The contribution from the Government of India will boost ESCAP’s efforts to strengthen early warning systems through regional and South-South cooperation, to ensure that vulnerable communities receive the timely warning information that is required to save lives and livelihoods in disasters.

“ESCAP is extremely pleased to partner with the Government of India to further strengthen regional early warning systems and build resilience to natural disasters,” said Dr. Shamshad Akhtar, United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of ESCAP. “The Trust Fund has a strong record in promoting innovative solutions based on a regional approach, and the contribution from the Government of India will give these efforts a major boost.”

The contribution to the Trust Fund is part of a series of steps taken by the Government of India to support regional early warning systems. India is a Regional Service Provider for the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System (IOTWS), which became operational in 2011, and also an active member of the ESCAP/World Meteorological Organization Panel on Tropical Cyclones.

H.E. Mrs. Sushma Swaraj, Minister of External Affairs and Overseas Indian Affairs, India said, “India joins the international community in its efforts to prepare for any such natural calamity in the future by establishing effective early warning systems.”

H.E. Mr. Harsh Vardhan Shringla, Ambassador of India to the Kingdom of Thailand and Permanent Representative to ESCAP added, “The Indian Ocean Tsunami was devastating in its impact on coastal communities in several countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Despite suffering large casualties, India was one of the first countries to extend assistance in Search and Rescue and rehabilitation of the victims of the Tsunami in countries in its neighbourhood. Since then, India has made great strides to strengthen its multi-hazard early warning system and has extended this facility to cover the region. On the tenth anniversary of the Indian Ocean Tsunami, the Government of India has announced the contribution of USD $1 million to the Tsunami Trust Fund of UNESCAP to further strengthen the process of building resilience to natural disasters in the Asia-Pacific region.”

Created in 2005 following the devastation caused by the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the Trust Fund supports activities that build resilience through strengthened early warning systems for coastal hazards. It has made important contributions to the establishment of effective regional mechanisms such as the IOTWS and the Regional Integrated Multi-Hazard Early Warning System for Africa and Asia (RIMES) as well as to the strengthening of warning systems at the national and local levels.

Original link to the article- http://www.eurasiareview.com/27122014-india-escap-join-forces-strengthen-early-warning-systems-natural-disasters/

ASYMMETRY IS STRATEGY, STRATEGY IS ASYMMETRY – ANALYSIS ( Source- The Eurasia Review, Author- Lukas Milevski)

Special Forces ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons/ United States Army)

Source- The Eurasia Review

Author- Lukas Milevski

Much of the strategic studies literature of the past two decades identifies profound novelty in the conduct and challenges of modern war, novelty that ultimately calls into question the nature and even existence of war. War has allegedly now been transformed from a regular, conventional, purportedly symmetric exercise into an irregular, unconventional, asymmetric event, which must be understood anew.

Of all the new descriptors for war, “asymmetric” is among the broadest. It has even been suggested that asymmetry does not bear definition: “to define the term defies its very meaning, purpose, and significance.”1 Some, undeterred by such extreme pronouncements, have attempted at least to categorize various existing and potential concepts of asymmetry. Thus, Jan Angstrom has identified four different prisms through which asymmetry may be interpreted: “power distribution, organisational status of the actor, method of warfare, and norms.”2 Yet despite claims of newness, it has also been observed that asymmetry has infused nearly every, if not every, war in recorded history. (Possibly only the hoplite phalanxes of ancient Greece could be considered properly symmetrical in nearly all respects, for geography, demographics, and so forth make all polities fundamentally asymmetrical to some degree.) Misunderstanding asymmetry poses significant dangers: “our misuse of the terms asymmetry and asymmetric distorts those vital processes and leads us to make major strategic blunders. For example, by focusing on threats rather than enemy strategies we fail to understand their strategic nature, goals, and overall concepts of operations.”3

The question thus arises: how may one fruitfully discuss asymmetry as a separate phenomenon? Perhaps the time has come to abandon the endeavor as unhelpful and rather suggest that asymmetry in war, and even asymmetric strategy, are redundancies. Asymmetry is strategy, and strategy is asymmetry. This article argues the point in three parts. First, it suggests that observations of a novel change are overexaggerated. Second, it maintains that no matter the form war may take, the function of strategy is eternal. Third, it proposes that contemporary asymmetric conflicts are all comprehensible through the lens of strategy.

Form over Substance

Theorists of contemporary conflict, whether describing asymmetric or unconventional wars, war among the people, or other iterations of modern armed conflict, usually posit significant change in the character, if not actual nature, of war. Many of them accurately identify and analyze the characteristics of modern interventions. In perceiving significant differences between modern war and wars past, however, they caricature historical conflict.

Thus, Rupert Smith argues that “war as cognitively known to most non-combatants, war as battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs: such war no longer exists.”4 Martin van Creveld propounds the notion that “the demise of conventional war will cause strategy in its traditional, Clausewitzian sense to disappear.”5 Fourth-generation warfare theorists such as T.X. Hammes identify generations of warfare with particular styles of conducting war; third-generation warfare is, for example, maneuver warfare, and fourth-generation warfare “uses all available networks—political, economic, social, and military—to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency.”6

Yet their theories on the changes in war depend upon caricaturing what came before. They have succeeded somewhat in part because many centers of strategic education similarly caricature historical war. These caricatures rely on a Eurocentric perspective of strategic history. Smith’s war as a battle in a field between men and machinery and Hammes’s third-generation warfare as maneuver warfare, for example, both rely on the World Wars, especially World War II. These wars were fought among European or Western polities, all of which have similar strategic cultures. Yet modern interventions primarily take place between Western powers and polities elsewhere in the world, with significant differences in strategic culture. Theorists of change in war are comparing apples with oranges and perceiving change based on such flawed comparisons, which serve only to churn various fashions in strategic thought.

To analyze interventions, comparisons to the Third Afghan War of 1919 or the Rif War of 1919–1926 would much more accurately demonstrate how much war has actually changed. Similarly, conventional war must be compared to conventional war. Notably, Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia did not trigger a Georgian insurgency against the Russians, or even against the Abkhazians or South Ossetians. The war remained conventional throughout. The Iraq War of 2003 did transform into an insurgency, but not immediately. The period of a few months between the end of conventional operations and the serious beginning of the insurgency was terribly squandered by the United States, which visibly failed to begin righting the country. Although it would be incorrect to say that this great strategic and political failure caused the insurgency, it certainly exacerbated it.

Hew Strachan has suggested that “the real problem may well be that our policy has failed to recognise war’s true nature, and so has mistaken changing characteristics for something more fundamental than they actually are.”7 This mischaracterization is frequently manifested in the belief, as apparent before Iraq in 2003 and during some of the advocacy for intervention in Syria in 2013, that war is not adversarial, that enemies do not reciprocally interact with, and against, each other. The character of any war is not unilaterally set by any one implicated polity, but by the reciprocal hostility of all those involved. Thus, in not accounting for the enemy’s own initiative against us, the Western powers are blindsided by actions that are then interpreted as integral to the structure of contemporary war rather than as the consequence of something inherent in war, which is more fundamental and eternal.

Asymmetry and Strategy

That which is eternal is strategy, the purposeful threat or use of violence to achieve desired ends. Strategy has no permanent form, although it always retains its enduring substance and function. Strategy has always been practiced, even though before the word’s rediscovery in the 1770s, strategies explicitly labeled as such may not have been expressly planned or implemented.8 The core task of strategy may be identified as Everett Dolman does: “strategy, in its simplest form, is a plan for attaining continuing advantage.”9 Dolman rightly observes that the strategist’s task is usually aided more by advantage than disadvantage. “Advantage,” like strategy, is not defined by a particular form. Advantage may take the form of materiel, political will, a superior grasp of how to translate forces deployed into aims achieved, or so on. Understanding war and all the influences on it is necessarily multidisciplinary; therefore, asymmetry may manifest itself in a similarly wide range.

Strategy may be thus cast in a more absolute manner than merely the achievement of continuing advantage. Rather, strategy may be interpreted as the generation and exploitation of asymmetry for the purposes of the war. Roger Barnett complains that:

asymmetries arise if opponents enjoy greater freedom of action, or if they have weapons or techniques available to them that one does not. Perpetrators seek to void the strengths of their adversaries and to be unpredictable. They endeavor to take advantage of an ability to follow certain courses of action or to employ methods that can be neither anticipated nor countered effectively.10

Yet this is the very essence of strategy. Strategy is an adversarial act; the enemy also has a will, a capability, and a vote in the outcome. This reciprocal nature of strategy is a primary source of strategy’s nonlinearity, for defeat may beget renewed defiance and alternative attempts to achieve one’s goals, rather than the desired submission. Thus, Edward Luttwak, for instance, identifies the very pinnacle of strategic performance as “the suspension, if only brief, if only partial, of the entire predicament of strategy.”11 The predicament of strategy is the enemy. The pinnacle, therefore, is the removal of the enemy’s ability, however temporarily, to influence outcomes. Suffering from a position of weakness in an asymmetric relationship restricts one’s abilities to influence outcomes based on that relationship. To generate asymmetry effectively is to be, although not necessarily the only way to be, a skilled strategist.

The generation of asymmetry is the basis of much, if not most, strategic theory, particularly power-specific theories such as those pertaining to seapower or airpower. Command of the sea or of the air cannot mean anything other than the generation of a major operational asymmetry in either of those warfighting domains relative to the enemy. Similarly, the very idea of massing and applying one’s forces against the decisive point, a theme in both Antoine-Henri Jomini’s and Carl von Clausewitz’s works, is to generate asymmetry in a particular location, to achieve the desired wider effects. The debates about the revolution in military affairs and transformation are also ultimately about generating significant asymmetry, albeit in the form of a particular silver bullet. Cold War nuclear strategy was similarly meant to establish asymmetries of commitment, even when theorists might not be able to make operational sense of asymmetries of capability, particularly in the theories of Thomas Schelling. The strategic theories of Basil Liddell Hart were so steeped in the generation of asymmetry that it apparently affected his understanding of the moral component of strategy. He focused relentlessly on the indirect approach to create situations in which the enemy would be utterly helpless, therefore hopeless, and so would surrender without undue bloodshed, thereby removing killing from the concept of morality in strategy. Instead, “strategy is the very opposite of morality, as it is largely concerned with the art of deception,” in reality not because killing had no place in morality, but because killing had no place in his idea of good strategy.12

Asymmetry is thus clearly compatible with conventional warfare, simply because it is good strategy. During World War II, the conventional war par excellence, the Allies ultimately established major asymmetries in military-industrial production and logistics, on the sea, and in the air over all the Axis countries. World War I was a bloody stalemate on the Western Front for so long in large part because until 1918 neither side was able to generate the asymmetries required to break it. The belligerents who generated the most important asymmetries ultimately won. Not all asymmetries are equal; some may be more immediate than others, some may be ultimately more damaging to one’s ability to achieve desired goals than others, and so on. Effective asymmetry, like effective strategy, is context-sensitive.

Asymmetry is strategy, strategy is asymmetry. Conrad Crane of the U.S. Army War College is reputed to have suggested that “there are two types of warfare: asymmetric and stupid.”13 Generating effective asymmetry is good strategy. To condemn rhetorically our opponents for generating asymmetry reveals our conditioning born of understanding recent history through the prism of wishful thinking, of expecting one’s enemies to be poor strategists such as those faced in 1990–1991, 2001, and 2003. Wishful thinking, operationalized as unrealistically optimistic assumptions, does not usually lead to strategic success, as our experience of the variably labeled “war on terror” or “Long War” clearly indicates.

One might counter that conventional asymmetries on land, sea, and air are far more easily understood than unconventional asymmetries such as guerrilla warfare. This may indeed be the case, but so what? One may understand a threat and still be incapable of countering it. German General Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin, who had participated in the Italian campaign of 1943–1945, once likened operating under Allied air supremacy to playing chess against an opponent who could play three pieces each turn to his one. No amount of understanding of the threat can help alleviate a situation if that understanding cannot be turned into operational plans and successful outcomes. This is just as true of conventional asymmetries as of unconventional ones. In fact, conventional asymmetries are usually the more dangerous of the two for their ultimate political effects are usually greater, as the experience of warlords from Darius III to Napoleon to Adolf Hitler may attest. Each lost his empire to enemies who were ultimately more capable of generating effective asymmetry. Relatively few unconventional asymmetries have had the historical effect equivalent to losing an empire. One of the few pertinent, albeit inexact, examples is the American Revolutionary War, but even that war was “hybrid” rather than purely unconventional.14

Strategy in Contemporary War

Asymmetry today is most commonly associated with insurgency and irregular foes. Contemporary theories on strategies for counterinsurgency also implicitly emphasize the generation of effective asymmetry against the so-called asymmetric enemy. Unlike the generation of conventional asymmetries, many of which tend to be domain-oriented, contemporary counterinsurgency theory emphasizes asymmetry from the perspective of the population’s support, through the provision of security and other services, including effective governance. David Galula is frequently identified as the progenitor of this theory. It is nevertheless significant that his proposed strategic blueprint for counterinsurgency only begins with the destruction or expulsion of insurgents as an organized body and ends, after the organization of local communities into effective and self-sustaining political entities, with the destruction of the last of the insurgents.15

Force does not lack utility against a foe that is generating unconventional asymmetry. Indeed, the very form of that asymmetry reveals a significant concern about one’s own conventional military superiority over the insurgent. Unconventional asymmetry is guerrilla warfare, arising from military weakness and infused with concern for the survival of the insurgent force. Without that force, the insurgency is likely to fail. Galula noted that “in any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause.”16 A neutral majority will acquiesce to whichever party appears most likely to succeed. One of the most publicly visible features of such a measurement is the apparent effectiveness of the respective armed forces. The truism that the counterinsurgent loses if he does not win, but the insurgent wins if he does not lose, is indicative of this. Once the counterinsurgent, superior in strength, fails to win and so withdraws from the conflict, the only remaining viable power in the country will be the insurgent force. This truism is, of course, true only in the context of intervention because the counterinsurgent ultimately must leave; it is not an iron law of insurgency as such, as the example of Sri Lanka may attest.

This observation is not new to contemporary war. C.E. Callwell, one of the major luminaries of historical British strategic thought on small wars, offered an explanation at the end of the 19th century: “It is a singular feature of small wars that from the point of view of strategy the regular forces are upon the whole at a distinct disadvantage as compared to their antagonists.” In battle, however, regular troops have the tactical advantage: “Since tactics favour the regular troops while strategy favours the enemy, the object to be sought for clearly is to fight, not to manoeuvre, to meet the hostile forces in open battle, not to compel them to give way by having recourse to strategy.”17 The imbalance of military power between intervener and insurgent was, and remains, the basis for the guerrilla’s choice of strategy.

It is noteworthy in this context that, of the four great theorists of insurgent warfare, T.E. Lawrence, Mao Zedong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Ernesto “Che” Guevara, only Lawrence did not theorize the eventual transition from guerrilla to relatively, if not absolutely, conventional warfare for the final campaigns definitively to seize power from the government forces. Lawrence, of course, fought as part of a larger conventional operation commanded by General Edmund Allenby and so had no need to turn his fighters into a conventional force. This is not to argue that members of the Taliban are running around the Hindu Kush with Mao’s little red book in their pockets, but rather that these authors identified the limits of guerrilla warfare. Thus, not even insurgency may violate the fundamental truth which J.C. Wylie observed: “the ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with the gun. This man is the final power in war. He is control. He determines who wins.”18

The enemy relies upon unconventional asymmetry if he believes himself unable to succeed without it. The Taliban in Helmand Province only turned back to tried-and-tested guerrilla tactics after suffering disastrous casualties in futile frontal assaults on British bases. This adaptation coincided with the loss of widespread local support, as “the cost of aligning themselves with the Taliban turned out to be very high for many communities in terms of destruction and loss of life,” as well as with consequent Taliban attempts to regain some local legitimacy and support.19 The generation of asymmetry through guerrilla tactics has both advantages and disadvantages, which must be examined with respect to the function of strategy, that is, the conversion of violence into desired political effect for both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent.

The basis of strategy is war, the purpose of which “is some measure of control over the enemy.” Control is a rarely defined term whose limits are quite broad, being “neither so extreme as to amount to extermination . . . nor . . . so tenuous as to foster the continued behavior of the enemy as a hazard to the victory.”20 The pattern of events in war is driven by the reciprocal interaction of adversaries, “a contest for freedom of action.”21 Since control pertains to freedom of action, one might identify three different categories of control. The weakest form of control is merely the denial of control, or preventing the enemy from unduly restricting one’s own freedom of action. Once a belligerent is relatively strong enough, he may attempt to take control and threaten actively to limit his opponent’s freedom of action. The final type of control is its exercise after having taken it, to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion. Much of strategic theory assumes that a belligerent without freedom of action or the ability to pursue his political goals will ultimately abandon his endeavor.

Unconventional asymmetry is capable only of denying control to the superior enemy. Despite being the weakest form of control, it remains potent. A strategy based upon the accumulated effect of minor actions and continued elusiveness to deny control of the operational pattern of the war presents significant difficulties for the opposing side. Presenting no single set of targets and acting against and among civilians across geographies larger than their opponents may completely secure provide the counterinsurgent with a wide array of potential choices, whose strategic worth may be estimated but hardly known. Thus, Harry Summers caustically noted that during the Vietnam War, the United States identified up to 22 different wartime objectives.22 This plethora of choice encourages unproductive or even counterproductive actions and contradicting policy goals on the part of the conventionally superior force. For instance, in Afghanistan, U.S. policies simultaneously require the local warlords to be liquidated for purposes of state-building and to be preserved to fight the Taliban.23Unconventional asymmetry targets the stronger foe’s strategy rather than the enemy himself. The counterinsurgent, if unable to bring force or other tools effectively to bear to weaken the insurgency, merely marks time with blood. Time is a precious commodity in strategy and must be used wisely, but the substantial intellectual challenge facing the counterinsurgent places significant obstacles on the path of so doing.

Despite its deleterious effects on the stronger opponent’s strategic performance, unconventional asymmetry is a serious strategic gamble. Although it denies control to the enemy, the insurgents themselves also do not gain control over the pattern of the war. Both sides tend to have the maximum freedom of action possible in an otherwise reciprocally adversarial context. The Viet Cong might skulk into Saigon to plant explosives, but the Marines could hold Khe Sanh, within spitting distance of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which was absolutely vital to the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese army in South Vietnam. In such a situation, barring any dramatic changes, rarely is there a clear indication of who holds the advantage until the conflict itself actually ends.

Strategy poses a difficult challenge due to the nonlinearities involved, many of which stem from the active presence of an independently acting adversary. Yet on the sliding scale of difficulty, the generation of asymmetry through guerrilla warfare may almost be a leap of faith. Although the skilled guerrilla retains initiative in being able to choose his own battlefields, the power of decision is preserved for his foe. The denier of control has no direct influence on the perception of his efforts in the opposing headquarters; he cannot impose a victory, but can only wait until his opponent acquiesces to defeat. Although today insurgents are able to fight figuratively in the media as well as literally on the ground, the pressure of public opinion seems to count for less in wartime than in peacetime because of the other pressures war generates: “The declaration of war, and more immediately the use of violence, alters everything. From that point on, the demands of war tend to shape policy, more than the direction of policy shapes war.”24

The generation of asymmetry through use of guerrilla tactics may be a strategy that Western powers find difficult to defeat, despite more than a decade of constant experience with attempting to combat it. It is nevertheless fundamentally the same phenomenon as generating asymmetry through commanding the sea or the air and may be understood with the same basic toolbox of strategic concepts. British mastery of the seas largely bewildered French attempts to defeat it for over a century and resulted in the French development of a number of methods by which to strike at British command of the sea without directly challenging it, including the guerre de course and the later jeune école, which was obsessed with the potential of torpedo boats. Today the roles are reversed, for the weaker belligerent has bewildered the Western powers and left them scrambling to determine how to combat the threat.

Many time-tested methods of defeating guerrillas directly are unacceptable to liberal powers today. As David Kilcullen puts it, “Indeed, any given state’s approach to counterinsurgency depends on the nature of the state, and the concept of ‘counterinsurgency’ can mean entirely different things depending on the character of the government involved.”25 These methods may also be inappropriate for the specific conditions in which Western powers find themselves. Treating counterinsurgency as social work is more amenable to Western sensitivities than treating it as war. Although counterinsurgency definitely is the latter, it may well be both. Violence remains the base coinage of strategy, but this does not rule out the utility of counterfeits or other instruments of political power. One must remember that these tools are merely used as replacements for violence in specific circumstances where they may effectively take the place of force. War is war, but war is also politics. The other instruments of political power do not lose relevance once violence begins, but their utility is tempered by the introduction of force.

Moreover, it may be possible that today, compared to all prior historical experience, it is easiest for liberal powers to track and target insurgents. This is due to a number of factors, including the widespread use of new communications and other technologies, and new techniques to use this technology.26 Taking the fight directly to the insurgents has become a plausible option for liberal democracies in a way that would not have previously been allowed, with massive cordons and conscription of locals to serve in temporary militias. With an increasing ability to strike desirable insurgent targets directly and relatively precisely comes an opportunity, in theory but also necessarily tempered by the actual circumstances of practice, to render relatively ineffective the generation of asymmetry through guerrilla tactics. The particular character of specific asymmetries does not change the fact that they all may be comprehended through the lens of strategy.

Conclusion

Rupert Smith is skeptical of the idea of asymmetric warfare. He rightly indicates that “the practice of war, indeed its ‘art,’ is to achieve an asymmetry over the opponent. Labeling wars as asymmetric is to me something of a euphemism to avoid acknowledging that my opponent is not playing to my strengths and I am not winning.”27 Smith’s euphemism implies that the opponent is practicing strategy better than the Western powers are; since the practice of strategy determines how any particular polity engages in warfare, the implications of poor strategic practice are grave.

Asymmetry as now commonly used—to denote a supposedly particular new type of war—is not a useful term and, for some, implies strategic ethnocentric hubris that “assumes there is only one truth and model for warfare, and that we alone have it.”28 In fact, today and historically, most strategies seek to generate asymmetry as a way of minimizing the enemy’s vote on the character and outcome of the war. Lawrence Freedman once defined strategy as “the art of creating power.”29 Given that power is a necessarily relational quality—for one cannot have power in the absence of an entity on or against which it may be exercised—the generation of asymmetry is the restriction and minimization of the enemy’s effective power vis-à-vis oneself and the multiplication and maximization of one’s own against that adversary.

Labeling only a certain segment of strategies as asymmetric risks obscuring the enormous real asymmetric advantages liberal democracies have over those insurgents who purportedly employ the asymmetric strategies. This practice threatens conceptually to detach asymmetric warfare from war and strategy by treating it as something else, and in doing so it contributes toward preventing the Western powers from fully and effectively employing force against weaker challengers, as the popularity of asymmetry in strategic literature is a self-reinforcing symptom of our diluted grasp on strategy. Asymmetry will ever remain strategy, and strategy will ever remain asymmetry.

About the author:

*Lukas Milevski is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Graduate Institute of Political and International Studies at the University of Reading, United Kingdom.

Source:

This article was originally published in the Joint Force Quarterly 75, which is published by the National Defense University.

Original link to the article- http://www.eurasiareview.com/27122014-asymmetry-strategy-strategy-asymmetry-analysis/