Thursday, March 31, 2016
Russia proposes information systems for Indian Navy ( Source- Russia & India Report / Author- Konstantin Zavrazhin)
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| INS Vikramaditya ( R-33) (Image credits- Indian Navy) |
Source- Russia & India Report
Author- Konstantin Zavrazhin, RIR
The Russian Morinformsystem-Agat company has held talks with several Indian instrument-making and defence companies on new projects to jointly develop information systems for the Indian Navy, a company press release said.
“Talks were held with the GRSE Shipyard, Goa Shipyard, and Hindustan Shipyard on the possibilities for cooperation in the construction of new ships of Indian design, and integration of the concern’s information systems in these projects. Cooperation in development of joint-projects for manufacturing information systems for the Indian Navy were discussed with the instrument-manufacturing companies Bharat Electronics Limited and Mahindra & Mahindra, as well as defence companies Reliance Defence and the SUN Group,” RIA Novosti quoted the company’s press release as saying.
Among areas of cooperation between Morinformsystem-Agat and the SUN Group would be “participation in joint training programs for young people in technical disciplines needed for R & D activities in the defence sector."
Morinformsystem-Agat is participating in the Defexpo India 2016, an exhibition of land and naval armaments; held between March 28 and 31 in the Indian state of Goa.
пустым не оставлять!!
Defexpo India attracts leading Russian companies
A total of 18 companies from the Russian military-industrial complex (MIC) have been represented at this exposition, including the United Shipbuilding Corporation, Russia’s largest manufacturer of armoured vehicles, Uralvagonzavod, the Almaz-Antey Aerospace Defence Concern, and the Russian Helicopters Holding.
The stationing of the S-400 (Triumf) air defence systems in Syria has intensified talks on the system with India, while also attracting the interest of Saudi Arabia. Sale of S-400 systems could earn Russia about $4 billion.
The Russian Helicopters Holding presented the latest Mi-38 and Ka-226T aircraft, for the first time in India. They held talks with leading local aircraft manufacturer, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and the Pawan Hans Limited company, to locally manufacture these helicopters (within the framework of the “Make in India” program), and also about the after-sales service of Russian helicopters.
India today operates over 400 Russian helicopters. By the end of next year, the Indian fleet of these Russian-made aircraft could rise to 450 units. Russia and India signed an agreement at the end of 2015 to locally manufacture around 200 Ka-226T helicopters in India.
All organizational issues are likely to be resolved by the end of 2016, after which serial production will commence. Simultaneously, the companies plan to sign a contract to supply India with 48 Mi-17V-5 helicopters.
The Almaz-Antey Aerospace Defence Concern, a leading Russian developer and manufacturer of air defence systems, presented its advanced range of products at the exhibition. These included the S-400 anti-aircraft missile system (Triumf) and the missiles Calibre-PLE and Calibre-NKE.
For the first time abroad, Uralvagonzavod displayed a unique remote-controlled tank system, with firing high-explosive shells, (The ZVOF128 shoots 125 mm fragmentation-type projectiles with remote detonation, created to destroy armoured vehicles, small surface targets, drones, and helicopters).This highly effective weapon system is intended for T-72, T-80, and T-90 tanks.
United Instrument Manufacturing Corporation (UIMC) introduced a mobile fire control station for commanders of platoon gunners, armed with portable anti-aircraft missile systems, including the new Verba MANPADS. A small army backpack, in a few minutes, can be turned into a full-fledged platoon leader’s command station.
Sergey Goreslavsky, deputy head of Rosoboronexport, said on Tuesday that India and Russia have begun negotiations on modernization of Delhi’s fleet of diesel-electric submarines of the Project 636.6 Varshavianka class.
Russia has also provided India with a draft agreement for the supply of S-400 systems.
Meanwhile, plans are being finalised for licensed production of Kalashnikov assault rifles in India.
Original link to the article- http://in.rbth.com/economics/defence/2016/03/31/russia-proposes-information-systems-for-indian-navy_580809
Does China Need Allies? (Source- The National Interest / Author- Lyle J. Goldstein)
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| Image credits- VOA |
Source- The National Interest
Author- Lyle J. Goldstein
At a conference in China recently, a Chinese scholar seated next to me made the following ominous comment: “The United States is building up its alliances to surround and contain China. But China can also build up alliances to counter the United States.” Many Western strategists are, of course, dismissive of such warnings, on account of Beijing’s long-touted conviction that alliances are outdated and irrelevant. To boot, those states closest to Beijing, such as Pakistan, Laos and North Korea, are not particularly powerful and may form more of a burden than a benefit to Chinese foreign policy. But as a recent article on this forum illustrates, some major Chinese academic strategists continue to advocate for a change in China’s approach.
Further evidence of an intensifying debate in Beijing foreign policy circles is a December 2015 article in the important Chinese journal Chinese Foreign Policy. Written by China Academy of Social Sciences researcher Xu Jin the article merits a closer look because it was the volume’s lead paper, implying the argument has already garnered some significant support. It turns out, however, that the piece is being republished after appearing originally in another journal, once again underlining its importance. The title of the piece is simply “Why China Rejects Alliances” and the argumentation is clear in the very first sentence, when the curt question is answered. China rejects alliances, according to Xu Jin, because of a “few misunderstandings.”
Xu begins his argument with the bold statement that “Looking around the world since 1648, there has never been another single great power that pursued a policy of rejecting alliances”. He admits that this policy frequently affords Beijing greater flexibility, but he also believes that China may be viewed by certain countries as “evading responsibility” and “unreliable.” He then proceeds to outline several misconceptions that he claims are held by the Chinese foreign policy elite with respect to alliances.
First, he says that they fail to understand that an alliance is not the same as friendship. He explains the essence of an alliance actually revolves around common interests and goals. Thus, Xu cites U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia as a legitimate alliance, but one that governs a broader relationship that is “neither hostile nor friendly”. A second misunderstanding reflects the apparently common conviction among Chinese scholars that an alliance must imply a full spectrum of cooperation. Here, Xu presents as an illustrative example the U.S.-French and even the U.S.-UK relationships, wherein he suggests there have been frequent disagreements, with the Europeans often pursuing their own independent approaches. Directly criticizing major Chinese foreign policy thinkers like Liu Jianfei of the Central Party School, Xu contends that it is nonsensical to say forming alliances reflect a “Cold War mentality.” Rather, he says, countries have been making alliances for thousands of years, so that line of thinking does not correspond to an accurate reading of the historical record.
A fourth assumption that Xu attributes to the conventional rejection in Chinese foreign policy of alliances is the notion that seeking out alliances represents a weakening of national sovereignty, with a commensurate loss of flexibility. He suggests that even in the close alliance between Tokyo and Washington, the United States has retained significant flexibility, as demonstrated by Henry Kissinger’s secret trip to China in 1971 or by Washington’s somewhat “murky strategy” toward defending the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu islets. Xu ultimately concedes, however, that a price may indeed have to be paid in terms of flexibility and sovereignty. He argues that sometimes circumstances are such that “two countries understand that if each depends only on their own capacities, there would be no possibility for them to realize the goal of seeking gain and avoiding harm”.
A final sacred cow of Chinese foreign policy assumptions with respect to alliances that Xu confronts is the notion that China should treat all states in the exact same way. He explains that since the 1980s, Chinese foreign policy has “watered down any notion of friends and enemies” . He then compares relations between countries to simple interpersonal relations. “Could a person recognize and develop friendly relations with all other people?” Xu asks, and then answers: “Obviously, that is not possible.” He then states emphatically that Russia and Pakistan have a certain friendly and helpful disposition toward China, while Japan and Philippines certainly do not. He then warns: “Countries that are engaged in strategic confrontation with China should not be treated with kindness.” An implication of this argument may well be a more realist, hard-headed disposition in Beijing, which could even entail the formation of new, countervailing alliances.
The end of Xu’s article has a rather detailed analysis of the Sino-Soviet dispute that developed in the late 1950s and nearly resulted in a war between Moscow and Beijing in the late 1960s. His focus on that history seems wholly justified, since he maintains that this is the preeminent case in the minds of Chinese foreign policy analysts when they think about an alliance gone dreadfully wrong. He points out several reasons for the steady decline of the Sino-Soviet alliance under Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. First, Xu cites “leadership personalities” as a significant problem for managing the erstwhile alliance, but he also discusses “ideology” and “the lack of experience in both countries in managing such an alliance.” He argues that these factors are not likely to inhibit China’s ability to manage alliances in the future. Thus, he thinks Chinese diplomacy going forward will be pragmatic, and thus “will forgo participation in such a type of ideological alliance”.
In a final demonstration of intellectual boldness, this Chinese scholar calls on Chinese foreign policy elites to study Western practice with respect to alliance formation. He observes: “From now on, China has to study how to lead other people. Leading the world, however, is no easy feat. In that respect, we had better study the experience of the British and the Americans.” He further states that “as an alliance leader, the United States was quite a bit more lenient than the Soviet Union, and its leadership practice proved wiser.”
At the end of the article, the clarion call for alliance building and leadership is substantially reigned in. Earlier in the piece, Xu had noted that more than thirty years of steady economic growth show that the disposition to “reject alliances” under Deng Xiaoping’s famous dictum to “conceal one’s strength and bide one’s time” has enjoyed significant success. He contends that Beijing’s current inclination to form partnerships . rather than alliances, suits China’s current circumstances. However, Xu is quite clear that he doesn’t want alliances, as a tool of diplomacy, to be taken off the table of China’s future options.
One cannot be entirely pessimistic reading this innovative article, which demonstrates a dynamic debate underway among Beijing’s academic strategists. Moreover, it is rational and relatively moderate in its tone. The author demonstrates plenty admiration for American diplomacy and, especially, the United States’ management of alliances. Nevertheless, such a line of argumentation could encourage strategic pessimists in Beijing to push for creation of a genuine alliance, encompassing such important powers as Russia and Iran, for example. That would be an alarming development for the world order, to be sure. Those thinkers on both sides of the Pacific (and the Atlantic for that matter) concerned about preventing a new Cold War from taking shape need to take steps to arrest such disturbing tendencies.
About the author- Lyle J. Goldstein is Associate Professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. The opinions expressed in this analysis are his own and do not represent the official assessments of the U.S. Navy or any other agency of the U.S. Government.
Original link to the article- http://nationalinterest.org/feature/does-china-need-allies-15634
Tuesday, March 29, 2016
Monday, March 28, 2016
FGFA may be armed with BrahMos cruise missiles ( Source- Russia & India Report / Sputnik)
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| Sukhoi T-50 ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Alex Beltyukov) |
Source- Russia & India Report / Sputnik
A supersonic BrahMos cruise missile may be installed on a Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) jointly developed by Russia and India, head of the Russian-Indian BrahMos Aerospace enterprise, Sudhir Mishra, said Monday.
The FGFA has stealth capabilities and is based on the Russian T-50 prototype jet. The FGFA project came about following the signing of a Russian-Indian cooperation agreement on October 18, 2007.
"We are presenting BrahMos to many Indian public and private defense companies, from some of them we get a technical job. We presented it also to developers of the FGFA — they asked to adjust the size of the missile, so it can be placed on board the aircraft. Such work is ongoing," Mishra told RIA Novosti during the exhibition Defexpo India 2016.
He also said that four nations are negotiating the purchase of the supersonic BrahMos cruise missiles.
"Defense export is a very sensitive subject, we cannot say much without permission of our governments. However, I can say that currently consultations are being held with four foreign countries," Mishra told RIA Novosti.
He did not specify which nations are interested in buying the missiles.
BrahMos is a short-range supersonic missile, which has been used by the Indian Navy since 2005. The missile has a range of 180 miles and can carry a conventional warhead of up to 660 pounds.
BrahMos Aerospace was formed by India’s Defense Research and Development Organization and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyenia. It produces weapons systems using Russian and Indian technology.
First published by Sputnik.
Original link to the article- http://in.rbth.com/news/2016/03/28/russian-indian-pak-fa-may-be-armed-with-brahmos-cruise-missiles_579605
More Bear Than Eagle: Russia Taking Advantage Of American Vacuum – Analysis ( Source- Eurasia Review, Modern Diplomacy / Author- Ninad Drca)
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| Russian cabinet meeting ( Image credits- VOA) |
Source- Eurasian Review, Modern Diplomacy
Author- Nenad DRCA
It is evident that the US cannot fight DAESH as if there is no complex war raging in Syria. Considering the conditions on the ground, the US administration must address not only how to degrade and destroy DAESH, but how US policy can help restore stability across the Syrian state.
It must do both by being diplomatically active in engaging all major actors in play in the region. For America, Russia and Iran cannot be allowed to set diplomatic precedence in Syria and Iraq and be the leaders. The United States must formulate integrated strategy that would involve Washington in any major diplomatic discussions regarding potential political solutions. So far this is not the case. This new approach will require expanded engagement with the Syrian players, both domestic and foreign, in order to improve possibilities for change.
Without inclusion of the Russian side, it will be more likely to undermine Western plans and potentially drag America into protracted and chaotic proxy war. Once it was clear that Syrian leader Assad would not step down easily, US policy did not adapt nor did policymakers create a viable alternative strategy to achieve its goals. It is apparent that Syria is becoming a geopolitical Chernobyl, spreading violence and fanaticism across the region. Once DAESH is eliminated any new strategy must aim to achieve an immediate drop in violence by coordinating a ceasefire across all sides. The difficulty is going to be determining the political price for the elimination of DAESH.
American political and military lethargy in Syria should be viewed as a result of having no compelling strategy that could push for deeper effective involvement. This must no longer be the case, as the US must work towards curbing further spillover of the Syrian crisis, which has brought refugee mayhem to Europe. Now US allies in Europe must contend with the massive potential threat emerging. The United States and European Union should use a combination of assertive military initiatives and broad diplomatic approaches to establish communication with all major regional actors. The United States must pressure Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey to halt financial and weapons assistance to their groups of choice within Iraq and Syria. Both the EU and US can use an integrated strategy that includes arms embargos, economic sanctions and rewards, and airstrikes.
Keeping Russian pride in mind, cooperation is possible by working parallel, coordinated air strikes and other operations for maximum effect against DAESH. In April, Foreign Minister Lavrov called it “the main threat” to Russia today. Jihadists who live in Russia’s North Caucasus have switched their allegiance to DAESH and declared their regions as part of the DAESH provincial network. Russia is worried that the Syrian Assad regime could be replaced by a worse Islamic extremist force. The collapse of governments in Libya and Iraq is used by Russia to affirm such concerns. The United States should use this shared fear to motivate Russia and the EU to work together with it. This is an opportunity for America to develop a new diplomatic path and establish new beneficial connections to Russia and come out as a cohesive positive influence. But so far this has frustratingly not happened.
Former deputy director of the CIA Michael Morell said that any strategy should probably include working with Syrian President Bashar Assad and Russia. The reason for this approach is that proxy war with Russia will not help America and it will not decimate terrorist groups that are more important in the immediate-term. The priority for all involved sides right now must be the absolute destruction of DAESH and its allies. DAESH has clearly achieved capacity to strike the EU and it has the same plans for the United States. The question whether President Assad needs to go can be tackled in a post-DAESH world.
The fight against radical Islam is something that the EU, Russia, and even China support. There is a potential to use this international sentiment to start working on new diplomatic relationships. While some countries can help militarily, many more can help financially by providing supplies or impeding DAESH financial networks. After multiple brutal terror attacks in France and now Brussels, the EU is out of time and must act as soon as possible on new ideas. Meanwhile, the United States must stop appearing hamstrung by the continued lack of valid partners on the ground in Syria, whether diplomatically or militarily. Too much time and resources are wasted and it is only adding to the image of the US being indecisive and even impotent.
Continued diplomatic dialogue should present realistic and achievable goals that many countries find attractive. At the moment most countries want DAESH to be eliminated. But the United States should not allow Russia to continue to lead the way in military and diplomatic action. It should be a primary part of all regional high level negotiations, which at the moment it is not. The current rigid and recalcitrant American strategy should be abandoned. The Middle East must understand that America will be the part of any solution no matter what. That is something Iran should be reminded of due to its recent political and military assertions.
At the moment, the EU lacks cohesive leadership that can mandate decisions and act in a timely manner. Sometimes it can take the EU a very long time to agree on something urgent. Following the recent attacks in Paris and Brussels, it remains to be seen if NATO can react according to its accord of mutual protection. If it doesn’t, then some of America’s prime European partners might start looking more toward Russia as a strategic partner. For example, British Prime Minister David is open to offering compromises on the future of Syrian President Assad in return for Russian help targeting DAESH. French President Hollande will travel to Washington and Moscow to discuss ways of increasing international cooperation in the fight against DAESH, not just Washington. The United States must act to avoid losing leadership position to Russia in this fight against terrorism. Putin is more than willing to exploit the void left by Washington in Syria and Iraq. Both France and the UK cannot single-handedly defeat domestic or international terrorist threats. They are now painfully aware that they both need foreign assistance in this desperate struggle. So what remains to be seen is who is going to step up to that desperate need in REAL terms: America or Russia? Disturbingly, so far in real terms the answer seems to be more bear than eagle.
About the author: Nenad Drca is a former military trilingual linguist who worked across many nations over eight years. He lived and worked on three continents. This experience gave him a deep appreciation for intelligence community. After graduating with BA in Psychology he returned to work for the US Army as a DOD civilian. He expects to graduate next March with Master of Science in International Security and Intelligence Studies degree.
Source: This article was published by Modern Diplomacy
Original link to the article- http://www.eurasiareview.com/28032016-more-bear-than-eagle-russia-taking-advantage-of-american-vacuum-analysis/
Russia's Next Super Submarine Is Almost Ready for War ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Dave Majumdar)
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| Yasen class SSN at launch ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Kremlin) |
Source- The National Interest
Author- Dave Majumdar
The Russian Navy’s first Project-885 Yasen-class nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine, K-329 Severodvinsk, is set to deploy on its first combat training mission.
The new submarine recently completed operational testing after being accepted into service in June 2014. Prior to that, the boat had been undergoing pre-delivery sea trials since September 2011.
“Operations trials of the Severodvinsk submarine are over and the submarine is ready to fulfill its designated missions,” Russian Northern Fleet spokesman Vadim Serga told the Moscow-based TASS news agency. “The Severodvinsk’s crew is currently completing measures necessary to put the submarine into service and to take to sea for planned combat training sessions."
Severodvinsk and her more advanced Project-885M sister ships are capable vessels. “We’ll be facing tough potential opponents. One only has to look at the Severodvinsk, Russia’s version of a [nuclear guided missile submarine] (SSGN). I am so impressed with this ship that I had Carderock build a model from unclassified data.” Rear Adm. Dave Johnson, Naval Sea Systems Command’s (NAVSEA) program executive officer (PEO) submarines said during the 2014 Naval Submarine League’s symposium in Falls Church, Va. “The rest of the world’s undersea capability never stands still.”
Severodvinsk leverages many of the automation technologies the Soviet Union invested in during the 1970s and 1980s with the Project 705 Lira-class boats—better known by their NATO-code name as the Alfa-class. The Alfa-class submarines—which were built with a titanium hull and liquid-metal cooled reactor—were the fastest and deepest diving operational submarines ever built—save for the lone Soviet Project 661 Anchar-class (NATO: Papa-class) boat. As such, the 13,800-ton, 390-foot long, submarine is highly automated vessel with a crew of only 32 officers and 58 enlisted submariners.
The U.S. Naval Institute’s Combat Fleets of the World noted that some reports suggest the vessel might have a maximum speed of between 35 and 40 knots. It is far quieter than previous Russian submarines and has a maximum “silent” speed of about 20 knots. Like most new nuclear submarine designs, Severodvinsk reactor is designed to last for the life of the boat.
According to the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), while the new Russian submarine is quieter than the Improved Los Angeles-class boats, the new vessel is not quite as silent as the Seawolf or Virginia-class. However, the Russians were always only lagging slightly behind the U.S. in quieting technology according to Navy sources.
Unlike most Soviet submarine designs, the Yasen-class boats do not make use of a double-hull—instead it has hybrid design with a lighter structure over the vessel’s pressure hull according to Russian media reports. Another unique feature for a Russian vessel is that it incorporates a spherical bow sonar called the Irtysh-Amfora for the first time. As a result, Severodvinsk has its torpedo tubes located at about mid-ship like U.S. submarines. The vessel has eight torpedo tubes, four of which are 650mm tubes while the rest are 533mm tubes. Combat Fleets of the World estimates that the Yasen-class may carry as many as 30 torpedoes.
But the Russians are well aware that time has not stood still since 1993 when Severodvinsk was laid down. The Russian navy is set to take delivery of an improved Project 885M Yasen-class attack submarine in 2016 according to Russian state media, which is named after the city of Kazan. The new Project 885M boat incorporates many improvements over Severodvinsk. Kazan is expected to have improved sensors and weapon systems compared to Severodvinsk. It is also likely to be quieter than Severodvinsk. The Russian navy hopes to procure a minimum of eight Yasen-class attack boats. Four boats have been ordered thus far with a third vessel, Novosibirsk, having been laid down in July 2013.
While the Project 885M is an impressive and very capable vessel, it is not quite an equal to the latest American Virginia-class boats in terms of acoustical or sensor performance. In terms of raw performance, the Severodvinsk and her sisters are likely more similar to the U.S. Navy’s three Seawolf-class attack boats, which according to Navy sources were designed specifically to counter late generation Soviet vessel like the Project 941 Akula—also known more commonly as the Typhoon— Project 971 Shchuka-B (oddly code-named Akula by NATO) and the Project 945 Sierra-class boats.
The Yasen-class boats are fast, heavily armed and deep diving—and ideally the United States would have more Seawolf-class vessels to handle them. The Virginia-class subs don’t have the deep diving, high-speed open ocean performance of the Seawolf-class, but it should be enough to handle the handful of Project 885Ms that Russia builds.
Meanwhile, the Russians are working on a next-generation submarine to replace the Project 949A Antey (Oscar II) and Project 945 Sierra-class boats. Construction should start in the 2020s if Russia’s economy recovers.
About the author- Dave Majumdar is the defense editor for The National Interest. You can follow him on Twitter: @davemajumdar.
Original link to the article- http://www.nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russias-next-super-submarine-almost-ready-war-15610
Sunday, March 27, 2016
The South China Sea's ‘White-Hull’ Warfare ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Koh Swee Lean Collin)
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| Credits- China.org |
Source- The National Interest
Author- Koh Swee Lean Collin
Coast guard–type forces, commonly called “white hulls,” ought to constitute a stabilizing presence compared to regular navy forces (or “grey hulls”), as sea-power theorist Harold Kearsley wrote in Maritime Power and the Twenty-First Century in 1992. “White hulls” do not convey the same overtly militaristic, war-fighting impression as regular naval forces employed for this purpose.
But theory can only go so far when the parties concerned have a different, or even revisionist, interpretation. China, for one, has quashed Kearsley’s idea. The recurring South China Sea incidents are illustrative: no longer are “white hulls” more dovish than their naval counterparts. In some cases, the coast guard can prove to be aggressive while the navy is relatively docile.
Outside Asia, the last notable instance of a coast guard exhibiting unusually aggressive behavior was Iceland’s coast guard, the Landhelgisgæslan, which not only relentlessly chased after foreign trawlers in the North Atlantic, even cutting their fishing nets, but also challenged more heavily armed foreign navies during the infamous Cod Wars. One such notable confrontation took place in June 1973, when the seventy-meter ICGV Ægir rammed into British frigate HMS Scylla, which is 113 meters long and has more than twice the Landhelgisgæslan gunboat’s nearly 1,200-ton displacement, at 2,500 tonnes.
White Hulls in Southeast Asia
The contemporary China Coast Guard (CCG) is perhaps a more aggressive rendition of the Cod War–era Landhelgisgæslan. One major difference is that the CCG and its two predecessor agencies—China Marine Surveillance and Fishery Law Enforcement Command—are dealing with comparatively weaker Southeast Asian rivals in the South China Sea.
Southeast Asian governments have generally devoted limited resources to navies and paid even less attention to “white hulls.” This first changed during the early 2000s, when the region witnessed a scourge of piracy, sea robberies and other transnational maritime crimes, leading to the emergence of new or expanded coast guard–type agencies. The Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) was formed in 2005. Indonesia renamed its existing coordinating agency BAKAMLA in 2014. The newly formed Vietnam Fisheries Resource Surveillance joined the Vietnam Coast Guard in 2013.
These coast guard agencies are meant to alleviate navies’ peacetime constabulary burden and facilitate a legal approach in enforcing maritime sovereignty and jurisdictional rights, as granted by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Compared to the 326-vessel CCG (including one hundred offshore-capable assets), these agencies were much smaller in size by the end of 2015, according to the latest Military Balance 2016. Their assets are also mostly ill-equipped inshore and coastal craft, which may suffice against criminals at sea, but are essentially helpless against a larger, better-equipped coast guard adversary in an offshore environment. The recent Sino-Indonesian standoff in waters off the Natuna Islands is just one incident that amply illustrates the severe limitations of Southeast Asian coast guards.
Persistent Capacity Shortfalls
Indeed, Indonesia's BAKAMLA musters over one hundred vessels under various subordinate agencies. But the overwhelming majority are suited for inshore and coastal duties, like the fishery patrol craft HIU-011, which was involved in the latest incident. Fewer than ten are offshore patrol vessels (OPVs). While the navy remains keen to perform constabulary duties, its offshore assets are disproportionately too few for the colossal Indonesian archipelago. In any case, only three of the navy’s seven ships are stationed at the islands, the bulk of enforcement work being left to the under-equipped BAKAMLA assets.
Of Malaysia’s 190-strong MMEA fleet, only two vessels are OPVs capable of enforcing Kuala Lumpur’s offshore claims. They are about thirty years old, and simply too few in number. The navy first responded to China’s intrusion off the South Luconia Shoals in September 2013. According to the hansard of a parliament Senate session in December 2015, the navy and MMEA conducted 191 and seventy-eight patrols, respectively, to monitor the Chinese off the shoals in 2014; in 2015, they each conducted 241 and 104. The MMEA clearly needs more offshore-capable assets, but the seven recently approved OPVs will take time to enter service, and may not suffice for Malaysia's vast maritime zone.
The seventy-two-strong Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) fleet counts only five offshore-capable assets. The navy therefore bears the brunt of South China Sea enforcement duties, and the ensuing humiliations too. Reminiscent of the Icelandic coast guard face-off with Royal Navy during the Cod Wars, smaller Chinese coast guard vessels thwarted attempts by the Philippine Navy ship, BRP Gregorio del Pilar, from apprehending Chinese fishermen at the Scarborough Shoal in April 2012. Since then, Chinese coast guards maintained vigil at the shoal while Manila kept its navy away. But the PCG is obviously outmatched by its Chinese counterpart, thereby ceding de facto administration of the shoal to Beijing.
Finally, Vietnam is in a better position, since its fewer than fifty coast guard vessels include slightly more than ten offshore-capable assets. Yet this shortfall was acutely felt during the oil rig standoff with China between May and July 2014. In the first place, because of their small physical sizes, Vietnam’s coast guard vessels lack the necessary endurance, and so need to be constantly rotated in order to sustain a Vietnamese presence. To illustrate, one Chinese OPV possesses the same endurance equivalent to two smaller Vietnamese craft deployed in rotation. Essentially, Vietnam's coast guard capacity was “maxed out,” imposing strains on existing assets given the high operational tempo, compromising normal maintenance routines.
Out-Deployed, Out-Maneuvered and Out-Built by China?
Knowing this, China appears confident of success in the South China Sea. Its calculations paid off; not only are its Southeast Asian rivals incapable of fielding any coast guard that can match it in numbers and quality, but they also avoid deploying navies. Even when they do send in the grey hulls, these forces behave cautiously. In any case, they are well aware that the Chinese navy is too superior to trifle with. When Admiral Scott Swift, chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, warned of a “palpable sense” in the region that "might makes right" has taken root as a philosophy, he was correct.
Remember one of James Cable’s astute observations in the seminal work Gunboat Diplomacy: sheer size matters. The side with the larger fleet and superior vessels prevails. This is a sobering reality played out in the South China Sea incidents: larger coast guard ships can furnish Beijing a “stabilizing” and “defensive” veneer to justify its own strategic narrative of being “victimized” in the disputes.
But the recent South China Sea incidents symbolize the common issues Southeast Asia faces when building maritime security capacities: insufficient funding, occasional lack of political will and, for some, endemic corruption. China has a larger baseline capacity to begin with, not to mention the requisite resources and shipbuilding capability to expand its coast guard, including more offshore-capable assets that displace three thousand tons and more. Nonetheless, if Southeast Asian governments wish to enforce their maritime sovereignty and jurisdictional rights, the least they can do to beat the odds is to focus on more cost-effective, offshore coast guard capabilities instead of expensive toys for the militaries.
Koh Swee Lean Collin is associate research fellow at the Institute of Strategic and Defence Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies based in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Collin primarily researches on naval affairs in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on Southeast Asia (see here). He can be reached at iscollinkoh@ntu.edu.sg .
Original link to the article- http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-south-china-seas-%E2%80%98white-hull%E2%80%99-warfare-15604
Will the EU-Turkey Deal Work? ( Source- IDSA / Author- K.P Fabian)
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| European Union- Turkey deal on Syria ( Image credits- VOA/ Author) |
Source- IDSA
Author- K.P Fabian
After long negotiations in Brussels, Turkey and the 28-member European Union (EU) have signed a deal on Syrian refugees that is both complex and controversial. The deal was inked at the EU headquarters on March 18, with the Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu beaming and his EU counterparts looking relieved, but far from beaming. Turkey has extracted a good deal for itself from the EU. The EU found itself in a weak negotiating position, overwhelmed by the inundation of Syrian refugees coming from Turkey threatening its very foundations, the Schengen Agreement and much more. At the same time, it is difficult to dismiss the thought that the EU could have played a smarter game with its weak hand. While it is too soon to say whether the deal is going to work out to the satisfaction of its makers, primarily, President Erdogan of Turkey and Chancellor Merkel of Germany, there are serious flaws and none should be surprised if it falls through and seriously hurts the two principal deal-makers politically, Merkel much more than Erdogan, not to mention the mounting misery of the helpless human beings in question.
Before we look at the substance of the deal, let us see why and how Europe finds itself in a vulnerable situation. Was it possible for the EU to have handled the refugee crisis in a smarter way? Let us start with a thought experiment: EU has a population of 500 million. It decides to accept refugees from Syria and elsewhere up to 0.5 per cent of its population – 2.5 million – and decides to distribute them among its member states based on population, with the poorer states getting financial support from the EU based on an agreed formula. The EU, having accepted to take in 2.5 million, puts diplomatic pressure on the US, Canada, GCC and other Arab states to take care of the remaining refugees, if needed.
As it happened, when the flow of refugees from Syria sharply increased in 2015, only Germany, Austria, and Sweden came forward to accept them. The picture of a three-year-old Kurdish boy, Aylan Kurdi, whose body was washed up on the coast of Bodrun in Turkey splashed across the media on 3 September 2015 put pressure on some EU leaders to accept more refugees and to address the crisis on a war footing. Aylan’s father, Abdullah, had paid Euro 4000 for a flimsy boat, without lifeboats, that sank killing his wife and two sons including Aylan. According to Abdullah, the boat’s bottom had holes and, within 500 metres from the starting point, it started to collect water and nothing could have been done to prevent the sinking. They were on a 10 km journey to the Greek island of Lesbos.
Merkel went to the border with Hungary and welcomed the Syrian refugees who sang her praise. She announced what is known in Germany as willkommenspolitik (welcome policy) and was nominated as the Person of the Year for 2015 by Time magazine for her leading role in bringing out an agreement between Greece and EU on the debt owed by Greece and for welcoming refugees fleeing strife-torn Syria. Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Caliph of the Islamic State, was the runner up. The explanation is that the criterion is not the moral quality but the importance of the impact of the person. Merkel was a strong contender for the Nobel Peace Prize that ultimately went to Tunisia’s civil society.
Merkel negotiated the deal with Davotuglu and passed it on to EU, which obliged her by endorsing it. Essentially, the deal has four elements:
Turkey will accept back any asylum seeker who comes to Greece from Turkey if Greece/EU after due process rejects the claim of asylum. In return, EU will accept another Syrian refugee in Turkey after due process. The intended message to the asylum seekers is that anyone who was deported to Turkey will not be accepted. The intention is to discourage asylum seekers from setting out on boats to Lesbos and Chios, the Greek islands close to Turkey.
EU will process rapidly Turkey’s request for visa-free entry into the Schengen area for a positive decision by the end of June 2016. Turkey has already fulfilled 35 out of the 72 requirements and once all the requirements are completed the EU Parliament will be asked to enact the necessary legislation.
Turkey will receive a total of Euro 6 billion by 2018 to spend on Syrian refugees in its own territory. Turkey will let Syrians take up employment or start businesses.
EU will exert itself to facilitate Turkey’s admission to EU as early as feasible.
Amnesty International and other Human Rights bodies have already criticised the deal. The crux of the criticism is that the EU has no business to send back asylum seekers to Turkey since it is not a safe country. Turkey has not signed up in full to the UN Convention on refugees and it has, in violation of international law, sent back to Syria a number of Syrians. It is reasonably clear that Turkey does not qualify to be considered as a safe country where the refugees can get the protection they are entitled to under international law. Equally, it is clear that EU, which has been till recently exhorting Turkey to improve its human rights record, has been blackmailed by Erdogan into dealing with him even as he methodically moves his country away from democracy.
The moral bankruptcy as well as the legal flaw of the deal is as clear as daylight. Let us examine the deal from a practical point of view. 1600 Syrians have reached Lesbos and Chios within 36 hours of the coming into force of the agreement. Turkey has prevented 200 from sailing. 10 Turkish monitors have reached Lesbos and some Greeks are upset over the presence of these Turks in the island. EU had promised to send 2500 or 4000 (both figures have been mentioned in reports) officials including interpreters to Lesbos/Chios to examine and decide on the claims for asylum. The officials are not yet in place. If the claim for asylum is rejected, there is scope for an appeal and the intention is to dispose off the appeal fast and send back to Greece, if possible, everyone who came in after 20 March.
Suppose the asylum seekers refuse to go back and start a hunger strike? What will EU do? Use force? Obviously, there is scope for ugly scenes with all the attendant consequences.
There is another practical consideration. If the Lesbos/Chios route is closed, the asylum seekers will seek other routes, say from Libya to Italy. Will EU replicate the deal to take care of the flood of refugees into Italy? Will the deal be with Libya that has two governments and two parliaments, or with Turkey once again?
The only effective way to stop the flow of refugees is for Turkey to confiscate all boats or use brute force to prevent Syrians from going to the coast. Perhaps, Turkey might do that after a while after extracting more concessions from EU, perhaps secretly. The question is whether Turkey is entitled to prevent refugees from leaving its territory by using force? Does international law give Turkey the authority to do that? What will be the impact on public opinion in Europe if European media carry the story? One might assume that Erdogan might succeed in silencing the Turkish media by intimidation.
Let us look at the project for visa-free entry into the Schengen area for Turkish passport holders. As Erdogan’s harsh measures on Kurds get harsher, a large number of Kurds might come to Germany and try to settle down. Some German political leaders have already given vent to their concerns in this regard. Since the project requires approval by the European Parliament, will it approve it or place conditions on Erdogan to stop the violation of human rights of the Kurds and the shutting down of newspapers? How will he react to such an admonishment?
As regards Turkey’s admission into EU, there is strong opposition among Europeans to taking that country in. Should the admission of Turkey require approval through referendum, will all the 28 member states, including Cyprus, approve it? Turkey accepted associate membership of the European Economic Community in 1959 since it was not going to get full membership. In 1987 it applied for membership and the EU took 12 years to recognise Turkey as a candidate. Negotiations have been going on at a pace that will put a snail to shame and only one of the 35 chapters has been closed. EC President Jean-Claude Juncker affirmed before his election that Turkey would not be admitted under his presidency. He reiterated his position after his election. Merkel herself has been arguing against full membership and offering only privileged partnership. In June 2013, Germany asked, and the EU agreed, to put off talks with Turkey by four months. All told, Turkey is unlikely to get membership in the foreseeable future.
Another important matter to bear in mind is that Merkel, 61, in office for ten years, has peaked and her popular support has started falling. In the recent state elections in Baden-Wurttemberg, Saxony-Anhalt, and Rhineland Palatinate, a new party named ‘Alternative for Germany’ got 1.3 million votes on an anti-Merkel platform. Merkel’s Bavarian partner CDU (Christian Democratic Union) has openly criticised her. If Merkel loses political ground in Germany her position as the most powerful person in EU will change.
Meanwhile, Erdogan has not stopped lambasting the EU. He said on 22 March, “This EU has officially designated the PKK (Syrian Workers Party) as terror organization. So how come it allows this terror organization to erect tents and raise flags. Is this sincerity? Is this honesty? The EU, which has made Turkey wait at its door since 1963, still continues its hypocrisy today.” He has vowed to continue voicing his criticisms if this situation persists.
In short, the Merkel-Erdogan deal might prove to be unimplementable and its moral bankruptcy and legal imperfections cannot be denied. If the deal falls through, serious consequences will follow not only for the two leaders, but also for the millions of human beings unfortunate enough to be born under the Syrian sky. German critics of Merkel might be reminded of the disastrous deal between Dr. Faustus and Mephistopheles in the work of Germany’s most famous writer Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.
About the author- K. P. Fabian retired from the Indian Foreign Service in 2000, when he was ambassador to Italy and PR to UN. His book Commonsense on War on Iraq was published in 2003.
Original link to the article- http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/will-the-eu-turkey-deal-work_kpfabian_230316
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