Sunday, July 31, 2016

China Will Hold its Fire in the South China Sea — Until September ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Harry J. Kazianis)

Credits-Internet image


Over at the Washington Post, acclaimed columnist David Ignatius takes on the always tumultuous tides roiling the South China Sea. Ignatius points out the scope of Beijing’s defeat in the recent international court case brought by Manila, noting that while most that follow professionally this important part of the world were of the collective mind China would lose in some fashion, but no one (myself included) thought Beijing would lose so badly. Score one for the “rules-based international order.”


But it’s what happens next that is key. And to be clear, China will respond — and respond with a vengeance.

However, as Ignatius points out, at least for now, while Beijing has only stepped up the rhetoric and seems content to take selfies of its bombers over what could be its next island reclamation project in the South China Sea, the hotly contested Scarborough Shoal, China is not exactly in a position to respond — at least not right now. But come September, the timing could not be any better for what could be a big reaction that the world might not even notice.

G-20 Summit + A Presidential Election = A Time of Troubles for Asia:

Why the delayed response you ask? The timing for a forceful reaction, at least in a strategic sense, is far from ideal.

Remember, Beijing is set to host the G-20 Summit for the first time on September 4-5 in the city of Hangzhou. Always looking to enhance its status as a rising superpower as well as play the part that China is the ultimate partner nation and never one to start trouble, Beijing will follow a carefully well scripted playbook in the South China Sea — lots of fiery talk and signaling, but no escalatory steps for the time being. China would not want to risk having any drama at this prestigious gathering — beyond what could occur already when it comes to tensions in Asia. Why rock the boat and lose face? Now is simply not the time for a squabble. I would argue Beijing has every incentive to hold its fire until after the summit.

But the plot thickens from there, adding more reason to the argument that Beijing is holding back for the right time to respond. Why not take advantage of the daily media drama show that is the US Presidential election cycle and save any escalatory moves in the South China Sea so they simply get buried in the news cycle?

There could not be a better time to start trouble in the South China Sea, at a time when the United States—truly the only nation that could really deter Beijing from troublemaking — will be very much distracted in the business of selecting its next Commander-in-Chief. American as well as global media will be very much focused on the battles to come between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, whether it’s the upcoming presidential debates or the latest scandal of the day.

Even if China were to declare a South China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) or start reclamation work at Scarborough Shoal, there is a good chance it would get much less coverage when the world is following the every tweet, speech and controversy over the race for the White House. So for China, that might just be the best time to pounce, when the world’s collective gaze is simply somewhere else.

We must also consider this: with a change of power looming in America and uncertainty over who will win as well as additional uncertainty over what their positions will be when it comes to Asia, Beijing might gamble now is the time to move. It might also feel it could get away with a little more drama now against an Obama administration that wants to leave its time in office not embroiled in a crisis in Asia. As they say, timing is everything.

A Time to Prepare:

For China, there might not be a better time to raise tensions and cement their claims in the South China Sea. Oh what Beijing will you do? Or maybe a better question: are the nations around the South China Sea and in the greater Indo-Pacific region preparing? It seems they should.

Harry J. Kazianis is a Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at the Center for the National Interest and Senior Editor at The National Interest Magazine. You can follow him on Twitter: @Grecianformula.

This first appeared in AsiaTimes here

© THE NATIONAL INTEREST ( ALL RIGHTS RESERVED)

Wednesday, July 27, 2016

HAL Has Capacity To Produce 8 LCA Tejas Per Annum

Does India really need Russia’s ‘Backfire’ bomber? ( Source- Russia & India Report)

Russian Air Force TU-22 M Bomber ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Dmitriy Pichugin)


The Indian Air Force has a variety of specialised fighters, ground attack jets and multirole aircraft in its fleet, but a strategic bomber has never figured in its war plans. According to the Russian wire service Interfax, that could change as India’s Ministry of Defence has reportedly sought to buy four Tupolev Tu-22M3 maritime strike bombers from Russia.

This isn’t the first time reports have surfaced that India is interested in acquiring this fearsome Cold Warrior – codenamed Backfire by NATO. According to the Federation of American scientists, “In December 1999 it was announced that India would lease four Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers, with the aircraft slated to arrive in India as early as June 2000.” They never did.

However, the first time the Backfire was set to fly into the subcontinent was in mid-1971 when Russia offered it as a strategic bomber. However, Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lal rejected the offer.

India seeks four strategic bombers from Russia

Defence analyst Bharat Karnad said, the “reasons trotted out verged on the farcical”. Karnad explains: “As Wing Commander (later Air Marshal) C.V. Gole, member of the Air Marshal Shivdev Singh Mission to Moscow and test pilot, who flew the Tu-22(M) informed me, he was appalled by the fact that he had to be winched up into the cockpit, and that the plane would have to take off from as far east as Bareilly to reach cruising altitude over Pakistan!”

Although the Backfire has been creating panic in American carrier groups for decades (the Chinese have also tried hard to buy the bomber or its design blueprints), which is an indication of its utility, the IAF has refused to accept what has been offered to it on a platter. It prefers to remain bogged down at the theatre level while steadfastly refusing to grow a strategic wing.

Armed and dangerous

To be sure, the Backfire is a completely different species of aircraft compared with the IAF’s current fleet, and a doctrinal transplant would have to happen before the IAF brass can envision a role for a long-range strike bomber.

The Tu-22M is an extremely large aircraft flown by a four-man crew of a pilot, co-pilot, navigator and weapon systems operator. With its phenomenal combat range of 2400 km, and a blistering speed of over 2300 kph (faster than most jet fighters), the Tu-22M is ideal for targeting aircraft carriers and large ships. Russian tests reveal that when a shaped charge warhead weighing 1000 kg was used in the Kh-22 missile, the resulting hole measured 16 ft in diameter and 40 ft deep. Not even the largest US Navy CVNs can survive such an impact, and at the very least will be out of commission of months.

The bomber is designed to take off from secure inland bases, be vectored towards US aircraft carrier groups and fire its complement of up to six – often nuclear-tipped – cruise missiles from safe standoff distances.

The Backfire’s primary weapon is the supersonic Raduga Kh-22 cruise missile. In high-altitude mode, it climbs to the edge of space (89,000 ft) and makes a near hypersonic speed dive towards its target. In low-altitude mode, it climbs to 39,000 ft (higher than most commercial airliners) and makes a shallow dive at Mach 3.5, making the final approach at an altitude under 1600 ft.

New long-range Russian bomber to be different

Bill Sweetman and Bill Gunston write in ‘Soviet Air Power’ that the Kh-22 missile could be “programmed to enter the correct Pentagon window”. In fact, during the 1980s, Russian Naval Aviation was so sure about the accuracy of these missiles that the Backfire carried only one Kh-22, armed with a nuclear warhead.

Today’s Backfires are also equipped with the more advanced Kh-15. This missile climbs to an astounding 130,000 ft and then dives in on the target, accelerating to Mach 5, which makes it the world’s fastest aircraft-launched missile.

Just like the MiG-25 spooked western air force pilots of a previous generation, the Backfire was a big scare word in western military circles during the 1970s. American experts involved in arms limitation talks believed it was an intercontinental strategic bomber. Russian secrecy about the aircraft’s capabilities added to the speculation, leading American intelligence and US aircraft manufacturers (for obvious reasons) to suggest inflated ranges. This led to fears that the Backfire could strike the continental US.

However, even when the Russians added in-flight refuelling capability, the Backfire wasn’t intended to strike the US, but rather its naval assets in the open sea. Russian Naval Aviation strategists envisioned up to a hundred Tu-22M bombers making a pack attack against US Navy carrier battle groups in the event of war.

Backfire for India

Built at the peak of the Cold War when speed, payload and range mattered more than cost, the heavy Backfire is expensive to operate and maintain. The general consensus was that deploying it against high value assets alone makes sense. However, Russia used it with devastating effect against the Afghan Mujahideen in the 1980s, and in the 2008 Georgian War, with its iconic moment when Georgia’s tie-chewing President Mikheil Saakashvili runs for cover as Russian bombers fly overhead.

Again, in the ongoing conflict in Syria, Backfires have rained freefall bombs, destroying Daesh assets as well as US-backed terror groups. These strikes have severely degraded Daesh strength in the region.

Since the IAF has at least 400 attack aircraft, including the Sukhoi Su-30MKI, MiG-29 and Mirage-2000, that have Pakistan sorted, deploying the Backfire against Pakistan would be a huge overkill. Using limited numbers against Chinese land targets would be suicidal as Beijing has a robust air defence network bolstered by the Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missile and its Chinese knockoffs.

The Backfire’s only conceivable deployment in India is as a maritime strike bomber against People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) assets, especially in the backdrop of growing Chinese naval activity in the Indian Ocean.

Backfires operating from the Thanjavur Air Force Base in southern India – and armed with the 300 km range BrahMos – can comfortably strike naval assets up to Seychelles. They can also be used to target PLAN vessels operating in the South China Sea. The bomber’s ferry of 6800 km means it can reach Darwin, Australia, without aerial refuelling. Clearly, such an aircraft would be a huge force multiplier for India.

If the media reports about India wanting a limited number of just four Backfires are true, then it would suggest they would be deployed in a maritime – rather than strategic – strike role. The bombers are equipped to receive data directly from spy satellites monitoring the oceans. India, which has a constellation of ocean survey and spy satellites, can access real time satellite intelligence and despatch the Backfires on ship hunting missions. The bombers can also be guided by scout aircraft.

Forces rivalry

While the IAF’s timidity in adopting a strategic role is a likely reason for the repeated rejection of the Backfire, another factor could be forces rivalry. Air forces are highly resistant to strategic bombing being done by the navy or army. The Tu-22M being a specialised maritime strike bomber, it could – in the IAF’s view – be the beginning of the navy’s strategic air arm. The air force clearly doesn’t want the Indian Navy poaching on its turf. In this backdrop, chances are the IAF will find another farcical excuse to scuttle Backfire talks.

Operate with caution

The Russian bomber is certainly a game changer, but it doesn’t mean India should rush headlong into a deal. In terms of size, firepower and reach, it dwarfs everything in India’s air arm, but it should not be forgotten that the Tu-22M is a 40 year old design. It last rolled off the assembly lines in 1993 and the aircraft is well out of guarantee, so the delivery of spares might be an issue.

Why the BrahMos armed Sukhoi is bad news for India’s enemies
Flight Global reports that in 1991 the Tu-22M mission-capable rate was just 30-40 per cent, although it was not really a representative year because that’s when the Soviet command economy had collapsed.

India should have bought these aircraft cheap as chips when the Soviet Union dissolved and Moscow was wondering what to do with 300 surplus Backfires. But costs aside, having a nascent fleet comprising just four bombers would still be a good idea as it would give India a rare glimpse into the world of strategic airpower.

Endgame

During the Cold War, only two organisations in the West had got the Backfire’s range right. The first was US aircraft maker McDonnell Douglas and the other was Flight International, where Sweetman, the defence analyst worked. Years later, in 1992, the Russians brought the Tu-22M to the Farnborough International Air Show, along with a one-page handout. According to Sweetman, “We’d hit the fuel capacity within 5 per cent.”

When Flight International had published the Backfire’s range, an engineer from McDonnell Douglas had called them, wondering how the magazine had hit the same numbers his team had. Sweetman explains: “Later, I found out why that McDonnell Douglas guy was so surprised. His team had been working for what he preferred to call the Culinary Institute of America, which was quarrelling with the US Air Force. The Air Force claimed the Backfire had intercontinental range; the CIA said it could make it with inflight refuelling but could never get back.


“US Air Force intelligence boss Major General George Keegan threatened to mess with the F-15 programme – a huge McDonnell Douglas contract – if McDonnell Douglas analysts, the ones feeding the CIA, didn’t find more fuel tanks in the Russian bomber so that their conclusions matched his. CEO Sanford “Sandy” McDonnell stood his ground. Keegan went on to start the Great Space Laser Panic of ’79. And the Tu-22M did what it did best, which wasn’t strategic bombing but scaring the bejeesus out of carrier groups.”

© RUSSIA & INDIA REPORT ( ALL RIGHTS RESERVED)

Revealed: US Navy's New Littoral Combat Ship Is Getting a Big Missile Upgrade ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Kris Osbourn)

USS Freedom ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons/ United States Navy)

Author- Kris Osborn

The Navy plans to deploy two separate long-range over-the-horizon missile weapons aboard its Littoral Combat Ship later this year as part of an effort to better arm the vessel and give it an ability to attack longer-range land and ocean targets than it is currently configured to do, according to industry sources familiar with the ship's development. 


The Kongsberg-Raytheon Naval Strike Missile will soon deploy with the flat-bottomed "Freedom" variant LCS and a Harpoon Block IC missile will deploy on the Navy's trimaran "Independence" variant of the ship; the idea is to further assess each weapon in an operational setting as a way to better determine the ideal over-the-horizon weapon for the ship's future. 

At the same time, the Navy is also weighing the prospect of arming the LCS with the emerging Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile or a laser-guided Extended Range Griffin Missile. 

A formal competition among industry is expected at some point in the future, per Navy statements which indicate that no formal decision regarding which weapon will ultimately be integrated onto the ship has been make. 

In September 2015, Director of Surface Warfare Rear Adm. Peter Fanta directed the installation of a technologically mature, over-the-horizon capability across in-service littoral combat ships to support the Navy's distributed lethality concept. Priority was given to Coronado and Freedom as ships preparing to deploy in fiscal year 2016. 

Distributed Lethality:

The Navy's distributed lethality strategy involves numerous initiatives to better arm its fleet with offensive and defensive weapons, maintain a technological advantage over adversaries, such as the fast-growing Russian and Chinese navies, and strengthen its "blue water" combat abilities against potential near-peer rivals, among other things. 

Arming the Littoral Combat Ship, and its more survivable and lethal variant, the Frigate, is designed to better equip the LCS for shallow and open water combat against a wider range of potential adversaries, such as enemy surface ships, drones, helicopters, small boats and maneuvering attack craft, at beyond-the-horizon ranges.

"The Navy is in the process of researching and defining requirements for a shipboard anti-ship missile.  Competition will absolutely factor into any acquisitions strategy to ensure that we fulfill the requirement at the best value to the government," Navy spokeswoman Lt. Kara Yingling told Scout Warrior in an interview. 

The LCS is already equipped with 30mm and 57mm guns to destroy closer-in enemy targets such as swarms of small boats and the Navy plans to deploy a maritime variant of the HELLFIRE Missile aboard the ship by next year to destroy approaching enemy targets from "within the horizon" 

The development of these LCS-launched over-the-horizon missiles entirely consistent with the Navy’s emerging “distributed lethality” strategy which seeks to better arm the fleet with long-range precision offensive and defensive fire power.

Part of the rationale to move back toward open or “blue water” combat capability against near peer competitors emphasized during the Cold War. While the strategic and tactical capability never disappeared, it was emphasized less during the last 10-plus years of ground wars wherein the Navy focused on counter-terrorism, counter-piracy and things like Visit Board Search and Seizure. These missions are, of course, still important, however the Navy seeks to substantially increases its offensive “lethality” in order to deter or be effective against emerging high-tech adversaries.

Having longer-range or over-the-horizon ship and air-launched weapons is also quite relevant to the “distributed” portion of the strategy which calls for the fleet to have an ability to disperse as needed.  Having an ability to spread out and conduct disaggregated operations makes Navy forces less vulnerable to enemy firepower while. At the same time, have long-range precision-strike capability will enable the Navy to hold potential enemies at risk or attack if needed while retaining safer stand-off distance from incoming enemy fire. 

Yingling said requirements for a ship-launched weapon of this kind were still being determined. 

Harpoon:

Littoral combat ship USS Coronado successfully executed the first live-fire over-the-horizon missile test using a Harpoon Block IC missile, July 19, during the Navy's Rim of the Pacific exercise.

RIMPAC is a biennial multinational exercise that provides a unique training opportunity that fosters sustained cooperative relationships critical to ensuring the safety of sea lanes and security on the world's oceans.

Navy officials told Scout Warrior that part of the rationale for the live-fire Harpoon exercise was to assess the ability of the LCS to withstand a deck-firing of the weapon. 

Harpoon is an all-weather, over-the-horizon weapon designed to execute anti-ship missions against a range of surface targets. It can be launched from surface ships, submarines and aircraft and is currently used on 50 U.S. Navy ships: 22 cruisers, 21 Flight I destroyers and seven Flight II destroyers, Navy statements said. 

The Boeing-built Harpoon reaches high subsonic speeds and is engineered to reach over-the-horizon ranges of 67 nautical miles, Navy information says. It has a 3-foot wingspan and weighs roughly 1,500 pounds. The air-launched weapon is 12-feet long and the ship and submarine launched Harpoon is 15-feet long; it uses Teledyne Turbojet solid propellant booster for surface and submarine launch, Navy information specifies. 

The Harpoon generates 600 pounds of thrust and fires with a sea-skimming mode to better avoid enemy ship radar detection. Its warhead uses both penetration and high-explosive blast technology. 

Naval Strike Missile: 

The Navy will soon deploy the Naval Strike Missile aboard the Freedom variant of the LCS that can find and destroy enemy ships at distances up to 100 nautical miles, service officials said.

The Naval Strike Missile weapon is developed by a Norwegian-headquartered firm called Kongsberg; it is currently used on Norwegian frigates and missile torpedo boats, company officials said.

“The Navy is currently planning to utilize the Foreign Comparative Testing program to procure and install the Norwegian-built Naval Strike Missile on the USS FREEDOM (LCS 1).  The objective is to demonstrate operationally-relevant installation, test, and real-world deployment on an LCS,” a Navy spokeswoman from Naval Sea Systems Command told Scout Warrior. 

The deployment of the weapon is the next step in the missiles progress. In 2014NSM was successfully test fired from the flight deck of the USS CORONADO (LCS 4) at the Pt. Mugu Range Facility, California, demonstrating a surface-to-surface weapon capability, the Navy official explained.

First deployed by the Norwegian Navy in 2012, the missile is engineered to identify ships by ship class, Gary Holst, Senior Director for Naval Surface Warfare, Kongsberg, told Scout Warrior in an interview.

The NSM is fired from a deck-mounted launcher. The weapon uses an infrared imaging seeker, identify targets, has a high degree of maneuverability and flies close to the water in “sea-skim” mode to avoid ship defenses, he added.

“It can determine ships in a group of ships by ship class, locating the ship which is its designated target. It will attack only that target,” Holst said.

Holst added that the NSM was designed from the onset to have a maneuverability sufficient to defeat ships with advanced targets; the missile’s rapid radical maneuvers are built into the weapon in order to defeat what’s called “terminal defense systems,” he said.

“One of the distinguishing features of the missile is its ability to avoid terminal defense systems based on a passive signature, low-observable technologies and maneuverability. It was specifically designed to attack heavily defended targets,” Holst said.

For instance, the NSM is engineered to defeat ship defense weapons such as the Close-In-Weapons System, or CIWS – a ship-base defensive fire “area weapon” designed to fire large numbers of projectiles able intercept, hit or destroy approaching enemy fire.

CIWS is intended to defend ships from enemy fire as it approaches closer to its target, which is when the NSM’s rapid maneuverability would help it avoid being hit and proceed to strike its target, Holst added.

Holst added that the weapon is engineered with a “stealthy” configuration to avoid detection from ship detection systems and uses its sea-skimming mode to fly closer to the surface than any other missile in existence.

“It was designed against advanced CIWS systems. It is a subsonic weapon designed to bank to turn. It snaps over when it turns and the seeker stays horizontally stabilized -- so the airframe turns around the seeker so it can zero-in on the seam it is looking at and hit the target,” he said.

Raytheon and Kongsberg signed a teaming agreement to identify ways we can reduce the cost of the missile by leveraging Raytheon’s supplier base and supplier management, Holst explained.

Kongsberg is working with Raytheon to establish NSM production facilities in the U.S., Ron Jenkins, director for precision standoff strike, Raytheon Missile systems, said.

Kongsberg is also working on a NSM follow-on missile engineered with an RF (radio frequency) sensor that can help the weapon find and destroy targets.  

The new missile is being built to integrate into the internal weapons bay of Norway’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter as well. 

Kongsberg and Raytheon are submitting the missile for consideration for the Navy’s long-range beyond-the-horizon offensive missile requirement for its LCS.  

“The Navy has identified a need for an over-the-horizon missile as part of their distributed lethality concept which is adding more offensive weapons to more ships throughout the fleet and they wanted to do this quickly,” Holst explained.  

They are pitching the missile as a weapon which is already developed and operational – therefore it presents an option for the Navy that will not require additional time and extensive development, he said.

 “The missile is the size, shape and weight that fits on both classes of the Littoral Combat Ship,” Holst said.

Extended Range Griffin Missile: 

Raytheon is testing a new extended range Griffin missile which triples the range of the existing weapon and adds infrared imaging guidance technology, company officials said.

The extended range Griffin starts off with a baseline Griffin and adds an extended range rocket motor. The emerging Griffin missile can fire more than twice the range of HELLFIREs, Raytheon developers explained. 

The existing Griffin missile, which can be launched from the air, sea or land, uses GPS and laser guidance technology. The new variant now being tested allows infrared technology to work in tandem with laser designation, they added. 

A version of the Griffin missile is now integrated onto smaller, fast-moving Navy Patrol Coastal boats. 

The Griffin uses a semi-active laser sensor which is engineered into the current Griffin. The extended range Griffin has both a semi-active laser system and an imaging infrared dual mode, developers explained. A semi-active laser can point out the target to the missile -- and imaging infrared captures the target and then navigates on its own/ 

The extended range Griffin also features a data link in order to allow the weapon to receive in-flight target updates, jRaytheon officials said. 

The Griffin's targeting technology could help destroy small fast-moving surface targets such as swarming boats and also help fast-moving ships reach targets as well. This technology is well-suited to equip the fast-moving LCS, which can maneuver up to speeds of 40-knots. 

The Griffin does not have millimeter wave technology, like the Hellfire, but is capable of operating in some difficult weather conditions, officials added. Overall, however, the extended range Griffin is engineered to operate in reasonably clear weather conditions. 

In addition, the new missiles infrared guidance system is configured with computer algorithms which enable the weapon to distinguish targets from nearby objects, Raytheon developers said. 

The imaging infrared is passive and uncooled so there is no cooling involved. Once a laser spot is removed, the imaging infrared seeker takes over on its own. This technology allows the weapon to change course and potentially adjust to emerging and new targets while in flight. 

Raytheon plans to continue testing of the weapon for another year and hopes the new missile will be considered for a range of ground applications, surface ships and air platforms including patrol craft and even unmanned aerial systems.

Long Range Anti-Ship Missile:

Lockheed Martin is developing a new deck-mounted launcher for the emerging Long Range Anti-Ship Missile engineered to semi-autonomously track and destroy enemy targets at long ranges from both aircraft and surface ships.

The weapon, called the LRASM, is a collaborative effort between Lockheed, the Office of Naval Research and the Defense Advanced Project Research Agency, or DARPA.

While this emerging weapon is earlier in the developmental process than both the Harpoon and the NSM, it could provide an even more capable, high-tech ability to the LCS. However, industry sources indicate that the LRASM is expected to be much more expensive than the other alternatives, and a LRASM-specific deck-mounted launcher for the LCS would need to be operational before the weapon could successfully fire from the ship. 

A deck-mounted firing technology, would enable LRASM to fire from a much wider range of Navy ships, to include the Littoral Combat Ship and its more survivable variant, called a Frigate, Scott Callaway, Surface-Launched LRASM program manager, Lockheed Martin, told Scout Warrior in an interview.

“We developed a new topside or deck-mounted launcher which can go on multiple platforms or multiple ships such as an LCS or Frigates,” Callaway said.

The adaptation of the surface-launcher weapon, which could be operational by the mid-2020s, would use the same missile that fires from a Mk 41 Vertical Launch System and capitalize upon some existing Harpoon-launching technology, Callaway added.

The LRASM, which is 168-inches long and 2,500 pounds, is currently configured to fire from an Air Force B-1B bomber and Navy F-18 carrier-launched fighter. The current plan is to have the weapon operational on board an Air Force B-1B bomber by 2018 and a Navy F-18 by 2019, Navy statements have said.

With a range of at least 200 nautical miles, LRASM is designed to use next-generation guidance technology to help track and eliminate targets such as enemy ships, shallow submarines, drones, aircraft and land-based targets.

Navy officials said LRASM is currently developing along with what it calls Increment 1 to establish an initial air-launched missile solution for the Navy.

"The objective is to give Sailors the ability to strike high-value targets from longer ranges while avoiding counter fire. The program will use autonomous guidance to find targets, reducing reliance on networking, GPS and other assets that could be compromised by enemy electronic weapons,” a Navy statement said.

The missile has also been test fired from a Navy ship-firing technology called Vertical Launch Systems currently on both cruisers and destroyers – as a way to provide long range surface-to-surface and surface-to-air offensive firepower.

Navy officials told Scout Warrior that the service is making progress with an acquisition program for the air-launched variant of LRASM but is still in the ealry stages of planning for a ship-launch anti-ship missile. The Navy will likely examine a range of high-tech missile possibilities to meet its requirement for a long-range anti-ship missile -- and Lockheed certainly plans to submit LRASM as an option for the Navy to consider. 

"The current LRASM program is fulfilling a specific capability for an air-launched anti-surface weapon. While DARPA evaluated the feasibility of a ship-launched variant, it would be inappropriate to speculate about a ship-launched version ahead of the requirements, informed by the updated Analysis of Alternatives, and any resulting budget plans," Yingling added. 

High-Tech Semi-Autonomous Missile:

Along with advances in electronic warfare, cyber-security and communications, LRASM is design to bring semi-autonomous targeting capability to a degree that does not yet exist. As a result, some of its guidance and seeker technology is secret, developers have said.

The goal of the program is to engineer a capable semi-autonomous, surface and air-launched weapon able to strike ships, submarines and other moving targets with precision. While many aspects of the high-tech program are secret, Lockheed officials say the available information is that the missile has a range of at least 200 nautical miles.

Once operational, LRASM will give Navy ships a more a short and long-range missile with an advanced targeting and guidance system able to partially guide its way to enemy targets and achieve pinpoint strikes in open or shallow water.

LRASM employs a multi-mode sensor, weapon data link and an enhanced digital anti-jam global positioning system to detect and destroy specific targets within a group of ships, Lockheed officials said.

LRASM is engineered with all-weather capability and a multi-modal seeker designed to discern targets, Lockheed officials said. The multi-mode sensor, weapon data link and an enhanced digital anti-jam global positioning system can detect and destroy specific targets within a group of ships, Lockheed officials said.

LRASM is armed with a proven 1,000-pound penetrator and blast-fragmentation warhead, Lockheed officials said.

About the author- Kris Osborn became the Managing Editor of Scout Warrior in August of 2015. His role with Scout.com includes managing content on the Scout Warrior site and generating independently sourced original material. Scout Warrior is aimed at providing engaging, substantial military-specific content covering a range of key areas such as weapons, emerging or next-generation technologies and issues of relevance to the military. Just prior to coming to Scout Warrior, Osborn served as an Associate Editor at the Military.com. This story originally appeared in Scout Warrior

© THE NATIONAL INTEREST ( ALL RIGHTS RESERVED)

Indian Army to Receive 100 New Self-Propelled Howitzer Guns ( Source- The Diplomat / Author- Franz-Stefan Gady)

K-9 Vajra ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / 권순삼, 국방시민연대 (Defense Citizen Network)


India has moved a step closer in acquiring 100 new K-9 Vajra 155 mm/52 caliber self-propelled tracked howitzers for the Indian Army. A contract between the Indian Ministry of Defense and the howitzer’s maker, South Korea’s Samsung-Techwin  (and its local Indian private-sector partner Larsen & Toubro (L&T), is expected to be signed within the next two months, an Indian defense official told Defense News.
The defense ministry and L&T have completed price negotiations at the beginning of July. The $750 million deal, however, has not yet been approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), a government body headed by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The CCS’s approval is a prerequisite before the signing of any defense deal. IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly reported in early July that the contract is likely to be cleared by the CCS before the end of the current fiscal year which ends in March 2017.
The K-9 Vajra is a modified version of the Samsung-Techwin K-9 155 mm/52-caliber. A tender for the new howitzer gun was released in 2011. After extensive maintenance acceptability, high altitude, and desert trials in 2013 and 2014 respectively, the self-propelled tracked howitzer was selected over the Russian-made 2S19 Msta-S howitzer, which had been specifically modified with a 155mm/52 caliber gun to fit Indian Army requirements.
Around 50 percent of the K-9’s hardware will be indigenously made by L&T in India despite of the fact that the new howitzer gun will be acquired under the “Buy Global” category of the so-called Defense Procurement Procedure (DPP), which allows over-the-counter sales of military hardware. The Business Standard reported in October 2015:
L&T plans to build 13 [some sources indicate 14] major sub-systems of the K-9 Vajra at its facilities in Pune, Talegaon, and Powai. This includes the fire control system, ammunition handling system, muzzle velocity radar, and the nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) system.
 The K-9 Vajra is specially designed for arid lands such as the desert areas bordering Pakistan. Mounted on a tracked vehicle, the K-9 Vajra is ideally suited for mobile tank warfare. 
The Indian Army wants to induct this new howitzer into its mechanized strike corps to offer close fire support during deep thrusts into enemy territory. 
The overall number of K-9 Vajra required by the Indian Army will be around 250. This is based on the creation of at least three K-9 Vajra regiments for each of the army’s three armored divisions, as well as another three regiments for the independent armored brigades within the army’s three strike corps.
However, budgetary constraints will limit the number of guns acquired by the Indian Army to 100 for now, according to defense analysts. The K-9 self-propelled tracked howitzer has an operational range of 450 kilometers (279 miles) and can engage enemy targets at a distance of up to 40 kilometers (24 miles).
About the author- Franz-Stefan Gady is an Associate Editor with The Diplomat. His interests include civil-military relations, revolution in military affairs, and cyber diplomacy. He also is a Senior Fellow with the EastWest Institute where he edits the Policy Innovation Blog. Franz-Stefan has reported from a wide range of countries and conflict zones including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. His writing and photos have appeared in The International New York Times, BBC News, Foreign Affairs Magazine, Foreign Policy Magazine, The National Interest, Vice News, The Middle East Eye, The Christian Science Monitor, Profil, Der Standard, and Die Presse among other publications. Franz-Stefan also has provided expert commentary for Asia News Weekly, Al Jazeera America, Channel News Asia, CCTV, The Financial Times, PBS, Voice of America, Radio France, SCPR, and ORF among others.
Follow him on Twitter.
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Tuesday, July 26, 2016

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ADIZ in the South China Sea: Nine-Dash Line 2.0? ( Source- The National Interest / Author- Alexander Vuving)

PLAAF J-10 ( Image credits- Wikimedia Commons / Author- 天剣2)
Source- The National Interest


Ever since China set up its first air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea in November 2013, a Chinese ADIZ has hung as a sword of Damocles over the South China Sea. The same day as China’s Ministry of Defense announced the establishment of the East China Sea ADIZ, the ministry’s spokesman proclaimed, “China will establish other air defense identification zones at an appropriate time after completing preparations.” Since then, official statements by both China’s Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs have never ruled out the possibility of a South China Sea ADIZ, saying consistently that setting up such an ADIZ is the right of China as a sovereign state. Adding to this suggestion, sources close to the Chinese military occasionally told foreign journalists that China had plans and was ready to impose an ADIZ in the South China Sea. In early 2016, Navy Senior Colonel Liang Fang, a renowned strategist in the National Defense University, publicly urged the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to declare an ADIZ in the South China Sea. All these announcements might be deliberate efforts to bluff China’s rivals, but the possibility of a Chinese ADIZ in the South China Sea in real.


Will China set up a South China Sea ADIZ? If it does, when will it do so, and with what size and scope? These questions have been raised numerous times since November 2013. A South China Sea ADIZ was again a hot issue following a remark by China’s Vice Foreign Minister in relation to the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s South China Sea ruling. How do you predict what the South China Sea ADIZ? This article will help both readers who want to make informed judgments about others’ predictions and readers who want to make informed predictions themselves to think systematically about the subject.

Will China Set Up an ADIZ in the South China Sea?

The South China Sea ADIZ is a dog that hasn’t barked, but it can turn out to be one of three animals.

First, it can be a dog that will eventually bark. Most observers believe that China’s declaration of an ADIZ in the South China Sea is just a matter of time. Two reasons are paramount to support this belief. First, China’s official statements suggest that it already has plans for the South China Sea ADIZ that are to be executed when time is ripe.

Second, the facilities that China is building on the disputed islands in the South China Sea are too large for the need of the local communities. Some of these facilities include four three thousand-meter-long runways on Woody Island, Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef and Mischief Reef and a high-frequency radar station on Cuarteron Reef. China has also deployed to Woody Island long-range surface-to-air missiles that can reach two-hundred kilometers. In the eyes of many experts, the most logical application of these infrastructure and weapons systems is to support an ADIZ in the future.

But the South China Sea ADIZ can also be a dog that never barks. Even if China already has a plan to set it up, the time may never be ripe for a formal declaration. At least four arguments can be brought up to support this possibility.

First, “China may have learned from its East China Sea ADIZ that this particular game is not worth the candle.” As David Welch explains, “Declaring a South China Sea ADIZ would seriously undermine Chinese interests, aviation safety and international confidence in Beijing’s judgment. Very likely it would prompt other claimant states to declare overlapping ADIZs of their own.” However, some other experts doubt whether China has really learnt the lessons of the East China Sea ADIZ this way. In retrospect to China’s East China Sea ADIZ, Zhu Feng argues that the benefits it brings have outweighed the risks.

Second, an ADIZ may undermine the ambiguous nature of China’s claims in the South China Sea. Ambiguity has arguably served China’s interests well, so China will have to think twice before it imposes an ADIZ in the South China Sea.


Third, some of China’s rivals are holding cards that can deter China from declaring an ADIZ in the South China Sea. Most effective among these cards is likely a Vietnamese ADIZ over the Paracel Islands, which can reestablish some forms of Vietnamese administration over the islands. China may also be deterred by the prospects of Vietnam launching a legal action against it, or Vietnam and the Philippines granting the U.S. military regular access to strategic places on the South China Sea coast such as Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang in Vietnam or Ulugan Bay, Subic Bay and Zambales Province in the Philippines.

Fourth, China can leverage its hypothetical ADIZ in the South China Sea as a deterrent to possible challenges from the other users of the sea. If an ADIZ works best when it is unborn, it will be kept unborn.

Finally, the South China Sea ADIZ can be a dog that barks under the guise of a different animal. This camouflage may take various forms. China may impose one or more exclusion zones not under the name of ADIZ.

Alternatively, it may be a quasi or de facto ADIZ that is undeclared but nevertheless actively enforced. According to the Philippine judge Antonio Carpio, China is already effectively enforcing a quasi-ADIZ in the South China Sea by warning Philippine planes flying over the Spratlys via radio to “stay away from the area.” Similar warnings have been sent to military and civilian flights from other countries, including the United States and Australia. Currently, China’s quasi-ADIZ appears to cover no more than twenty nautical miles from the shores of some Chinese-controlled features.

Why Does China Need an ADIZ?

The question whether China will set up a South China Sea ADIZ can only be answered adequately if one understands why China needs an ADIZ in this area. Alas, the utility of an ADIZ is one of the least discussed topics in the discourse about China’s ADIZ. There is a general tendency to simply assume that China’s ADIZ is what its name implies—an air defense zone or a military tool of territorial control. But the utility of an ADIZ goes beyond the military realm and an ADIZ does not need to be effectively enforced in order to bring benefits to the country that declares it. As with other policy tools, it can perform political, diplomatic and legal functions.

An ADIZ can perform one or more of at least six functions. Two of these functions (early warning mechanism and exclusion zone) require effective enforcement, while three other (sovereignty marker, bargaining chip and signaling device) rely more on a formal declaration. One of the functions (deterrent) can only work without a declaration of the related ADIZ.

-ADIZ as an early warning mechanism. This is the original use with which the United States created the first ADIZs during the Cold War. It did so to reduce the risk of a surprise aerial attack from the Soviet Union. China today may be more concerned about spy activities conducted by the United States than a surprise attack, either from the United States or its South China Sea neighbors. If China wants to reduce U.S. surveillance activities along its coast, the capability to enforce is more important than the formal declaration of an ADIZ, since Washington has already declared it will neither recognize nor accept a Chinese ADIZ.

-ADIZ as an exclusion zone. An ADIZ can provide a legal basis for denying foreign aircraft access to certain areas. China’s ADIZ in the East China Sea requires even aircraft that transit the international airspace and not bound to China to identify themselves.


-ADIZ as a sovereignty marker. Although an ADIZ is not a territorial claim, it can be used to exercise some forms of sovereignty rights and administration over the airspace of a territory. Acceptance or acquiescence by foreign aircraft of an ADIZ then may be interpreted as recognition of the ADIZ-declaring state’s effective exercise of sovereignty over a territory. While an ADIZ must be enforced in order to function as an early warning mechanism or an exclusion zone, it does not need much enforcement to act as a sovereignty marker. Some poor enforcement may be enough to register the exercise of sovereignty and no actual enforcement is required to elicit recognition by foreign states.

-ADIZ as a bargaining chip. An ADIZ can be used to boost the position of the state that declares it in some game it plays with foreign states. China’s East China Sea ADIZ, for example, has strengthened Beijing’s position vis-à-vis Japan in their disputes over the Senkaku (or Diaoyu) Islands. It gave China a legal basis to scramble its jet fighters against Japanese planes in the region and broadened the area of physical dispute from the islands’ adjacent waters to airspace over the territory. The East China Sea ADIZ also helped China to create a new status quo in the region. As Ian Rinehart and Bart Elias argued, “The PRC would acquire strategic advantage by asserting a maximalist position, then seeming to back down, while preserving some incremental gain—akin to a ‘ratchet’ effect.”

-ADIZ as a signaling device. An ADIZ can be used to signal something important about the state that issues it. The audience of the signaling may be domestic or international or both. Declaring an ADIZ in the face of foreign opposition may signal resolve. It may also signal anger, and thus indirectly, formidability, when responding to a preceding event that hurts the ADIZ-declaring state. The enforcement of an ADIZ may signal capability. Resolve, anger and capability may act to deter foreign states from hurting the ADIZ-declaring state. Can an ADIZ be employed to reassure others of the declaring state’s cooperative intention? One observer argues that China tried to use its East China Sea ADIZ as an “instrument of engagement, not aggression.” However, the international opposition to both the East China Sea and the South China Sea ADIZ suggests that only a fool would use it to signal cooperation.

-ADIZ as a deterrent. Not only signals sent by the announcement of an ADIZ, but the serious possibility of an ADIZ can also act to deter others from doing things that the ADIZ-declaring state does not want. While the former function can only work after the ADIZ is declared, the latter will cease to work at that same moment. For an unborn and hypothetical ADIZ to serve as a deterrent, it has to be designed in ways that are highly detrimental to the interests of the deterred. With its possible functions as an exclusion zone, a sovereignty marker and a position booster, China’s ADIZ can serve as a deterrent. In fact, China has developed a consistent narrative on the South China Sea ADIZ, saying whether it will declare an ADIZ in the South China Sea depends on the threat level it faces.

When Will China Set Up an ADIZ in the South China Sea?

China’s decision to declare an ADIZ will most likely be the result of its cost-benefit calculation. If China has plans to declare an ADIZ in the South China Sea, it will likely make the announcement when the anticipated benefits exceed the anticipated costs. The benefits derive mainly from the utility of an ADIZ; the costs depend largely on foreign reaction. Circumstances such as a North Korea crisis that makes the United States depend on China’s support or an international court ruling on the South China Sea dispute could also influence this cost-benefit analysis. These international events may either tie the hands of China’s rivals or allow them to be more assertive in the South China Sea. They may also change the military, political, legal and diplomatic value that China can extract from a South China Sea ADIZ.

While the benefits are arguably more or less clear to China, the costs add a thick fog of uncertainty to the matter. It is generally hard to know how a foreign state will react, and China may well misread foreign signals. For outside observers, predicting whether and when China will announce a South China Sea ADIZ is a business that is bound to fail. Nevertheless, the uncertainty associated with this business is not unlimited—several factors set the parameters of Beijing’s decision.

If China wants to use a South China Sea ADIZ for military purposes (early warning and anti-access area denial), effective enforcement is a key requirement. The building of necessary infrastructure and the deployment of necessary assets are key indications of when China will set up its ADIZ. China may formally declare an ADIZ once its capabilities for enforcement are in place, but if the circumstances are not favorable, it may impose its early warning systems and exclusion zones under names different than ADIZ, or it may enforce them undeclared on a de facto basis.

If China employs its ADIZ as a “sovereignty marker” (to register sovereignty over the South China Sea territories and get international recognition or acquiescence), a bargaining chip, or a signaling device, a declaration is more important than de facto enforcement. The benefits of an ADIZ in these respects are potentially large, but the risks associated with a declaration are also significant. These risks are much higher than those associated with the declaration of China’s East China Sea ADIZ. As the South China Sea dispute involves more parties, a South China Sea ADIZ will turn more states against China. While the East China Sea ADIZ caught the world by surprise, a South China Sea ADIZ will not. This means that China’s rivals have time not only to think about their best reaction, but also to put pressure on China to prevent a South China Sea ADIZ. Still, these risks may plunge temporarily when a number of China’s rivals need its cooperation for a different issue of higher priority. Also, some circumstances may temporarily catapult the value of a South China Sea ADIZ as a bargaining chip or a signal of resolve. These moments will provide the best chance for China to declare a South China Sea ADIZ.

If China imposes an ADIZ in the South China Sea, the maximum scope of this ADIZ will likely be roughly that of the nine-dash line. A larger scope will cause much additional opposition while bringing little additional utility. The cost-benefit ratio of an ADIZ varies with its scope. Essentially, China has six choices with the scope of a South China Sea ADIZ.

The smallest ADIZ would cover the Paracel Islands. This ADIZ can also include parts or whole of the Hainan Island. Such an ADIZ will have the smallest number of opponents. It will likely be opposed by Vietnam, which claims the Paracels and the United States, but it may avoid strong reaction from most other states.

In a second scenario, China can declare an ADIZ along its South China Sea coast, encompassing not just the Paracel Islands but also the Pratas Islands, which lie 180 nautical miles southeast of Hong Kong. As the Pratas are administered by Taiwan, an ADIZ that covers this territory will not only increase the number of opponents but also inadvertently create an opportunity for Taiwan to step up in the international arena.

A third version of a South China Sea ADIZ would stretch out from China’s southern coast and involve the Pratas, the Paracels, and Scarborough Shoal, which lies 100 nautical miles from the Philippine coast. This ADIZ will cause strong opposition from at least the United States, Vietnam, Taiwan and the Philippines.

In a fourth version, an ADIZ that covers only the Paracels and Scarborough Shoal can avoid provoking Taiwan but still turn the United States, Vietnam and the Philippines against Beijing.

A fifth choice is a full ADIZ that contains roughly all the area China claims in the South China Sea, including the Pratas, the Paracels, Scarborough Shoal, the Spratly Islands and the waters between and surrounding them. This ADIZ will have the largest number of opponents but also the largest benefits among the different versions of a South China Sea ADIZ. China can leave the Pratas Islands outside the full ADIZ, but this smaller version may not significantly reduce Taiwan’s opposition as it still involves the Taiwan-held Itu Aba Island in the Spratlys.

Finally, a sixth choice for China is to declare an ADIZ over the Spratly Islands with the possible coverage of Scarborough Shoal, but not the Paracel Islands. As all claimants of the South China Sea disputes are involved in the Spratlys, this ADIZ will still have the maximum number of opponents. However, it could significantly reduce the risks by avoiding a Vietnamese ADIZ over the Paracels. A Vietnamese ADIZ that encompasses the Paracel Islands can act as a Vietnamese sovereignty marker, allowing Hanoi to register some exercise of sovereignty and administration over an area where China is denying there is a dispute.

A “Red Line” or Just an “Orange Line”?

China’s possible ADIZ would not be the first ADIZ in the South China Sea. During the Cold War, a Philippine ADIZ was established in 1953, and a South Vietnamese ADIZ also existed until the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. However, the Philippine ADIZ is inoperative, while the South Vietnamese ADIZ is nonexistent even for the Vietnamese military of today.

On the contrary, a Chinese ADIZ in the South China Sea is perceived as highly threatening and intolerable. Vietnam’s top defense diplomat Nguyen Chi Vinh noted in a January 2014 interview that an ADIZ “would be more dangerous than even the nine-dash line” because it would come with more excessive regulations than the latter. Suggesting that China’s South China Sea ADIZ might be unacceptable to Hanoi, Vinh said in the same interview that it would “kill” Vietnam. Similarly but more bluntly, then Philippine Foreign Secretary Alberto del Rosario said during a joint press conference with his British counterpart in January 2016, “whether this [China’s South China Sea ADIZ] is done in terms of a de facto basis or it is official, this will be deemed unacceptable to us.” At the same press conference, British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond stated, “Freedom of navigation and overflight are non-negotiable. They are red lines for us.” The United States’ official position is that an “ADIZ over portions of the South China Sea” would be “provocative and destabilizing.” U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has repeatedly called for China not to declare an ADIZ there. Australia’s Foreign Minister Julie Bishop also urged China not to create the South China Sea ADIZ. In June 2016, Taiwan’s Defense Minister Feng Shih-kuan told lawmakers, “We will not recognize any ADIZ by China.”

While it is certain that several countries will defy China’s ADIZ in the South China Sea one way or another, it remains unclear whether the South China Sea ADIZ represents a “red line,” the passage of which will trigger formidable countermeasures. Nevertheless, foreign reactions to a Chinese ADIZ in the South China Sea will likely be harsher than what happened with Beijing’s East China Sea ADIZ, which can be likened with the yellow card in soccer. The South China Sea ADIZ appears to belong to a weaker sense of red line that can be called “orange line.” In this sense, an orange line represents a watershed between what is tolerable and what is not, but the response to what is intolerable may or may not be very fearsome.

About the author- Alexander L. Vuving is a Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. This article is adapted from the author’s “Guide to the South China Sea ADIZ,” written for the South China Sea Chronicle Initiative. The author wishes to thank Cai Ngoc Thien Huong for her research assistance and Van Pham for her initiative of a larger project on China’s ADIZ. The views expressed in this article and any possible mistakes are the author’s own.

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