Monday, November 30, 2015
What Are Boeing’s Prospects for the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet in Asia? ( Source- The Diplomat / Author- Benjamin David Baker)
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| United States Navy FA-18 Super Hornet ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / United States Navy) |
Source- The Diplomat
Author- Benjamin David Baker
As the Diplomat has noted recently, the Asia-Pacific has become an important market for modern military aircraft. Companies from countries such as France, Sweden, Russia, and China have been attempting to sell their platforms to a range of states in the region (see here and here for Beijing’s Asian aircraft bids). Several states, including Indonesia, Malaysia and India, are either planning to or are in the process of acquiring modern fighter jets.
U.S. companies have a long and established position in this market. This has partially been for political purposes. During the Cold War, many states bought American kit out of necessity as much as quality, as there were few other acceptable sellers available (the French company Dassault being an important exception).
U.S. companies are still among the top suppliers of Asian air forces. Today, however, economic considerations are becoming increasingly important and U.S hardware is often prohibitively expensive. As such, it is possible to identify two broad categories of military combat aircraft: cutting edge, “fifth generation” aircraft, and conventional “fourth generation” platforms.
In the first category, the U.S. still holds an important advantage. Lockheed-Martin’s controversial F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has attracted both confirmed and potential buyers in the Pacific, such as Australia, Singapore, Japan, and South Korea. (Although the latter two are developing their own, indigenously-designed fifth generation birds, the Mitsubishi ATD-X Shinshin and the Korea Aerospace Industries’ KF-X.)
In the second category, U.S. models are facing a more level playing field. Modern Russian jets such as the Sukhoi Su-35, so-called “Eurocanards” represented by the Eurofighter Typhoon, Saab Gripen, and Dassault Rafale, and even the joint Sino-Pakistani JF-17 Thunder, represent tough competition for U.S. fighters.
One of the United States’ main contenders for this market is Boeing’s F/A-18E Super Hornet. Originally deployed back in 1999, the Super Hornet is today the mainstay of both the U.S. Navy and the Australian Air Force, with over 500 aircraft fielded in total.
Boeing has been aggressively trying to market the Super Hornet to other potential buyers, so far with mixed results. India and Brazil were both approached by Boeing to replace their fleet of fourth-generation fighters–New Delhi ended up buying the French Rafale and Brasilia landed on the Swedish Gripen, partially due to the diplomatic fallout following the Snowden revelations. On the other hand, Finland, Poland, and possibly Kuwait, are considering the Super Hornets for their own fighter replacement programs.
All in all, however, Boeing is struggling to find orders for its Super Hornets. Orders for the aircraft have been falling since the last Super Hornet was delivered to Canberra in 2011. Ever since that delivery, new models have been produced mainly as replacements for existing aircraft in the U.S. and Australian arsenals. Furthermore, the Super Hornet, alongside its predecessor, the F/A-18 Hornet, is mainly intended as a stopgap measure until Australia deploys its long-awaited F-35s. Although Canberra has ordered several of the Super Hornet’s electronic warfare derivatives, the EA-18G Growler, for 2017, this will not be a viable solution in the long term.
In the Pacific, there are two possible states which represent potential markets for the Super Hornet. Malaysia is in the middle of finding replacements for its 10 Soviet-era MiG-29s. As the F-35 is beyond Kuala Lumpur’s price range, the contenders are the usual suspects: the Dassault Rafale, the Eurofighter Typhoon, Saab’s Gripen C/D and, finally, Boeing’s F/A-18E Super Hornet. The rumor is that the Gripen is leading the competition. This is both due to price, but not least due to the fact that both Brazil and neighboring Thailand acquired the Swedish platform.
According to AviationWeek, the timing of this program is not ideal for Boeing. No decision on Malaysia’s future aircraft is likely within a year, but Boeing’s Super Hornet program manager, Dan Gillan, has previously said that the company would have to decide whether to support continued production of the Super Hornet soon. In other words, to remain a candidate for Malaysia, the Super Hornet will need further orders from elsewhere.
However, Boeing is still putting up a fight. Howard Berry, vice president for Super Hornet sales, emphasizes the payload-range capability of the Super Hornet, which has twice the empty weight of the Gripen C/D. It also has the advantage that the Royal Malaysian Air Force currently operates the F/A-18D Hornet, of which the Super Hornet is an enlarged derivative.
The other contender is Canada. Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government has stated that it will cancel its participation in Lockheed-Martin’s F-35 project and has turned to other sources for its new fighter fleet. As Canada currently operates the Hornet (under the domestic denomination CF-18), Boeing is hoping that Ottawa the familiarity of pilots with the jet, interoperability with the older fleet, and military ties between the U.S. and Canada will make it an obvious choice.
Boeing still makes great fighters. Both the Hornet and the Super Hornet are tried and tested platforms, and have given good operational service. However, with rival Lockheed-Martin claiming a huge stake in the international warplane market with its F-35, and foreign companies offering comparable aircraft to the Super Hornet, Boeing will have to fight hard to stay competitive.
About the author- Benjamin David Baker is an editorial assistant at The Diplomat. He is currently serving as a reserve officer in the Norwegian Armed Forces and has previously worked and published at the International Law and Policy Institute and the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. He received his Master of Arts from the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy at the School of Oriental and African Studies, where he focused mainly on Chinese Foreign and Security Studies. He writes mainly on military affairs, China, the Indian Ocean, and the Arctic.
Original article was published here @ The Diplomat
10 Essential Facts About Chinese Aid in Africa ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Brad Parks)
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| Image credits- VOA/ author |
Source- The National Interest
Author- Brad Parks
The global development landscape is currently in a period of tumult. A number of developing countries that were once aid recipients are now aid donors, and they represent a growing proportion of the total money spent on international development. China is by far the largest emerging competitor in the global aid market, and its unique way of designing and delivering assistance is challenging the traditional policies and practices of Western powers.
More and more money is sloshing around, as well as more players. China now has a robust bilateral aid program, but it’s also helped create alternative sources of multilateral funding for developing countries—namely, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank.
Beijing is shaking the foundations of international order put in place by Western powers after World War II. Its attitude towards aid transparency norms is a case in point. China has opted out of global reporting systems, such as the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), which were put in place by Western powers to facilitate donor coordination and minimize duplication and waste. Instead, Beijing has chosen to release few details about its rapidly growing international development finance program, making China’s foreign aid program an informational black hole.
AidData, a research lab at the College of William and Mary, has led an effort over the last four years to address this data deficit. Using an open-source data collection and triangulation methodology, we have amassed a large dataset (at china.aiddata.org) that tracks twenty-two separate Chinese government departments and agencies, funding nearly 2,650 development projects in fifty-one African countries worth approximately $94 billion. We started with Africa because the continent receives more than half of China’s international development budget each year.
Based on these data and other sources, our analysis has resulted in some surprising challenges to widely-held assumptions about what China is up to in Africa. There are ten things we’ve learned, with each having implications for anyone trying to understand the motivations of rising powers more broadly, as well as their global reach and impact.
Finding 1: Over the last decade, Western politicians and public intellectuals have popularized several myths about the nature, distribution, and impact of China’s overseas development activities. One popular claim is that China now provides as much, if not more, aid to Africa as the United States, and that much of this aid is funneled to corrupt and authoritarian regimes. Another commonly heard claim is that China is a “rogue donor” with a strong interest in natural resource acquisition and a weak interest in helping improve social or economic outcomes in developing countries. But if one scratches the surface, it becomes clear that most of these claims are based upon anecdotal accounts, ideological and political commitments and research undertaken with non-transparent data sources and methods. Beijing has made the problem worse: by disclosing little reliable information about its overseas development activities, it has fueled suspicions and made it far more difficult to dispel false claims with evidence.
Our research tries to separate aid (in the strict sense of the term) from official financial activities that resemble but do not qualify as aid—in particular, commercially-oriented state financing with higher interest rates and lower grant elements. And by producing more granular data and analysis, we have managed to uncover a number of new insights that all point in the same direction: the Western policy establishment, and especially U.S. national security experts, should step back and take a deep breath. The sky is not falling.
Finding 2: Consider the myth that China provides as much, if not more, aid to Africa than the United States. This claim is usually trotted out by doomsayers who see it as evidence of declining U.S. power and influence. But by combining our database with the OECD’s strict definition of aid (“official development assistance” or “ODA”), we found that China provided approximately $31.5 billion of aid to Africa between 2000 and 2013 (or approximately $2.25 billion per year). By comparison, the United States disbursed nearly three times as much ODA to Africa over the same period: $92.7 billion (or approximately $6.62 billion per year).
Yet there is an element of truth in the popular claim that Chinese funding to Africa rivals that of the U.S. if one uses a broader definition of aid (called “official financing”) that includes financial transfers with no or little grant element, and financial transfers lacking developmental intent, China and the US provide roughly comparable levels of funding to Africa -- $94.3 billion and $107.9 billion, respectively, between 2000 and 2013. The reason is simple: China provides more funding to Africa for commercial purposes than its does for strictly development purposes.
Finding 3: Another popular myth is that Chinese development finance is all about the “hardware of development” (e.g., roads, ports, railways, refineries and electrical grids). Our data confirms that China has focused its efforts in these sectors, but it also shows that Beijing has created a large and diverse portfolio of investments in Africa’s agricultural, educational, and health sectors. China’s broad sectoral footprint actually resembles that of Western donors—except it is markedly less interested in supporting environmental programs.
Finding 4: How closely does China align its overseas development spending with its foreign policy interests? We found that when African states consistently vote with China in the UN General Assembly, or align their voting with China’s voting over time, they usually receive significantly more official development assistance (ODA) from Beijing. In this regard, China seems to be following the example of the U.S. Previous research has uncovered a similarly strong correlation between U.S. aid provision and how U.S. aid recipient countries vote in the UN General Assembly.
Finding 5: Contrary to a claim popular among public intellectuals, we don’t find that China favors authoritarian or corrupt regimes (so-called "rogue states”) in its allocation of aid. Nor does China seem to take commercial self-interest or natural resource acquisition considerations into account when it allocates aid resources across countries. In fact, we find that Chinese aid flows do go to poorer countries. Beijing evidently makes its aid allocation decisions based on humanitarian and socioeconomic needs, which is again similar to the U.S., and encouraging because it suggests that China and the U.S. have shared aims that may provide a foundation for long-term cooperation.
Finding 6: By contrast, we find that less concessional, and more commercially oriented, forms of Chinese state financing (e.g., so-called “other official flows,” or OOF) tend to go to countries that are rich in natural resources and countries with higher levels of corruption. The fact that Chinese OOF favors corrupt and natural resource-rich countries helps explain why policymakers, journalists and public intellectuals perceive more “Chinese aid” to be flowing to those kinds of countries. In fact, it is not aid that flows to such countries, but rather OOF, which is not aid in the traditional sense.
The fact that China is funneling significant financial resources to corrupt countries is a source of potential concern, but Western policymakers and pundits should probably reserve judgment until they have better evidence that Beijing’s willingness to work with unsavory regimes is actually worsening governance outcomes. It’s important to recognize that China may be more willing to work in countries that are plagued by high levels of corruption because they rely on financial modalities, such as commodity-backed loans, that reduce the risks of financial misappropriation. China also tends to use loans to pay Chinese contractors for work performed in counterpart countries, which arguably gives it more fiduciary control over the funds that it provides to African countries.
Finding 7: Once aid arrives in a given country, there are both similarities and differences in how Western and Chinese funding is allocated between subnational localities. Neither Western nor Chinese donors are good at targeting the areas most in need of aid. We’ve found that aid from both China and the World Bank often ends up going to wealthier rather than poorer regions of African countries.
However, our own interviews and interactions with World Bankers and Chinese aid officials suggest that this probably reflects organizational ignorance rather than disinterest in improving aid’s impact; better subnational targeting and coordination may therefore be an area where the U.S. and China can find common ground.
Finding 8: By pinpointing the precise latitude and longitude coordination of Chinese-backed projects, we have learned that African leaders are able to more easily manipulate incoming funding from China for their own domestic political purposes. Specifically, we have found that a disproportionate share of Chinese aid and other sources of Chinese state financing goes to the birthplaces of African leaders. On average, an African leader’s home region receives nearly four times more financial support from China during the period of time when he or she is in power, after controlling for a number of other factors that influence funding distribution. By contrast, we do not find the same pattern for the World Bank, one of the largest Western suppliers of development finance.
China’s official policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of its partner countries is the likely reason for this political targeting bias: African officials know that they have more leeway with Beijing’s money, and they use it. But the U.S. should exercise strategic restraint and use this as an opportunity to work more closely with China rather than to shame or chastise it. Many U.S aid programs have also proven to vulnerable to political misuse by governing elites. Therefore, now is not the time to seek the moral high ground, but rather to recognize that the similarities between U.S. and Chinese aid are probably greater than the differences, and both countries will be better off if they work towards shared objectives like less aid fragmentation, closer donor coordination and better aid outcomes.
Finding 9: Another strongly held but weakly supported claim is the notion that Chinese aid fuels conflict. We find that in some circumstances, the opposite is in fact true. Specifically, we find that sudden withdrawals of Western aid make civil conflict far more likely, but this effect disappears if an aid-receiving country also receives significant funding from China, or China steps in and at least partially fills the void. Chinese aid can effectively serve as a “shock absorber” for countries that face large-scale Western aid withdrawals.
Given that the U.S. often finds itself balancing two objectives—promoting political stability and encouraging just and democratic governance—that can cut in opposite directions, China’s willingness to step in when the West steps out may very well be a net positive.
Finding 10: Finally, new research at AidData has punctured the myth that Chinese soft power is rapidly eclipsing Western sources of influence in the developing world. Through a 2014 survey of nearly 6,750 policymakers and practitioners around the world, we uncovered virtually no evidence that the “Beijing Consensus” (China’s model of authoritarian, state-led capitalism) is achieving high levels of resonance and uptake with developing world leaders. When we asked host government officials in 126 low-income and middle-income countries to rate the usefulness of China’s policy advice across 23 different sectors, China Development Bank, China Ex-IM Bank and Chinese Embassies ranked 75th, 59th and 70th, respectively, out of 86 bilateral and multilateral development finance institutions. This suggests that much of the talk about the purported strength of Chinese soft power is just that—talk.
It remains to be seen if China will eventually “catch up” with the most influential (Western) providers of policy advice, as it establishes more rapport and experience working with leaders in other countries. However, our analysis suggests that even if China does want to boost its policy influence in the developing world, it will face an uphill battle. Western aid agencies have for decades employed so-called “local hires” (national staff based in their countries where they work) to help them design and implement development programs. Many of these local hires later assume positions of power in their governments. This matters because familiarity breeds favorability: we have found that the more extensive an individual’s work history with a given aid agency, the more favorably he or she will view that organization when he or she assumes office. Therefore, as Western aid agencies have employed, trained and professionally socialized a disproportionately large number of future policymakers over many decades, they have effectively stacked governments across the developing world with sympathetic interlocutors who share similar policy preferences.
If China wishes to overcome this challenge and become competitive in the marketplace of ideas that exists in its aid-receiving countries, it will need a vastly stronger “ground game.” Unless or until this happens, U.S. policymakers and pundits need not be unduly concerned.
About the author- Brad Parks is the Executive Director of AidData at the College of William & Mary.
Original article was published here @ The National Interest
Japan-India Maritime Surveillance Aircraft Deal May Come Before the New Year ( Source- The Diplomat / Author- Ankit Panda)
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| Shinmaywa US-2 ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons) |
Source- The Diplomat
Author- Ankit Panda
I’ve been writing on Japan-India relations for years and it seems like a highly anticipated deal for the sale of Japanese-made Shinmaywa US-2 amphibious aircraft has been just around the corner since at least 2011. Now, the Japan Times reports that the two countries are likely to at long last reach “a broad defense accord” when Shinzo Abe visits New Delhi from December 11 to 13. New Delhi and Tokyo, under their strategic global partnership, hold annual prime ministerial summits (each affords this privilege to no other country). The deal, once completed, would signal a major step forward in India-Japan security ties, building on parallel developments including Japan’s bid to join the U.S.-India Malabar naval exercises as a permanent member.
Negotiations for a US-2 sale to India began in Japan under the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) governments of Naoto Kan and Yoshihiko Noda. The amphibious aircraft sale issue was swiftly picked up by Abe’s government, which has sought to expand Japan’s role as a defense exporter in Asia. In April 2014, the Abe administration formally altered Japan’s decades-old self-imposed ban on selling arms, which effectively blocked Japanese firms from participating in global defense commerce. (For more background on Japan’s export policies, see here.) Meanwhile, Japan and India, though close strategic partners whose ties have only grown since Shinzo Abe and Narendra Modi rose to the helm of the bilateral, have no formal government-to-government channels to negotiate arms sales.
The Shinmaywa US-2, the kit at the center of this now four-year-long negotiation process, is a relatively unexciting piece of kit. It’s a reliable and capable surveillance aircraft. For India, the primary attractive feature of the US-2 is its versatility and its usefulness in maritime search and rescue operations due to its short take-off ability. The Indian Navy will likely deploy the aircraft to support military and civilian ships in the Indian Ocean and even deep in Southeast Asian waters, according to one Indian military source. With a range of 4,500 kilometers, the US-2 should reinforce India’s sea patrol and maritime domain awareness capabilities considerably in the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal.
Progress on this deal will be a deliverable to watch for when Modi and Abe meet in a couple weeks. Though the US-2 sale has long been politically uncontroversial in both Tokyo and New Delhi, the devil with this deal is in the details. Tokyo is concerned about the possible leak of Japanese technological secrets. The Indian Navy is looking to license US-2s for assembly in India. Finally, depending on the outcome of negotiations on cost, India could expand its order from 12 units to as many as 18.
About the author- Ankit Panda is a foreign affairs analyst, writer, and editor with expertise in international relations, political economy, international security, and crisis diplomacy. He has been an editor at The Diplomat since 2013. His analysis and reports have been widely cited and reprinted, including in the Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times, the Washington Post, Reuters blogs, Foreign Policy, the National Interest, International Business Times, Lowy Interpreter, Newsweek, RealClearWorld, RealClearDefense, Slate, the Daily Dish, the Daily Beast, Business Insider, and Vice, among others. His articles have been translated into Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, Urdu, Thai, and Russian. Panda has additionally provided expert commentary for the BBC, Voice of America, SiriusXM radio, and CCTV, among others. He hosts and produces a popular podcast on geopolitics for The Diplomat.
Panda’s work as a policy researcher has been presented to the European Union, the United States Department of State, the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, among others. His work is widely cited by academics and think-tank researchers.He maintains involvement in track-two exchanges in North America, Europe, India, and Japan. He has lived or worked in India, Belgium, Jordan, France, Malaysia, the United States, Sweden, and Japan, and traveled extensively.
Original article was published here @ The Diplomat
Sunday, November 29, 2015
The Ultimate Weapon No More: Why Did Battleships Become Obsolete? ( Source- The National Interest / Author- David Axe)
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| USS Iowa battle ship ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons/ United States Navy) |
Source- The National Interest
Author- David Axe
In many ways, the battleship represented the greatest-ever concentration of naval power in a single vessel. Between World War I and World War II, the big, fast, thickly-armored and heavily-armed warships dominated the world’s oceans.
And then, very quickly, the battleship became practically obsolete. Why is a complex question — one that University of Kentucky professor Robert Farley,an occasional War Is Boring contributor, addresses in his new tome The Battleship Book.’
“The world reached ‘peak battleship’ in 1918,” Farley writes, “when 118 dreadnoughts served in 13 different navies.” Combat claimed eight battlewagons during the Great War. “The Second World War was far more deadly.” Sixty-three battleships were in service in 1939 and another two dozen of the giant warships left the slipways before the conflict’s end. Twenty-three sank in combat.
Battleships excelled at shore-bombardment, anti-aircraft defense and action against other battleships. But not for long. During World War II and beyond, new technology eroded the big ships’ advantages.
“Especially with the shift to the jet age, smaller, less expensive ships could provide the same anti-aircraft defense.” Submarines proved better battleship-killers than other battleships were. Battlewagons were still effective in the shore-bombardment role — indeed, the U.S. Navy’s World War II-vintage Iowas lingered in that niche until the early 1990s — but carrier-launched planes arguably beat out the battleships in that mission, too.
“The battleship era ended not because the ships lacked utility,” Farley writes, “but rather because they could no longer fulfill their roles in a cost-effective manner.” They were too big, too pricey to build and maintain, and their crews of thousands of sailors were just too large.
“Battleships, in the end, are simply a delivery system for ordnance,” Farley concludes. “When other platforms became capable of delivering ordnance more efficiently, the battleship began to disappear.” Today just one battlewagon, by Farley’s definition, remains in frontline use — Russia’s Pyotr Velikiy, a missile-armed nuclear-powered battlecruiser dating to the Cold War.
When she’s gone, the battleship era will truly end.
This piece first appeared in WarIsBoring here.
Original article was published here @ The National Interest
Saturday, November 28, 2015
Friday, November 27, 2015
The Consequences of China's Obsession With Stability ( Source- The Diplomat / Author- David Volodzko)
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| Image credits- Wikimedia Commons/ John Hill |
Source- The Diplomat
Author- David Volodzko
Last week China accused the European Union of prejudice and ignorance for pronouncing concerns about the rights of Chinese lawyers. Stavros Lambridinis, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, visited China, and in a subsequent press release expressed “strong concern about the recent arrests, detentions and summons of hundreds of human rights lawyers and activists.”
Among these is the case of a middle-aged woman named Wang Yu.
In 2008 Tianjin train officials barred Wang from boarding a train, despite her having already purchased a ticket. When she remonstrated, they beat her. Months later it was she, rather than her attackers, who was sent to jail for two and a half years.
The torture and slavery she witnessed in prison inspired her to become a defender of human rights, but to defend the legal rights of Chinese citizens is to become an enemy of the Chinese state. Last July her electricity was cut and she quickly texted friends that she could hear someone trying to break into her home.
State police had come in the night, presumably in boots and black shirts, and stolen her away without informing relatives whether she was alive or dead. They also lied to neighbors about their activity, telling them they were arresting a drug addict.
When Wang’s boss, Zhou Shifeng, requested an explanation, police arrested him too, along with his associates, and hundreds of other human rights lawyers. State media claimed police had successfully destroyed “a major criminal gang.”
What had Wang done that was so harmful?
She defended the Uighur academic Ilham Tohti, who has devoted his life to nurturing dialogue between ethnic Uighur and Han Chinese. She also represented the Feminist Five, who were arrested for handing out fliers in order to raise awareness about sexual harassment. And she represented one of the seven primary school girls from Jiangxi who were sexually abused by their teacher. These are the major cases that have defined Wang’s career since she was released from prison.
Lest you doubt whether the Chinese government would punish a woman for trying to defend children from rape, remember the case of Tang Hui. Tang’s 10-year-old daughter was kidnapped, gang raped and sold into prostitution, and when Tang sought justice, she was thrown into a labor camp. Public outrage won her release, but victories such as hers are rare, while fates such as Wang’s remain common.
One should nevertheless resist the temptation to perfunctorily tar the Chinese government. Even when it comes at the unconscionable cost of incarcerating heroes like Wang Yu or Tang Hui, stability is the ever-present aim. It is often a mindless and immoral resolution for stability, but one distinct from a consciously sexist agenda or the perpetuation of rape culture.
In fact, China actually ranks higher than the United States on the UN Gender Inequality Index. And the government is making slug-like but perceptible progress; although child rape and homosexual rape were effectively legal, earlier this month it was reported these loopholes have been closed.
The point is, the Chinese government is not opposed to human rights, and such accusations are unhelpful. Rather, it is opposed to human rights lawyers, feminists, academics, journalists, and any others who attempt to throw a spotlight on human rights issues. Quiet resolution is the state’s strongly preferred modus operandi.
The Chinese government views itself and its people with a kind of bodily integrity, and is therefore scornful of Western moralizing, which it considers an unethical infringement. But this requires the West to condone such abuses through silence. Plus, not all Chinese citizens themselves agree with the state’s view.
The state routinely goes well beyond what’s needed to maintain stability. Last month state police grabbed Wang’s son, and he now remains under house arrest with no visits, no mail, no phone calls, and no Internet allowed. He has been severed from the world because his mother wanted to help her fellow citizens.
The U.S. State Department expressed its concern last month regarding the “systematic campaign by China to target family members of Chinese citizens who peacefully challenge official policy and work to protect the rights of others.”
And it was in this milieu that Lambrinidis commented earlier this month, “[R]ule of law requires lawyers that can practice freely without fear of persecution and provide checks and balances against the miscarriage of justice.”
This week Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei responded to these remarks by saying, “the press release turned a blind eye to the progress China has made in the cause of human rights … which not only interferes in China’s domestic affairs but also runs counter to the spirit of governance by the rule-of-law.”
About the author- David Volodzko took his MA at the State University of New York where his research included human behavior and cross-cultural communication. He is a former university lecturer and has been published with ChinaFile, The China Policy Institute, GlobalPost, The Jamestown Foundation, openDemocracy, South China Morning Post and Washington Monthly. He is also the author of the blog Rational Consent.
Original article was published here @ The Diplomat
Thursday, November 26, 2015
Saving Taiwan's Marine Corps ( Source- The Diplomat / Authors- Grant Newsham and Kerry Gershaneck)
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| Image credits- Reuters |
Source- The Diplomat
Authors- Grant Newsham and Kerry Gershaneck
While other Asia/Pacific nations are building amphibious capabilities, Taiwan (the Republic of China) is going the other way – at its great peril. Taiwan’s slow self-destruction of its Marine Corps creates a dangerous gap in its defense, and undermines both deterrence and the confidence of its friends.
Rather than continue to eviscerate this strategically vital force, with vision and relatively modest investment Taiwan’s leaders must re-forge it to make it a decisive national asset for its “asymmetric defense” plans.
How Taiwan’s Marines Got to This Point
The Ma Administration shrank the Taiwan Marine Corps (TMC) from 16,000 to 9,000 troops in recent years, and even considered disbanding it – at a time when its militarily powerful, increasingly aggressive adversary across the Taiwan Strait is openly advertising its ability to take Taiwan by force.
These decisions were nominally linked to an overall decline in defense spending. More accurately, however, they reflect a glaring failure by Taiwan’s defense establishment to recognize the TMC’s essential role in national defense, and the vital role it can play in making Taiwan “too tough a nut to crack.”
The Taiwan Marine Corps was established on Mainland China as an amphibious assault force. When the Nationalist government fled to Taiwan following the Communist victory in the civil war, the TMC’s main mission shifted over time from amphibious assault to retake the mainland to a more static defense of Taiwan and its few outlying islands.
Tough and disciplined, the Taiwan Marines mastered that particular role, particularly the difficult maneuvers designed to disrupt PRC amphibious assaults. But the TMC suffered increasingly serious deficiencies.
Much like species on the Galapagos Island cut off from outside contact and influence, the TMC has been cut off from most interaction with foreign militaries. As a result, it resembles a 1979 version of the U.S. Marine Corps. Although TMC’s ethos and professionalism are superb – indeed, the best in the Taiwan Armed Forces – the Taiwan Marines “froze” in time where the U.S. Marines were 35 years ago: relatively heavy, mechanized, and not particularly mobile.
Eventually its skillsets did not seem to match Taiwan’s defense requirements, as the PRC’s strengthened military and offensive capabilities altered the regional security environment. Consequently, the TMC has fared badly in bureaucratic resource battles.
Redefine the TMC
The TMC’s current need to redefine itself resembles the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In the immediate post-Vietnam War era, the USMC had to reshape itself into a lighter (though still hard-hitting) expeditionary force making use of a “new” old concept: “maneuver warfare.” The USMC knew they had to offer distinctive war-fighting capability – that they could not simply try to be a better version of the U.S. Army that was also familiar with the ocean and ships.
Similarly, the Taiwan Marine Corps’ organization and purpose needs to be radically transformed. To this end, the TMC should become Taiwan’s essential “Rapid Deployment Counterattack Force” – a hybrid of the USMC and the British Royal Marines. It must be become light, mobile, operationally flexible in its thinking, and able to operate as a lethal fire-brigade from one end of Formosa to the other.
Mobility requires an “air wing” for transportation and fire support. This aviation element can be established within the TMC itself in a manner akin to USMC aviation, or with helicopters and crews from the Taiwan Navy or Taiwan Army, permanently attached and integrated into the TMC.
With an embedded aviation element, TMC could then adopt the combat-proven “MAGTF” (Marine Air-Ground Task Force) structure and a doctrine akin to the USMC. The MAGTF combines ground, aviation, and logistics elements into a single coherent and mobile force. The TMC is well-suited for this sort of organization, which offers flexibility, self-sustainment, and “scalability” – i.e. it can be as big or as small as commanders need it to be, it, depending on the mission.
Taiwan Marine Corps’ Amphibious Role – Keep It
Keep the TMC’s amphibious capability and mission. For Taiwan, amphibious assault is still feasible in most scenarios, except for an assault against a well-defended coastline or in an extremely high-threat environment far from Taiwan. There are a number of ways to employ a properly sized and equipped amphibious force in a counter-attack role in the context of a strategic defense of Taiwan.
An amphibious capability is also indispensable in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations. Although war in East Asia is not unthinkable, particularly in light of the PRC’s increasing bellicosity and acquisitive actions in the region, Taiwan has not had to fight pitched battles for decades. However, natural disasters frequently occur in Taiwan and the region, and HA/DR alone warrants an amphibious capability. The TMC, operating with Taiwan Navy (TN) amphibious ships, is the ideal force to spearhead HA/DR efforts as it combines sea/ground/air capabilities and is able to move rapidly with substantial supplies, equipment, and personnel to affected locations – both domestically and regionally.
The TMC has already proved its usefulness in domestic HA/DR on a number of occasions, to include the 2009 flooding when TMC amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs) were the only vehicles capable of accessing certain afflicted areas. The TMC’s AAVs are old, but they still have life in them. When newer versions of amphibious vehicles are developed overseas, the Taiwan Marines should acquire them.
Engage in Regional HA/DR Support
Looking beyond Taiwan, one notes that the majority of regional natural disasters require an amphibious response. Following the TMC’s transformation into MAGTFs, it must learn to work with the Taiwan Navy to build a truly amphibious force along the lines of the U.S. “Marine Expeditionary Unit” (MEU). A MEU is a combination of amphibious ships with Marines and their logistics and organic aviation assets aboard, trained, equipped, and ready to join fully in regional HA/DR missions and training exercises.
Taiwan’s involvement in regional disaster response operations to date has been limited. Generally speaking, the Taiwan Air Force flies in relief supplies and goes home – leaving a handful of Taiwanese civilians behind to handle relief operations. This concept is outdated, and serves only to keep Taiwan isolated and marginalized in the international arena. When physically and politically possible, Taiwan Armed Forces (Marines and Navy taking the lead) should get directly involved on the ground.
Beyond obvious foreign policy benefits, this approach has practical operational benefits. For example, the Taiwan military (with its organization, manpower, and equipment) gets practical experience assisting the overall relief effort and ensures that supplies and aid are used properly. As importantly, Taiwan gets greater visibility (and, hence credit) for humanitarian activities with the attendant political benefits. This political angle to HA/DR also applies domestically as well, since failure to effectively respond to local disasters discredits both the Ministry of National Defense and whatever administration is in power.
One anticipates criticism from certain quarters of Taiwan Armed Forces’ more active role in regional humanitarian activities. However, those who’ve been involved in disaster relief understand that the victims don’t care where help comes from.
Strengthen Specialized Roles for TMC
Besides reorganizing and improving mobility and maintaining an amphibious capability, the Taiwan Marine Corps can also strengthen Taiwan’s overall defense by improving or taking on the following specialized roles. These roles will directly support Taiwan Ministry of National Defense plans for an “asymmetric” defense of Taiwan.
Become the MOUT (Military Operations in Urban Terrain) specialists. Taiwan’s terrain is either vertical or it is urbanized, particularly in central and northern parts of the island. A MOUT capability is essential to defending Taiwan, and is a specialized skill that requires focused, complex training. The Taiwan Marines have already developed considerable expertise in MOUT and should enhance and expand these capabilities.
Transition to light artillery and ASCM (anti-ship cruise missiles) missions. Replace the TMC’s heavy, self-propelled artillery with light, mobile artillery, and take advantage of advances in precision-guided munitions. Taiwan Marines might also adopt the ASCM and establish anti-ship cruise missile units. Land based, mobile, and easily concealed, ASCMs are almost impossible to destroy from the air while giving an attacking naval force migraines. ASCMs are a perfect weapon for the TMC, with its littoral warfare expertise. Sea-going by nature, Taiwan Marines might potentially operate ASCMs aboard Taiwan Navy ships.
Expand ANGLICO (Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company) capabilities. Taiwan Marines are already proficient in coordinating combined arms – air, artillery, naval surface, and ground fires. The TMC can expand this capability – and improve overall lethality – by deploying ANGLICO teams throughout the entire Taiwan Armed Forces
Develop an armored capability based on the USMC’s Light Armored Vehicle (LAV). The wheeled LAV-25 (and its variants) would give the Taiwan Marines an added dimension of agility, high maneuverability and firepower – all of which are necessary attributes for a newly designed TMC. The LAV’s core mission sets are Security Missions, which provide the commander with early warning, allowing him to concentrate combat power at the right place and time. Such economy of force missions are, again, perfectly suited for the TMC and defense of Taiwan.
Improve TMC’s Air Defense role. TMC has played a role in air defense for years, but in a static way. Instead, the Taiwan Marines deploying shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and other mobile SAM systems can provide a highly mobile air defense capability, thereby complicating PRC targeting of Taiwan’s AAA capabilities by PLA missiles, aircraft, and Special Operations teams and sleeper agent cells.
Take on Mine Warfare specialty. Sea mine technology has improved markedly in recent times, to include “smart” mines. Properly employed, these cheap, highly effective weapons are particularly valuable in defending Taiwan, and are a role TMC might take on given their expertise in littoral operations and boat operations.
Maintain and upgrade TMC Amphibious Reconnaissance Group (ARG). The Amphibious Reconnaissance Group (ARG) Marines are tough customers able to do the “sexy stuff” – parachuting, ocean swimming, SCUBA, etc. – along with their main mission of serving as “eyes and ears” in the ocean, on the beach, and on land and direct action missions. Special Forces such as the ARG are potentially an asymmetric force multiplier, but they need appropriate doctrine and to be properly trained and employed. Like much of the Taiwan Armed Forces, the ARG suffer from professional isolation – lack of exposure to other militaries. In addition to developing opportunities to interact with other foreign special operations units, the Amphibious Reconnaissance Group could use a thorough outside review of its doctrine, missions, and employment concepts.
The Taiwan Marines’ Road Ahead: The Path to Asymmetric Warfare Success
First, end the Taiwan Marine Corps’ isolation. Decades of near-isolation and lack of interaction with other militaries have resulted in a less-capable Taiwan Marines Corps – and the Taiwan Military writ large. The United States can, and should, take the lead in this regard – and has at least nominally stated its intention to do so. The U.S. National Defense Authorization Act 2016 (NDAA 2016) states that “military forces of Taiwan should be permitted to participate in bilateral training activities hosted by the United States that increase credible deterrent capabilities of Taiwan.”
Moreover, NDAA 2016 also notes that “the United States should continue to support the efforts of Taiwan to integrate innovative and asymmetric measures to balance the growing military capabilities of the People’s Republic of China….” A re-shaped and re-purposed Taiwan Marine Corps certainly qualifies as an asymmetric and innovative measure.
The U.S. Marines and U.S. Navy in particular should be allowed to bring the TMC (and Taiwan Navy) back into the fold – particularly for HA/DR operations. As a first step, the U.S. Marine Corps should send one or two Mandarin-speaking officers as Liaison Officers to the Taiwan Marine Corps, as it has done in sending LNOs to the Japan Ground Self Defense Force and other regional militaries.
Second, do not cut the TMC any further, and instead consider enlarging it. At least maintain the current size of the TMC and, if necessary, expand the Corps by a few thousand Marines or however many are necessary, depending on a proper assessment of what’s needed for the TMC’s new role as described in this article. The Taiwan Marines have lost a number of superb, creative, and well-disciplined officers and troops from downsizing in recent years. Consider enticing some of them to return.
Third, strengthen the specialized roles outlined in this article, to fill vital niches in Taiwan’s asymmetric defense capabilities and geometrically increase the costs to an aggressor.
Fourth, increase defense spending. The shift to an all-volunteer force has proven difficult for Taiwan’s armed forces – especially for the TMC – owing to low pay and perceived harsh training and living conditions. A bigger defense budget is needed, and if spent right, would allow the necessary improvements. Taiwan’s decreasing defense spending over recent years is perplexing given that Taiwan is a wealthy country. For a country facing such a daunting military threat, Taiwan simply cannot provide an adequate defense without investing money.
Conclusion
Eliminating a large, vital component of Taiwan’s best ground troops – and the ones best able to operate in the littorals where land and sea come together – was ill-advised. This move undermined both Taiwan’s security and many knowledgeable Americans’ perception of Taiwan’s commitment to its own security.
Taiwan’s government must recognize that a reorganized and re-purposed Taiwan Marine Corps will substantially improve Taiwan’s overall defense capabilities. Moreover, it must recognize that Taiwan making a more serious effort to defend itself – and spending the money to do so – has a deterrent effect on adversaries while also making Taiwan’s friends more willing to assist in the event of trouble.
The Taiwan Marine Corps is a key element of Taiwan’s fragile defense capability, and it needs to be understood and recognized as such. Otherwise, it will be whittled away into irrelevance, leaving a void in Taiwan’s defense framework that its well-armed, well-trained, increasingly assertive chief adversary will deeply appreciate.
About the authors- Grant Newsham is senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies, and a retired U.S. Marine Colonel. He served as the first U.S. Marine Liaison Officer to the Japan Ground Self Defense Force and was instrumental in the development of the Japan Self Defense Force’s nascent amphibious capability. He remains active in amphibious development in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Kerry Gershaneck is a Senior Associate with Pacific Forum CSIS, and a professor at a major Asian military academy. Through his Marine Corps and civil service career, he helped develop ROC/Taiwan military capabilities at the tactical through strategic levels.
Original article was published here @ The Diplomat
Wednesday, November 25, 2015
Russian Jet Down in Turkey: Misstep or Game-Changer? ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Nikolas K. Gvosdev)
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| Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Dmitry Terekhov |
Source- The National Interest
Author- Nikolas K. Gvosdev
As we continue to gather more information on the shoot-down of a Russian aircraft by Turkish planes, the incident forces not only Russia and Turkey but all NATO countries (including the United States) as well as other regional players to reconsider their positions and assumptions. Over the coming hours, days and weeks, we will have a better sense of whether this will be treated as a tragic mistake or whether it will be seen as a game-changer that alters the trajectory of the Syrian conflict and Russia's relationship with the West.
In the immediate aftermath, whatever progress Presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan achieved on the sidelines of the Antalya G-20 summit is now completely lost. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's trip to Turkey, which was designed to get the Turkish-Russian agenda back on track, has now been cancelled. The shoot-down may prove to be the final nail in the coffin of a losing four-year attempt by both Russia and Turkey to find a way to compartmentalize their deep disagreements over Syria from infringing upon a very lucrative economic relationship between the two countries. Putin's comments about a "stab in the back," and Erdogan's own clear statements that Turkey will not stand by any infringement of its airspace, suggest that a rapid move by both sides to offer apologies and to put the incident behind them seem to signal that this incident will continue to have negative consequences for the relationship.
This is also proving to be a critical test of NATO's commitment. Certainly, NATO countries, starting with the United States, are calling for de-escalation of the situation and for both sides to refrain from provocation. Beyond that, however, will NATO members unequivocally back all necessary measures to deter Russia from retaliation or from any incursions into Turkish territory? Or will the alliance fracture on this question, with some countries arguing that Turkey's own actions in Syria do not give it the right to call on the alliance for immunity? Given the growing uncertainty among some NATO members, particularly in the Baltic States, about the degree to which other alliance members would honor their treaty commitments should they get into entanglements with Russia, what NATO does in the coming days will be important for determining the future relevance of the alliance. It will also be important because with the potential for more incidents of this support miscalculations could easily spiral out of control.
The shootdown also calls into question French President François Hollande's vision of using the struggle against ISIS as a way to knit together a grand anti-terror coalition. Presumably, Putin will ask Hollande when they meet in Moscow on Thursday how Russia can take part in strikes against the Islamic State if France's NATO ally will be targeting Russian aircraft. In turn, this is likely to have negative ramifications for France's efforts to craft a UN Security Council resolution as the international legal basis for common action against ISIS—given Russia's past insistence that other rebel groups operating against the Assad government also be covered in any anti-ISIS mandate.
French officials were hoping, in the wake of the downed civilian Russian airliner over Sinai and the attacks in Paris, that Moscow would be prepared to shift its focus in Syria from defending the Assad regime to taking the fight to ISIS. There had also been indications that Moscow was cautiously exploring with Western diplomats, Turkey and Saudi Arabia the possibility of a settlement in Syria that would provide for the eventual departure of Assad from power. Now, Moscow may swing back towards Iran's preferences of further action to entrench Assad's control over the key parts of Syria that he needs for regime survival—something that Assad has started to do in recent days, with forces backed by Russian helicopter gunships and additional fighters provided by Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.
Over the last week, there was guarded optimism that the different players in Syria were beginning to search out possible compromises that could lead to a settlement of the civil war and a singular focus on ISIS. Whether this incident will be viewed as a tragic outlier, or whether it derails that process altogether, is still unclear. President Hollande's press conference in Moscow on Thursday may provide the critical answer.
About the author- Nikolas Gvosdev is a contributing editor at The National Interest and co-author of Russian Foreign Policy: Vectors, Sectors and Interests (CQ Press, 2013).
Original article was published here @ The National Interest
New South China Sea Lighthouses: Legal Futility and Strategic Risk ( Source- The Diplomat / Authors- Jonathan G. Odom and Kerry Lynn Nankivell)
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| Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Alvesgaspar |
Source- The Diplomat
Authors- Jonathan G. Odom and Kerry Lynn Nankivell
International law can be viewed as either a tool or a weapon, depending on how it is wielded. On the one hand, the rules of international law outlining the range of legitimate territorial and maritime claims can provide an invaluable toolbox of objective standards for sorting out a way forward in what can often be a complex problem of international relations. On the other, a misinterpretation or partial understanding of the applicable international law can obfuscate the intentions of the rival claimants and further complicate the overall situation. In some ways, a partial understanding of the applicable law might be more harmful than no knowledge at all.
For the unresolved disputes in the South China Sea, one issue worth considering is the potential significance of the new lighthouses that China has constructed on several geographic features within the Spratly Islands. The recent “China’s Lighthouses in the Spratlys” commentary by Lin Ting-Hui of Taiwan is an example of how a misinterpretation or a partial understanding of the applicable law can obfuscate more than it illuminates. This includes both the international law of the sea, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the customary international law relating to sovereignty claims. Below is an attempt to outline the limited legal significance of those new lighthouses, and a strategic risk arising from their construction.
Lighthouses and Maritime Baselines
Lin correctly identifies the law of the sea as one body of international law that applies to some aspects of the unresolved disputes between the South China Sea claimants. To be sure, the proper application of that body of international law can help improve the overall situation. In particular, the UNCLOS rules prescribe how the coastal states may lawfully draw the maritime baselines along their respective coasts and establish their maritime zones from those baselines.
Several of the new lighthouses built by China were constructed on geographic features that were either low-tide elevations or submerged features prior to China’s “reclamation” activities. In Lin’s commentary, he cites Articles 7 and 47 of UNCLOS, to support the proposition that a coastal state may draw straight baselines from a lighthouse that it has constructed on a low-tide elevation. What he might not realize, however, is that these two rules of law have limited (if any) applicability to the Spratly Islands, and that they must be interpreted properly in the context of the entire treaty, as is required by the international law of treaties.
The general rule for drawing a coastal state’s maritime baselines is found in Article 5 of UNCLOS, which requires a state to use the low-water line along its coast. As an exception to that general rule, Article 7(1) of the treaty provides that a coastal state may draw straight baselines in two limited situations: (1) when the state’s coastline is “deeply indented and cut into” or (2) if there are “a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity.”
The International Court of Justice has held that the rules for drawing straight baselines are intended to be used in exceptional situations only “if a number of conditions are met” and those rules must be applied “restrictively.” But China flipped that established paradigm on its head and legislated in 1992 that it would employ that exceptional methodology for all of the baselines on its coast, including those around its claimed island groups. (The United States has diplomatically and operationally challenged those improperly drawn baselines as an excessive maritime claim.) Assuming for the sake of argument that China’s entire coastline warranted the use of straight baselines, Article 16 of UNCLOS would require China to publish all of the coordinates of those baselines. China declared straight baselines along its mainland coast and around the Paracel Islands in 1996, and around the Senkakus in 2012, but has never declared baselines for any of the islands in the Spratlys or published such coordinates.
Article 7(4) of UNCLOS mentions lighthouses. Lin quotes that provision to offer potential legitimacy for China to someday draw straight baselines in the Spratlys from low-tide elevations where it recently constructed lighthouses. However, Article 7 – including paragraph 4 that Lin quotes – applies only if the coastal state first satisfies one of the two exceptional situations specified in Article 7(1). In other words, if the low-tide elevation is not located on a deeply indented coastline or within a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, then the Article 7(4) rule for drawing of straight baselines from lighthouses on low-tide elevations is simply not relevant.
Moreover, Article 7(4) must be read in proper context with the general rules contained in other provisions of UNCLOS that specify the legal status of low-tide elevations and artificial islands. Specifically, Article 13(1) states that a low-tide elevation may be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of an island’s territorial sea, but only if that low-tide elevation is located within the territorial sea of that island. At the same time, Article 13(2) of the treaty makes it clear that a low-tide elevation “has no territorial sea of its own” if it is located beyond the coastal state’s mainland or islands. That provision makes no exception allowing for territorial sea around a low-tide elevation if a lighthouse is constructed on it. Thus, whether a lighthouse is constructed on a low-tide elevation is not determinative – what matters is the location of the low-tide elevation (i.e., its proximity to an island). In addition, Articles 60(8) and 80 of UNCLOS specify clearly that artificial islands, installations, and structures “do not possess the status of islands” and have “no territorial sea of their own.” Therefore, any attempt to justify a territorial sea by the mere construction of a building on an artificial island would be legally futile – whether that building was a lighthouse, an outhouse, or a skyscraper.
Additionally, Lin also quotes from Article 47 of UNCLOS to support a similar proposition of drawing “archipelagic baselines” from lighthouses constructed on low-tide elevations. But archipelagic baselines may only be drawn by “archipelagic states” (i.e., states constituted “wholly” of islands), such as Indonesia and the Philippines. Lin’s citation to Article 47 is wholly misguided; the treaty does not permit a continental state, such as China or the United States, to draw straight baselines around the outermost points of an offshore archipelago.
Lighthouses and Sovereignty Claims
After discussing the potential effect of UNCLOS on China’s recent construction of lighthouses in the Spratlys, Lin then argues those activities are more likely intended to solidify China’s sovereignty claim versus claims asserted by other claimant states. More specifically, he states that China appears intent on “safeguarding of its territorial sovereignty” and “efforts to strengthen the legal basis of its claim.”
To support this point, Lin cites a ruling by the International Court of Justice in the 2002 case between Indonesia and Malaysia concerning the sovereignty of the islands of Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipidan. Regrettably, he focuses solely on those portions of the Court’s ruling that briefly discussed the specific detail of a claimant state constructing lighthouses. He overlooks another portion of the ruling that identifies and applies a principle of international law that is more fundamental and universal to the adjudication of competing sovereignty claims than the unique instance of constructing lighthouses.
In evaluating the competing sovereignty claims to a land feature, what matters is not only what action a state has taken, but also when it takes that action. The relevant concept in international jurisprudence is known as the “critical date.” Specifically, the Court in the Indonesia/Malaysia case ruled that “it cannot take into consideration acts having taken place after the date on which the dispute between the Parties crystallized unless such acts are a normal continuation of prior acts and are not undertaken for the purpose of improving the legal position of the Party which relies on them.” Under the facts of that case, the Court concluded that Malaysia’s construction of lighthouses on these two small islands was a relevant act demonstrating Malaysia’s effectivités (i.e. continuous exercise of governmental activity) primarily because Indonesia was not disputing Malaysia’s sovereignty of the two islands “at the time when these activities were carried out.” In other words, actions taken by a claimant state after the critical date are legally “meaningless” when it comes to determining which claimant has the superior claim of sovereignty.
For the South China Sea disputes, there is much legal-historical work yet to be done to identify the critical dates relevant to various competing territorial claims. With respect to the Spratlys, history provides many potential candidates for the date or dates. We know that German surveys of the islands in the late 19th century were protested by the Qing dynasty, though the picture with respect to China’s official reaction to the first modern claim to the islands (lodged by the British) is much less clear. The privately made claim of Tomas Cloma in 1956 drew protest from both Taiwan (as the Republic of China) and Vietnam, though official disputes between two or three governments might not be said to have crystallized until Manila took on Cloma’s claim sometime between 1974 and 1978. Military encounters in the Spratlys might be taken as evidence of a “critical date” when all parties became aware of disputed sovereignty: clashes between Vietnam and Beijing over South Johnson Reef in 1988, or reciprocated protests by Manila (over Beijing’s construction on Mischief Reef in 1995) and Beijing (over Philippine presence on Second Thomas Shoal in 1999) might also be candidates for further investigation. More recently, the negotiation of the non-binding China-ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties to the South China Sea disputes (DoC) in 2002 suggests an implicit recognition of generalized sovereignty disputes.
All of these legal developments between the claimant states are evidence of a recognized dispute over the maritime space adjacent to the islands and perhaps the underlying territorial disputes. But, despite the need for closer legal-historical investigation, whether the date is 1887, 1956, 1974, 1995, 2002 or somewhere in between, any reasonable observer would acknowledge that those “critical dates” when all rival claimants were aware or should have been aware of the existence of a sovereignty dispute in the Spratly Islands are all clearly at some point in the past.
Therefore, if Lin wants to make a credible case that Beijing’s recent construction of lighthouses is part of a legal strategy to “strengthen the legal basis” of China’s sovereignty claim to the Spratlys, then he would first need to demonstrate that no dispute existed prior to those recent construction activities. That assertion, however, would fly in the face of reality. As one international law expert aptly observed, the sovereignty over the Spratly features is “indisputably disputed.”
A Paramilitary Strategy Cloaked in Legal Rhetoric
As discussed above, Lin’s legal analysis on the significance of China’s new lighthouses in the South China Sea is fundamentally flawed for both the law of the sea and customary law of sovereignty. The cause of this problem might simply be an innocent misunderstanding by an individual who is an expert in international relations, but who is not trained in international law. Regardless, giving him the benefit of the doubt, the potential effect of such flawed legal analysis could be significant: namely, the strategic risk of arming a claimant state, such as China, with legal rhetoric as a weapon to execute a paramilitary strategy in the South China Sea.
If China was to read Article 7(4) of UNCLOS in isolation and out of context, it might finish its “reclamation” activities in the Spratlys and emplacement of lighthouses on those artificial islands, and then attempt to declare belatedly straight baselines from those artificial islands and claim internal waters enclosed therein. But such actions would perpetuate China’s manipulation of the prevailing legal regime for purposes for which it was not intended. More fundamentally, it would facilitate the erosion of an international rule-set which effectively balanced the interests of coastal states and user states.
Similarly, if were China to read the excerpts of the 2002 I.C.J. decision about lighthouses in isolation and ignore the requirement that such actions are legally relevant only before a dispute arises, then it might convince itself and attempt to persuade the international community that such actions bolster its sovereignty claims. But such legal rhetoric would undermine the “critical date” principle of international law, and incentivize tit-for-tat construction activities by other South China Sea claimants and other states elsewhere in the world where there is disputed sovereignty. Such a state of affairs would be both unhelpful in sorting out where sovereignty actually lies, and may also invite conflict as rival claimants rush to demonstrate a “display of power and authority” over the same area.
The specific question about the significance of these new lighthouses uncovers a central paradox to the South China Sea disputes. All claimant states, including China, would like to achieve their national strategic goals by legally defensible means because perceived compliance with internationally-established norms and standards confers tangible strategic benefits. For that reason, Beijing (and to some extent, the other claimant states) pursue questionable claims through recourse to legal rhetoric.
Seen in this context, intentionally or not, quasi-legal commentary runs the risk of misrepresenting the law and encouraging the claimants to pursue what need to be understood as purely strategic goals. By contrast, thoughtful strategic commentary that maintains an open dialogue without misrepresenting the legal realities at play is an essential first step to keeping China and the other South China Sea claimants honest in what is already a turbulent sea.
About the authors- Commander Jonathan G. Odom and Kerry Lynn Nankivell are both professors at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii, where Commander Odom teaches international law and Professor Nankivell teaches maritime security. The views expressed are their own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its components.
Original article was published here@ The Diplomat
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