PAKISTAN CANNOT SUCCEED IN NEFARIOUS DESIGNS ON KASHMIR (SOURCE- EURASIA REVIEW / AUTHOR- BRIG ANIL GUPTA (RETD) )

Image source- Wikimedia Commons / Credits- Sauood 007

Source- Eurasia Review

Author- Brig Anil Gupta (Retd)

The recent twin terror attacks at Kathua and Samba have evoked strong public outrage against Pakistan — both its army and civilian establishment. The legislative assembly of Jammu and Kashmir currently in session has also passed a unanimous resolution condemning the unfriendly neighbouring country. Unhappy with the formation of an alliance government in partnership with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Pakistan is hell bent upon fomenting trouble in the state.

Apart from spreading terror, the aim of these twin attacks appears to be to foment communal tension and hit Jammu’s economy. Hence, the time chosen for the terror attacks coincided with the Navratra festival that is not only celebrated with great devotion by the locals but also attract large number of pilgrims from the rest of the country to the holy shrine of Vaishno Devi. It is to the credit of the people of Jammu that they have not fallen prey to the nefarious designs of the enemy. Pakistan must realise that Indians are resilient and won’t be provoked by such cowardly acts which in fact make their resolve to fight terror even stronger.

Pakistan continues to use terror as an instrument of state policy to further its so called “national interests”. Despite having been militarily defeated and diplomatically snubbed it continues to be obsessed with the idea of Kashmir being its “umbilical cord”. Having realised that it cannot defeat India militarily it has adopted the policy of “thousand cuts” to keep India bleeding. It continues to classify the terrorists in Pakistan as “good” and “bad” terrorists. All those terrorist organisations that carry out terror attacks against India are termed “good” and their leaders enjoy the patronage of the government despite being declared as proclaimed international terrorists by the United Nations, USA and many Western countries.

The likes of Hafiz Sayeed, Zaki ur Rehman Lakhvi, Dawood Ibrahim etc. are termed as “strategic assets” by the Pakistan Army, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the establishment. No international rules, restrictions or bans apply to them because they are key players in the plan to bleed India. Thus, Pakistan’s double talk on terror continues unabated. The recent twin terror attacks thus need to be viewed in this light.

Of late, Pakistan has preferred the International Border (IB) sector over the Line of Control (LoC) sector for carrying out infiltration for terror attacks. There are many reasons for this, of which weather is one such reason but very minor. The major reason is the proximity of NH 1 to the IB which runs at a distance of 5-15 km from the border. NH 1 provides a target of strategic importance within striking distance that can draw immediate media attention. ‘Striking Distance’ being the distance within which they have the capability to carry out a one-night operation ,i.e. infiltrate and strike on the same night thus reducing the chances of being intercepted after crossing the border. The terrain in this sector in the form of broken ground and numerous nullahs (running east-west) also assists infiltration. A number of brick kilns and mobile towers along the NH 1 provide good navigational land marks at night. There are many lucrative targets both military and civilian available within the striking distance as compared to the LoC sector.

Another important factor is the density of troop deployment. The density is much less as compared to the LoC sector, which apart from having a strong anti-infiltration deployment also has a very effective counter-terrorist grid in the hinterland. The Pakistani authorities also hope that a strike in this sector may rouse communal passions leading to communal riots thus damaging the harmonious social fabric of the state to further its failed agenda of “Two Nation Theory”. Pakistan’s insistence on terming the IB as “Working Boundary” and thus refusing to accept it as an accepted International Border is also a reason for preferring this sector so that it can claim the entire Jammu & Kashmir as disputed territory. Such terror attacks can also be used as a diversionary tactics to aid infiltration of bigger groups to the Bhaderwah-Doda belt via Basholi-Banni. In the past this route has been used by the terrorists both for infiltration/exfiltration as well as for rest and recoup. Thus the area of Banni-Macheddi in the depth also assumes importance.

It is worth examining as to how the terrorists manage to cross the border despite the claim of the Border Security Force (BSF) that it is well guarded. The aim is not to point finger at any particular force. All security forces are carrying out their assigned roles to the best of their abilities within the given resources. Is it then the question of resources? I have already highlighted the aspect of terrain. Another important point to note is that the border fence has been erected against the lie of the ground and hence easily gets damaged during the monsoons or periods of heavy rain, thus creating gaps. Naturally, to cover these gaps greater strength of manpower for deployment is needed affecting deployment elsewhere. Moreover, it is not difficult to breach a linear deployment like the current pattern on the border.

For the counter infiltration deployment to be effective it needs to be an all-weather multi-layered deployment in tiers. A counter-smuggling and a counter-infiltration deployment cannot follow the same pattern. It has to be dynamic rather than static. The first tier of deployment should be based on all-weather, 24×7 surveillance radars, sensors, hand-held thermal imagers, night vision binoculars and alarm systems. It must be complemented with physical deployment based on threat assessment and terrain. The night ambushes should be laid on a dynamic grid pattern rather than static linear deployment. The vulnerable areas like nullahs and gaps need to be covered with adequate deployment. Each border out post (BOP) must have an operational command post manned by a team led by an officer who should monitor the data being received from the surveillance grid with authority to redeploy ambushes under its operational control. The entire deployment needs to be backed by a reliable and secure communication system.

The second tier needs to be deployed between the IB and NH based on high grounds or dominating ground. A similar dynamic grid of ambushes equipped with night vision devices and night sights need to be established in the second tier also. This tier also needs to be complemented with police nakkas (outposts). However, the aspect of communication needs to be coordinated and rehearsed. The third tier needs to be based on the NH and areas immediately in depth. Village Defence Committees (VDCs) should be incorporated in this tier. VDCs need to be properly armed, well trained and highly motivated. Long range Surveillance Radars (LSRs) along with surveillance command posts could also form part of the third tier. The readers would agree that the ultimate question is of availability of resources. But then no price is heavy for a nation when it comes to ensuring peace for her citizens. There is a saying “If you want peace be prepared for war.” The unified command must put its heads together to make the IB sector impregnable in order to beat the nefarious designs of the troika that rules Pakistan and is determined to keep the pot boiling in J&K to ensure that the citizens of this state are denied the dividends of peace.

Looking inwards, those advocating revocation of Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) must rethink whether the time is ripe for it or by insisting for its removal they may be helping the troika in Pakistan. To sum up, a pro-active approach towards border management, surveillance and infiltration is the need of the hour. To achieve this, an integrated, professional and well trained intelligence network is a pre-requisite. This network should not rely only on electronic intelligence (ELINT) but should also be backed up by human intelligence (HUMINT). The training camps and launch pads need to be under constant surveillance. Since a large number of army camps are also located in the area, there should be a seamless integration between BSF, police, intelligence agencies and the army.

The issue of command and control should be unambiguous. There should be no duplicity at all. The coordination between neighbouring units deployed on the border should be flawless since inter-unit and inter-formation boundaries are always vulnerable. It needs to be understood that till such time we make our borders impregnable we will continue to be the victims of cross-border terror because Pakistan is not going to relent from bleeding India.

*Brig Anil Gupta is a Jammu-based security and strategic analyst. The views expressed in the article are entirely personal. He can be contacted at anil5457@gmail.com

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Asia's Coming Nuclear Nightmare ( Source- The National Interest / Author- David Brewster)

INS Chakra ( Image source- Wikimedia Commons / Credits- Ajai Shukla)

Source- The National Interest

Author- David Brewster

While the world focuses on the dangers that a nuclear-armed Iran could present in the Middle East, a potentially more dangerous and unstable nuclear proliferation is occurring in the Indian Ocean.

In the coming years India, Pakistan, and perhaps China will likely deploy a significant number of nuclear weapons at sea in the Indian Ocean. This could further destabilize already unstable nuclear relationships, creating a real risk of a sea-based exchange of nuclear weapons.

Observers have long seen India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry as the most unstable in the world, and South Asia as the most likely location of nuclear conflict. This is not just academic speculation. Foreign diplomats have been evacuated from Islamabad on several occasions from fears of an impending nuclear exchange with India.

India has a “no first use” (NFU) nuclear-weapons policy of sorts, although it is increasingly subject to caveats and exceptions. But Islamabad refuses to adopt an NFU policy and indeed has announced a long list of actions that it claims would justify a nuclear response against India. Pakistan is also busy miniaturizing its nuclear weapons for tactical use, thus reducing the threshold for Pakistani nuclear action.

Importantly, Pakistan sees its nuclear arsenal not only as a deterrent but also as an enabler,  providing an umbrella under which it can sponsor sub-conventional attacks against India. In the face of terrorist attacks such as those in Mumbai in 2008, Delhi has found its options constrained by concerns about a possible Pakistani nuclear response. But few are confident that India's restraint can be maintained in the face of another serious cross-border attack that is proved to have been sponsored by Pakistan.

Both India and Pakistan are now in the process of moving their nuclear weapons capabilities into the maritime realm.

India is the furthest down this track, having launched its first indigenous nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine INS Arihant in 2009 (expected to be commissioned this year); it is also in the process of building two more so-called SSBNs. Further, India is developing nuclear-tipped Dhanush short range ballistic missiles for deployment on offshore patrol vessels. India has leased a nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine and has plans to construct up to six more SSNs (unlike SSBNs, SSNs are not armed with nuclear ballistic missiles). Pakistan is following India's lead, having recently established a Naval Strategic Force Command Headquarters with the declared intention of developing a sea-based deterrent. This may involve nuclear-armed conventional submarines supplied by China, rather than SSBNs.

Some nuclear weapons states have created a nuclear “triad” in order to have an assured second strike capability. While such an assured capability can help stabilize a nuclear relationship, according to a recent Carnegie report, taking the India-Pakistan nuclear dynamic into the maritime realm may in fact create greater instability.

One issue is an ambiguous mix of conventional and nuclear capabilities at sea, including the deployment of nuclear missiles on Pakistani conventional submarines and on Indian missile boats. Uncertainty over whether a platform is carrying nuclear weapons creates a risk of an inadvertent but highly escalatory attack on an opponent's nuclear capability. Another concern is that maritime nuclear capabilities could lower Pakistan's already low nuclear threshold. Islamabad may be tempted to conduct a demonstration nuclear attack at sea, believing it will not be escalated on land. A further problem is Pakistan's reported propensity to delegate nuclear authority to field commanders, which could create considerable risks if submarine communications are interrupted.

China is also a major player in the nuclearization of the Indian Ocean. China's role in creating a nuclear-armed Pakistan is a big factor in the distrust that characterizes the India-China security relationship. In the 1980s, China supplied Pakistan with weapon plans along with fissile material, and facilitated the supply of missile technology. Any further moves by China to develop Pakistan's maritime nuclear capability will only cement India's threat perceptions about China.

The India-China nuclear relationship is itself relatively unstable and is now also moving into the Indian Ocean. This is because India's land-based nuclear deterrent currently suffers from considerable geographical and technological disadvantages compared with China. China is able to deploy its nuclear missiles in sparsely populated territory close to India's border, providing it with nuclear missile coverage of the entire subcontinent. In comparison, India fields much shorter range missiles that can barely reach major population centers in eastern China.  

This gives India good reason to establish an assured second strike capability on SSBNs that could potentially be forward deployed into the western Pacific. Alternatively, India may deploy its SSBNs in a well-protected “bastion” in the Bay of Bengal, although this may require further development of Indian missile technology.

There have been increasing detections of Chinese SSNs in the Indian Ocean in recent years, including the deployment of a Chinese SSN to the western Indian Ocean between last December and February, nominally as part of its anti-piracy deployment. According to Indian sources, these deployments are part of hydrographic “profiling” of the region and will likely increase in frequency. But Beijing has less reason to deploy its SSBNs in the Indian Ocean; instead, they will likely be primarily deployed in the western Pacific, targeted at the United States. This could create its own risks: the detection of an unusual transit of a Chinese SSBN into the Indian Ocean or an Indian SSBN into the Pacific could be seen as an escalation at times of tension.

The United States also has a potentially significant role in facilitating nuclear stability in the Indian Ocean. In the 1980s, Washington helped construct India's only facility for communications with submerged nuclear submarines and the U.S. might again support India's maritime nuclear capabilities. It might even be in Washington's interests to help Pakistan. The establishment of reliable communications links with Pakistan's nuclear-armed submarines could, for example, be critical in stabilizing the India-Pakistan nuclear dynamic.

Despite concerns about superpower competition in the Indian Ocean during the latter half of the Cold War, there was relatively little nuclear competition in that theatre. The three-party nuclear rivalry we will soon see in the Indian Ocean is likely to be more unstable, and potentially far more dangerous.

About the author- Dr. David Brewster is with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, where he specializes in South Asian and Indian Ocean strategic affairs.  He is also a Senior Maritime Security Fellow at the Indian Council on Global Relations, Mumbai, and a Fellow with the Australia India Institute.

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Vietnam and Great Power Rivalries ( Source- Te Diplomat / Authors- Nhina Le and Koh Swee Lean Collin)

Image credits- Presidency of Russia 

Source- The Diplomat

Authors- Nhina Le and Koh Swee Lean Collin

t all began with apparently innocuous activity reported in both the Russian and Vietnamese press citing the Russian Defense Ministry on January 4. According to the reports, Russian Air Force Il-78 Midas tanker planes were granted access last year to Vietnam’s aerodrome facilities in Cam Ranh Bay, located in the southern Vietnamese province of Khanh Hoa. The Il-78s enabled the refueling of Russian Tu-95 “Bear” strategic bombers, which coincided with intensified Russian military flights in the Asia-Pacific, including “Bear” sorties that circled the major U.S. military redoubt in Guam.

These flights, claimed to be a show of strength and for intelligence-gathering purposes, were deemed “provocative” in the eyes of Washington. A request was made to Hanoi “to ensure that Russia is not able to use its access to Cam Ranh Bay to conduct activities that could raise tensions in the region,” according to the U.S. State Department. Moscow rejected Washington’s concerns and defended its military ties with Vietnam.

Troubled Ties?

Some commentaries in the media had associated this Cam Ranh Bay issue with troubles brewing in U.S.-Vietnam relations. But this is not really the case.

Of course, it would have appeared strange for Hanoi to have failed to anticipate that such activities would not go unnoticed by Washington. Because Vietnam does not operate Illyushin-type military planes, those planes in Cam Ranh Bay with their distinct red star markings and the standard livery of the Russian Air Force would have been hard to miss.

But there has been a recent upsurge in bilateral relations between Vietnam and the U.S., in no small part driven by resurgent tensions with Beijing over the South China Sea disputes. Washington partially lifted its decades-long arms embargo on Vietnam, with talk within the establishment that there it might be completely lifted in the future. The U.S. also agreed to supply patrol boats as part of a broader plan to aid Hanoi in maritime security capacity-building. Vietnam was also reportedly keen on purchasing second-hand P-3 Orion long-range maritime patrol aircraft.

Certainly, bilateral relations are far from perfect, given residual issues of contention, for example, persistent disquiet in Washington over Vietnam’s human rights record. Nevertheless, relations have been moving in a generally positive direction.

Vietnam’s Thinking

Hanoi does not view itself as having deviated from a long-avowed post-Cold War foreign policy that stresses certain key tenets, such as independence, no-alliances, and non-alignment.

This approach emphasizes both collaboration and struggle against domination and exclusion politics (vua hop tac, vua dau tranh). It is also premised on adapting to the post-Cold War geopolitical changes and to aid in its Renovation (doi moi) process. This means not just making new friends, but preserving traditional friendships as well. Longstanding ties with Russia count in the latter category.

Since 1991, Hanoi has been consistent with this principle of vua hop tac, vua dau tranh. This tendency stems from the fact that Vietnamese nationalists attack attempts to “sell” the country to foreign forces, and are sensitive to accusations that Vietnam is a client state of any particular Great Power. To this end, Hanoi has assiduously resisted external attempts to dictate its policymaking.

For instance, in the 1990s, then Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thanh insisted: “Cam Ranh Bay is a Vietnamese base, and has nothing to do with the Soviets,” and that other actors, including the United States, could access this base if they were willing to normalize relations with Vietnam. Nguyen’s words were meant to be a response to Moscow’s attempt to turn the bay into its military foothold in Southeast Asia.

Broader, Deeper Engagement

News about the Russian Il-78s is nothing new, although media reports tend to link it to the ongoing Ukraine crisis. But the tanker planes’ presence can be seen as part of a broader arrangement under which Moscow enjoys access to Vietnam’s military facilities in Cam Ranh Bay including arguably the most crucial of all, the naval base.

But Moscow is no stranger to that. Under a 25-year agreement signed in 1979, the Soviet Navy Pacific Fleet stationed its 922nd Logistics Center and maintained a warship flotilla in Cam Ranh Bay. Since having withdrawn its last forces from the garrison in May 2002, for almost a decade Russia’s military presence receded from the Asia-Pacific, especially as Moscow became more focused on Europe.

Now, Russia is keen to revive its access to Cam Ranh Bay, with its prized deep-water anchorages and most strategically of all, direct access into the South China Sea. The fact that it was at different times under the control of both Cold War superpowers, first the United States and then the Soviet Union, attests to Cam Ranh’s enduring geostrategic importance. The bay is certainly an ideal stopover point for Russian warships sailing to and from the Russian Far East and Gulf of Aden. It would be analogous to the Syrian port in Tartus, to which the Russian Navy Mediterranean task force has had regular access.

In fact, Russia’s interest in reviving access to the Cam Ranh Bay precedes the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis. The events in Crimea and subsequent tensions in Europe merely catalyzed Russia’s “eastward” glance into the Asia-Pacific and gave greater salience to the bay. Earlier deals with Vietnam, for example the sale of Kilo-class submarines in 2009, had a role to play. During the numerous high-level defense interactions that took place in 2012-2013, Russia and Vietnam agreed on the broad modalities regarding Cam Ranh Bay. In exchange for granting Russian warships greater access, Vietnam would receive Moscow’s assistance in developing the infrastructure in the bay, including those for Hanoi’s Kilo fleet and more significantly perhaps, a major servicing center for foreign civilian and military vessels. Subsequent bilateral agreements did not deviate from this arrangement.

In 2013-2014, as the Ukraine crisis brewed, some within the Russian establishment – including prominent lawmakers – spoke of the reopening of Russia’s naval base in Cam Ranh Bay as part of Moscow’s grand plans to enhance its global military footprint. The Russian press even reported about the possibility of opening a Russian Navy sustainment center in the bay. However, the issue of restoring a Russian base in Cam Ranh Bay was not raised by either side.

It would at any rate have been impossible to do so, given Hanoi’s avowed post-Cold War foreign policy. Apparently keen to squash any speculation about Cam Ranh Bay being reinstated as a foreign military base, Vietnamese officials repeatedly emphasized that all countries are welcome to assist in developing the bay’s infrastructure. They also reiterated that Cam Ranh Bay is not intended to be a military port, but an international ship servicing and repair hub that is open to all foreign civilian and military users.

Less than two months before the Il-78 report, on November 25 during a visit to Russia by Nguyen Phu Trong, secretary general of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party, an inter-governmental agreement was inked that allows simplified access procedures for Russian warships visiting Vietnam’s Cam Ranh naval base. Under this agreement, Russian vessels approaching the port need only notify the latter authorities for entry. Permission for entry would be granted automatically.

A ‘China-Russia Axis’ in the Asia-Pacific?

Tracing back these developments, it is evident that Cam Ranh Bay features prominently within Moscow’s new global military strategy. Russia’s interest in returning to the bay preceded the Ukraine crisis, which merely gave greater impetus to Moscow’s push for access. Without that crisis, Russia’s actions would not have generated quite the same concerns.

But with Russia’s growing military assertiveness in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, ostensibly targeting the U.S. and its allies, there are reasons to worry. Moreover, Russian tanker flights staged out of Cam Ranh Bay can be interpreted as a violation of Vietnam’s principle of not giving other countries permission to maintain military bases or to use its soil to carry out military activities against other countries. Because Hanoi has yet to offer any clear explanation about this, Washington must be left wondering whether Vietnam has been consistent with its policy and whether it favors Russia over other partners, including the U.S., with whom ties have strengthened in recent times.

Washington is keen to secure greater access to Cam Ranh Bay as part of its strategic rebalance to Asia, given the simmering tensions over maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas. It is plausible that Washington might perceive Beijing as the beneficiary if the Cam Ranh Bay becomes a catalyst that jeopardizes U.S.-Vietnam relations and compels the U.S. to pivot away from the region. When one looks back at not just recent moves but also past developments in Sino-Russian relations, a rather interesting picture emerges.

Both China and Russia have common interests in a multi-polar world order, as exemplified in the several joint declarations they have signed since the 1990s. This strategic convergence was lent greater salience following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the U.S., and the subsequent American military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Sino-Russian vision of a multi-polar world order is obliquely referring to the perceived U.S. global hegemony.

Escalating tensions between the U.S. and Russia over Ukraine provide an ideal pretext for broader and deeper Sino-Russian collaboration. The $400 billion gas deal signed in May 2014 demonstrates China’s willingness to assist Moscow at a challenging time, just as the West is trying to isolate Russia over Ukraine. In the meantime, Russia has encouraged China to play a significant role in developing the Russian Far East. Despite nagging concerns over China’s infringements of its military-technological intellectual property rights, Moscow has pushed to enhance defense-industrial cooperation with Beijing, including offering up some of its latest armaments.

Russia’s growing presence in the Asia Pacific, including the “Bear” flights off Guam, seems designed to send Washington two related messages. First, Washington should not meddle in Russia’s interests in Europe, particularly eastern Ukraine and the former Commonwealth of Independent States. Second, if the Americans continue with their actions, including intensified NATO military activities in Europe, Russia can respond by using the Asia-Pacific as a backdoor to exercise its own form of gunboat diplomacy.

Although there are no official agreement between Moscow and Beijing on Russia’s potential role in the South China Sea crisis, it may still serve the interests of both countries to target American interests in this sensitive area. The Chinese do not yet have the requisite force projection capabilities to venture this far out into the Western Pacific, and the People’s Liberation Army has only just begun preparations to develop this. Russian “Bear” flights circling Guam may well have been welcomed by Beijing, at a time of intensified U.S. military activities, including P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol flights in the South China Sea, close to China’s strategic naval base in Hainan.

Fallout

The Cam Ranh Bay saga merely exposes the complexity that Great Power rivalries bring to this volatile region. Vietnam may be in a tricky spot. Certainly, those in Washington who believe that Russia’s military use of Cam Ranh Bay constitutes a security challenge will continue to press Hanoi to cease this access. But Washington’s threat that it will not fully lift the arms embargo on Vietnam, for instance, has dubious utility and would not happen for three reasons.

First, even if Washington decides to maintain the partial arms embargo, Vietnam has alternatives. In recent years, Vietnam has been strengthening defense links with Israel and other European countries keen to sell it weapons. And Hanoi has since acquired some of their offerings. Second, more so than in the past, Washington as a whole increasingly values its relationship with Hanoi. Hence, the controversy of Russia’s tanker flights from Cam Ranh Bay, Washington has been at pains to emphasize, does not put a strain on U.S.-Vietnam relations. Finally, Hanoi can still count on the support of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which it is a member, in case of political and economic reprisals by Washington.

Vietnam certainly needs the U.S. to serve as a counterweight to a rising China. Yet at the same time, the reality is that the U.S. is not Vietnam’s only option. Today, Hanoi enjoys a firmer footing in its diplomatic, economic and security relationships with counterparts worldwide. It has at its disposal a wider range of strategic options to safeguard and promote its national interests.

Business as Usual?

For a smallish country that finds itself caught up in Great Power politics, a well-conceived, principled foreign policy approach will help Vietnam look after its national interests. The foreign policy principle of vua hop tac, vua dau tranh is a pragmatic approach that instructs Hanoi not to put all its eggs into one basket. The diversification of relationships, power instruments and strategies is a requisite. A principled foreign policy stance means that not only must Vietnam not favor one external power favored over another, but there is no opportunity for any of these actors to dictate its direction. From Hanoi’s perspective, Washington is in no position to prevent Vietnam from offering Russia access to Vietnamese military facilities. This is because Russia is not the only user: The U.S. military and other external actors – particularly the Indian Navy which has been a regular visitor to Vietnam’s bases – benefit from this inclusive arrangement too.

In the long run, exercising exclusivity and partiality towards foreign access to its military bases will risk setting a dangerous precedent for Vietnam. It is already in a tenuous position amidst the ongoing Great Power rivalries and simmering tensions in the South China Sea. Moreover, back-pedaling from or doing anything antithetical to its post-Cold War foreign policy would deal a blow to Vietnam’s standing within ASEAN. This is especially true given that the regional bloc subscribes to a set of norms known as the “ASEAN Way,” one of which has been the principle of non-interference. Washington could find itself doing more harm than good if it tries to enter this minefield.

If it wants to remain being seen as an independent actor on the world stage, Vietnam will have to adhere faithfully to its post-Cold War foreign policy principles. It will be in the interest of Hanoi to re-emphasize to the international community that Cam Ranh Bay is open to diverse external users, civilian and military. U.S. grumbling notwithstanding, for Vietnam the Cam Ranh Bay situation is just business as usual.

About the authors- Nhina Le is a Research Associate at George Mason University’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution in the United States. Koh Swee Lean Collin is an Associate Research Fellow at the Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. 

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India’s Key to Sri Lanka: Maritime Infrastructure Development (Source- The Diplomat / Author- Nilanthi Samaranayake)

Image source- Flickr / Credits- Presidency of Sri Lanka

Source- The Diplomat

Author- Nilanthi Samaranayake

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent trip to Sri Lanka highlights New Delhi’s reawakening to the strategic position that Sri Lanka holds in India’s neighborhood. Since 2008, India has watched as China built port facilities, highways, and other major infrastructure in Sri Lanka. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy warships have also paid port visits to Sri Lanka, even taking in Trincomalee, where India has been sensitive to any extraregional presence for decades. Most recently, in September and October 2014, New Delhi became unsettled at the sight of a conventional Chinese submarine and a tender ship openly paying port visits in Colombo on the way to counter piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden. Despite the public nature of the docking and advance notice, Indian policymakers appeared to be taken by surprise and feared India had lost strategic ground to China regarding Sri Lanka. In essence, how did India go from once being offered the opportunity by Sri Lanka to develop Hambantota harbor to being caught off guard by Chinese submarine visits in its backyard?

Shortly after the submarine episode, Maithripala Sirisena defeated Mahinda Rajapaksa in Sri Lanka’s January 2015 presidential election and visited India for a successful summit with Modi in February. But despite this recent warming of relations, India should recognize the underlying factors—some of its own making and others independent—that have contributed to the perception that India’s overall relationship with Sri Lanka has fallen behind Sri Lanka’s relationship with China, given the latter’s robust commercial activity. A better understanding of these factors will help New Delhi develop a comprehensive and less reactive approach to Indian Ocean security as new manifestations of China’s engagement in the region lead observers to question India’s preeminence in its own backyard.

Why is India in this position?

Before considering the factors that have affected India’s position in Sri Lanka and led some to conclude that India is now lagging behind China, observers should appreciate that India’s overall political-military standing in the Indian Ocean is strong and outstrips that of China. As demonstrated by Modi’s recent trip to Sri Lanka, Mauritius, and Seychelles, India is actively deepening its partnerships with most Indian Ocean littoral states. With Sri Lanka alone, India’s naval ties have strengthened considerably during the postwar period in terms of bilateral exercises, staff talks, training, equipment, senior official visits, and trilateral maritime domain awareness cooperation involving Maldives. By contrast, Sri Lanka’s naval relationship with China over the same period remains limited mostly to the realm of military diplomacy and some training.

Yet looking beyond India’s strengths of geography and political-military standing, one can identify three primary issues that have complicated India’s ties with Sri Lanka. The first set of developments involves China and is out of India’s control: China’s considerable ability to invest in and carry out infrastructure projects and the PLA’s entry into the Indian Ocean due to regular counterpiracy patrols. Now that China has contributed to the security of the maritime commons, it is unrealistic to expect that the PLA Navy will not seek the opportunity to gain far-seas operational experience through a variety of assets, including the submarine and tender ship that visited Sri Lanka. The fact that PLA Navy ships prefer to visit a Chinese-built and operated terminal in Colombo is not surprising.

The second factor involves domestic Indian politics and center-state relations. Before the Modi era, New Delhi largely prioritized the internal interests of the state of Tamil Nadu over national strategic interests in Sri Lanka. For electoral reasons, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition government needed to weigh the demands of Tamil Nadu’s chief ministers concerning Tamil populations in northern and eastern Sri Lanka. India supported Colombo during its war against the LTTE through important assistance such as radars and intelligence sharing, but the Indian (and U.S.) ban on lethal assistance gave China the opportunity to fill a gap through its munitions and postwar diplomatic support to Colombo. This policy reduced Indian military and diplomatic assistance to Sri Lanka at critical times in its history. Regardless of the human rights merits of this policy, New Delhi needs to recognize the strategic implications of such a prioritization.

The third factor is less understood. India has not provided significant investment in Sri Lanka’s maritime infrastructure, which Sri Lanka sees as essential to achieving its national development goals. An overlooked angle when trying to understand why India seems to have merely watched China develop a port presence in Sri Lanka is that India lacks a structural economic incentive (although it has a strategic incentive) to invest in Sri Lanka’s maritime infrastructure. Of course, few countries can boast China’s massive currency reserves for lending or environment of government-supported businesses to carry out construction activities. Plus, India has infrastructure development needs of its own, some of which will even be met by Chinese investment. But when India has actively promoted investment in the region by Indian companies or government-to-government assistance, it has focused on projects that do not pose direct economic competition. For example, India has provided up to $3 billion in lines of credit, loans, and grants to help build up infrastructure in Nepal and Bangladesh—two neighborhood countries considered low-income economies by the World Bank. In terms of development projects across the Indian Ocean, India is financing construction of Sittwe port in Myanmar, which will promote connectivity with India’s landlocked northeast, and Chabahar port in Iran, which will allow trade from Afghanistan to bypass Pakistan.

In Sri Lanka, India is supporting infrastructure projects mostly in the north of Sri Lanka such as the construction of a power plant, 27,000 new homes, and a hospital; the dredging of the war-devastated Kankesanthurai port; and the reconstruction of the Northern Railway Line. While much appreciated and important for Sri Lanka’s internal development, these projects are primarily intended to improve the infrastructure of the war-ravaged Tamil population in the north and help promote post-conflict reconciliation. They do not directly advance Colombo’s maritime development goals as do Chinese port-building projects in Colombo and Hambantota and construction of highways connecting coastal cities like Colombo, Galle, and Matara.

On the other hand, Colombo competes with Mumbai for the busiest port in South Asia, and both have aspirations to rival Singapore as a regional shipping hub. When Rajapaksa offered India the opportunity to develop Hambantota port, New Delhi declined. It may have done so for many reasons (U.S. investors passed as well on Rajapaksa’s offer); nevertheless, China was able to assume this role. Notwithstanding criticism during the election campaign of the terms of loans undertaken to build these projects, Chinese financing and construction have allowed Sri Lanka to develop two modern ports in the Indian Ocean region that can service the newest generation of deep-draft ships. China’s terminal in Colombo port has already helped reduce congestion, and Hambantota port transships Indian-built cars exported to Africa.

Ironically, Chinese port development in Sri Lanka indirectly benefits India, whose ports are in need of upgrading and do not have the depth and large cranes that are needed to handle mega container ships. In fact, approximately 70 percent of shipping to and from Indian ports goes through Colombo port. Sri Lanka certainly wants the business from India, but New Delhi may see this transshipment activity as a shortcoming of Indian ports. For example, a former Indian foreign secretary suggested that Campbell Bay in India’s Nicobar Islands should be developed to lessen some of this dependence. Although the Indian government and companies finance and carry out important connectivity projects throughout Sri Lanka, India has not chosen to develop maritime infrastructure on the scale that China has. When considering China’s commercial investments and the PLA Navy’s entry into the Indian Ocean, India’s lower maritime investment profile in Sri Lanka has raised questions to observers about the strategic implications for India’s standing in its region.

What’s next?

The February and March Modi-Sirisena summits present opportunities for Indian investment in Sri Lanka, including in the maritime realm. Ferry services could restart, and Modi announced that Indian and Sri Lankan companies will work together to develop oil tank facilities that can refuel visiting ships in Trincomalee. Modi stated a desire to help the northern city become “a regional petroleum hub.” These developments suggest India may undertake a major investment in Sri Lanka’s maritime infrastructure. Furthermore, Harsha de Silva, Sri Lanka’s deputy minister of policy planning and economic development, recently stated that “India would be welcome to invest in building and upgrading the east and west terminals of Colombo port.”

More broadly, Modi’s administration should encourage public-private partnerships and government-to-government investments in India’s neighborhood, beyond concerns about China. According to the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, South Asia is one of the least integrated regions in the world. By investing in Sri Lanka’s maritime infrastructure and regional connectivity, India is enhancing its own security. Of course, India needs to build up its domestic maritime infrastructure, such as through Modi’s Sagar Mala initiative. But maritime South Asia will be developed eventually (although much too slowly for those within the region), and India should have a stake in the course of this development rather than primarily extraregional countries and institutions driving the process.

Beginning with the UPA government and now under the Modi administration, India has made great strides in recent years to expand its political and military weight in the Indian Ocean. New Delhi now needs to work on building the economic dimension of maritime power. All Indian Ocean countries—including India—want to improve their infrastructure. Until India approaches maritime economic policy in its neighborhood more proactively and demonstrates the appeal of its own investment and construction capabilities, it will continue to react with alarm to each new manifestation of China’s inexorable reach into the Indian Ocean.

About the author- Nilanthi Samaranayake is a strategic studies analyst at CNA Corporation, a non-profit research and analysis organization located in the Washington, D.C. area. The views expressed are solely those of the author and not of any organization with which she is affiliated.

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India and the Culture of Innovation ( Source- The Diplomat / Authors- Asit K. Biswas & Kris Hartley)

Param Super Computer
 ( Image source- Wikimedia Commons / Credits- CDAC)

Source- The Diplomat

Authors- Asit K. Biswas & Kris Hartley

“Everyone under 18 has only one guru, Google guru,” said Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at a Nasscom event in early March. He insisted that India’s IT industry, where innovation plays a critical role, is successful because government is “not there anywhere.” By implying that state participation stifles industry growth, this widespread sentiment belittles industrial planning and the promotion of particular sectors or corporate champions. Does Modi’s statement about the absence of government support India’s commitment to R&D and innovative capacity? Innovation is a driver of national competitive advantage, and ultimately the individual is the primary source of innovation. Therefore, connecting human development and government intervention becomes a crucial task in supporting growth strategies.

Following India’s latest budget, and amidst mixed messages about the country’s 2015 economic prospects after a disappointing 2014, discussions have focused on governance failings in typical areas such as corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, the growing infrastructure deficit, and an underperforming education and academic research sector. Some analysts argue that a burdensome corporate tax rate (falling from 30 percent to 25 percent under the new budget) and inadequate fiscal incentives are discouraging investment and innovation. Others cite intellectual property protection as a key condition for innovation. Strikingly, India ranked 29 out of 30 countries (ahead of only Thailand) in the 2015 Global Intellectual Property Center index, which measures commitment to innovation via IP protection efforts. India ranked last in the two prior years.

Such an array of causes for India’s economic woes would bewilder even the most seasoned policymaker. How, then, can these causes be specified and linked to policy remedies, particularly in the innovation-driven global economy? Prominent Indian businessman Satish Reddy recently bemoaned that the latest budget makes only modest appropriations for innovation. By contrast, infrastructure spending is slated to increase, with a more robust focus on public-private partnerships. Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) scientist Prakash Mujumdar argues that India’s efforts to boost innovation should include expanding broadband infrastructure, encouraging more students to pursue science-related fields, and fostering a culture of experimentation.

Mujumdar’s last point is a critical factor distinguishing innovation-poor countries from innovation-rich countries. The latter provide a possible roadmap for India’s development, but the synergies of multi-faceted policy interventions are elusive without systemic cultural reform at both the organizational and individual levels. Such innovative cultures are already present in many developed countries, and India can realistically aspire to similar.

A common policy trap involves capital therapy, namely the assumption that additional money will successfully address challenges. For example, V K Saraswat, member of the Indian think tank NITI Aayog, identifies R&D spending as a key factor in India’s pursuit of growth. Yet R&D spending in India has grown by double-digit percentage points in recent years while innovative capacity lags. This highlights a glaring disconnect. Innovation is not a metric in which one country or firm can simply out-spend the other. While technology, infrastructure, and governance are necessary for innovation, the global competitive environment cannot be reduced to a military-style arms race. Innovation is about culture and this is a factor over which government has only peripheral control.

India has introduced a National Skills Council to oversee worker education and vocational training. There is a measurable link between innovation and worker productivity, and recognition of individual innovation is not entirely absent in India. National cultures of innovation and entrepreneurship may be regarded as complementary, and in some emergent ways Indian firms are embracing innovation as an operational strategy and institutionalizing innovation in the workplace through dedicated corporate roles. However, such initiatives may not be enough to stimulate a pro-innovation cultural shock-change. What distinguishes companies in innovation-rich countries is a tolerance for failure that is fundamental to the creative process. Nevertheless, this mindset is antithetical to that of aspiring entrepreneurs in developing countries.

In generating a sense of policy urgency about the innovation performance gap between India and its peer countries, rankings and indices can be helpful. The yearly Global Innovation Index (GII), a widely cited reference on the subject, has recently released its seventh edition. It adopts a broad view of innovation in measuring seven analytical pillars covering capabilities (inputs) and results (outputs). The 2014 report emphasizes the “human factor,” acknowledging the role of the individual in innovative capacity – as mentioned earlier.

There are many stories behind seven years of GII data. Few, however, are more compelling than trends in India and China over this period. Figure 1 depicts the ranking performance of four dynamic global economies. The indexed value approach creates a “starting line” against which each country’s yearly performance is measured relative to its original position. The chart shows that both China and Singapore improved their rankings, with China having more volatility during the financial crisis. The United States slipped at the beginning of the crisis and has made slow progress recovering. Most notable is India’s dismal performance, flattening after a precipitous decline during the crisis but more recently continuing its distressing trend.

Despite its low rankings in the GII, India appears to have a healthy startup environment. Nasscom chair R Chandrasekaran argues that India is becoming an “innovation destination,” and that the next generation of IT innovation will occur locally as business increasingly address the unique challenges facing domestic organizations. These ambitions will not be realized without robust policy intervention. The GII’s comprehensive metrics highlight a range of dimensions in which India has room for improvement. The usual constraints – infrastructure, regulation, and market functionality – continue to hamstring growth. However, improvement in India’s innovation is unlikely unless there are significant cultural and institutional changes, including attitudes towards experimentation, risk-taking, and possible failures. If this creative awakening occurs in both the public and private sectors, India will be positioned to outpace its faster-growing but potentially less innovative peers.

About the authors- Asit K. Biswas is distinguished visiting professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. Kris Hartley is a doctoral candidate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. 

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Make in India- kamorta class corvette

INS Kamorta ( Image source- Wikimedia Commons / Credits- Indian Navy)

In continuation of our series "Make In India", today we feature Kamorta class Corvette. She is the first of a new class of corvettes designed and built in India with high level indigenous content. Built as an Anti Submarine warfare corvette, Kamorta is highly capable and a real force multiplier. 

Kamorta class corvettes are the Indian Navy's next-generation anti submarine warfare platform, built under Project 28. They are being built at Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE), Kolkata. All the four corvettes are planned to be handed over to the Indian Navy by the year 2017.

Project 28 is the primary project for driving localisation and developing the warship construction industry in India. The aim with this project is to stipulate unprecedented standards while providing opportunities to Indian vendors to develop expertise with the technology. The project, driven by the Navy's Directorate of Naval Design, has been delayed by two years with a cost overrun from the originally estimated INR28 billion (US$440 million) to Rs. 70 billion (US$1 billion), primarily to meet this goal.

The order for the first four corvettes was placed in 2003, with construction commencing on 12 August 2005.

Design:

The basic design for Project 28 was specified by the Indian Navy's Directorate of Naval Design, with the detailed design by GRSE.[4] The design includes many stealth ship features, including reductions in acoustic signature and vibration of the vessels.

Displacing around 3,400 tonnes and a length of around 110 meters, these vessels will have a very high percentage of Indian made equipment – either designed indigenuously or built under license through technology transfer agreements.

The DMR 249A hull steel is produced by SAIL (Steel Authority of India Limited). The main machinery is raft mounted to reduce acoustic and vibration signatures. Each gear unit and the associated engines will be mounted on a common raft. The vessel will feature automated control and battle damage systems. The Project 28 vessels use diesel engines built by Pielstick of France. DCNS supplied the noise-suppressing raft-mounted gearbox for CODAD propulsion. Wärtsilä India will deliver the low-vibration diesel alternators to power the on-board electronics. Other signature management control features are built in to combat the ship's infrared signature, radar cross-section, noise and magnetic outputs. Two independent interconnected switchboards optimise redundancy and reliability.

It was announced on 21 December 2006 that GRSE awarded France's DCNS a contract to provide a comprehensive engineering package of raft mounted Propulsion Power Transmission Systems (PPTS) for the four corvettes. Under the contract, DCNS will deliver four propulsion packages (consisting of eight reduction gear units on cradles and either thrust blocks) to GRSE. The company will also provide support to GRSE for the mechanical integration of the propulsion plant. DCNS is partnering with Walchandnagar Industries Limited, to provide the raft mounts and other components, including thrust blocks and systems auxiliaries. The first propulsion package was delivered in 2008, with the remaining three to follow at the rate of one per year until 2011.

The armament is to include a license-built Otobreda 76 mm Super Rapid gun in a stealth mount and a weapons layout similar to what is found on the Talwar-class and Shivalik-class frigates including two Larsen & Toubro built derivatives of the RBU-6000 anti-submarine rocket launcher, as well as Larsen & Toubro torpedo launchers. Revati, the naval variant of the DRDO-made Central Acquisition Radar (CAR), is a confirmed sensor aboard the vessel. Hangar and aviation facilities will also be standard features.

The ships also includes an integrated ship management system (ISMS) from L-3 MAPPS which combines an integrated platform management system and bridge management system into a single integrated system.

Four ships are being built under the class with 8 more to follow in Project-28 A with improved sensors and weapon systems. 

The importance of this class of ships is not only their indigenous development but the fact that they are designed to be the foundation for the establishment of an entire eco-system for the development and building of warships. 

This ship in letter and spirit commemorates and takes forward the motto "Make in India" . May this class and the ships to follow rule the seven seas with the flag of India flying high.

JAI HIND

China's Nightmare: Vietnam's New Killer Submarines (Source- The National Interest / Author- Lyle J. Goldstein)

Kilo Class Submarine ( Image source- Wikimedia Commons / Credits- United States navy)

Source- The National Interest

Author- Lyle J. Goldstein

After a brief respite, the South China Sea cauldron is starting to boil once again. This time, the hub-bub concerns not a close call between aircraft, nor dueling flotillas of coast guard vessels surrounding a mysterious oil exploration rig, nor the precarious resupply of a rusted out hulk of a ship grounded purposefully on an obscure reef

Rather, the current frenzy among journalists, strategists, and now legislators concerns a variety of new structures that Beijing has undertaken to build up in and around its occupied reefs in the Spratlys. These structures will likely include an airfield.

While this recent construction makes for interesting satellite photos, the impact on the actual naval balance of power seems quite minimal: limited to perhaps somewhat improved Chinese surveillance in the southern part of the South China Sea.

However, Beijing already enjoys relatively plentiful sources of intelligence regarding “maritime domain awareness” in this sensitive, contested domain, so the actual change is minimal. Lest anyone get too excited, all these reefs (and related structures) are easily turned into “glass” by any reasonably modern military power in the age of precision-guided weapons.

A rather more significant alteration in the local balance of power may result from the operational readiness of Vietnam’s new fleet of Kilo-class conventional submarines. This weapon system is sufficiently potent, and the order of six boats from Russia is sufficiently large, that this deployment over the next year (particularly in light of Vietnam’s historically weak maritime forces) could hypothetically alter the balance in the South China Sea quite dramatically.

This edition of Dragon Eye will explore a February 2015 analysis concerning Vietnam’s deployment of the new Russian-made submarines that appeared in the Chinese naval-affiliated magazine 舰船知识 [Naval & Merchant Ships], published by the China State Shipbuilding Corporation, an entity very much involved in China’s on-going naval modernization. I have commented on the China-Vietnam military balance before, so this effort may form a modest update of sorts.

This Chinese analysis notes at the outset that the Vietnamese Navy is totally lacking in experience with “large type conventional submarines,” including not only their operations, but also their logistics and maintenance requirements. In a passage that might be termed condescending, the author writes: “… if [the submarine] is not used properly, not only will it become useless in combat, but [this lack of proficiency] can seriously threaten the lives of the whole crew.”

Given China’s own ample experience purchasing Russian Kilo’s during the 1990s, it is not surprising that Chinese naval analysts demonstrate an intimate knowledge regarding the processes and challenges involved with molding these particular imported boats into a credible fighting force.

Three crucial steps are described in the process: crew training, pier-side exercises and at sea exercises. It is noted that long before crews gathered to train that Vietnamese specialists were studying the production processes at the fabrication facilities in St. Petersburg.

Pier-side exercises also involve a theoretical component, followed by work with simulators, and then finally by drills aboard the boat to familiarize personnel with all the submarine’s complex systems. Since “… in the process of receiving the submarine [from Russia], there is simply not enough time to test all areas completely … problems with equipment may arise later. These problems should gradually be discovered in the course of at sea drills …”

A focus of the Chinese analysis is the projected basing plan for the new Vietnamese submarines. The old Russian base at Cam Ranh Bay [全兰湾] is viewed as the most logical location. It is noted that back in the Cold War Soviet nuclear submarines and large sized surface vessels commonly visited Moscow’s “largest foreign base,” so that the infrastructure should be quite adequate. According to this analysis, a digitized submarine training center became operational in April 2013. Hundreds of Russian technicians apparently worked on the setup of the facility that may house 30 different simulators.

An interesting segment of the Chinese analysis attempts to outline five possible ways that Hanoi might deploy its new force of submarines. First, it is noted that Vietnam has a long tradition of employing frogmen that goes back to operations against U.S. Navy ships back in the Vietnam War.

Second and more importantly, the Russian boats are viewed as playing a major deterrence role n the big ocean it could be very difficult to find these quiet submarines … Therefore, other countries will not generally risk sending surface ships into such sensitive waters and so these measures might achieve the goal of deterrence.”

A third method of employment is described as “ambush operations”. Here, it is suggested that the Vietnamese Kilos might lurk off an adversary’s ports and it is further asserted: submarines are quite an ideal weapon to support Vietnam’s “intention … of realizing an[anti-access strategy].”

 At the same time, the analysis holds that, despite this newly potent submarine force, Hanoi, will not be capable of “sustained offensive operations,” since any given “submarine’s weapons load out is limited …” Nevertheless, a fourth suggested mode of employment would be undertaking blockade operations .

According to this analysis, the Vietnamese submarine force could realistically strive to “destroy an adversary’s sea lanes of communication” within 5-6 years. “The newest Vietnamese naval plans … [suggest] that in the event of a China-Vietnam naval clash … [Vietnam] will undertake to blockade the sea lane through the Malacca Strait.”

A fifth and final method that this Chinese naval analyst expects from the Vietnamese submarine force is to seek “local superiority”. This will be feasible now, because Vietnam’s new submarine force “will have a certain scale.”

To cope with this perceived threat, the Chinese Navy has moved aggressively to field a light frigate, the type 056, of which at least 17 are now in Beijing’s arsenal. This Chinese analysis highlights that the first type 056A , hull number 593, was commissioned in November 2014. As this version is newly equipped with a towed-array sonar system, it is quite clear the ship’s primary purpose is anti-submarine warfare (ASW).

This article suggests that two more type 056As were launched at the end of November. No wonder Jane’s has concluded that “Beijing is ramping up at feverish pace its effort to address [Anti-Submarine Warfare]…”

China’s new maritime patrol aircraft, the Gaoxin-6, is also said to be a critical asset for coping with the Vietnamese submarine threat. Along with Chinese submarines lurking near Vietnamese naval bases, as well as intelligence provided by China’s robust system of surveillance satellites, this Chinese analysis also highlights China’s new undersea surveillance system. The fixed bottom listening arrays that are now confirmed to have been deployed in the South China Sea are said to be [on par with the world’s leading systems] and also to have experienced breakthrough development.

 Overall, this article is representative of the tone of Chinese naval writings about Vietnam and the South China Sea more generally. It reflects ample concern, to be sure, but there is also a serene and perhaps even disturbing confidence that China has the situation in hand.

During the spring 2014 “oil rig crisis” in the South China Sea, Hanoi and Beijing seemed to lurch ever closer to a major clash of arms. Such a clash would inevitably be a disaster for both countries, and for the Asia-Pacific more generally. We may hope that the collapse of world oil prices will help to cool tensions in the South China Sea cauldron for a while longer.

But rather than seeking to take advantage of these still obvious tensions, Washington should be grasping for all possible diplomatic opportunities to promote restraint, including especially facilitating confidence building measures, as well as urging serious bilateral negotiations, not just to manage, but to actually resolve these thorny issues

About the author- Lyle J. Goldstein is Associate Professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, RI. The opinions expressed in this analysis are his own and do not represent the official assessments of the U.S. Navy or any other agency of the U.S. Government.  

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